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SUMMARY 
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a b a s i s f o r t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d e c i s i o n . T h i s a n a l y s i s a l s o s h o w s t h a t 
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C H A P T E R I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1 .1 P r o b l e m D e s c r i p t i o n 
T h e i n c i d e n c e o f r e p o r t e d c r i m e h a s b e e n g r o w i n g i n t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s a t a r a t e w h i c h g r e a t l y e x c e e d s t h e g r o w t h i n t h e n a t i o n ' s 
p o p u l a t i o n . D u r i n g t h e f i v e y e a r p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 6 9 , f o r e x a m p l e , 
t h e number o f c r i m e s a g a i n s t p r o p e r t y p e r 1 0 0 0 p e r s o n s r o s e 31% a b o v e 
t h e 1 9 6 9 r a t e w h i l e t h e number o f v i o l e n t c r i m e s p e r 1 0 0 0 p o p u l a t i o n 
i n c r e a s e d 40% o v e r t h e same p e r i o d [ 2 9 ; p p . 1 3 - 1 4 ] , W i t h t h e l e v e l o f 
c r i m e i n c r e a s i n g a t s u c h r a t e s , t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t i n i t i a t e d e f f o r t s 
t o s t u d y t h e p r o b l e m w i t h t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a p r e s i d e n t i a l c o m m i s s i o n , 
a n d i n 1 9 6 7 t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n L a w E n f o r c e m e n t a n d t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
o f J u s t i c e p u b l i s h e d i t s r e p o r t s [ 5 4 ] [ 5 5 ] . One l a s t i n g r e s u l t o f t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s w o r k w a s t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t e m p i r i c a l m o d e l s c a n be 
u s e d e f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m ( C J S ) 
a s s o c i e t y ' s i n s t r u m e n t f o r c o n t r o l l i n g c r i m e . Two v a r i e t i e s o f e m p i r i c a l 
m o d e l s w e r e u s e d b y t h e C o m m i s s i o n ' s T a s k F o r c e o n S c i e n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y 
t o e v a l u a t e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m . A s i m u l a t i o n 
m o d e l o f t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a f e d e r a l c o u r t w a s u s e d t o e v a l u a t e t h e 
e f f e c t s o f d e l a y s i n t h e c o u r t s ; a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l s d e v e l o p e d b y C h r i s t e n -
s e n w e r e u s e d t o d e v e l o p e s t i m a t e s o f t h e r a t e o f r e c i d i v i s m a n d o f t h e 
number o f a r r e s t s p e r l i f e t i m e o f t h o s e o f f e n d e r s who r e c i d i v a t e [ 5 4 ] . 
B o t h t h e s i m u l a t i o n a n d t h e a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l s r e p o r t e d b y t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n h a v e h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p a c t o n p o l i c y a n a l y s t s f r o m t h e v i e w -
2 
p o i n t o f t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e o f s u c h m e t h o d s f o r t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e 
C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m ' s p e r f o r m a n c e , b u t t h e w o r k o f C h r i s t e n s e n i n 
p a r t i c u l a r a l s o y i e l d e d i m p o r t a n t i n s i g h t s o f a c r i m i n o l o g i c a l n a t u r e . 
T h e e s t i m a t e s t h a t he d e v e l o p e d i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l a r g e p e r c e n t a g e o f 
t h o s e o f f e n d e r s who a r e a r r e s t e d o n c e w i l l be r e - a r r e s t e d f o r s e v e r a l 
a d d i t i o n a l c r i m e s l a t e r i n l i f e . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f 
C h r i s t e n s e n a n d o t h e r s [80], C J S a d m i n i s t r a t o r s h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o c o m ­
b a t t h i s i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m b y i m p l e m e n t i n g 
s p e c i a l p r o g r a m s d e s i g n e d t o r e d u c e t h e s o - c a l l e d c a r e e r c r i m i n a l ' s 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c o m m i t o f f e n s e s . One e f f o r t c u r r e n t l y f i n a n c e d b y 
t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t e m p t s t o d e c r e a s e t h e t i m e t h a t 
t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l i s f r e e t o commi t o f f e n s e s b y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n ­
c r e a s i n g h i s c h a n c e s f o r c o n v i c t i o n a n d by i n c r e a s i n g t h e e x p e c t e d 
l e n g t h o f h i s p r i s o n s e n t e n c e . A l t h o u g h t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s 
a p p e a r t o h a v e b e e n r e a l i z e d w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s p e c i a l 
p r o s e c u t o r s w h o s e c a s e l o a d s c o n s i s t o n l y o f r e c i d i v i s t s [68] 
[76] [65], t h e m e t h o d s o f e v a l u a t i n g s u c h p r o g r a m s g e n e r a l l y r e l y 
on t h e a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s o f m o d e l i n g t h e c a r e e r s o f o f f e n d e r s . 
T h e a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l s w h i c h h a v e b e e n u s e d t o d a t e f o r t h i s p u r ­
p o s e , h o w e v e r , p o s s e s s s e v e r a l s h o r t c o m i n g s . One d e f i c i e n c y o f t h e s e 
m o d e l s i s t h e i r n e e d t o p o s s e s s a g g r e g a t e p a r a m e t e r s w h i c h g r e a t l y 
s i m p l i f y t h e a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , r e l e a s e , a n d r e c i d i v i s m p r o c e s s e s . I n 
a d d i t i o n , v e r y l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i s d e v o t e d i n a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l s t o t h e 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f d i f f e r e n t o f f e n d e r t y p e s o t h e r t h a n t o t h e f i r s t o f ­
f e n d e r - r e c i d i v i s t d i c h o t o m y . T h e s e two s h o r t c o m i n g s i n m o d e l i n g 
c r i m i n a l c a r e e r s n o t o n l y l i m i t t h e e v a l u a t i v e e f f o r t s f o r c a r e e r 
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criminal programs, but they also inhibit the innovative policy analyst 
from experimenting with proposed programs or operating procedures. 
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
To overcome the deficiencies in the evaluation methods currently 
in use, it is the objective of this research to develop a digital 
simulation model of an idealized Criminal Justice System that traces 
the entire criminal careers of arrested first offenders. Although the 
use of simulation models in Criminal Justice planning is not new, this 
model is the first known implementation of a digital simulator which 
includes several descriptors for each simulated offender, which is of 
sufficient detail structurally to mimic the actual flows of offenders 
throughout the Criminal Justice System for their entire criminal careers, 
and which describes the completed offender careers in terms of such 
factors as the average number of offenses per offender and the average 
cost of processing an offender over his entire criminal career. These 
offenders are distinguished from those of earlier simulations in that 
they are characterized by their age, sex, current offense, and number 
and type of previous offenses. The simulator which has been selected 
for this model is the Generalized Network Simulator (GNS). The capa­
bilities of this simulator are such that it is ideally suited for the 
modeling of large scale systems. By combining the queueing, resource 
allocation, and costing features of GNS into the model of the Criminal 
Justice System, the resulting tool is a sophisticated tool for policy 
evaluation and analysis. 
In addition to developing such a model, an example of how it can 
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be used to evaluate policy alternatives is also addressed. Using data 
originating primarily from the Sacramento County, California Criminal 
Justice System, alternate policy scenarios for plea bargaining are 
examined. The choice of plea bargaining as the topic for experimental 
analysis is predicated on its centrality in the adjudication process. 
Of all the cases in the U.S. District Courts that result in convictions, 
as much as 89% of those convicted for index offenses in 1975 were 
determined by the defendant negotiating a plea of guilty [74; pp. 603]. 
This remarkably high percentage indicates that a great deal of plea 
negotiations must be taking place, thereby tending to reduce prison 
sentences and, ostensibly, increasing the number of re-arrests during 
a criminal career. Therefore, it is only natural that research designed 
to impact the career criminal begin with an evaluation of the present 
plea bargaining model with additional analysis directed at alternatives 
to the present arrangement. 
Although the analysis of the plea bargaining scenarios is not to 
be construed to be a definitive treatment of the topic or of its alter­
natives, the principal purpose for its inclusion in this research is to 
highlight the potential uses of a career criminal - oriented digital 
simulation model of the type developed for this research. In the 
evaluation of the policy alternatives, sample output from the model is 
examined and additional analyses are performed which might be of use to 
an analyst attempting to evaluate policy alternatives which impact 
recidivism and, in particular, the career criminal. 
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1.3 Overview of the Research 
The organization of this research is as follows. In Chapter II 
and in the first two sections of Chapter III is discussed the important 
literature upon which this thesis is based. Specifically, Chapter II 
discusses the analytical and simulation models beginning with the Com­
mission' s efforts which have been used to examine aspects of CJS per­
formance. In Chapter III, on the other hand, the mechanics of plea 
bargaining is examined with an eye intent on simulating alternative policy 
scenarios. Two economic models of plea bargaining are addressed which 
shed considerable light on how this process may actually work and on 
how it may be simulated with some credibility. This analysis leads to the 
formulation of a model in the last section of Chapter III which attempts 
to describe how the prosecutor would respond to two measures which are 
important to career criminal programs, an offender's previous arrest 
record and the severity of his most recent offense. 
In Chapter IV the Generalized Network Simulation model is developed 
which traces arrested offenders, both juveniles and adults, from the 
moment of their first arrest until the time when they are released from 
the system, having desisted in their criminal careers. The GNS network 
representation of the model is given and the details of the model's 
processors are described. 
The implementation of the model is then discussed in Chapter V. 
To begin, the data used for the analysis of plea bargaining is first 
described. Then, the model's queues are initialized and the Criminal 
Justice System's resources are allocated to the model's processors; 
finally, the models validity is evaluated for its ability to mimic 
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observable phenomena as well as for its own internal consistency. 
In as much as Chapters IV and V are devoted to the description, 
implementation, and validation of the model, Chapter VI returns to the 
issue of plea bargaining. This chapter addresses itself to the for­
mulation and testing of alternative plea bargaining scenarios designed 
to simultaneously reduce the average number of offenses of the criminal 
career of both sexes and the average cost of processing these offenders 
over their entire criminal careers. Sample outputs from the model are 
evaluated at this time and sensitivity analyses are conducted on the 
cost model's parameters. 
Finally, Chapter VII concludes this research by summarizing the 
important results and by offering suggested avenues for additional work 
in this area. In addition, the insights derived from the evaluation of 
plea bargaining, both from the modeling and the administrative points 
of view, are discussed and recommendations offered. 
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CHAPTER II 
A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM MODELS 
2.0 Introduction 
In order to develop the simulation model of the Criminal Justice 
System described in Chapter I a thorough understanding is required of 
the quantitative techniques which have already been used to evaluate the 
system's performance. That is the purpose of this chapter: to survey 
those models which have had considerable impact on CJS modeling and on 
system - level performance measurement. Two distinct classes of models 
are identified in this survey. The first class is composed of models 
which are analytical in nature. These models have been used for describing 
the composition of the offender population (career criminals versus one­
time offenders) and for predicting the recidivism rate of career criminals. 
The latest generation of these models is currently being used to evaluate 
these performance measures for several metropolitan systems in this 
country. 
Another class of CJS models which have been used for planning and 
evaluation purposes, are digital simulation models. Because of the 
flexibility of the simulation method, these models have been used variously 
for forecasting resource requirements, for evaluating delays in processing 
offenders, and for examining the effects of alternative parameter speci­
fications on resource requirements and on recidivism. None of these models, 
however, has been used with the detail given to describing the offender 
that is proposed for the model developed in this research. Furthermore, 
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only one simulation model has already been developed which integrates 
the queueing and costing factors which are envisioned for this model, 
but the earlier effort was abandoned without having been fully imple­
mented. 
To begin this summary of CJS models, the analytical models are 
addressed first. 
2.1 Analytical Models 
The analytical model form first appeared in the 1967 Presidential 
Commission's Task Force Report: Science and Technology [54]. Christensen 
was the author of several simple but illuminating models which described 
the percentage of the offender population which recidivated and which 
approximated the number of arrests that could be expected during any 
recidivists criminal career. Although Christensen's models were simplis­
tic in nature, they did spark the imagination of other modelers who have 
developed not only descriptive models but also models which include policy 
variables. The analytical models that have appeared in the Criminal 
Justice literature are aggregate in nature; because of the need to obtain 
mathematical solutions to such complex phenomena, these models generally 
limit the analyst to addressing policy scenarios which are specific and 
which a s s u m e little interaction among the policy variables. These models 
can be characterized by: 
1. A high level of aggregation, 
2. An assumed-homogeneous criminal population, 
3. An assumption of steady-state, 
4. Time invariant parameters, 
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5 , A lack of consideration of CJS costs and resource usage. 
2 . 1 . 1 Early Models of Offenders 
Christensen's analysis that appeared in the Task Force Report: 
Science and Technology [ 5 4 ] was pioneering because it showed that, 
by using simple mathematical models to describe a criminal career and the 
composition of the offender population, a great deal of information can 
be gleaned from such an analysis. His work is most noteworthy for his 
development of models of an offender's career in crime. Initially, he 
devised a crude forecasting function for the number of offenders who are 
arrested each year who have never before been arrested. Using information 
derived from this forecasting function, he then formulated and estimated 
the parameters of a probabilistic model of the number of arrests that 
occur during an offender's criminal career. Finally, his other major 
contribution was the derivation of an estimate for the incapacitative 
effect of the CJS over an offender's lifetime. Although his models have 
not specifically re-appeared in the literaure, Christensen's pioneering 
efforts have served as a source of insight for several subsequent models 
which are currently being used to evaluate the Criminal Justice System. 
Christensen developed forecasts of the percentage of the U.S. 
population that had been arrested at least once. He assumed that the 
probability of the first arrest is dependent upon the offender's age a 
and upon the offender's ability to survive to that age. The joint 
probability that a person is arrested for the first time and that he is 
an a-year-old was defined as 
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where L is the probability that a person survives to age a, V is the a a 
number of first offenders who are arrested at age a, is the size of 
the entire population whose age is a, and the ratio 
V 
P ( a ) (2-10 a 
is the probability that an offender is first arrested at age a. By 
assuming that L and p(a) are both time invariant, Christensen could 
Si 
forecast the number of persons who are arrested for the first time 
(called virgin arrestees) during any year t. With a forecast of the 
U.S. population M (t), the virgin arrest forecast could then be computed 
as 
d* 
F(t) = I v j L M » (2-2) 
a=0 3 a 
where d' is the age beyond which people are no longer arrested. 
Since L , M , and M (t) were all available at the time, Christensen a a a 
only needed to approximate to determine the forecast function. To 
accomplish this, he first estimated the virgin arrest fraction r as a 
a 
function of age using 1965 juvenile data collected from the Philadelphia 
County Court. This fraction was then multiplied by N , the number of 
arrests of a-year-olds reported in the 1965 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). 
The resulting product is the number of virgin arrests who are a years old, 
V = r N . (2-3 ) a a a 
(Christensen also had to adjust V for the limited coverage of the FBI 
cl 


















Figure 1. A Single-Input, Single-Output Simulation Model 
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ratio of the U.S. population to the statistical population in order 
to derive a forecast for the entire U.S.) 
Pursuing the arrest issue further, Christensen also developed a 
crude model of offender recidivism. Using data from the District of 
Columbia, he determined empirically that the number of arrests during 
an offender's criminal career is best described by an exponential function 
of the form 
x = r e " n / b , (2-4) 
where x is the percentage of the population arrested at least n times, 
n is the expected number of arrests during an offender's lifetime, b is 
the average number of arrests of offenders who are arrested at least 
once, and V is the maximum probability of the exponential distribution 
function. For adult males, he estimated T = 50% and b = 7.6 while for 
m m 
adult females, r = 13% and b = 3.8. 
Defining P as the probability that a person who was arrested i 
times will be arrested (i + 1) times, then 
p = x(n + 1) 
i x(n) , 
for n _> 0. But substituting the definition of x into the above equation, 
this probability is 
(2-5) 
For adult male offenders, b = 7.6 results in P = .88 for all i _> 1. 
This clearly demonstrates that one-time male offenders are distinctly 
different from multiple offenders since P - r = .5. In addition, it 
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d e s t r o y s t h e n o t i o n t h a t x i s P o i s s o n d i s t r i b u t e d , s i n c e s u c h a h i g h 
c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s e q u e n t a r r e s t s v i o l a t e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f i n d e ­
p e n d e n t e v e n t s r e q u i r e d f o r a P o i s s o n p r o c e s s . 
C h r i s t e n s e n a l s o d e t e r m i n e d t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e U . S . p o p u ­
l a t i o n w h i c h w a s c o n v i c t e d a t l e a s t o n c e . S i n c e i t s d e r i v a t i o n i s 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e p e r c e n t a g e a r r e s t e d , i t w i l l a l s o n o t b e d e ­
s c r i b e d h e r e . T h e r e w a s , h o w e v e r , a n o f f s h o o t o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n 
a n a l y s i s w h i c h d e s e r v e s m e n t i o n i n g i n a s much a s i t r e - a p p e a r s i n 
v a r i o u s f o r m s i n s e v e r a l l a t e r m o d e l s . T h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s r e c u r r i n g 
theme i s o f f e n d e r i n c a p a c i t a t i o n . A l t h o u g h C h r i s t e n s e n d i d n o t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y a n a l y z e t h e i n c a p a c i t a t i o n e f f e c t o f t h e C J S , h e d i d 
d e v e l o p a s i m p l i s t i c m o d e l t o e s t i m a t e t h e a v e r a g e number o f y e a r s 
t h a t a n o f f e n d e r i s u n d e r t h e c a r e o f t h e c o r r e c t i o n s s u b s y s t e m . 
T h e m o d e l h e d e v e l o p e d i s b a s e d u p o n h i s f i n d i n g s t h a t a p p r o x i ­
m a t e l y f = 12% o f t h e t o t a l U . S . p o p u l a t i o n U i s e v e n t u a l l y c o n v i c t e d 
o f a c r i m e ; t h e e x p r e s s i o n f o r t h e number o f p e o p l e i n t h e U . S . t h a t 
a r e e v e n t u a l l y c o n v i c t e d i s 
C = f U . ( 2 - 6 ) 
E s t i m a t i n g g , t h e f r a c t i o n o f t h e U . S . p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h i s s u p e r v i s e d b y 
c o r r e c t i o n s a t a n y p o i n t i n t i m e , t h e e x p r e s s i o n f o r t h e number s u p e r v i s e d 
i s 
S = g U . 
C h r i s t e n s e n f o u n d , b y d e f i n i n g L a s t h e a v e r a g e l i f e t i m e o f a U . S . r e s i d e n t 
( i n y e a r s ) a n d T a s t h e a v e r a g e t i m e t h a t a c o n v i c t i s i n p r i s o n , t h a t 
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can also be used to describe the number of persons eventually convicted, 
assuming that the ages of those being supervised is uniformly distributed 
between their birthdays and age L. Equating the two expressions for C 
and solving for T results in an estimate of the incapacitation effect 
of the CJS: 
T fU - f . (2-8) 
By assuming L = 70, Christensen determined that the average time that a 
convicted offender spent under the supervision of corrections was T = 4 
years. 
Thus, Christensen fathered the idea that analytical techniques 
can be used to estimate the characteristics of the offender population. 
His work has led to several models which have combined his description 
of virgin offenders and recidivists into a unified formulation of the 
criminal career. Eventually, his successors were able to incorporate 
deterrence and i n c a p a c i t a t i o n f u n c t i o n s in to the model of the c r i m i n a l 
career. Thus, the use of such models for the evaluation of alternate 
policy scenarios is based upon the impact of Christensen's work for the 
President's Commission on the Criminal Justice community. 
2.1.2 A Feedback Model of Recidivism 
Belkin, Blumstein and Glass [9] were some of Christensen's earliest 
successors in applying analytical techniques to the control of crime. 
They developed a feedback model of the CJS. Although their model con­
tained only two components of the CJS, a combined police and judicial com­
ponent and a corrections component, their objective was to model the entire 
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c r i m i n a l c a r e e r . T h u s , t h e f e e d b a c k i n t h e m o d e l i s t h e f l o w o f 
r e c i d i v i s t s b a c k i n t o t h e p o l i c e s u b s y s t e m ( v i z , t h e i r r e - a r r e s t f o l l o w ­
i n g t h e i r r e l e a s e f r o m t h e C J S . O f f e n d e r s r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e p o l i c e -
c o u r t c o m p o n e n t a r e r e - a r r e s t e d w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y f o l l o w i n g e l a p s e d 
y e a r s w h e r e a s o f f e n d e r s who a r e r e l e a s e d f r o m c o r r e c t i o n s a r e r e - a r r e s t e d 
a f t e r y e a r s w i t h p r o b a b i l i t y T h e d e l a y s a n d w e r e b o t h 
a s s u m e d t o be t h e m e a n v a l u e s o f n e g a t i v e e x p o n e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s ; 
h o w e v e r , S t o l l m a c k a n d H a r r i s [ 6 4 ] w e r e l a t e r t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e 
d e l a y b e t w e e n a n o f f e n d e r ' s r e l e a s e f r o m t h e C J S a n d h i s s u b s e q u e n t r e ­
a r r e s t c a n i n f a c t be d e s c r i b e d b y t h e n e g a t i v e e x p o n e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
B e c a u s e t h e t i m e a n o f f e n d e r s p e n d s i n p r i s o n w a s f o u n d t o be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
o n e y e a r , t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s a s s u m e d : 
T 2 - T 1 + 1 . 
B e l k i n , B l u m s t e i n a n d G l a s s d e t e r m i n e d t h e m o d e l ' s i n p u t V ( t ) , 
the number o f v i r g i n a r r e s t s at t i m e t, by u s i n g the r e l a t i o n 
V ( t ) - I p ( a ) U ( a , t ) ( 2 - 9 ) 
a 
w h e r e p ( a ) i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a f i r s t - o f f e n s e a r r e s t a t a g e a a n d U ( a , t ) 
i s t h e number o f p e o p l e i n t h e U . S . who a r e a - y e a r s - o l d a t t i m e t . To 
d e r i v e a n e s t i m a t e o f p ( a ) f o r a l l a , t h e y c o m b i n e d C h r i s t e n s e n ' s e s t i m a t e 
o f p ( a ) i n e q u a t i o n 2 - 1 f o r a d u l t o f f e n d e r s w i t h a n e s t i m a t e d e r i v e d f r o m 
a l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d y o f a d o l e s c e n t m a l e s c o n d u c t e d b y W o l f g a n g , F i g l i o a n d 
S e l l i n [ 8 0 ] . 
B e l k i n , B l u m s t e i n a n d G l a s s u s e d t h e i r m o d e l o f t h e C J S t o a n a l y z e 
t h e r e c i d i v i s m p r o c e s s . F o r s i m p l i c i t y , t h e y a s s u m e d t h a t a - = c u = a 
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(i.e., that rehabilitative and special deterrence effects of corrections 
are non-existent). By conducting parametric studies, they were able to 
determine a "best" fit between the total number of arrests predicted by 
the model, N(t), and the FBI's statistics over the period between 1960 
and 1970. The parametric analysis resulted in the estimates a = .875 
and = 1.1 years. Further analysis of the FBI's data, however, showed 
that the data was quadratic. To test this observation, they hypothesized 
that p(a) varied with time, and they re-evaluated the virgin arrest rate 
by adding a linear growth term to the old estimate: 
where G is an empirically-determined rate of growth which they assumed 
began in 1963. Next, these analysts examined the fit between the model's 
N'(t) and the FBI's statistics. They discovered that a' = .86 and = 1.2 
minimized the average percent deviation between the model - generated 
and the actual data, and they concluded that the magnitude of p(a) had 
increased over time with a concomitant decline in a, the re-arrest proba­
bility. That is, the level of crime committed by first-offenders had 
increased while recidivism had declined. 
Analyzing their model during steady state, Belkin, Blumstein and 
Glass determined that 
By defining u = (1 - a) , they further determined that 
V'(t) = V(t) + (t - 1963)G 
d N(t) = d V(t) 
N(t) V(t) (2-11) 
1 7 
This last equation specifies that a percentage increase either in the 
virgin arrest rate, V(t), or in u causes the same percentage increase 
in N(t). Thus, a 10% reduction in V(t) is approximately equivalent to 
a 5% reduction in a, an insight of considerable importance to policy 
analysts. 
To be sure, Belkin, Blumstein and Glass's model and accompanying 
analyses reached a much greater level of sophistication than those of 
Christensen. They demonstrated that recidivism can be modeled. In 
addition, they showed that important insights can be acquired by re­
examining the model's assumptions and by evaluating the effects of 
parameter changes on the model's performance measures. This work has 
also shown CJS planners that reducing the rate of recidivism is a much 
more effective method of reducing the total level of crime than is 
reducing the virgin arrest rate. Unfortunately, this model does not tell 
the CJS planner how to reduce recidivism. Nor does it give any hint as 
to the alternatives which are the least costly. These important perfor­
mance measures, it will be seen, are lacking in each of the analytical 
models surveyed. It is not until the simulation models that such issues 
are addressed. 
2.1.3 A Policy Model Involving Incapacitation 
The first model which possessed recognizable policy variables was 
developed by Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar [5] and it was subsequently refined 
by Shinnar and Shinnar [63]. The resulting model is similar to the 
Christensen and to the Belkin, Blumstein and Glass models in that it 
portrays the recidivism process; however, it was not developed as a model 
of the Criminal Justice System. Rather, Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar modeled 
18 
the criminal career of an offender and incorporated the incapacitation 
effect of the CJS into the model formulation. Two policy variables were 
included in the formulation, the length of incarceration and the effec­
tiveness of the police and the prosecution. For simplicity, the processes 
being modeled were assumed to be in steady state. Although it was dis­
covered that the steady state assumption is not valid, this does not 
necessarily detract from the model itself. Indeed, as was shown earlier 
for Belkin, Blumstein and Glass's model, useful insights are oftentimes 
gained from such models. 
Despite the fact that Christensen had shown that offenders are 
arrested according to a negative exponential distribution, Avi-Itzhak 
and Shinnar assume that an offender commits X offenses per year according 
to a Poisson distribution. This apparent discrepancy can be justified 
by assuming that the crime commission process is in fact composed of 
independent criminal acts, whereas the process of arresting offenders 
i s no longer independent of the number of previous arrests of each offen­
der. It seems quite reasonable to assume that the police would more 
likely suspect and consequently arrest an offender who has been arrested 
at least once. This also may explain the existence of the high correlation 
between an offender's arrests numbered two and above. 
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar were able to specify the number of crimes, 
x, committed by a criminal during his career in crime by assuming each 
criminal career is exponentially distributed with an average length T. 
(They also showed that a constant career length gives approximately the 
same results.) Thus, if the CJS does not affect the behavior of the 
offender (viz, through deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation), 
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then the expected number of crimes committed by an offender is 
E(x) = AT. 
Because Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar's objective was to describe the effect 
that the CJS has upon the offender's criminal career, they developed 
the following model. 
First, these two modelers defined a parameter q, the joint 
probability that an offender is both arrested and convicted following 
his commission of a crime. This parameter is one of the model's policy 
variables since changing the effectiveness of either the police or the 
prosecution changes the value of q. For simplicity, q is assumed to be 
constant for each offense, i.e., the police and the prosecutor do not 
become more effective as an offender commits additional offenses. By 
defining J to be the conditional probability that an offender is incar­
cerated following his conviction, and S as the actual time served in 
prison, the product qJ becomes the conditional probability that an 
offender is imprisoned following his commission of a crime and qJS is 
the average detention (incapacitation) time for each offense. The ratio 
( AqJ) ^ is the average time that each offender is not in prison. 
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar approximated the fraction of the time that 
an offender is free to commit offenses by the expression, 
(AqJ)" 1 = 1 
(AqJ^+S 1 + X q J S * 
At a later date, Shinnar and Shinnar [63] showed that this relationship 
is more precise for T >> S; otherwise, the expression overestimates the 
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actual ratio. Assuming that an incapacitation effect actually exists, 
the expected number of crimes that an offender commits becomes 
W \ = AT 
* w 1+XqJS (2-12) 
and the effectiveness of the CJS in reducing crime is 
T = 1 - 1+AqJS . (2-13) 
This result of Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar's model is striking, because their 
model is immediately a tool for testing CJS policy, both new and proposed. 
In particular, sentencing alternatives and police and prosecution effec­
tiveness can be varied under scenarios designed to maximize T, Once again, 
however, independent studies would have to determine the cost effective­
ness of each policy alternative as a cost model is not presently available 
for any of the analytical models surveyed. 
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar were able to evaluate the sensitivity of 
th 
their model to changes in policy by defining " N — time out" equivalent 
systems. This equivalence exists when an offender is assumed not to be 
sentenced to prison for the first (N-l) times that he is convicted. That 
t h 
is, for the first (N-l) convictions = 0, c=l,2,...,N-1. For the N — 
conviction, the offender is assumed to be sentenced to prison for the 
remainder of his life; thus, S N = « . Assuming that S i s an exponentially 
distributed random variable with E(s) = — , Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar were 
th 
able to determine the N — time out equivalent model's sensitivity to the 
policy variables q and — . Their results show that N decreases if either 
" a 
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the release to conviction recidivism probability, 
1 - P " (2-"> 
decreases or if the expected sentence length — increases. The greatest 
^s 
reduction in N is achieved for simultaneously large values of 1-P (that 
is, large q) and small values of — . For both small values of 1-P and 
1 ^ large — , N varies relatively little. 
^s 
Thus, Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar developed a model dealing with an 
offender's criminal career, and they were able to determine the impact 
of the CJS on the number of offenses committed per offender. This model 
is a powerful tool because of its ability to relate the expected number 
of offenses per offender, E ( x ) , to the policy variables q and S. As with 
other models of this type, however, the model is highly aggregate and, 
as a consequence, it does not have the ability to differentiate between 
the treatment of offenders who, for example, commit different offenses. 
Hence, the parameters q, J, and S must be estimated separately for each 
offender category in order to examine differential treatment; but, this 
approach hinders the analysis of dynamic behavior like the crime switch­
ing phenomena observed by Wolfgang, et al. [80] and Blumstein and Larson 
[12]. To be sure, then, the high level of aggregation reduces the 
utility of such a model for policy evaluation studies. In addition, the 
lack of cost and resource considerations excludes the criterion of an 
incremental crime reduction per incremental cost; a separate cost model 
must be added to afford meaningful cost estimates. 
2.1.4 A Policy Model Involving Deterrence and Incapacitation 
The most recent advance in analytic models of the operations of 
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t h e C J S , a p o l i c y m o d e l d e v e l o p e d b y B l u m s t e i n a n d N a g i n e x a m i n e s t h e 
i n c a p a c i t a t i v e a s w e l l a s t h e d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t s o f i n c a r c e r a t i o n [ 1 4 ] . 
T h e i r m o d e l b o r r o w s d i r e c t l y f r o m A v i - I t z h a k a n d S h i n n a r 1 s f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f o f f e n d e r i n c a p a c i t a t i o n ; h o w e v e r ; t h e i n s i g h t s a n d a n a l y s i s o f 
E h r l i c h [ 2 7 ] [ 2 8 ] c o n c e r n i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t u n ­
d o u b t e d l y s t i m u l a t e d t h e i r r e s e a r c h . E h r l i c h b u i l t a u t i l i t y -
t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l o f c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r . T h e p r e m i s e u n d e r l y i n g h i s 
m o d e l w a s t h a t o f f e n d e r s a r e r a t i o n a l b e i n g s who make d e c i s i o n s b a s e d 
u p o n s u c h t a n g i b l e s a s w e a l t h a n d t h e t h r e a t o f p u n i s h m e n t . T h e 
c h o i c e s E h r l i c h m o d e l e d d e a l w i t h t h e m i x o f l e g a l a n d i l l e g a l a c t i ­
v i t i e s . H i s s u b s e q u e n t r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s o f t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e 
l e v e l s o f e a c h i n d e x c r i m e f o r e a c h s t a t e i n t h e U . S . f a i l e d t o r e ­
j e c t h i s h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e p u n i s h m e n t ( t h e l e n g t h o f 
t h e s e n t e n c e ) a n d t h e c e l e r i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t ( t h e j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t y o f 
a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d i m p r i s o n m e n t i n v e r s e l y a f f e c t t h e number o f o f f e n s e s . 
A rmed w i t h A v i - I t z h a k a n d S h i n n a r ' s m o d e l a n d E h r l i c h ' s c o n ­
c l u s i o n s , B l u m s t e i n a n d N a g i n d e v e l o p e d a m o d e l t o b e u s e d f o r a n a l y z i n g 
i m p r i s o n m e n t p o l i c y s c e n a r i o s i n a s t a t i c e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e i r m o d e l i s 
a n o n - l i n e a r p r o g r a m w h o s e g o a l i t i s t o m i n i m i z e t h e l e v e l o f c r i m e , 
g i v e n t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a n u p p e r b o u n d o n t h e n u m b e r o f o f f e n d e r s who 
c a n b e i m p r i s o n e d ; t h i s c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t i s b a s e d u p o n a n o b s e r v a t i o n 
t h a t t h e number o f p e r s o n s i n p r i s o n i n t h e U . S . h a s r e m a i n e d e s s e n t i a l l y 
c o n s t a n t s i n c e 1 9 3 0 . A l t h o u g h t h i s c o n s t r a i n t a p p e a r s t o h o l d n a t i o n a l l y , 
o n n o t s o g r a n d a s c a l e , l o c a l o r r e g i o n a l c a p a c i t y c o u l d c h a n g e w i t h 
t h e d e m o l i t i o n o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p r i s o n f a c i l i t i e s . T h u s , t h i s m o d e l 
i s b e s t s u i t e d f o r m a c r o a n a l y s i s w h e r e t h e f i x e d - c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t 
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probably is a very real limit. 
Blumstein and Nagin concentrated on two policy variables: 
the probability of imprisonment given that an offender is convicted, Q, 
and the average time served in prision, S'. In addition, another vari­
able which is the consequence of police and prosecutorial effectiveness 
(and higher-order policy variables related to budgetary processes) is 
the conditional probability of conviction given that a crime has been 
committed, q. The product of qQ, the conditional probability of impri­
sonment given the commission of a crime, times S results in qQS, the 
expected number of man-years of imprisonment per crime. 
Blumstein and Nagin's expression for the aggregate crime rate 
is 
C = AnP , ( 2 - 1 5 ) 
where P is the fraction of the population that is criminal, n is the 
proportion of an offender's criminal career that he is active (not 
incarcerated), and the product An is the effective crime rate per 
offender. Both P and rj were described as functions of Q and S. From 
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar, 
To include the deterrent effects of Q and S in the formulation of P, 
Blumstein and Nagin assumed the logistic function 
eu(Q,S) 
P ( Q , S ) =
 1 + eu(Q>S) , ( 2 - 1 7 ) 
where u(Q,S) = Y Q + Y-^Q + Y2Q S N i-s t n e expected disutility of imprison-
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3P 3P 
men t f o r a l l o f f e n d e r s . R e q u i r i n g f o r d e t e r r e n c e t h a t — < 0 a n d — < 0 , 
o^l do 
t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t r a i n t s o n t h e l o g i s t i c m o d e l ' s p a r a m e t e r s w e r e d e t e r ­
m i n e d : 
J1 < 0 , Y 2 < 0 , n > 0 . 
M o d e l s o f t h i s f o r m h a v e b e e n u s e d s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t h e p a s t t o d e s c r i b e 
i n t h e a g g r e g a t e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s s i m i l a r t o t h a t e x a m i n e d h e r e . 
B l u m s t e i n a n d N a g i n r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e a v e r a g e number o f p e r s o n s 
i n c a r c e r a t e d a t a n y o n e t i m e i s 
I = q Q S G . 
S i n c e I _< U w h e r e U i s t h e u p p e r bound o n p r i s o n c a p a c i t y , t h e f i n a l f o r m 
o f t h e m o d e l i s , 
M i n i m i z e C = A n ( Q , S , A q ) P ( Q , S ) 
S u b j e c t t o : I = qQS A n ( Q , S , Aq) P ( Q , S ) j< U 
0 < Q < Q < 1 ( 2 - 1 8 ) 
— x — x m a x — 
0 < S < S 
— max 
S i n c e b o t h C a n d I a r e n o n l i n e a r , u s e o f t h i s m o d e l r e q u i r e s s e a r c h i n g 
o v e r t h e a c c e p t a b l e r a n g e s o f b o t h Q a n d S s o t h a t C i s m i n i m i z e d w h e n 
I < U . 
F o r a C J S w i t h a f i x e d p r i s o n c a p a c i t y , t h i s m o d e l i s a n o t h e r 
u s e f u l t o o l f o r a s s i s t i n g i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f s e n t e n c i n g p o l i c y . T h e 
m o d e l d o e s h a v e s e v e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h a r e i n h e r e n t t o a n a l y t i c a l 
m o d e l s a n d w h i c h w e r e d i s c u s s e d f o r t h e p r e v i o u s m o d e l . I n a d d i t i o n t o 
25 
these limitations, one cannot help but question the formulation of P, 
the fraction of the population that is criminal. Specifically, it seems 
that the policy variable q should have been included in the offender's 
utility function since Ehrlich [27] found that P is inversely proportional 
to the product of Q and q. This change would allow additional experi­
mentation on the deterrent effects of the CJS. 
Another problem that detracts from this model as with the other 
analytical models is that the model is not dynamic; none of these models 
facilitates the exploration of transient behavior between two policies. 
A dynamic model would be especially desirable since the delays become 
extremely important when trying to optimize around a fixed capacity. 
The possibility of an infeasible level of incarceration (i.e., I > U) 
as the result of a policy change makes the examination of the dynamic 
response a critical shortcoming of this and its sister models. 
2.2 Simulation Models of CJS Operations 
Unlike the analytical models, the simulation models have emphasized 
the operations of the CJS as opposed to the characteristics of the 
offender population. By evaluating the effects that alternate parameter 
values have on some measure of performance, the simulation models have 
dealt with the issue of CJS policy directly. The analytical models, on 
the other hand, have been much more descriptive than prescriptive in 
character. The performance measures of the analytical models have been 
the crime rate while a few have used the expected number of re-arrests 
of the first offender. The performance measures of the simulation models, 
however, have varied considerably. As will be seen, the simulation models 
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have analyzed the CJS using one or more of the following as the 
objective criteria: 
1. Cost 
a. Annual CJS operating cost 
b. Total CJS cost attributable to the 
average criminal career 
2. CJS resource availability 
3. Delays in processing offenders 
4. Recidivism 
2.2.1 Queueing Models 
The first serious attempt to model the operations of the CJS was 
developed by Navarro, Taylor and Cohen [54]. Their model, called 
COURTSIM, makes use of the General Purpose System Simulation (GPSS) 
language to trace on a day-to-day basis the paths along which offenders 
progress through the Washington, B.C. judicial system; COURTSIM is a 
model of steady-state behavior. The processing of an offender begins 
at the moment of his arrest but continues only to the point at which the 
presiding magistrate delivers his sentence. Unfortunate data deficiencies 
present at the time of the investigation precluded any detailed charac­
terization of the offender while only that information deemed necessary 
to describe the offender flow was incorporated in the model. Incor­
porated into the model, however, was a limited number of such treatment-
specific characteristics as the date of the indictment, the offender's 
bail status, the number of motions filed in court, the charge for the 
most serious crime committed, and the number of co-defendants in the trial. 
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Since the COURTSIM model was another product of the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, one 
of its chief responsibilities was to successfully demonstrate the 
utility of simulation in dealing with strategic and tactical questions 
in criminal justice administration. The COURTSIM study is also parti­
cularly noteworthy for its treatment and analysis of court delays and 
the resulting backlogs that even today plague the judicial process. 
Besides including the unavoidable delays associated with processing the 
offender, capacity and resource scheduling constraints are introduced 
for each processing unit in order to incorporate these additional delay 
considerations into the model and, in so doing, to enhance the model's 
credibility. 
Several experiments were conducted using the COURTSIM model to 
demonstrate the effects of various capacity and procedural changes on 
offender processing delay. Obviously, since the model's offender is 
so primitively described, only relativistic statements result from this 
analysis. While the authors themselves cautioned that their results 
were only tentative, their recommendations are worth noting. They 
recommended that improvements be made to data gathering capabilities 
so that the information required for such a model would be available for 
evaluation purposes, and they recommended that cost-effectiveness studies 
be conducted before CJS policy conclusions are drawn from the experiments 
on such models. 
Fortunately for the simulation modeler tremendous progress has 
been made in the area of data collection; but, one severe limitation of 
simulation models has been their inability to simultaneously consider 
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resource availability constraints, resource or other operating costs 
as well as the queueing phenomena. A recent innovation in simulation 
systems, however, has shown that such limitations can be overcome in 
one simulation model. By developing a stochastic network model of the 
criminal court of Champaign County, Illinois, Hogg, DeVor and Luhr [38] 
demonstrated this capability using the Generalized Network Simulator, 
GNS. As the name implies, GNS simulates stochastic networks by consi­
dering the network nodes as either activities or events. The network's 
arcs exist merely to capture precedence relationships. Because of these 
attributes, GNS has been selected as the simulator for this research; 
its capabilities shall be described in more detail in Chapter IV. 
As a result of the advanced data collection capabilities and of 
the advances in simulation software, the remaining shortcomings of 
Navarro, Taylor and Cohen's COURTSIM are not too restrictive. More 
recent court models, e.g., Holeman [39], are essentially applications 
of the methodology demonstrated with COURTSIM. Several of these models 
are discussed by Chaiken, et al. [19]. 
2.2.2 A Continuous Flow Model 
Comparing the COURTSIM model to the analytical models, COURTSIM 
does not consider the recidivism of offenders. Rather, the crime rate 
is translated into the offenders who are to be processed by the model, 
ignoring any distinction between recidivists and first offenders. This 
model is considered to be "open loop" in that recidivists are not modeled; 
the re-arrest of an offender is not simulated, nor is an offender's 
criminal career. Only the epoch during which an offender is under the 
direct purview of the CJS is simulated. 
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Another open loop model of CJS operations to have achieved acclaim 
by planners was first published in 1969 by Blumstein and Larson [12]. 
The so-called JUSSIM I model was used to forecast system costs, workloads, 
and resource requirements. Unlike the COURTSIM model, JUSSIM does not 
deal with individual offenders; consequently, queueing phenomena are not 
examined. Following their arrest, offenders are routed through the model 
by branching ratios that specify the proportion having a pre-defined 
characteristic that will follow a specific arc at each decision point in 
the system. The particular identifier used in JUSSIM1s first application 
was the most serious crime for which the offender was charged. Any 
legitimate set of discriminators could, however, have been used to specify 
subsets of the arrested population. To forecast the workload, resource 
requirements and subsystem costs, the JUSSIM model is driven by a fore­
casting function of the total arrest rate. By following the flow of 
offenders through the model, administrators are able to predict the 
workload on each element in the model. Possessing this information it 
is a simple matter to compute the resources required for a given work­
load, the computation of the cost per resource unit following directly. 
The beauty of the JUSSIM model lies in its ability to capture, 
if only in an elementary fashion, the essential characteristics of the 
CJS and to impute costs for handling alternate system loads which result 
from changes in operating policy. Of course, the approach is plagued 
with assumptions, but most of these can be dealt with with additional 
effort: 
1. The fact that fixed and variable costs are both treated as 
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variable is a deficiency in the current model. Although 
Blumstein and Larson argue that fixed costs become variable 
in the long run, they fail to consider that certain expenses 
are contingent upon the construction or demolition of 
physical plant. Such costs should be considered fixed as 
to do otherwise is to assume a static physical plant. 
2, Although the lack of delays in the model is at first 
appalling, for an open-loop model like JUSSIM I, their 
inclusion would have little effect on the resulting policy. 
According to the Presidential Task Force on Science and 
Technology [54] 80% of the cases filed in Washington, D.C. 
courts in 1965 took less than 28 weeks between arraignment 
and a trial disposition, the average delay being 15 weeks. 
Thus, although the delays in the model would range between 
three and seven months, the spillover of offenders arrested 
in one year and disposed of in the succeeding year should 
be approximately counterbalanced for any year; eliminating 
this spillover between years should cause only slight error 
in an unstable system and no error during a stable period. 
3. Of Blumstein and Larson's assumptions, the one that is perhaps 
the most difficult to reconcile is the invariance of the 
branching ratios. Although significant trends, if they 
existed, were considered in developing these flow probabili­
ties, the flow along one branch is not in any way related to 
the flow of another; nor is any thought given to relating the 
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b r a n c h i n g r a t i o s t o t h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e o f f e n d e r f l o w o f a 
m o d e l c o m p o n e n t i n o r d e r t o i n c o r p o r a t e a s u r r o g a t e f o r t h e 
a c t u a l d e c i s i o n s b e i n g made i n t h e c o m p o n e n t . 
4 . T h e f i n a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s h o u l d b e m e n t i o n e d i s t h e l i m i t e d 
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t y p e s o f o f f e n d e r s . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s 
m o r e d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e i n g e n u i t y o f t h e m o d e l e r , t h e o b j e c ­
t i v e s o f t h e s t u d y , a n d t h e a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f n e e d e d s t a t i s t i c s 
t h a n u p o n a n y d e f i c i e n c i e s o f t h e a p p r o a c h . A l t h o u g h t h e 
u s u a l a p p r o a c h h a s b e e n t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n o f f e n d e r 
c a t e g o r i e s s t r i c t l y o n t h e b a s i s o f c r i m e c o m m i t t e d ( c f . , 
B l u m s t e i n a n d L a r s o n [ 1 2 ] , C o h e n , e t a l . [ 2 0 ] , C A N J U S [ 1 1 ] 
[ 1 8 ] [ 4 0 ] ) , o t h e r o f f e n d e r d e s c r i p t o r s s u c h a s r a c e o r s e x 
o r a g e c o u l d a l s o b e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . 
2 . 2 . 3 A F e e d b a c k M o d e l o f t h e C J S 
I n t h e same a r t i c l e i n w h i c h J U S S I M I was f i r s t i n t r o d u c e d , 
B l u m s t e i n a n d L a r s o n [ 1 2 ] a l s o d e s c r i b e d a n e x t e n s i o n w h i c h h a s e x t r a ­
o r d i n a r y p o t e n t i a l f o r c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e p l a n n i n g . T h e m o d e l , c a l l e d 
J U S S I M I I , i s a f e e d b a c k m o d e l w h e r e i n o f f e n d e r s a r e t r a c k e d f r o m t h e 
p o i n t o f t h e i r f i r s t a r r e s t t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y f i n a l l y l e a v e t h e 
C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m f o r t h e l a s t t i m e . J U S S I M I I o f n e c e s s i t y i n ­
c l u d e s m e a s u r e s o f c r i m i n a l r e c i d i v i s m ( t h e f e e d b a c k p r o c e s s ) i n o r d e r 
t o d e t e r m i n e i f a n d when o f f e n d e r s a r e r e - a r r e s t e d . T h e i n p u t t o t h i s 
m o d e l , u n l i k e t h a t f o r J U S S I M I , i s t h e n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s d u r i n g e a c h 
y e a r who a r e a r r e s t e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e i r l i v e s . T h e number o f 
f i r s t o f f e n d e r s i s t h e n a d d e d t o t h e number o f r e c i d i v i s t s t o g i v e t h e 
t o t a l number o f a r r e s t e e s d u r i n g t h e y e a r . 
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The flow of offenders is treated similarly to the flow in 
JUSSIM I except that each crime-specific flow variable is now further 
broken down by offender age. The first offenders and, of course, the 
recidivists are additionally described by the age of their initial arrest 
in order to be able to compute such criminal career-related statistics 
as the number and type of crimes for which the offender is charged. The 
subsystem cost estimates developed using JUSSIM I are then used to ap­
proximate the average CJS processing cost attributable to each offender 
over his entire criminal career. Consequently, with a realistic version 
of JUSSIM II criminal justice planners can analyze the implications of 
various programs designed to reduce recidivism vis-a-vis the offender's 
criminal career profile as well as the CJS operating cost, a powerful 
approach indeed for measuring and testing the effectiveness of alternate 
policy scenarios. 
The manner in which Blumstein and Larson formulated the offender 
flow in JUSSIM II i s well worth examining. The model ' s input consists 
of the number of first offenders grouped by age and by offense. The 
model then combines this virgin arrestee flow, (which may be either an 
age-specific cohort or the entire first offender population, with the 
recidivist component. Then, the model determines by means of branching 
ratios the path along which each offender travels through the CJS. 
(Remember, no delays are considered up to this point.) As this published 
version of JUSSIM II is a highly simplified model, only five criminal 
dispositions were included: 
1. Juvenile care 





If the offender is incarcerated, JUSSIM II would determine the delay 
until the inmate is to be released and whether or not he is reincarcerated 
for a parole violation. For each disposition, the model computes the 
number of arrestees who are again arrested. The re-arrest probability 
P(a) was assumed to be a piece-wise linear function of an offender's age, 
a. 
After determining the number of re-arrested offenders using P(a), 
an estimate of the time between an offender's release from the CJS and 
his subsequent re-arrest is determined. A negative exponential distri­
bution is assumed and the average delay time over all dispositions is 
determined to be approximately two years. Using the method of moments 
to estimate the parameters of the delay, the density function is 
P (delay = x years) = ~ e X ^ 
When an offender is re-arrested, JUSSIM II determines the most 
serious crime for which he is charged by invoking the Markovian assump­
tion: the current offense depends soley upon the type of the immediately 
preceding crime. Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin [80] tested this assumption 
with their male birth cohort and found this model to be an acceptable 
representation of crime switching behavior. In addition, Blumstein and 
Larson examined several cases having different so-called "crime switch" 
transition matrices. They found that the number of career arrests 
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for each index crime is more sensitive to the arrest and re-arrest 
probabilities than to the crime-switch phenomenon. 
The assumptions which are invoked for the recidivism component 
of the JUSSIM model are: 
1. The probability of recidivism is only a function of 
an offender's age, his most recent crime, and the 
disposition of the CJS following his latest arrest; 
2. Crime switching behavior depends soley on the offen­
der's previous crime; 
3. The delay between an offender's release from the CJS 
and his subsequent re-arrest is assumed to be a 
distributed negative exponential, the mean being a 
function of the CJS disposition. 
Since the JUSSIM II analysis of career criminal cost is dependent upon 
the cost estimates derived using JUSSIM I, many of the limitation of 
the open-loop model also apply to the feedback model. 
Because of the power of the feedback model, several implemen­
tations of JUSSIM II exist today. Among these, the Canadian model CANJUS 
[11] [18] r^O] and implementations of JUSSIM in Pittsburgh and 
Philadelphia [20] are most noteworthy. In addition, Mathematica's 
PHILJIM model represents an extension of the JUSSIM II concept [19]. 
The carryover of offenders into a succeeding year because of CJS delays 
is handled explicitly, thereby removing some of the prediction errors 
caused by not including such delays in the model. PHILJIM has been 
implemented in Alaska, Denver, Sacramento, Austin, and Washington, D.C. 
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2.2.4 A Feedback Model of Corrections 
Another feedback model of CJS operations was developed by Pittman 
[50] to evaluate alternatives in connections policy. His model is a 
Markov chain representation similar to the model of crime-switching 
behavior used in JUSSIM II. Unlike the crime-switch model which possesses 
states corresponding to the seven index crimes, Pittman's offenders may 
be in any of the following four states: 
1. In prison because of conviction, 
2. In prison because of a technical violation of 
parole, 
3. On parole, 
4. Free but not under CJS supervision. 
The matrix P is composed of elements p^. , the steady-state transition 
probabilities from state i to state j, where i=l,2,3,4 and j=l,2,3,4. 
The approximate cost c ^ of being in each state for one year was 
empirically determined; however, since each offender may be in either 
one or two states during the year, the cost c „ for i^j was assumed to 
be 
c.. = (c.. + c. .)/2 + k. ., 
i j n J J i j 
where the cost of the transition between states is k... Thus, the 
i J 
offender is assumed to spend half of a year in each state. 
Possessing the transition matrix P and the cost matrix C, Pittman 
was able to estimate future system loads and the crime mix given the 
number of first offenders who are arrested and convicted. In addition, 
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by simulating a number of years, N, Pittman was also able to determine 
the expected number of times the offender is re-arrested, 
m=l 
During steady-state, the average time that an offender is in any state 
is determined analytically by 
tt - a - P . . ) " 1 . 
Pittman used this identity to compute the average sentence length, t^. 
Also using these last two relationships, Pittman was able to determine 
the expected criminal profile; by also making use of the cost matrix C, 
he was able to compute the expected career criminal cost of an offender. 
Although Pittman1s model is obviously more analytical than simu-
lar; his emphasis is on the issues which actually change the flow of 
offenders within the corrections subsystem. Unlike the models of Belkin 
et al. [9], Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar [5], and Blumstein and Nagin [14], 
Pittman's model can analyze the effects on the offender profile of 
changing the transition probabilities p „. In addition, by changing the 
costs c.., this model can also be used to develop a least-cost solution 
for reducing crime and thereby overcome one of the major deficiencies 
with the previous analytical works. 
Of course, the criticisms of Blumstein and Larson's model (Section 
2.2.2) apply here as well. The time invariance of the transition 
probabilities could be a problem in forecasting system load; if the p^. 
do change, the calculations for E(r) and for t. also change. Aggregating 
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the costs can also create problems if the future cost distribution 
changes because of new facilities or programs. Further disaggre­
gation of the variables which describe the offender would make Pittman's 
model more meaningful but also more complex. For example, to include 
the seven index crimes would increase the data requirements seven-fold. 
To further expand the scope of the model to include the police and 
court subsystems expands the data requirements and complicates the 
computation of the performance measures. Thus, to resolve the limi­
tations of Pittman's model, would require considerably more data and 
model analysis in order to draw conclusions about the performance of 
the entire CJS. Since steady-state analysis is not as useful as 
simulated analysis for such complex systems, Pittman's approach is more 
useful in subsystem analyses than it is for global CJS studies. 
2.2.5 A Feedback Queueing Model of the CJS 
In 1972, a queueing model was developed of the entire CJS which 
incorporated a model of offender recidivism similar to that demonstrated 
by Blumstein and Larson. The model is called DOTSIM, an acronym for 
Dynamic Offender Tracking Simulation [19]. DOTSIM like COURTSIM follows 
each offender through the Criminal Justice System; however, like JUSSIM 
II the input to the DOTSIM model is the number of first-offense arrests 
by crime type. Each offender's attributes are randomly generated upon 
his first arrest. 
DOTSIM has the capability of delaying the processing of offen­
ders whenever the demand for a particular resource exceeds its supply. 
This competition over scarce resources makes DOTSIM a keen tool for 
CJS analysis since a particular policy alternative may arise which 
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could cause resource shortages to delay offenders longer than 
expected. This characteristic, in the view of this author, although 
contrary to the conclusion espoused by Chaiken, et al. [19], makes the 
DOTSIM approach superior to the JUSSIM II model and even to the PHILJIM 
model with its surrogate delay capability. The random processing of 
offenders through the CJS itself lends greater resolution to the in­
tricacies of offender-specific policy formulation. The effects of each 
policy scenario can be ascertained by measuring the change in the crime 
rate, resource requirements and system costs relative to a base-line 
policy. 
The costs embedded in the model include those which are directly 
attributable to an offender based upon his usage of resources. The 
indirect costs of equipment and facilities were also apportioned to 
the offenders based upon their percentage utilization over an entire 
year. 
The DOTSIM model does, however, have its limitations. First, 
the increased cost of operating the model and of collecting the neces­
sary empirical data restricts its usefulness as a research tool. This 
ostensibly is the reason that it has been never used for policy analysis 
[19]. In addition, the model was formulated in such a way as to 
prevent the testing of specific policies which examine differential 
recidivism tendencies of alternate correctional programs; DOTSIM's 
recidivism model was aggregated over all dispositions, A final 
criticism of this model is its inability to determine the average career 
criminal cost, a useful performance measure for evaluating CJS policy. 
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2.3 Summary 
The CJS models used for evaluation purposes have been of two 
types: analytical and simular. The analytical models have all been 
aggregate models of homogeneous offender populations, whereas the 
simulation models have generally disaggregated the offender population 
along offense categories. All of the simulation models have included 
cost as a factor in their analysis; none of the analytical models, 
however, have evaluated the cost of alternate scenarios. In fact, two 
policy-oriented analytical models developed by Avi-Itzhak, et al. and 
Blumstein and Nagin concentrate primarily on the crime rate, the former 
through the reduction of recidivism and the latter through the reduction 
of crime perpetrated both by first offenders and by recidivists. 
Blumstein and Nagin also examine the crime reduction issue under the 
influence of an upper bound on prison resources. 
Historically, the simulation models have proven more flexible 
than their analytical counterparts. The simulation model JUSSIM II for 
example, uses both costs and resources as performance criteria in 
addition to being able to examine criminal recidivism. Thus, although 
both types of models have been used to address the issues of recidivism 
and resource constraints, the simulation model with its costing element 
simultaneously embedded in the same construct becomes a superior tool 
for analysis. By overlaying the additional features of a discrete event 
simulation model like DOTSIM (Dynamic Offender Transaction Simulation) 
or like the Generalized Network Simulator (GNS), the simulation approach 
to CJS analysis is as sophisticated a tool for holistic analysis as 
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might ever be required by modelers or policy analysts. Such a model 
could be either as aggregate or as detailed as the analyst desires. 
For example, in modeling plea bargaining in a holistic model, the 
queueing behavior of the CJS could be constrained by resource limits 
and the costs of processing an offender could be determined for each 
stage in the model. The plea bargaining component itself, could also 
be as complicated as necessary, since the model would not be bound 
by mathematical tractability. The only restrictions on such a model 
would be, then, essentially empirical. Can the required date be col­
lected, and can the model and its output be validated? Because of the 
advance in the collection and dissemination of information, however, 
such simulation models are feasible. 
The proposed simulation model should possess the majority of the 
characteristics of its predecessors which are listed in Table 1. 
T a b l e 1. C a p a b i l i t i e s o f M o d e l s o f t h e C J S 
MODEL (Year) 
Christensen (1967) 
Be lk in , Blumstein 
and Glass (1973) 
Av i - I t zhak and Shinnar 
(1977) 
Blumstein and Nagin 
(1977) 
Navarro, Taylor and 
Cohen (1967) 
COURTSIM 
Blumstein and Larson 
(1969) 
JUSSIM I 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
ECONOMICS OP T H E COURTS 
3 . 0 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
A s p o i n t e d o u t i n t h e f i r s t c h a p t e r , t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s p l a y e d 
a n e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g r o l e i n t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n p r o c e s s o f t h e c o u r t s . 
B e f o r e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g , t h e c o u r t s a l o n e 
d e t e r m i n e d t h e g u i l t o f a d e f e n d a n t a n d s e n t e n c e d t h o s e i n n e e d o f 
c o r r e c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g b u r d e n o n t h e c o u r t s h a s 
i n c r e a s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e m a s s i v e 
c o u r t c a s e l o a d s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r now a s s i s t s i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f c a s e s 
h i m s e l f b y a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t s t o n e g o t i a t e g u i l t y p l e a s w h i c h r e s u l t 
i n l e s s s e v e r e c h a r g e s . T h i s p r o c e s s i s l o o s e l y c a l l e d " p l e a b a r ­
g a i n i n g . " 
B e c a u s e o f t h e i n t e r e s t d u r i n g t h e p a s t d e c a d e t o b e t t e r u n d e r ­
s t a n d c r i m e a n d i t s c o n t r o l , e c o n o m i s t s h a v e b e g u n t o d e v e l o p m o d e l s 
w h i c h s t r u c t u r e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s i n a n a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n 
how i t w o r k s . ( T h u s , t h e e c o n o m i c m o d e l s o f t h e c o u r t s a r e d e s c r i p t i v e 
m o d e l s , u s i n g t h e t e r m i n o l o g y o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g c h a p t e r . ) B e c a u s e 
t h e s e m o d e l s h a v e n o t b e e n u s e d f o r q u a n t i t a t i v e p o l i c y a n a l y s i s , t h e 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g m e c h a n i s m s a s d e s c r i b e d b y e c o n o ­
m i s t s i n t o a s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l l i k e GNS o r D O T S I M s h o u l d p r o v e t o be 
u s e f u l f o r C J S p o l i c y e v a l u a t i o n s . T o f a c i l i t a t e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a 
p l e a b a r g a i n i n g c o m p o n e n t i n a d i s c r e t e e v e n t s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l , i n 
S e c t i o n 3 . 2 a n d 3 . 3 t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n 
43 
b e t w e e n a n o f f e n d e r a n d t h e p r o s e c u t o r a r e d i s c u s s e d . T h e n i n S e c t i o n 
3 . 3 , b y b u i l d i n g u p o n t h e s e two e f f o r t s , a m o r e e x t e n s i v e m o d e l i s 
p o s t u l a t e d w h i c h p r e d i c t s t h e e f f e c t o f c e r t a i n c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r ­
m a t i o n o n t h e o u t c o m e o f p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s e v e r i t y 
o f a n o f f e n d e r ' s c r i m e a n d a n o f f e n d e r ' s a r r e s t r e c o r d a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d 
i n t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d e c i s i o n f u n c t i o n a n d t h e e f f e c t o n t h e o u t c o m e 
o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g i s p o s t u l a t e d . 
T h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r e c e e d i n g m o d e l s f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y . T h e 
e q u a t i o n s a n d d y n a m i c s o f e a c h m o d e l a r e d e s c r i b e d i n o r d e r t o c l a r i f y 
t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n 
m o d e l d e v e l o p e d f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h . 
3 . 1 A P a r e t o O p t i m a l M o d e l 
T h e e c o n o m i s t who p i o n e e r e d i n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r i m i n a l 
c o u r t w a s W i l l i a m L a n d e s . T h i s man d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l " t h a t 
i d e n t i f i e s t h e v a r i a b l e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e c h o i c e b e t w e e n a s e t t l e m e n t a n d 
a t r i a l " [ 4 3 ; p , 1 6 5 ] . A c c o r d i n g t o R h o d e s , h e d e m o n s t r a t e d " t h a t t h e 
p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . . . c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a ' m a r k e t ' i n w h i c h 
t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' b u y s ' g u i l t y p l e a c o n v i c t i o n s i n e x c h a n g e f o r p r o m i s e s 
o f s e n t e n c i n g l e n i e n c y " [ 5 7 ; p . 1 ] . L a n d e s ' s m o d e l , i t t u r n s o u t , i s a n 
i n d i v i d u a l l y t a i l o r e d c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e p r o s e c u ­
t o r , w i t h e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t e x p e c t i n g t o g a i n f r o m t h e o u t c o m e o f p l e a 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h i s v i e w r e s u l t s i n a P a r e t o o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n f o r bo. th 
t h e p r o s e c u t o r a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t . 
3 . 1 . 1 M o d e l E q u a t i o n s 
T o r e a c h a f i n a l d e c i s i o n i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , e a c h 
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p a r t i c i p a n t a t t e m p t s t o m a x i m i z e h i s o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s u b j e c t t o t h e 
a v a i l a b i l i t y a n d p r o d u c t i v i t y o f h i s r e s o u r c e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r t r i e s t o m a x i m i z e t h e e x p e c t e d s e n t e n c e l e n g t h o f a l l o f f e n ­
d e r s , 
m 
E ( S ) = Y P . S . ( 3 - 1 ) 
1 = 1 
w h e r e E ( S ) i s t h e e x p e c t e d s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n o f a l l d e f e n d a n t s , m i s 
t h e number o f d e f e n d a n t s t o b e p r o s e c u t e d , P ^ i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f 
t h 
c o n v i c t i n g d e f e n d a n t i , a n d S ^ i s t h e l e n g t h o f t h e i — d e f e n d a n t ' s 
s e n t e n c e . T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t may be w r i t t e n a s 
m 
I C X = B ( 3 - 2 ) 
i = l 1 1 
t h 
w h e r e i s t h e c o s t o f p r o s e c u t i n g t h e i — d e f e n d a n t , X_^ i s 1 i f t h e 
d e f e n d a n t i s p r o s e c u t e d a n d z e r o o t h e r w i s e , a n d B i s t h e b u d g e t a v a i l ­
a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n . 
E a c h d e f e n d a n t w i s h e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e f i n a l o u t c o m e o f p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g . A c c o r d i n g t o L a n d e s , t h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o h i s m a x i m i z i n g 
t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y o f g o i n g t o t r i a l , 
E ( Z . ) = P * U . ( W . ) + ( 1 - P * ) U ± ( W * ) , ( 3 - 3 ) 
w h e r e E ( Z ^ ) i s t h e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y o f a t r i a l o f d e f e n d a n t i , 
P * i s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t i m a t e o f t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f h i s c o n ­
v i c t i o n i f he g o e s t o t r i a l , u \ ( W ^ ) i s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s u t i l i t y 
f o r a c o n v i c t i o n , a n d U\(W*S i s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s u t i l i t y f o r 
d i s m i s s a l . 
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T h e v a r i a b l e W . , t h e endowment f r o m a t r i a l c o n v i c t i o n , i s a f u n c t i o n f 
1 
o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s w e a l t h p r i o r t o a r r e s t , Y ^ , t h e e x p e c t e d l e n g t h o f 
h i s s e n t e n c e , S ^ , a n d t h e v a l u e o f t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t h e e x p e n d s f o r h i s 
d e f e n s e , R . . T h a t i s , 
1 
W. = f ( Y . , - S * , - R . ) . 
l i l l 
T h e v a r i a b l e W^, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s h i s endowment f r o m b e i n g d i s m i s s e d . 
I t i s w r i t t e n a s a f u n c t i o n g o f Y ^ a n d R_^ a c c o r d i n g t o 
W i = 8 ( Y i > ~ V * 
B o t h f a n d g a r e i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n s o f t h e i r a r g u m e n t s . 
B y d e f i n i n g 
W I - f <*v - s i - - V 
a s t h e endowment f r o m a c o n v i c t i o n w i t h t h e n e g o t i a t e d s e n t e n c e S ^ , 
L a n d e s a s s u m e s t h a t a n o n - t r i a l s e t t l e m e n t o c c u r s w h e n e v e r 
t i . = U . ( W f . ) - E ( Z . ) > 0 . ( 3 - 4 ) 
i l l l 
T h u s , t h e d e c i s i o n t o s c h e d u l e a t r i a l f o r a d e f e n d a n t ( v i z , n o t a l l o w 
a g u i l t y p l e a ) d e p e n d s u p o n ; 
1 . T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t i m a t e s o f t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f c o n v i c t i o n b y t r i a l ( P ^ a n d P ^ , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ; 
2 . T h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d r i s k ( a s i t i s e m b o d i e d i n 
h i s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n U ) ; 
3 . T h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e o f f e n s e ( a s i t a f f e c t s S . ) ; 
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4 . T h e c o s t d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n c u r r e d b y b o t h d e f e n d a n t a n d 
p r o s e c u t o r f o r t h e t r i a l v e r s u s t h e n e g o t i a t e d p l e a o u t ­
c o m e s ; 
5 . T h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b u d g e t a n d t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t . 
T h e c a s e t h a t i s m o s t l i k e l y t o be s e t t l e d o u t o f c o u r t b y a n e g o t i a t e d 
p l e a , t h e n , o c c u r s w h e n e v e r " t h e p r o s e c u t o r a n d s u s p e c t a g r e e o n t h e 
e x p e c t e d o u t c o m e o f a t r i a l , t h e c o s t s o f a t r i a l t o b o t h p a r t i e s e x c e e d 
t h e i r s e t t l e m e n t c o s t s , a n d s u s p e c t s a r e g e n e r a l l y r i s k a v e r s e i n t h e i r 
t r i a l v e r s u s s e t t l e m e n t c h o i c e " [ 5 7 ; p . 1 7 3 ] . 
3 . 1 . 2 M o d e l D y n a m i c s 
U s i n g h i s m o d e l a s a v e h i c l e f o r a n a l y s i s , L a n d e s c l a i m s t h a t 
o f f e n d e r s w i t h g r e a t e r f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s a r e m o r e l i k e l y t o p l e a d t o 
a l o w e r n e g o t i a t e d s e n t e n c e t h a n o f f e n d e r s w i t h o u t f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s . 
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s b a s e d u p o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t s u c h a d e f e n d a n t i s b e t t e r 
a b l e t o e x p e n d m o r e r e s o u r c e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h i s o u t c o m e . I n a s much a s 
t h e l o n g e r s e n t e n c e r e p r e s e n t s f o r e g o n e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , 
h e w i l l s p e n d m o r e t o r e d u c e t h e max imum p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e . T h u s , t h e 
w e a l t h i e r t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e g r e a t e r t h e c h a r g e r e d u c t i o n e x p e c t e d . 
( T h i s m o d e l d o e s n o t , o f c o u r s e , c o n s i d e r t h e p o t e n t i a l n o t o r i e t y b e ­
s t o w e d o n t h e p r o s e c u t o r f o r b r i n g i n g a p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l - k n o w n o r 
w e a l t h y d e f e n d a n t t o t r i a l . ) 
L a n d e s a l s o c l a i m s t h a t a b a c k l o g o f t r i a l c a s e s s e r v e s t o r a t i o n 
t h e l i m i t e d s u p p l y o f c o u r t t r i a l s . When a b a c k l o g d e v e l o p s b e c a u s e , 
f o r e x a m p l e , t h e l e n g t h o f a t r i a l i n c r e a s e s , a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s a r e 
r e q u i r e d t o p r o s e c u t e a d e f e n d a n t e n r o u t e t o a t r i a l . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 
e x t r a d e l a y e f f e c t i v e l y r e d u c e s t h e number o f h i g h S . c o n v i c t i o n s b y 
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t h o s e c a s e s d e l a y e d b e y o n d t h e p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n . T h e e f f e c t o f t h e 
i n c r e a s e d b a c k l o g i s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r m u s t i n c r e a s e t h e number o f 
n e g o t i a t e d p l e a s i n o r d e r t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e r e d u c t i o n i n E ( S ) . 
E v e n t u a l l y , a n e q u i l i b r i u m b a c k l o g i s r e g a i n e d w i t h a l a r g e r p e r c e n ­
t a g e o f t h e t o t a l number o f c a s e s b e i n g n e g o t i a t e d t h a n b e f o r e t h e 
i n c r e a s e i n t h e b a c k l o g . 
3 . 1 . 3 Summary 
L a n d e s ' s m o d e l o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g s u b s u m e s t h e n o t i o n o f w h a t may 
b e c a l l e d p e r s o n a l i z e d j u s t i c e : t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n v e s t i g a t e s e a c h 
d e f e n d a n t i n o r d e r t o e s t i m a t e t h e e x p e c t e d s e n t e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , 
F ^ i ^ i * T h e n , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h r o u g h c a r e f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r a n d d e f e n d a n t a g r e e t o e i t h e r c o n d u c t a t r i a l o r t o h a v e t h e 
d e f e n d a n t p l e a d g u i l t y t o a l e s s e r c h a r g e . E a c h p a r t i c i p a n t ' s a b i l i t y 
t o n e g o t i a t e i s b a s e d u p o n h i s b u d g e t , u p o n h i s e s t i m a t e s o f t h e p a r a ­
m e t e r s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d u p o n h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a y t h e p r i c e 
f o r t h e d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . T h e r e s u l t o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g i s s a i d t o b e 
P a r e t o o p t i m a l i n t h a t e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t e x p e c t s t o b e n e f i t f r o m t h e 
o u t c o m e o f t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
3 . 2 A R e s o u r c e C o n s t r a i n e d M o d e l 
L i k e h i s p r e d e c e s s o r L a n d e s , R h o d e s [ 5 7 ] d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r e t i c a l 
e c o n o m i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e m e c h a n i c s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g . B y a l t e r i n g 
c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e b e h a v i o r s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r , h e d e - e m p h a s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n 
t h e s e p a r t i c i p a n t s . I m p l i c i t i n t h e L a n d e s m o d e l i s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t 
t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s s u f f i c i e n t v a l i d i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g e a c h d e f e n -
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d a n t t o j u d i c i o u s l y a l l o c a t e h i s r e s o u r c e s b e t w e e n c a s e s w h i c h c o m p e t e 
f o r h i s f i x e d b u d g e t , R h o d e s , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t a s s u m e t h i s . H i s 
p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t s 
h i s a b i l i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e h i s o v e r s i z e d c a s e l o a d . H e e x p l a i n e d , 
B e c a u s e o f t h e b u d g e t a r y c o n s t r a i n t s i m p o s e d u p o n t h e p r o s e c u t o r s 
a n d o t h e r s , t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f d e f e n d a n t s , i n c l u d i n g p l e a b a r g a i n ­
i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s , may n o t b e a s i n d i v i d u a l i z e d a s w a s a s s u m e d i n 
t h e L a n d e s m o d e l . S i n c e t h e p r o s e c u t o r d o e s n o t h a v e t h e r e s o u r c e s 
f o r d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f e v e r y s u s p e c t ' s c a s e , r o u t i n e c o n ­
c e s s i o n s r a t h e r t h a n r i g o r o u s b a r t e r a r e t h e n o r m a t i v e p a t t e r n o f 
r e a c h i n g c o m p r o m i s e . [ 5 7 ; p p . 1 6 - 1 7 ] 
3 . 2 . 1 M o d e l E q u a t i o n s 
I n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h i s v i e w s o f a c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s p e r s o n a l f o r m 
o f j u s t i c e , R h o d e s d e s c r i b e s t h e d e f e n d a n t a s w a n t i n g t o m i n i m i z e a 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n c o m p o s e d o f t h e e x p e c t e d r e d u c t i o n i n h i s s e n t e n c e a n d 
o f h i s t o t a l c o n s u m p t i o n o f g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s w h i l e n o t b e i n g h e l d b y 
t h e C J S . T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t p r o p o s e d 
b y L a n d e s w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c e p t i o n . R h o d e s e x p l i c i t l y c o n s t r a i n s 
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r h i s own d e f e n s e b y 
C £ . + C j . = D . ( 3 - 5 ) f i d i l 
w h e r e D . i s t h e b u d g e t o f d e f e n d a n t i , C , . . i s t h e c o s t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s 
l f i 
c o n s u m p t i o n w h i l e f r e e , a n d C ^ i s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e n d i t u r e f o r h i s 
own d e f e n s e . 
R h o d e s a l s o p o r t r a y s t h e p r o s e c u t o r a s m a x i m i z i n g a f u n c t i o n IT. 
R e f o r m u l a t i n g h i s m o d e l s o t h a t i t c o r r e s p o n d s m o r e c l o s e l y w i t h e q u a t i o 
3 - 1 a n d 3 - 2 , 
TT — T P . S . + p E ( 3 - 6 ) 
i e l 1 1 P 
48 
w h e r e I i s t h e s e t o f d e f e n d a n t s who a r e s e n t t o t r i a l , p i s t h e number 
o f o f f e n d e r s who p l e a d g u i l t y d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g p e r i o d , E ^ i s t h e 
e x p e c t e d s e n t e n c e f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t who p l e a d s g u i l t y , a n d P_^, a n d 
m a r e d e f i n e d a s i n e q u a t i o n 3 - 1 . He f o r m u l a t e s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d ­
g e t c o n s t r a i n t s u c h t h a t t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s t o c a s e s i s m u c h 
m o r e s t r u c t u r e d t h a n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e L a n d e s m o d e l . F o r o f f e r n d e r s who 
g o t o t r i a l , R h o d e s a s s u m e s t h a t t h e c o s t t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s f i x e d a t 
C ^ , , w h e r e a s f o r t h o s e o f f e n d e r s who p l e a d g u i l t y t h e c o s t i s a l s o f i x e d 
b u t a t a n amoun t < C ^ . T h u s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t i s 
w r i t t e n a s 
m m 
Y X . . C + I I . C = B (3-7) 
i l i p 2 i T 
1=1 - P i = l 
w h e r e i s 1 i f d e f e n d a n t i p l e a d s g u i l t y a n d z e r o o t h e r w i s e , X 2 i i s 
1 i f t h e d e f e n d a n t g o e s t o t r i a l a n d z e r o i f h e d o e s n o t , a n d B i s t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e c o n s t r a i n t s 
m 
1 = 1 
( 3 - 8 ) 
m 
I X - n 
i = l 
d e f i n e t h e number o f o f f e n d e r s who p l e a d s g u i l t y a n d who g o t o t r i a l , , 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , w h e r e m j> n • + p . T h e number o f o f f e n d e r s who a r e r e l e a s e d 
p r i o r t o t h e i r a r r a i g n m e n t i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
r = m - ( n + p ) 
W i t h t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f h i s b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r 
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m u s t d e t e r m i n e t h e o p t i m a l c o u p l e t { X ^ , f o r e a c h o f f e n d e r i . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e p r o s e c u t o r f i r s t d e t e r m i n e s t h e p a r a m e t e r s n , p a n d r 
a n d h e t h e n d e t e r m i n e s w h i c h o f f e n d e r s i a r e t o b e p r o s e c u t e d a n d how 
a c o n v i c t i o n m i g h t b e o b t a i n e d . T h u s , v i e w i n g t h i s a s a s e q u e n t i a l t w o -
s t a g e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r m u s t f i r s t s e l e c t t h e o f f e n d e r s 
t o b e p r o s e c u t e d , e i t h e r r e l e a s i n g o r d i s p o s i n g i n f o r m a l l y o f a l l o t h e r s . 
S e c o n d , h e " m u s t d e t e r m i n e a n d o f f e r p l e a b a r g a i n i n g s e n t e n c e s o f s u f ­
f i c i e n t l e n i e n c y t o m a i n t a i n a n o r d e r l y f l o w o f c a s e s t h r o u g h t h e c r i m i ­
n a l c o u r t s " [ 5 7 ; p . 2 1 ] . 
I n h i s s t u d y o f t h e d y n a m i c s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g , R h o d e s d i s c u s s e s 
two c a s e s w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e d i f f e r e n t a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e amount o f 
a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r o n e a c h d e f e n d a n t . F o r 
C a s e I , t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n w h e r e a s f o r C a s e I I t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r d o e s n o t h a v e a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n d e s c r i b i n g e i t h e r t h e 
d e f e n d a n t o r t h e c r i m e u n t i l a f t e r t h e f i r s t d e c i s i o n h a s b e e n m a d e . 
I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s a s s u m e d t o h a v e a c c u m u l a t e d s u f f i c i e n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n o n e a c h d e f e n d a n t p r i o r t o h i s d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r t o t r y a 
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i n c o u r t o r t o o f f e r a r e d u c e d c h a r g e i n e x c h a n g e f o r 
a g u i l t y p l e a . 
3 . 2 . 2 C a s e I D y n a m i c s 
F o r C a s e I , t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n o n e a c h 
o f f e n d e r p r i o r t o s e l e c t i n g t h o s e t o b e p r o s e c u t e d . He r a n k s t h e d e ­
f e n d a n t s b y h i s e s t i m a t e o f t h e i r c o n v i c t a b i l i t y , A n o f f e n d e r ' s 
c o n v i c t a b i l i t y i s d e f i n e d a s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f h i s b e i n g c o n v i c t e d f o r 
h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e , b u t i t e x c l u d e s a n y e f f e c t t h a t 
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s o u r c e e x p e n d i t u r e s u l t i m a t e l y h a v e u p o n t h e p r o b a -
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b i l i t y o f c o n v i c t i o n . T h u s , a n o f f e n d e r ' s c o n v i c t a b i l i t y i s c o m p o s e d 
o f t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : 
1. H i s a g e , r a c e a n d s e x , 
2. H i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , 
3. T h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e p r e s e n t o f f e n s e , 
4. T h e amoun t a n d q u a l i t y o f t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h i m , 
5. T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s e x p e n d i t u r e o n t h e c a s e , 
6. T h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t o d i s p o s e o f t h e c a s e . 
F r o m t h i s r a n k i n g o f d e f e n d a n t s , t h e h i g h <K c r i m i n a l s a r e t h o s e 
who a r e a l m o s t c e r t a i n t o p l e a d g u i l t y t o l e s s e r c h a r g e s i n o r d e r t o 
a v o i d t h e e x p e n s e s a n d p o t e n t i a l l y h a r s h e r s e n t e n c e s o f a t r i a l . T h e 
l o w $ . o f f e n d e r s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a r e c e r t a i n t o be r e l e a s e d i f t h e 
l 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e e x c e e d e d . T h o s e d e f e n d a n t s w h o s e 
$ a p p e a r s i n t h e m i d d l e p o r t i o n o f t h e c o n v i c t a b i l i t y c o n t i n u u m , h o w e v e r , 
may e i t h e r b e s e n t t o a t r i a l o r t h e y may n e g o t i a t e a g u i l t y p l e a . I f 
t h e s y s t e m i s i n e q u i l i b r i u m , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e h i g h $ ^ d e f e n d a n t s 
w o u l d p l e a d g u i l t y , w h e r e a s t h e l o w e r $ d e f e n d a n t s who a r e n o t r e ­
l e a s e d w i l l g o t o t r i a l . T h u s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r c a n q u i t e e a s i l y d e t e r ­
m i n e r , n a n d p u s i n g h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e s o f C T , C ^ , B a n d M w h e n t h e 
s y s t e m i s i n s t e a d y s t a t e . 
When t h e s y s t e m i s n o t i n s t e a d y s t a t e , h o w e v e r , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
o f X ^ ^ a n d b e c o m e s l e s s c l e a r . When a d e f e n d a n t f i r s t e n t e r s t h e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r , h i s c o n v i c t a b i l i t y i s e v a l u a t e d a n d h i s 
p o s i t i o n o n t h e $ ^ c o n t i n u u m i s r e s o l v e d . T h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r m u s t a d d r e s s i s s h o u l d t h e o f f e n d e r b e r e l e a s e d ? T h i s 
d e c i s i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o R h o d e s , i s m e r e l y a n e c o n o m i c o n e . I f t h e 
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d e f e n d a n t ' s $ . f a l l s b e l o w some t h r e s h o l d v a l u e ( d e t e r m i n e d s o t h a t 
1 
pC + nC = B ) , t h e n h e i s t o b e r e l e a s e d . F o r t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s e c o n d 
d e c i s i o n , t h e c r i t e r i a f o r s e n d i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g d e f e n d a n t s t o a t r i a l 
o r a l l o w i n g them t o n e g o t i a t e a g u i l t y p l e a i s l e s s p r e c i s e . O b v i o u s l y , 
t h o s e d e f e n d a n t s w h o s e $ ^ i s v e r y l o w w i l l g o t o t r i a l a n d t h o s e w h o s e 
$ ^ i s h i g h w i l l n e g o t i a t e g u i l t y p l e a s . H o w e v e r , f o r t h o s e d e f e n d a n t ' s 
w h o s e $ ^ i s n e a r t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t , R h o d e s a s s u m e s t h a t t h e s e o f f e n d e r s 
may b e f o r c e d i n t o e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , d e p e n d i n g o n s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c ­
t o r s . T h e f a c t o r s w h i c h R h o d e s e x p l o r e s a r e : 
1 . A n e x t e r n a l i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t ( t h a t i s , 
f r o m B t o B ' ) , 
2 . A n e x t e r n a l i n c r e a s e i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b u d g e t ( v i z , f r o m 
D . t o D ' . ) , a n d 
l l 
3 . A n i n c r e a s e i n t h e d e l a y a n o f f e n d e r e x p e r i e n c e s w h i l e 
a w a i t i n g a t r i a l . 
B e c a u s e R h o d e s ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e e f f e c t s o f a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e d e f e n d a n t 1 
b u d g e t w a s i n c o n c l u s i v e , t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r s h a l l n o t be e x p l o r e d 
f u r t h e r . 
A n i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t f r o m B t o B ' , a s s u m i n g 
a n d C r e m a i n u n c h a n g e d , i n c r e a s e s t h e number o f o f f e n d e r s p r o s e c u t e d 
P 
( n ' + p ' > n + p ) , i t r e d u c e s t h e number o f g u i l t y p l e a s ( p ' < p ) , a n d 
i t i n c r e a s e s t h e number o f t r i a l s ( n f > n ) . T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s a r e b a s e d 
u p o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f c o n v i c t i o n a t a t r i a l d e ­
c r e a s e s a s t h e number o f t r i a l s i n c r e a s e s , 
9 P . 
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and that the following condition holds, 
i < 0 




-—- (C - C ) + £.C 3n T p i T > 0 
a 3P. 
If • »R <s " V < 0 (3-9) 
9 ( n + P ) = _r c > 0 
3B ^i LT U* 
The length of the pre-trial delay at time t, d̂ ,, affects the 
prosecutor's disposition of offenders. Rhodes showed that if 
3 P . 3 2P 
3d. + P 3p3d 
then the effect of the pre-trial delay on the variables n, p and r is; 
Zap 
_3 
3d 2 8 P ' 
< 0 
In ad. -itm >o-
T / t 
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F o r t h i s t o b e t r u e , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f c o n v i c t i o n i s a s s u m e d t o d e ­
c r e a s e a s d ^ g e t s l a r g e : 
3 P . 
t 
i _ < 0. 
3 p 3 d t 
3 . 2 . 3 C a s e I I D y n a m i c s 
F o r t h e s e c o n d c a s e t h a t R h o d e s d e s c r i b e s , t h e p r o s e c u t o r d o e s 
n o t h a v e a n y i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e d e f e n d a n t s p r i o r t o s e l e c t i n g t h o s e t o 
b e p r o s e c u t e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e p r o s e c u t o r r a n d o m l y c h o o s e s t h e r 
d e f e n d a n t s t o b e r e l e a s e d o r i n f o r m a l l y t r e a t e d . T h e r e m a i n i n g ( n + p ) 
o f f e n d e r s a r e o n c e a g a i n r a n k e d b y t h e i r $ ^ i n o r d e r t o s e p a r a t e t h o s e 
t o b e s e n t t o t r i a l f r o m t h o s e who w i l l n e g o t i a t e a p l e a . T h e d y n a m i c s 
o f t h i s s e c o n d c a s e a r e i n e v e r y r e s p e c t i d e n t i c a l t o t h e d y n a m i c s 
d i s p l a y e d b y C a s e I , w i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n . When a p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t i s 
i n c r e a s e d , t h e n u m b e r p r o s e c u t e d w i l l l i k e w i s e i n c r e a s e ; h o w e v e r , b e ­
c a u s e t h e o f f e n d e r s a r e c h o s e n r a n d o m l y , t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s l i k e l y t o 
p r o s e c u t e a n o f f e n d e r w h o s e <K i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l o w e r t h a n t h e t h r e s h o l d 
w h i c h d i c t a t e s t h a t he be s e n t t o t r i a l . T h e r e f o r e , r a t h e r t h a n a 
c o n c o m i t a n t d e c l i n e i n t h e number o f g u i l t y p l e a s , t h e number o f o f f e n ­
d e r s s e n t t o t r i a l a s w e l l a s t h e number who p l e a d g u i l t y b o t h i n c r e a s e . 
R h o d e s s h o w s t h a t 




9n = 9p 
3 . 2 . 4 Summary 
T h e R h o d e s m o d e l d e s c r i b e s p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a s b e i n g a h i g h l y 
c o n s t r a i n e d , t w o - s t a g e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t u a l l y 
i n f l u e n c e s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d e c i s i o n s v e r y l i t t l e . F o r t h e f i r s t 
d e c i s i o n s t a g e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r m u s t s e p a r a t e t h e o f f e n d e r s i n t o two 
g r o u p s . On t h e f i r s t g r o u p o f o f f e n d e r s , h e s p e n d s a n e g l i g i b l e amoun t 
o f t i m e a n d r e s o u r c e s p e r c a s e t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t p u r s u i n g t h e c a s e 
f u r t h e r w o u l d u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t i n a d i s m i s s a l . On t h e s e c o n d g r o u p , 
h e i n t e n d s t o p r o s e c u t e e a c h c a s e u n t i l e i t h e r a c o u r t d i s p o s i t i o n 
o r a g u i l t y p l e a i s e x t r a c t e d . F o r t h i s l a t t e r g r o u p o f c a s e s , R h o d e s 
a s s u m e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r s p e n d s a f i x e d amoun t o n t h e d e f e n d a n t s who 
p l e a d g u i l t y a n d a s m a l l e r f i x e d amoun t o n t h o s e who g o t o t r i a l . T h u s , 
f o r h i s s e c o n d d e c i s i o n h e m u s t p r o m i s e t h e same s e n t e n c i n g l e n i e n c y 
f o r e a c h g u i l t y p l e a b e c a u s e no o n e c a s e i s s i n g l e d o u t f o r s p e c i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( i . e . , e x t r a r e s o u r c e e x p e n d i t u r e s ) . O f t h o s e o f f e n d e r s 
who d o n o t p l e a d g u i l t y , t h e y a r e g i v e n a c o u r t t r i a l w h e r e a h a r s h e r 
s e n t e n c e i s e x p e c t e d u p o n c o n v i c t i o n . 
R h o d e s a n a l y z e s t h e d y n a m i c s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g b y p o s t u l a t i n g 
a c o n v i c t a b i l i t y f u n c t i o n w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e t r u e a n d known v a l u e o f 
t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s b e i n g c o n v i c t e d p r i o r t o h i s e x p e n d i n g 
t i m e a n d money f o r h i s d e f e n s e . F o r t h e two s c e n a r i o s t h a t R h o d e s 
a n a l y z e s , t h e c o n v i c t a b i l i t y o f e a c h d e f e n d a n t i s a s s u m e d t o b e a v a i l a ­
b l e f o r b o t h d e c i s i o n s i n C a s e I I w h i l e i t i s a v a i l a b l e o n l y f o r t h e 
s e c o n d d e c i s i o n i n C a s e I . T h e s i g n s o f t h e p a r t i a l d e r i v a t i v e s o f 
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t h e number o f o f f e n d e r s who a r e p r o s e c u t e d , who p l e a d g u i l t y , a n d who 
g o t o t r i a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o c h a n g e s i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t a n d t o 
c h a n g e s i n t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y a r e s u m m a r i z e d i n T a b l e 2 f o r e a c h 
s i t u a t i o n . 
T a b l e 2. T h e E f f e c t s o n P l e a B a r g a i n i n g o f C h a n g e s i n t h e C J S 
\ . C h a n g e s i n 
\ t h e C J S 
I n c r e a s e 
P r o s e c u t o r ' s 
B u d g e t , B 
I n c r e a s e 
P r e - T r i a l 
D e l a y , d t 
P r o s e c u t o r ' s \ 
D i s p o s i t i o n \ . C a s e 1 C a s e 2 C a s e 1 C a s e 2 
Number o f 
O f f e n d e r s 
P r o s e c u t e d ( n + p ) 
+ + — — 
Number o f 
O f f e n d e r s S e n t 
t o T r i a l ( n ) 
+ + + + 
Number o f 
O f f e n d e r s Who 
P l e a d G u i l t y ( p ) 
+ — — 
N o t e : A " + " i n d i c a t e s t h e c h a n g e c a u s e s a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f 
o c c u r r e n c e s o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g e v e n t ; a " - " i m p l i e s a r e d u c t i o n . 
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3 . 3 A C a r e e r C r i m i n a l M o d e l 
O f t h e two e c o n o m i c m o d e l s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g d e v e l o p e d b y 
L a n d e s a n d R h o d e s , t h e m e c h a n i s m s d e s c r i b e d b y R h o d e s a r e m o r e 
r e a d i l y i m p l e m e n t e d i n a d i g i t a l s i m u l a t i o n l i k e t h a t p r o p o s e d f o r 
t h i s r e s e a r c h . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e m o d e l p r o p o s e d b y L a n d e s d o e s n o t 
a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f d e f e n d a n t r e l e a s e ( R h o d e s ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n p o i n t ) 
a n d t h e r e b y i g n o r e s p a r t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g t h a t w o u l d 
o t h e r w i s e e n r i c h s u c h a s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l . T h e t w o - s t a g e d e c i s i o n 
s t r u c t u r e a l s o l e n d s i t s e l f r e a d i l y t o t h e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e C J S . 
T h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n ( t o r e l e a s e t h e d e f e n d a n t ) may be 
e x e r c i s e d e i t h e r b e f o r e , a f t e r , o r b o t h b e f o r e a n d a f t e r t h e g r a n d j u r y 
h e a r i n g ; h i s s e c o n d d e c i s i o n w o u l d a c t u a l l y o c c u r p r i o r t o t h e a r r a i g n ­
men t h e a r i n g , b u t w o u l d n o t a f f e c t t h e f l o w s o f d e f e n d a n t s u n t i l 
i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h i s h e a r i n g . ( S e e C h a p t e r I V , S e c t i o n 4 . 2 . ) 
B e c a u s e o f t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e R h o d e s m o d e l i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i t i s 
u s e d a s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n 
m o d e l d e v e l o p e d f o r t h i s t h e s i s . I t s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i s d i s c u s s e d a l o n g 
w i t h t h e o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l i n S e c t i o n 4 . 2 o f C h a p t e r 
I V , 
A l t h o u g h t h e m o d e l i t s e l f d o e s n o t h a v e a n y s e v e r e s h o r t c o m i n g s , 
R h o d e s ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e m o d e l w a s r e s t r i c t e d . A l t h o u g h h e e x a m i n e d t h e 
d y n a m i c s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g u n d e r s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s , h e f a i l e d t o d e s ­
c r i b e t h e e f f e c t s o f s e v e r a l c a s e - s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s w h i c h i n f l u e n c e b o t h 
o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d e c i s i o n s . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s a p p a r e n t o v e r s i g h t 
i s t h a t R h o d e s c h o s e t o a n a l y z e t h o s e f a c t o r s w h i c h a f f e c t t h e o u t c o m e 
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o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g , b u t w h i c h a r e e x o g e n o u s i n p u t s t o t h e p l e a b a r ­
g a i n i n g m o d e l . F r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , he a g g r e g a t e d s e v e r a l c a s e -
s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s w h i c h w o u l d o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
e s t i m a t e o f a d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t a b i l i t y u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g o f a p r i o r i 
i n f o r m a t i o n . 
I t i s t h e o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s s e c t i o n t o p o s t u l a t e t h e d y n a m i c s o f 
two f a c t o r s w h i c h a f f e c t a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e ' s o u t c o m e , t h e s e v e r i t y o f 
t h e c u r r e n t c r i m e a n d t h e t o t a l number o f t i m e s a d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n 
a r r e s t e d . ( T h e s e v e r i t y o f a n o f f e n s e m i g h t b e d e t e r m i n e d , f o r e x a m p l e , 
b y u s i n g S e l l i n a n d W o l f g a n g ' s c r i m e s e r i o u s n e s s s c a l e [ 6 0 ] . ) I n c o r ­
p o r a t i n g t h e s e two b i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t a b i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n t h e m e c h a n i c s o f R h o d e s ' s m o d e l i s a u g m e n t e d b y t h e i n d i ­
v i d u a l i t y o f e a c h c a s e . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e s u l t i n g s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l 
a l l o w s c a s e - s p e c i f i c i s s u e s w h i c h o t h e r w i s e w o u l d be l o s t i n a n a g g r e ­
g a t e m o d e l t o b e e x p l o r e d u s i n g d i g i t a l s i m u l a t i o n . B y s e l e c t i n g t h e 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y a s o n e o f t h e s e i n f o r m a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s , 
t h e i m p a c t o f t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l i n r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n e d e n v i r o n m e n t s 
c a n e x p l i c i t l y b e e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h u s i n g s u c h a s i m u l a r m o d e l . 
3 . 3 . 1 M o d e l E q u a t i o n s 
T h e e q u a t i o n s w h i c h d e s c r i b e t h i s m o d e l o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g h a v e 
n o t c h a n g e d f r o m R h o d e s ' s f o r m u l a t i o n . O n l y t h e m o d e l d y n a m i c s h a s 
c h a n g e d b y p o s t u l a t i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n t o 
t h e o u t c o m e s o f t h i s p r o c e s s . 
3 . 3 . 2 M o d e l D y n a m i c s 
I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e d y n a m i c s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g when c a s e - s p e c i f i c 
58 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s m a i n ­
t a i n e d b e t w e e n C a s e I when a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e a n d C a s e I I 
when i t i s n o t . U n d e r t h e s c e n a r i o o f C a s e I I , t h e no a p r i o r i i n f o r ­
m a t i o n r u l e p r e v e n t s t h e p r o s e c u t o r f r o m k n o w i n g b e f o r e h i s f i r s t 
d e c i s i o n e i t h e r t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e p r e s e n t o f f e n s e o r t h e o f f e n d e r ' s 
c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y ; h o w e v e r , b o t h p i e c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n b e c o m e a v a i l a b l e 
t o h i m p r i o r t o h i s f i r s t d e c i s i o n f o r C a s e I a n d f o l l o w i n g t h e f i r s t 
d e c i s i o n f o r C a s e I I . 
F o r t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t s h a l l be a s s u m e d t h a t t h e c o s t o f a c q u i r i n g 
c r i m e - s p e c i f i c k n o w l e d g e d o e s n o t d i r e c t l y i m p a c t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
b u d g e t . I t i s f u r t h e r a s s u m e d t h a t t h e p o l i c e i n t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
d e t e r m i n e t h e s e v e r i t y , s_^ , o f e a c h o f f e n d e r ' s c r i m e a n d t h a t t h e y t r a n s ­
m i t i t t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r a t no a d d i t i o n a l c o s t t o e i t h e r . F o r t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e number o f o f f e n s e s a n o f f e n d e r h a s a l r e a d y c o m m i t ­
t e d , t h e c o s t o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e t r i e v a l s y s t e m n e c e s s a r y 
t o s t o r e s u c h d a t a i s a s s u m e d t o b e c o v e r e d b y g r a n t s f r o m o t h e r C J S 
a g e n c i e s w h i c h t h e n m a k e i t a v a i l a b l e a t no e x t r a c o s t t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r . 
T h u s , f o r e i t h e r b i t o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o b e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r , 
a n d C p a r e n o t i n c r e a s e d a n d a n y e f f e c t o n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a 
d e f e n d a n t i s t h e u n c o n f o u n d e d e f f e c t o f t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n 
o n $ . . 
1 
When t h e s e v e r i t y o f e a c h o f f e n s e i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r , 
t h e c o n v i c t a b i l i t y o f d e f e n d a n t i i s a s s u m e d t o v a r y a s 
3 $ . 
3 s . 
l 
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F r o m t h e e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n o f R h o d e s ' s m o d e l , a n o f f e n d e r ' s p r e f e r e n c e 
f o r a g u i l t y p l e a i n c r e a s e s a s <K i n c r e a s e s . T h u s , f o r a h o m o g e n e o u s 
o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n whose d i s t r i b u t i o n o f o f f e n s e s e v e r i t y s c o r e s i s 
s y m m e t r i c w i t h c o n s t a n t mean s , a n o f f e n d e r w i t h s ^ > s i s m o r e l i k e l y 
t o p l e a d g u i l t y t h a n a n o f f e n d e r w i t h s ^ _< s , a l l o t h e r f a c t o r s 
b e i n g e q u a l . When s ^ i s a l s o a v a i l a b l e p r i o r t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s f i r s t 
d e c i s i o n , t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s m o r e l i k e l y t o r e l e a s e t h o s e o f f e n d e r s w h o s e 
s . < s t h a n t h o s e w h o s e s . > s . T h e s e r e s u l t s a r e d i s p l a y e d i n T a b l e 3. 
T a b l e 3 . T h e E f f e c t s o f C a s e - S p e c i f i c I n f o r m a t i o n o n P l e a B a r g a i n i n g 
\ C a s e - S p e c i f i c 
\ I n f o r m a t i o n 
A b o v e A v e r a g e 
C r i m e S e v e r i t y 
A b o v e A v e r a g e 
Number o f P r e ­
v i o u s A r r e s t s 
P r o s e c u t o r ' s \ 
D i s p o s i t i o n \ ^ 
C a s e 1 C a s e 2 C a s e 1 C a s e 2 
P r o b a b i l i t y 
O f f e n d e r i 
i s P r o s e c u t e d 
+ 0 + 0 
P r o b a b i l i t y 
O f f e n d e r i 
g o e s t o T r i a l 
— — — — 
P r o b a b i l i t y 
O f f e n d e r i 
P l e a d s G u i l t y 
+ + + + 
N o t e : A " + " i n d i c a t e s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n c r e a s e s t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f 
a d i s p o s i t i o n ; " 0 " i n d i c a t e s c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t 
a v a i l a b l e ; " - " i m p l i e s a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a d i s p o s i t i o n . 
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T h e a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e h o m o g e n e i t y o f t h e o f f e n d e r p o p u ­
l a t i o n a n d t h e s y m m e t r y o f t h e s ^ d i s t r i b u t i o n a r e v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o t h i s 
a n a l y s i s . I n e s s e n c e , t h e y e n a b l e t h e a n a l y s i s o f c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r ­
m a t i o n u n e n c u m b e r e d b y t h e phenomena w h i c h R h o d e s e v a l u a t e d . I f t h e s e 
ap. 
a s s u m p t i o n s h a d n o t b e e n m a d e , t h e f a c t o r s - — , £ . a n d d e f i n e d 
dn 1 1 
e a r l i e r w o u l d i m p a c t how t h e p r o s e c u t o r r e l a t e s t o c h a n g e s i n a n i n d i ­
v i d u a l o f f e n d e r ' s s ^ . H o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s h a v e b e e n m a d e , 
s u c h e f f e c t s c a n s a f e l y b e i g n o r e d . 
I f t h e c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y o f e a c h o f f e n d e r i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r i n s t e a d o f t h e s e v e r i t y o f a n o f f e n s e , t h e c o n v i c t a b i l i t y 
o f a n o f f e n d e r i s a l s o d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d b y t h e number o f t i m e s a ^ 
t h a t h e h a s a l r e a d y b e e n a r r e s t e d , 
3 $ . 
3 a . 
l 
F o r t h e same r e a s o n a s d e s c r i b e d when s . i s a v a i l a b l e , i f a n o f f e n d e r 
l 
s h o w s a g r e a t e r t h a n n o r m a l p r o p e n s i t y t o r e c i d i v a t e ( a s d e m o n s t r a t e d 
b y a ^ ) , t h e n h e i s a l s o m o r e i n c l i n e d t o n e g o t i a t e a g u i l t y p l e a i n 
o r d e r t o g u a r a n t e e f o r h i m s e l f a s m a l l e r s e n t e n c e . S i m i l a r l y , i f a ^ 
i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g e r e c i d i v i s m o f a n o f f e n d e r a , t h e o f f e n d e r 
i s m o r e l i k e l y t o b e p r o s e c u t e d t h a n n o t , a s s u m i n g a l l o t h e r f a c t o r s 
r e m a i n c o n s t a n t . F o r r e a s o n s s t a t e d e a r l i e r , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
r a n d o m v a r i a b l e a ^ i s a l s o a s s u m e d t o be s y m m e t r i c w h i l e t h e o f f e n d e r 
p o p u l a t i o n i s a s s u m e d h o m o g e n e o u s . 
T h e r e s u l t s o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s k n o w i n g t h e a_^ f o r e a c h o f f e n d e r 
i s s u m m a r i z e d i n T a b l e 3. 
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3 . 4 Summary 
R e p e a t i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s c h a p t e r , i t w a s d e s i r e d t o show 
t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p r e s e n t s a v i a b l e 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f a n o t h e r w i s e u n t e n a b l e p r o c e s s . T h e t r e a t m e n t i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r h a s e x a m i n e d two o p p o s i n g e c o n o m i c v i e w s o f t h i s p r o c e s s . T h e 
L a n d e s m o d e l p r e s e n t e d a P a r e t o o p t i m a l o u t c o m e o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g ; t h e 
R h o d e s m o d e l i n t r o d u c e d t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e c o u r t s a r e o v e r - w o r k e d 
a n d u n d e r - s t a f f e d a n d , a s a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h a t p l e a b a r g a i n i n g i s s u b j e c t 
t o many i n f l u e n c e s w h i c h a r e b e y o n d t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d i r e c t c o n t r o l . 
I n d e v e l o p i n g a m e t h o d o l o g y f o r t h e t r e a t m e n t o f o f f e n d e r s b y t h e 
c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t o r , R h o d e s ' s m o d e l h a s b e e n u s e d a s a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r 
t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f c a s e - s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s w h i c h a f f e c t p l e a b a r g a i n i n g . 
S e c t i o n 3 . 2 d i s c u s s e d t h e a f f e c t t h a t t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y a n d t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t h a v e o n p l e a b a r g a i n i n g o u t c o m e s , a n d S e c t i o n 3 . 3 
d e s c r i b e d t h e e f f e c t when t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e o f f e n s e a n d t h e o f f e n d e r ' s 
c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y a r e k n o w n . T h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c factors 
w a s r e s t r i c t e d i n t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t a n d t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y 
w e r e a s s u m e d t o n o t c h a n g e a n d t h e r e b y c o n f o u n d t h e r e s u l t s . O t h e r 
a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e d t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c 
f a c t o r s a r e t h e h o m o g e n e i t y o f t h e o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n a n d t h e s y m m e t r y 
o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f c r i m e s e v e r i t y a n d t h e number o f p r e v i o u s a r ­
r e s t s . I f a n y o f t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s i s v i o l a t e d , t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e s i n c e o t h e r f a c t o r s 
w h i c h d i c t a t e t h e o u t c o m e when t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y c h a n g e s now a f f e c t 
t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c p a r t i a l d e r i v a t i v e s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i f t h e c o s t o f 
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t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n i s p a s s e d a l o n g t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r , t h a t 
a n a l y s i s i s i n v a l i d b e c a u s e t h e o p t i m a l m i x o f o f f e n d e r s w i l l c h a n g e a s 
a r e s u l t o f t h e h i g h e r c o s t s o f f u l l y p r o s e c u t i n g o f f e n d e r s . 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r , R h o d e s ' s m o d e l a n d two c a s e - s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s 
h a v e b o t h b e e n e x a m i n e d u n d e r two d i f f e r e n t s c e n a r i o s . T h e f i r s t 
s c e n a r i o , C a s e I , a s s u m e s t h a t a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r b e f o r e h e d e c i d e s e i t h e r t o p r o s e c u t e a d e f e n d a n t o r t o 
r e l e a s e h i m . F o r C a s e I I , h o w e v e r , no a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e . 
I n t u i t i v e l y , t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f C a s e I s e e m s t o m o r e a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e 
t h e s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a n a l y z e d h e r e ( v i z , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t , 
t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y , a n d a d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m e s e v e r i t y a n d o f f e n s e h i s ­
t o r y ) . T h u s , f o r t h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l d e v e l o p e d f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h , t h e 
p l e a b a r g a i n i n g c o m p o n e n t i s b a s e d u p o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o f C a s e I , n o t 
C a s e I I . A n y i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s t o r e c e i v e i s a s s u m e d 
t o be a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e moment a c a s e i s a s s i g n e d t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r . 
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C H A P T E R I V 
A NETWORK S I M U L A T I O N MODEL OF THE C J S 
4 . 0 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
I n C h a p t e r I I , t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f t h e t e c h ­
n o l o g y o f C J S m o d e l i n g s h o w e d how s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l s h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o m i s e f o r t h e h o l i s t i c a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e e v a l u ­
a t i o n o f s e n t e n c i n g a n d p l e a b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . A m o d e l w h i c h c o m ­
b i n e s t h e q u e u e i n g , r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n , c o s t a n d r e c i d i v i s m c o m p o n e n t s 
d e s c r i b e d i n t h e s e e a r l i e r e f f o r t s w o u l d be a n e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e f i e l d . One s u c h m o d e l , D O T S I M , a p p a r e n t l y a p p r o a c h e d 
t h i s g o a l , b u t i t l a c k e d d e t a i l i n i t s r e c i d i v i s m c o m p o n e n t a n d a m o d e l 
o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g w a s n o n e x i s t e n t . S u b s e q u e n t l y , i n C h a p t e r I I I e c o n o m i c 
m o d e l s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g w e r e d e s c r i b e d i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p a f o u n d a t i o n 
f o r c r e a t i n g a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g c o m p o n e n t i n a s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l o f t h e 
C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m . T h e m e c h a n i c s o f p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s w e r e d i s c u s s e d 
i n l e n g t h a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f c h a n g e s i n t h e l e n g t h o f t h e p r e - t r i a l 
d e l a y , i n t h e s i z e o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t , a n d i n t h e amoun t o f c a s e -
s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r w e r e e x a m i n e d . 
T h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o d e s c r i b e a c o m p u t e r s i m u l a t i o n 
m o d e l w h i c h p o s s e s s t h e d e s i r e d a t t r i b u t e s . 
4 . 1 T h e G e n e r a l i z e d N e t w o r k S i m u l a t o r 
I n o r d e r t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e d i v e r s e d i m e n s i o n s o f c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e 
s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l s i n t o o n e e f f o r t , t h e G e n e r a l i z e d N e t w o r k S i m u l a t o r ( G N S ) 
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h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d a s t h e s i m u l a r v e h i c l e f o r t h i s t h e s i s . H i s t o r i c a l l y , 
GNS e v o l v e d f r o m t h e G e n e r a l E v a l u a t i o n a n d R e v i e w T e c h n i q u e S i m u l a t o r 
( G E R T S ) s e r i e s o f n e t w o r k m o d e l s [ 3 7 ] [ 6 9 ] . C o m b i n i n g i n t o o n e s i m u l a ­
t o r t h e q u e u e i n g , r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n , a n d c o s t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t w e r e 
o t h e r w i s e a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Q, R , a n d C v e r s i o n s o f G E R T S I I I , GNS i s a 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o o l f o r u s e b y p l a n n e r s o f a v a r i e t y o f s y s t e m s i n c l u d i n g 
c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e . A l t h o u g h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f GNS may b e f o u n d i n o t h e r 
r e f e r e n c e s , a n o v e r v i e w o f i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s f o l l o w s . 
U n l i k e o t h e r n e t w o r k r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , GNS r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e n o d e s 
r e p r e s e n t a c t i v i t i e s a n d t h a t t h e a r c s p o r t r a y p r e c e d e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
b e t w e e n t h e n o d e s . GNS d i f f e r s f r o m many n e t w o r k f l o w m o d e l s i n t h a t t h e 
n o d e s f o r t h e s e o t h e r m o d e l s r e p r e s e n t e i t h e r t h e i n i t i a t i n g o r t e r m i n a t ­
i n g e v e n t s o f t h e a c t i v i t y r e p r e s e n t e d a l o n g t h e a r c . I n e i t h e r c a s e , 
e n t i t i e s t r a v e l t h r o u g h t h e n e t w o r k a l o n g t h e a r c s . I f m u l t i p l e a r c s 
l e a v e a p a r t i c u l a r n o d e , GNS a l l o w s t h e u s e r t o c h o o s e t h e m e t h o d o f a r c 
s e l e c t i o n : i t may b e p r o b a b i l i s t i c o r i t may b e a s p e c i a l u s e r - d e s i g n e d 
r u l e . 
T e c h n i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e n o d e s o f t h e GNS n e t w o r k a r e r e f e r r e d t o 
a s e i t h e r n o d e s o r b o x e s , t h e f o r m e r r e p r e s e n t i n g a n e v e n t w i t h a d u r a t i o n 
o f z e r o a n d t h e l a t t e r r e p r e s e n t i n g an a c t i v i t y w i t h a p o s i t i v e d u r a t i o n . 
A c e r t a i n t y p e o f b o x , c a l l e d a q u e u e b o x , a l s o a l l o w s t h e m o d e l - b u i l d e r 
t o s p e c i f y t h e max imum number o f s e r v e r s a v a i l a b l e w h i c h , when a l l s e r v e r s 
a r e b u s y c r e a t e s a q u e u e o f e n t i t i e s w a i t i n g t o b e s e r v e d . O n l y o n e s e r ­
v e r i s r e q u i r e d t o p r o c e s s e a c h e n t i t y , b u t a n u n l i m i t e d number o f r e ­
s o u r c e s o f n o m o r e t h a n 3 0 t y p e s may a l s o be r e q u i r e d t o p r o c e s s e a c h 
e n t i t y . A n u n l i m i t e d number o f s e r v e r s c a n b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h q u e u e 
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b o x , b u t r e s o u r c e s may be s h a r e d b e t w e e n two o r mo re q u e u e b o x e s . 
GNS h a s s e v e r a l c o s t i n g o p t i o n s w h i c h may be i m p l e m e n t e d a t a 
u s e r ' s d i s c r e t i o n . F i r s t , t h e r e may be c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 
e n t i r e p r o j e c t ( m o d e l ) : a o n e - t i m e s e t - u p c o s t a n d a n o v e r h e a d c o s t 
p e r t i m e p e r i o d . S e c o n d , t h e r e may b e c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h q u e u e 
b o x : a o n e - t i m e s e t - u p c o s t a n d a c o s t o f o p e r a t i n g a b o x e a c h t i m e 
p e r i o d . F i n a l l y , s i n c e e a c h q u e u e b o x may a l s o r e q u i r e r e s o u r c e s t o 
p r o c e s s a n e n t i t y , e a c h r e s o u c e may h a v e a c o s t p e r u n i t t i m e o f u s e t h a t i s 
a l s o a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e b o x . H e n c e , t h e c o s t i n g c a p a b i l i t y 
i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e . 
T h e l a s t o f G N S ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s d i s c u s s e d h e r e d e a l s w i t h t h e c o n ­
c e p t o f t h e u s e r - c o n t r o l l e d b o x ( o r n o d e ) . S u c h a b o x a l l o w s t h e u s e r 
t o c r e a t e h i s own FORTRAN l o g i c t o a u g m e n t t h e a v a i l a b l e f a c i l i t i e s . 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , GNS a l l o w s t h e s t a r t c o n t r o l b o x a n d t h e e n d c o n t r o l b o x . 
I n t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e u s e r p r o v i d e s a d d i t i o n a l l o g i c t o be e x e c u t e d 
w h e n e v e r a n e n t i t y l e a v e s t h e a s s o c i a t e d queue a n d e n t e r s t h e i n - p r o g r e s s 
l i s t o f t h e b o x . T h e e n d c o n t r o l b o x s e r v e s t h e same f u n c t i o n a s t h e 
s t a r t c o n t r o l b o x , h o w e v e r , t h e u s e r ' s l o g i c i s e x e c u t e d o n l y when a n 
e n t i t y ' s s e r v i c e a t t h e b o x i s c o m p l e t e d a n d i t i s r e a d y t o l e a v e t h e 
f a c i l i t y . T h i s c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p l y a d d i t i o n a l l o g i c t o t h e s t o c h a s t i c 
n e t w o r k i s a n a s s e t f o r a n y s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l ; i t h a s b e e n u s e d e x t e n s i v e l y 
f o r t h i s m o d e l o f t h e C J S . 
A l t h o u g h GNS p o s s e s s e s many o t h e r f e a t u r e s , t h o s e t h a t h a v e b e e n 
m e n t i o n e d a r e o f p r i m a r y u s e f o r t h e p r e s e n t a n a l y s i s . ( T h e i n t e r e s t e d 
r e a d e r i s r e f e r r e d t o [ 3 6 ] , [ 3 7 ] , [ 3 8 ] , a n d [ 6 9 ] f o r f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n . ) 
T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e s e c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t o a s i n g l e m o d e l r e q u i r e s a 
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g r e a t d e a l o f c o m p u t e r t i m e a n d s t o r a g e c a p a c i t y . S i n c e t h e c o m p u t e r i n 
u s e i s a CDC C y b e r 7 4 , t h e e x e c u t i o n t i m e o f t h e m o d e l w i l l h a v e b e e n 
r e d u c e d o v e r t h e e x e c u t i o n t i m e o f o t h e r h a r d w a r e s y s t e m s , b u t t h e c o r e 
r e q u i r e d t o e x e c u t e t h i s m o d e l i s s t i l l l a r g e c o m p a r e d t o , s a y , J U S S I M I I . 
H o w e v e r , s i n c e GNS a l r e a d y p o s s e s s e s t h e d e s i r e d a t t r i b u t e s f o r t h i s m o d e l 
o f t h e C J S , i t i s u s e d w i t h t h e s e p r e c a u t i o n s i n m i n d . 
4 . 2 T h e S i m u l a t i o n Mode l 
4 . 2 . 1 M o d e l O v e r v i e w 
T h e GNS m o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m i s d i s p l a y e d i n F i g u r e 
1 . I t i s a f e e d b a c k m o d e l s i m i l a r t o t h a t d e v e l o p e d b y B e l k i n , B l u m s t e i n 
a n d G l a s s , h o w e v e r , e a c h o f f e n d e r i s m o d e l e d s e p a r a t e l y i n a m a n n e r s i m i ­
l a r t o D O T S I M . B y s i m u l a t i n g e a c h o f f e n d e r a s h e p r o g r e s s e s t h r o u g h t h e 
C J S , t h e d e l a y s i n t h e s y s t e m c a n b e s i m u l a t e d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e e m p h a s i s 
o n t h e o f f e n d e r a n d t h e s p e c i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f GNS e n a b l e t h e a n a l y s i s 
o f t h e e f f e c t s t h a t l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s h a v e o n t h e s y s t e m . S i n c e t h e 
r e s o u r c e s a r e f r e q u e n t l y s h a r e d b e t w e e n two o r m o r e q u e u e b o x e s , e a c h 
o f f e n d e r m u s t a l s o c o m p e t e f o r t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e a v a i l a b l e . H e n c e , 
t h e o b s e r v e d q u e u e i n g b e h a v i o r may be c o n f o u n d e d b y l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s . 
T h i s i s o n e i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h i s m o d e l t o C J S a n a l y s i s ; t h e 
a b i l i t y t o m o d e l t h e e f f e c t o f s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s i n t h i s m a n n e r h a s n o t 
b e e n a t t e m p t e d h e r e t o f o r e . 
T h e d i a g r a m i n F i g u r e 1 i s d r a w n u s i n g t h e n o t a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d 
f o r GNS [ 3 7 ] [ 6 9 ] . T h e b o x e s r e p r e s e n t a c t i v i t i e s , w h i l e t h e c i r c l e s a n d 
s e m i - c i r c l e s r e p r e s e n t e v e n t s . S t a r t a n d e n d c o n t r o l l o g i c i s r e p r e s e n t e d 
b y s h a d i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e b o x o r n o d e c l o s e s t t o t h e i n p u t o r t h e o u t p u t 
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F i g u r e 1. A GNS M o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m 
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of the activity. Queue boxes are represented as rectangles with a 
circle intersecting the box's inputs. Each queue box has associated 
with it exponentially distributed service times specified for each 
crime type. (Other service distributions could have been chosen, but 
were not for simplicity.) CJS resources are also specified; each 
server in the model corresponds to one unit of at least one type of 
resource. Thus, for each offender processed at a queue box, at least 
one resouce unit is being consumed and its cost added to the cost of 
the system. 
Whenever the portion of a node closest to its output is pointed, 
offenders are routed to one of the node's successor activities proba­
bilistically. Unless specified otherwise, the branching probabilities 
for each arc are a function of the offender's crime alone. For boxes, 
if the corners on the output side of the box are removed, then branching 
probabilities determine where an offender will be routed. Unless 
otherwise directed, these probabilities are also functions exclusively 
of the offender's crime. 
Another special event is the sink node. This node is differentiated 
from the other nodes by its half moon shape. The function of these nodes 
is to remove offenders from the simulation lists. For this particular 
model, this happens only if an offender dies (Node 3) or if he is never 
re-arrested (Nodes 7, 18, 27, 34, 35, 36 and 46). 
Of the many attributes which could have been generated for each 
offender, only the following are actually saved for each offender: 
1. Current Age 
2. Race and Sex 
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3. Age at death 
4. Career Criminal Cost 
5. Total number of arrests 
6. Types of offenses committed 
The offender's age at death is stored to prevent the time consuming 
regeneration of this age. The extra storage capacity required to store 
this attribute is considered an acceptable trade-off to the extra 
simulation time needed to regenerate it whenever needed. 
The crime categories simulated are the FBI's seven index offenses: 
1. Homicide 
2. Robbery 
3. Aggrevated Assault 
4. Burglary 
5. Grand larceny 
6. Auto Theft 
7. Forcible Rape 
These offenses have been chosen for the representativeness of their rates 
of commission vis-a-vis all other felonies and for the readily available 
data that exists. Each time an offender is arrested, it is assumed that 
he has committed only one offense. This assumption is consistent with 
earlier models; it simplifies the model considerably. 
4.2.2 The Cost Model 
The individual offender orientation of this simulation model enables 
the calculation of the expected number of times an offender is arrested 
during his criminal career in addition to the expected career criminal 
cost. Both of these performance measures have been used in previous works 
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(cf., Chapter II). The manner in which an offender's career criminal 
cost is determined is very similar to that used by Pittman; all set-up 
costs are assumed zero. The fixed costs of operating the CJS per time 
period and of operating each queue box are also assumed zero. The only 
mechanism used to impute the cost of operating the CJS to each offender 
is through the usage of resources. The actual career criminal cost for 
th 
the i offender, (CCC)^, is updated by the amount of each resource k 
required for processing him at activity e by the relation 
(CCC). = (CCC). + I C k T e. R e k > (4-1) 
k 
where C, is the cost of resource k per offender per time, T . is the 
processing time of offender i at activity e, and R is one if resource 
ek 
k is required to process offenders at activity e and it is zero other­
wise . 
For this analysis it is assumed that ten different resource types 
are sufficient to describe the resource scarcity and queueing interaction. 
(See Table 4.) This level of aggregation, although not absolutely ne­
cessary, simplifies this model and it reduces the time required to 
collect the additional data that otherwise would be required. Since each 
resource unit at this level of aggregation most likely does not correspond 
to an actual server (e.g., judge or prosecutor), each resource must be 
distributed to the queue boxes which require the specific resource type, 
to an actual server (e.g., judge or prosecutor), each resource must be 
distributed to the various queue boxes whose R ^ = !• Although the best 
way to distribute these resources is to conduct sensitivity studies on 
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t h e f i n a l m o d e l t o d e t e r m i n e how many u n i t s o f e a c h r e s o u r c e s h o u l d b e 
r e q u i r e d b y e a c h m o d e l e d s e r v e r t o p r o c e s s a s i n g l e o f f e n d e r , t h i s h a s 
n o t b e e n d o n e . I n s t e a d , e a c h q u e u e b o x e w h i c h r e q u i r e s r e s o u r c e t y p e 
k i s a s s u m e d t o u s e t h e r e s o u r c e a s e f f f i c i e n t l y a s a n y o t h e r p r o c e s s o r . 
H e n c e , R . = 0 o r 1 f o r a l l e a n d k . T h e c o s t o f e a c h r e s o u r c e i s 
e k 
t h e r e f o r e c o n s t a n t o v e r a l l C J S p r o c e s s o r s . T h e a c t u a l c o s t o f u t i l i ­
z i n g e a c h r e s o u c e a n d t h e maximum a v a i l a b i l i t y o f e a c h t y p e i s d e t e r m i n e d 
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r , S e c t i o n 5 . 2 . 
T a b l e 4 . C J S M o d e l R e s o u r c e s 
R e s o u r c e Number R e s o u r c e T y p e Queue B o x Numbers 
1 P r o s e c u t i o n 2 3 , 2 8 , 3 7 , 39 
CM P o l i c e 5 
3 S u p e r i o r C o u r t 3 7 , 39 
4 O t h e r C o u r t s 
oo 9 , 2 1 , 25 
5 G r a n d J u r y 28 
6 J u v e n i l e C o r r e c t i o n s 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 15 
7 A d u l t I n c a r c e r a t i o n 2 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 51 
oo P a r o l e a n d P r o b a t i o n 4 2 , 45 
9 P r e - T r i a l D e t e n t i o n 1 0 , 22 
1 0 I n d i g e n t D e f e n s e 2 5 , 39 
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What follows is a description of the model displayed in Figure 1 
as well as of the assumptions and the mechanisms underlying this struc­
ture. Each remaining subdivision of the chapter examines one of the 
major components of the CJS: Police Subsystem, Prosecution and Court 
Subsystem, Correction Subsystem, Juvenile Justice Subsystem, and 
Recidivism Model. 
4.2.3 The Police Subsystem 
Of all the subsystems in the model, the police subsystem is the 
least detailed as far as the actual CJS operation goes. The greatest 
number of articifial devices are employed here. This subsystem consists 
of four processors. 
Table 5. Elements of the Police Subsystem 
Activity Number Description 
1 Virgin Arrest Forecaster 
2 Virgin Arrests 
3 Offender's Death 
5 Total Police Arrests 
Box 1, Virgin Arrest Forecaster. This event generates at the be­
ginning of each simulated month a forecast of the number of persons who 
are arrested for the first time for each of the seven index offenses. 
By assuming that the proportion of the total number of people arrested 
for crime j who have not been arrested previously is constant, the 
number of so-called virgin arrestees is determined for month t by 
V . t = « . F. t , (4-2) 
where F is the forecast of the number persons arrested during month t for 
3 *-
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c r i m e j a n d N_. i s t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l a r r e s t e d o f f e n d e r s who h a v e n o t 
b e e n a r r e s t e d p r e v i o u s l y . T h e f o r e c a s t V i s s u b s e q u e n t l y c o n v e r t e d i n t o 
V f i r s t o f f e n d e r s b y t h e l o g i c o f B o x 1. E a c h s i m u l a t e d o f f e n d e r i s 
e n t e r e d i n t o t h e l i s t s w h i c h GNS u s e s t o k e e p t r a c k o f t h e e n t i t i e s w h i c h 
f l o w t h r o u g h t h e n e t w o r k , a n d e a c h o f f e n d e r ' s a t t r i b u t e s a r e c r e a t e d a t t h a t 
t i m e . T h e a t t r i b u t e s a g e a t a r r e s t , r a c e a n d s e x , a n d a g e a t d e a t h a r e a l l 
g e n e r a t e d i m m e d i a t e l y f r o m e m p i r i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s . T h e r e m a i n i n g 
a t t r i b u t e s , r e s e r v e d f o r s t a t i s t i c s c o l l e c t i o n , a r e a l s o i n i t i a l i z e d 
a t t h i s t i m e . 
T h e g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f B o x 1 d i s p l a y e d i n F i g u r e 1 
n e e d s some e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e a r c w h i c h f e e d s b a c k o n t o t h i s b o x r e p r e ­
s e n t s t h e f l o w o f a dummy e n t i t y . T h e b o x f i r s t g e n e r a t e s t h i s e n t i t y 
when t h e s i m u l a t i o n b e g i n s . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f e a c h m o n t h , t h i s dummy 
e n t i t y c o m p l e t e s s e r v i c e a t B o x 1 a t w h i c h t i m e i t r e - e n t e r s t h e b o x . 
T h u s , t h i s dummy e n t i t y s e r v e s a s a t i m i n g m e c h a n i s m . I t i s when t h e 
dummy e n t i t y r e - e n t e r s B o x 1 t h a t t h e s p e c i a l l o g i c o f t h i s b o x f o r e c a s t s 
t h e number o f f i r s t o f f e n d e r s who a r e a r r e s t e d d u r i n g t h e m o n t h a n d 
e n t e r s them i n t o t h e l i s t s o f B o x 2. 
B o x 2, V i r g i n A r r e s t s . A l t h o u g h e a c h o f f e n d e r i s a s s u m e d t o b e 
a r r e s t e d a t e i t h e r B o x 4 ( g r a n d j u r y w a r r a n t ) o r a t B o x 5 ( a l l o t h e r 
p o l i c e a r r e s t s ) , t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e i n t e r v e n i n g B o x 2 i s t o d e l a y t h e 
a r r e s t o f o f f e n d e r s s o t h a t a l l a r r e s t s do n o t o c c u r a t t h e b e g i n n i n g 
o f e a c h m o n t h . I n s t e a d , when B o x 1 g e n e r a t e s e a c h f i r s t o f f e n d e r , i t 
a l s o g e n e r a t e s a s e r v i c e t i m e f o r t h e o f f e n d e r a t B o x 2 s o t h a t a r r e s t s 
f o r e a c h c r i m e c a t e g o r y a r e u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d o v e r t h e m o n t h . 
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Box 5, Total Police Arrests. The only queue box in the police 
subsystem, Box 5 allocates the cost of the police to each offender that 
is arrested without a grand jury warrant. The method selected to do 
this is perhaps overly simplified, but it is a satisfactory approxima­
tion. By assuming that the amount of police resources required to 
apprehend and charge an offender is the same regardless of whether or not 
he is a first-offender or a recidivist, the total police cost can 
easily be allocated. If it is further assumed that the processing time 
of this box is negative exponential with a mean of one day, the cost 
of using each police resource at Box 5 results in a probabilistic 
allocation of the total cost of police services. Because of the artifi­
ciality of the one day processing required at this box, the total pro­
cessing times observed at the subsequent processors (i.e., initial 
hearing and juvenile intake) are necessarily reduced by one day. 
Upon an offender's completion of service at Box 5, the end control 
logic then determines if an offender is to be routed to the juvenile 
intake hearing (Box 8) or to the initial hearing (Box 21). It is 
assumed that all juveniles enter the CJS at this box; rather than because 
of a grand jury warrant at Box 4. 
4.2.4 The Prosecution and Court Subsystem 
Because the objective of this thesis is to evaluate alternative 
scenarios for plea bargaining, the prosecution and court subsystem is 
particularly detailed. This subsystem is composed primarily of the 
superior and criminal courts, the grand jury, and the initial arraignment 
hearings; thus, there exists sufficient detail for the implementation of 
the economic model of plea bargaining presented in the previous chapter. 
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T h e c o m p o n e n t s o f t h i s s u b s y s t e m a r e d e f i n e d i n T a b l e 6 . 
T a b l e 6 . E l e m e n t s o f t h e P r o s e c u t i o n a n d C o u r t S u b s y s t e m 
A c t i v i t y Number D e s c r i p t i o n 
4 G r a n d J u r y W a r r a n t 
21 I n i t i a l H e a r i n g 
22 A d u l t P r e - T r i a l D e t e n t i o n 
23 P r o s e c u t i o n 
25 L o w e r ( C r i m i n a l ) C o u r t 
28 G r a n d J u r y 
29 "No B i l l " f r o m G r a n d J u r y 
30 " T r u e B i l l " f r o m G r a n d J u r y 
31 D e a d D o c k e t o r N o l l e P r o s e q u i 
32 A r r a i g n m e n t H e a r i n g 
37 S u p e r i o r C o u r t T r i a l 
39 S u p e r i o r C o u r t G u i l t y P l e a o r N o l o C o n t e n d e r e , 
T h e GNS e v e n t s w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s two d e c i s i o n 
p o i n t s o c c u r a t B o x 2 3 , Node 3 0 , a n d B o x 3 2 . T h i s s t r u c t u r e d i f f e r s f r o m 
t h a t d e v e l o p e d b y R h o d e s i n t h a t h i s p r o s e c u t o r ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n o c c u r s 
b o t h a t B o x 23 a n d a t Node 3 0 . T h i s a d d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e e s s e n t i a l l y 
a l l o w s t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o d i s m i s s a d e f e n d a n t f o l l o w i n g t h e g r a n d j u r y 
h e a r i n g ( i . e . , a t Node 3 0 ) d e s p i t e e a r l i e r e v i d e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s 
g u i l t . I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s m o d e l o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n f u r ­
t h e r a s s u m e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r c h o o s e s t h o s e c a s e s t o b e t r i e d b y t h e 
l o w e r c o u r t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e n u m b e r o f l o w e r c o u r t h e a r i n g s i s a l s o 
a f f e c t e d b y t h e s i z e o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t , t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t p r e ­
t r i a l d e l a y , a n d s u c h c a s e - s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s a s t h e s e v e r i t y o f a n o f f e n ­
d e r ' s c r i m e a n d h i s p r e v i o u s a r r e s t r e c o r d . 
76 
T h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e o f f e n d e r f l o w s a r e c h a n g e d b y t h e s e f a c t o r s 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y a h e u r i s t i c o n e . F o r e a c h o f t h e a r c s i n t h i s s u b s y s t e m , 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a n o f f e n d e r who c o m m i t t e d c r i m e j t r a v e l s f r o m 
a c t i v i t y b t o a c t i v i t y d i s d e f i n e d a s P , , . . E a c h f l o w p r o b a b i l i t y i s 
b d j 
t h e n c h a n g e d a c c o r d i n g t o some f u n c t i o n f , t o y i e l d a r e v i s e d p r o b a b i l i t y 
b d 
P ' . w h i c h i n c l u d e s a d j u s t m e n t s f o r t h e f a c t o r s m e n t i o n e d i n S e c t i o n s 
b d j J 
3 . 2 a n d 3 . 3 , 
Pbd j =fbd(Pbdj>- ( 4" 3 ) 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e n a t u r e o f t h e f u n c t i o n f , , r e f l e c t s b o t h t h e d e c i s i o n 
b d 
p o i n t ( a c t i v i t y b ) a n d t h e d e c i s i o n ( t h a t i s , a r c d ) . T h i s f u n c t i o n i s 
d e s c r i b e d a t B o x 2 3 , Node 3 0 a n d B o x 3 2 . 
N o d e 4 , G r a n d J u r y W a r r a n t . T h e g r a n d j u r y w a r r a n t i s o n e o f two 
w a y s b y w h i c h a n o f f e n d e r e n t e r s t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m ; t h e o t h e r 
way i s b y p o l i c e a r r e s t ( B o x 5 ) . T h i s n o d e r e p r e s e n t s t h e a r r e s t o f a n 
o f f e n d e r b e c a u s e o f t h e i s s u a n c e o f a w a r r a n t b y t h e g r a n d j u r y . O n c e 
a n o f f e n d e r i s a p p r e h e n d e d , t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r o r n o t 
t h e o f f e n d e r s h o u l d b e d e t a i n e d ( t h a t i s , j a i l e d ) w h i l e h i s c a s e p r o c e e d s 
t h r o u g h t h e c o u r t s . I f s o , a dummy e n t i t y i s c r e a t e d a t B o x 2 2 , a d u l t 
p r e - t r i a l d e t e n t i o n , a n d i t r e m a i n s t h e r e u n t i l t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g o f f e n ­
d e r i s e i t h e r r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e C J S o r h e i s c o n v i c t e d a n d s e n t t o 
c o r r e c t i o n s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s dummy e n t i t y i s c r e a t e d , t h e o f f e n d e r 
i s s e n t t o B o x 2 8 , t h e g r a n d j u r y , i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e r e a l i z a t i o n 
o f N o d e 4 . 
B o x 2 1 , I n i t i a l H e a r i n g . T h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g s e r v e s a s a c h e c k 
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o n t h e p o l i c e . B y r e q u i r i n g t h a t e v i d e n c e b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e p r e s i d i n g 
m a g i s t r a t e , i t i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e m a g i s t r a t e t o d e t e r m i n e i f 
t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e o f f e n d e r a c t u a l l y c o m m i t t e d 
t h e c h a r g e d o f f e n s e . I f h e d e t e r m i n e s t h e c h a r g e s t o b e a p p r o p r i a t e , 
t h e o f f e n d e r i s s e n t t o B o x 23 f o r t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e 
c a s e . H o w e v e r , i f t h e e v i d e n c e i s deemed t o b e i n s u f f i c i e n t , t h e 
o f f e n d e r i s r e l e a s e d . F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t i s a s s u m e d 
t h a t a l l a r r e s t e d o f f e n d e r s p r o c e e d t o B o x 2 3 ; no o n e i s r e l e a s e d a t 
t h i s s t a g e . 
S i n c e a l l o f f e n d e r s a r e a s s u m e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h f u r t h e r p r o ­
c e s s i n g , t h e m a g i s t r a t e p r e s i d i n g a t t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g d e t e r m i n e s 
w h e t h e r o r n o t e a c h o f f e n d e r s h o u l d b e j a i l e d w h i l e a w a i t i n g t r i a l . 
A s a t N o d e 4 , a dummy e n t i t y i s c r e a t e d a t B o x 22 i f t h e o f f e n d e r i s 
t o b e j a i l e d . 
B o x 2 2 , A d u l t P r e - T r i a l D e t e n t i o n . When t h e l o w e r c o u r t s d e t e r ­
m i n e t h a t a n o f f e n d e r s h o u l d b e j a i l e d w h i l e a w a i t i n g a t r i a l , t h e o f ­
f e n d e r b e c o m e s a n a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l b u r d e n o n t h e C J S . T o m o d e l 
t h i s , B o x 22 w a s c r e a t e d t o a c c e s s t h e c o s t o f p r e - t r i a l d e t e n t i o n t o t h e 
o f f e n d e r ' s c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t . T h e d e c i s i o n t o d e t a i n a n o f f e n d e r 
i s made e i t h e r a t N o d e 4 f o l l o w i n g t h e i s s u a n c e o f a g r a n d j u r y w a r ­
r a n t o r a t B o x 21 a t t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g . T h i s d e c i s i o n i s d e s c r i b e d 
p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y i n t h i s m o d e l , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e t e n t i o n b e i n g 
a f u n c t i o n o f t h e c r i m e c a t e g o r y . 
When a n o f f e n d e r i s t o b e d e t a i n e d , a dummy e n t i t y i s c r e a t e d 
f o r i m m e d i a t e p r o c e s s i n g b y B o x 2 2 . R e m o v a l o f a dummy e n t i t y f r o m 
d e t e n t i o n i s p e r f o r m e d w h e n e v e r t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s o f B o x e s 2 5 , 
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37 or 39 are completed by the offender or when the offender is released 
because the case has been dismissed (Node 54). Alternatively, it is 
assumed that an offender may also be released from detention immediately 
prior to his trial. At any of these locations, the total time spent in 
jail is determined for the dummy and the associated cost of servicing 
the entity is then added to the career criminal cost of the corresponding 
offender. 
Box 23, Prosecution. This box represents the first decision point 
for the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process. As such, the special 
logic of this box must determine according to the description of Chapter 
III which offenders are to be released (Box 54), which cases are to be 
examined by the grand jury (Box 28), and which cases are to be tried 
by the lower court for having committed a misdemeanor (Box 25). Ac­
cording to the discussion in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the decisions made 
at this point do not solely depend upon the merits of each individual 
case. Instead, the prosecutor is cast in a situation where limited 
resources restrict the outcomes of plea bargaining even though it is the 
prosecutor's objective to maximize the cumulative severity of the sen­
tences handed down. Under this scenario, increasing the prosecutor's 
resources allows him to prosecute more offenders; thus, the probability 
that an offender is released to Box 54 is reduced while the probability 
of his being further•prosecuted (that is, sent on to the grand jury 
hearing) increases. However, an increase in the delay that offenders 
experience while awaiting trials by the superior court reduces the 
number of defendants whose cases are prosecuted. In addition, it was 
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hypothesized that an above-average severity of a defendant's latest 
offense increases the prosecutor's inclination to continue with the 
case, and the number of previous offenses committed by an offender is 
also positively related to the flow probabilities which connect 
activities 23 and 28. 
are taken into account at time t when determining the subsequent 
processing of each offender: 
1. The current level of the prosecutor's resources, B^; 
2. The current length of the superior court's (Boxes 37 and 39) 
pre-trial queues, Qfc; 
3. The current number of offenses committed by offender i, C\; 
4. The severity of the C\ offense committed by a defendant, . 
Since the analysis of Chapter III shows that any change in the 
offender flows depends upon the above four state variables, these varia­
bles in relation to their average values are used in this simulation mo­
del to implement the prosecutor's decision function f ^ at this activity 
as well as at the other two decision points at Node 30 and Box 32. 
Specifically, the following relations affect f, , in equation 4-3: 
In implementing Box 23, each of the following state variables 
otherwise; 
otherwise; 
if the pre-trial delay affects P' 






—r- if the offender's arrest record affects P' ,., C Q bdj 
1 otherwise; (4-6) 
S* 
— if crime severity affects P/,., S Q bdj (4-7) 
1 otherwise; 
where B Q and QQ are the baseline values of the prosecutor's budget and 
the pre-trial queue, respectively, and C Q and are defined as the 
expected values of the number of offenses per offender and of the 
severity of an offense. Although the function f ^ changes for each of 
the prosecutor's decision points, the function f__ , is defined using 
2 j, d 
the prosecutor's weighting function a s follows: 
MIN. l ( W l j t P 2 3 > 2 8 ) j ) , 1-0 if d = 28, 
if d = 25, 
(4-8) 
r23,28,j 23,25,j / ' if d = 54. 
V 
The prosecutor's weighting function is defined by the expression, 
W = G_ I . J . / H . 
i j t t i l t (4-9) 
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This formulation of f_0 , ensures that 
23, a 
for all d and j. 
Box 25, The Lower (or Criminal) Court. The criminal court is 
a less expensive alternative for dealing with an adult offender than 
is the superior court. This court handles cases of a less severe na­
ture than those appearing before superior court justices, thereby 
incurring a smaller cost per case because fewer court and prosecution 
resources are required. Referring to Rhodes's economic model in 
Section 3.2, the criminal court serves as a repository for those 
cases in which the convictability of the defendant is below the 
threshold requiring him to be sent to the superior court, but which 
is simultaneously above the minimum prosecutable value. Such cases 
are usually tried as misdemeanors. 
After processing each case, the judge presiding over the crimi­
nal court either releases the defendant to Node 57 after dismissing 
the charges or he sentences the convicted offender to one of the forms 
of correction allowed misdemeanor offenders: 
1. Jail for men (Box 26) 
2. Jail for women (Box 51) 
3. Probation (Box 42) 
4. Fine (Node 43) 
5. Suspended sentence (Node 44) 
Each sentence is determined probabilistically based on the crime an 
offender committed and upon the fact that he was convicted by the lower 
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court. The latter factor serves to differentiate between felony 
convictions in the superior court and misdemeanor convictions in 
the lower court. 
Box 28, The Grand Jury Hearing. The fundamental of the econo­
mic interpretations of plea bargaining is that the prosecutor is the 
only instrument of the courts which attempts to balance the immediate 
CJS-related costs of adjudication with the almost imminent social 
costs that will occur when an offender is released. The economists 
have modeled a prosecutor who maximizes the incapacitation term of all 
offenders, subject to the limitations of his budget. The cost to the 
prosecutor of handling a case depends upon the inherent convictability 
of the defendant, but as well upon the length of the pre-trial queue. 
The grand jury decision would also depend on the inherent convictability 
of a defendant; however, the assumption will be made that the grand 
jury is independent of the prosecutor and his budget, and, consequently, 
the state variables in equations 4-4 through 4-7. Thus, the grand 
jury simply examines the evidence against the defendant and determines 
the likelihood that he committed the offense. If the likelihood is 
below some pre-determined threshold value, then it releases the offen­
der to Node 29; otherwise, the defendant is sent to Node 30 following 
the grand jury's decision to issue a "true bill." 
Node 29, Grand Jury "No Bill". If the grand jury fails to in­
dict an offender, a "no bill" condition is said to exist. Consequently, 
the defendant is released from the CJS to Node 54 and, the corresponding 
entity at pre-trial detention (Box 22) is purged from the model. 
Node 30, Grand Jury "True Bill". When the grand jury indicts 
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an offender, a "true bill" is said to have been established and the 
offender is routed to this node for further processing. Following 
the issuance of a "true bill," the prosecutor must decide whether to 
arraign the defendant (Box 32) or to dismiss the case in spite of the 
indictment (Node 31, dead docket or nolle prosequi). Since the 
prosecutor is the decision maker at this stage, the same considerations 
are present as determined the offender's route following Box 23. 
Referring to the definition of the prosecutor's decision function ^ 
in equation 4-8, since the decision at Node 30 is the same as at this 
earlier decision point, the weighting function is assumed to be the 
same as in equation 4-9. Since f ^ depends upon the decision point and 
the output arcs, f„. , is defined as follows: 
3 0 , d 
\ / .(4-10) 
i - p- „ ., if d = 31. 
30,32,j 
Node 31, Dead Docket or Nolle Prosequi. Following a "true bill," 
the prosecutor still has the prerogative to dismiss a case by either 
declaring a dead docket or by nol-prossing the case. In either 
situation, the offender is routed from Node 30 to Node 31. Since Node 
31 has a zero duration, an offender routed here is immediately released 
from the CJS to Node 54. If he was in jail awaiting adjudication, then 
the corresponding dummy entity at Box 22 is released simultaneously. 
Box 32, Arraignment Hearing. If the prosecutor decides at Node 
30 to pursue a case, an arraignment hearing is scheduled. At such a 
hearing, the defendant must plead to the indictment charges issued by 
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t h e g r a n d j u r y . D e p e n d i n g o n how h e p l e a d s , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e 
p l a c e d on t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t ' s c a l e n d a r e i t h e r f o r a t r i a l 
( B o x 2 9 ) i f h e p l e a d s n o t g u i l t y o r f o r a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g ( B o x 3 7 ) 
i f h e p l e a d s g u i l t y . 
B o x 32 i s t h e t h i r d a n d f i n a l d e c i s i o n p o i n t i n t h i s s i m u l a t i o n 
m o d e l i n w h i c h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d e c i s i o n i s a f f e c t e d b y t h e s t a t e 
v a r i a b l e s d e f i n e d e a r l i e r . I f P ' , . i s d e f i n e d s i m i l a r l y t o P ' , . 
3 2 , d , j y 2 3 , d , j 
a n d P ' 0 _ , . , t h e n a n o t h e r w e i g h t i n g f u n c t i o n m u s t b e d e f i n e d t o t a k e 3 0 , d , j 
i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e s p o n s e s , 
W' = G H I . J . . ( 4 - 1 1 ) 
l j t t t I l 
T h e u p d a t e d f l o w p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n g e q u a t i o n : 
M I N . |W ' P - 0 , Q 1 . 0 , i f d = 39 I i j t 3 2 , 3 9 , j I 
P32,d,j " j \ / < 4" 1 2> 
' 1 - P 3 2 , 3 9 > J - l f d - 3 7 . 
F o l l o w i n g t h i s a r r a i g n m e n t , i f a n o f f e n d e r i s i n j a i l w h i l e 
a w a i t i n g t r i a l , h e may b e r e l e a s e d on h i s own r e c o g n i z a n c e . T h i s d e ­
c i s i o n i s made p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y . I f h e i s t o b e r e l e a s e d , t h e 
dummy e n t i t y a t B o x 22 i s p u r g e d f r o m t h e m o d e l . 
B o x 3 7 , S u p e r i o r C o u r t S e n t e n c i n g H e a r i n g . I f t h e d e f e n d a n t 
p l e a d s g u i l t y o r n o l o c o n t e n d e r e ( n o c o n t e s t ) t o t h e c h a r g e s f i l e d 
a g a i n s t h i m a t t h e a r r a i g n m e n t p r o c e e d i n g s ( B o x 3 2 ) , h i s c a s e i s 
p l a c e d o n t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t ' s c a l e n d a r ; t h a t i s , h i s c a s e i s s c h e d u l e d 
f o r a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g . F r o m t h e s i m u l a t i o n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e 
85 
o f f e n d e r i s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e s e r v i c e q u e u e o f B o x 3 7 . When t h e 
o f f e n d e r ' s c a s e i s f i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t , a j u d g e r e v i e w s t h e 
c h a r g e s a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t p l e a w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t , a n d h e s e n t e n c e s 
h i m t o a n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m o f c o r r e c t i o n . S i n c e t h e o f f e n d e r s s e n t 
t o t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t a r e u s u a l l y f e l o n s , t h e c o r r e c t i o n a l p o s s i b i l i ­
t i e s d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e o f t h e c r i m i n a l c o u r t . F o r t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t , t h e 
c o r r e c t i o n a l s t a t e s a r e : 
1 . J a i l f o r men ( B o x 2 6 ) 
2 . J a i l f o r women ( B o x 5 1 ) 
3 . P r o b a t i o n ( B o x 4 2 ) 
4 . F i n e ( N o d e 4 3 ) 
5 . S u s p e n d e d S e n t e n c e ( N o d e 4 4 ) 
6 . P r i s o n f o r men ( B o x 4 0 ) 
7 . P r i s o n f o r women ( B o x 4 1 ) 
8 . P a r o l e ( B o x 4 5 ) f o l l o w i n g a t e r m i n p r i s o n ( B o x e s 4 0 , 4 1 ) . 
A n o f f e n d e r i s s e n t e n c e d t o o n e o f t h e a b o v e f o r m s o f c o r r e c t i o n 
b y e x a m i n i n g h i s c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l ( f i n a l c h a r g e ) . F o r c o n v e n i e n c e , 
t h i s f i n a l c h a r g e i s d e t e r m i n e d a t e i t h e r o f b o x e s 37 o r 39 r a t h e r 
t h a n a t B o x 38 w h e r e i t a c t u a l l y w o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d . ( F o r s i m p l i c i t y , 
t h e f i n a l c h a r g e i s n o t d e t e r m i n e d f o r t h e l o w e r o r t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t s . 
D i s p o s i t i o n s o f c a s e s a t t h e s e h e a r i n g s a r e b a s e d u p o n t h e c r i m e 
c a t e g o r y i n s t e a d . ) T h i s a r t i f i c i a l i t y i s i n t r o d u c e d t o embed i n t h e 
m o d e l t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e f i n a l c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s r e s u l t i n g 
f r o m a t r i a l c o n v i c t i o n a n d t h o s e r e s u l t i n g f r o m g u i l t y p l e a s a t B o x 
3 9 . T h i s d e v i c e a l s o f a c i l i t a t e s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e c o r r e c t i o n a l 
s t a t e a s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e f i n a l c h a r g e i n s t e a d o f t h e c r i m e c a t e g o r y . 
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A c c o r d i n g t o S h i n , [ 6 2 ] t h e r e e x i s t s a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n 
t h e amount o f c h a r g e r e d u c t i o n a n d t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e e n s u i n g s e n t e n c e . 
T h u s , t h i s m o d e l i s a b l e t o c a p t u r e t h i s a s p e c t o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g 
a l t h o u g h i t s h a l l n o t b e i n v e s t i g a t e d a n y f u r t h e r h e r e . 
B o t h t h e m o d e l w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e f i n a l c h a r g e a n d t h e m o d e l 
w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o r r e c t i o n a l s t a t e a r e p r o b a b i l i s t i c . T h e f o r m e r 
i s b a s e d s o l e l y o n t h e m o s t r e c e n t a r r e s t c h a r g e o f a n o f f e n d e r , w h i l e 
t h e l a t t e r i s o n l y b a s e d u p o n t h e f i n a l c h a r g e . T h e d u r a t i o n s o f 
t h e r e s u l t i n g s e n t e n c e s a r e a l s o b a s e d u p o n t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l . 
( S e e C h a p t e r V , S e c t i o n 5 . 1 . ) 
B o x 3 9 , S u p e r i o r C o u r t T r i a l . W h e n e v e r a d e f e n d a n t p l e a d s n o t 
g u i l t y t o t h e a r r a i g n m e n t c h a r g e s , a t r i a l i s h e l d b y t h e s u p e r i o r 
c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e h i s i n n o c e n c e o r g u i l t . A f t e r p r o c e e d i n g t h r o u g h 
a s e r i e s o f l e g a l m a n e u v e r s a n d d e l a y t a c t i c s , t h e t r i a l d a t e i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d a n d t h e c a s e i s p l a c e d o n t h e c o u r t ' s c a l e n d a r ; h o w e v e r , 
i n t h i s m o d e l t h e p r o c e s s i n g t i m e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h B o x 39 i s a s s u m e d t o 
i n c l u d e b o t h t h e t r i a l a n d t h e p r e - t r i a l m a n e u v e r s ( c a l l e d m o t i o n s ) . 
T h u s , t h e m o d e l a s s u m e s t h a t t h e o f f e n d e r ' s c a s e i s f i r s t p l a c e d o n 
t h e c a l e n d a r ( v i z , p l a c e d i n t h e p r e - t r i a l q u e u e ) a n d when i t e n t e r s 
t h e p r o c e s s o r , i t i s p r o c e s s e d c o n t i n u a l l y u n t i l a v e r d i c t a n d p e r h a p s 
t h e s e n t e n c e a r e d e l i v e r e d . 
A t t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l , t h e m o d e l d e t e r m i n e s p r o b a b i l i s ­
t i c a l l y w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s g u i l t y . T h e c o n v i c t i o n p r o b a ­
b i l i t y i s a n e m p i r i c a l f u n c t i o n o f c r i m e t y p e . I f t h e o f f e n d e r i s n o t 
g u i l t y , h e i s r o u t e d t o Node 5 0 , d i s m i s s a l ; h o w e v e r , i f h e i s f o u n d 
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g u i l t y a f i n a l c o n v i c t i o n c h a r g e i s d e t e r m i n e d p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y 
b a s e d o n c r i m e t y p e . T h e c o r r e c t i o n s s t a t e s t o w h i c h t h e c o n v i c t e d 
o f f e n d e r may b e s e n t a r e i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e d e s c r i b e d f o r B o x 3 7 . 
T h e t y p e a n d l e n g t h o f t h e s e n t e n c e t h a t e a c h o f f e n d e r r e c e i v e s a r e 
a l s o d e t e r m i n e d a s a t B o x 3 7 ; h o w e v e r , t h e e m p i r i c a l v a l u e s o f t h e 
f l o w p r o b a b i l i t i e s a n d t h e d u r a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s may d i f f e r . 
F o r o f f e n d e r s who a r e d e t a i n e d w h i l e a w a i t i n g t r i a l t h e c o r ­
r e s p o n d i n g dummy e n t i t i e s a r e r e l e a s e d f r o m d e t e n t i o n a t B o x 22 when 
t h e o f f e n d e r c o m p l e t e s s e r v i c e a t B o x 3 9 . T h i s h o l d s t r u e f o r B o x 37 
a s w e l l . 
4 . 2 . 5 T h e C o r r e c t i o n s S u b s y s t e m 
F o r t h i s s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l , t h e C o r r e c t i o n s S u b s y s t e m c o n s i s t s 
o f a l l t h o s e b o x e s a n d n o d e s w h i c h r e p r e s e n t p o t e n t i a l d i s p o s i t i o n s o f 
e i t h e r t h e l o w e r o r t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t s ; j u v e n i l e c o r r e c t i o n s a r e 
c o n s i d e r e d a p a r t o f t h e J u v e n i l e J u s t i c e S u b s y s t e m . T h e c o m p o n e n t s 
w h i c h c o m p r i s e t h e Co r r e c t i o n s S u b s y s t e m a r e t a b u l a t e d i n T a b l e 7 . 
T a b l e 7 . E l e m e n t s o f t h e C o r r e c t i o n s S u b s y s t e m 
D e s c r i p t i o n 
J a i l f o r Men 
P r i s o n f o r Men 
P r i s o n f o r Women 
A d u l t P r o b a t i o n 
F i n e 
S u s p e n d e d S e n t e n c e 
P a r o l e 
C a s e D i s m i s s a l 
J a i l f o r Women 











Whenever an offender is sentenced either to prison, to jail, 
or to probation, an exponentially distributed service time is generated 
whose parameter is a function of the conviction label, the manner in 
which the offender was convicted, and the offender's sex in the case 
of the jail and prison dispositions where separate facilities are 
maintained for each sex. The method of conviction affects the duration 
of each sentence in this model; the time spent at each correctional 
facility depends upon whether the offender 
1. Was convicted by the lower court (Box 25), 
2. Pleaded guilty to the superior court's prosecutor (Box 37), 
or 
3. Was convicted by a superior court trial (Box 39). 
For the offender convicted by the lower court, the final conviction 
label is assumed to be the crime category. Greater resolution for 
lower court convictions is unnecessary when the majority of cases 
are tried in the superior court. 
Following his release from corrections, an offender is routed 
to either Node 56 or 57. These nodes determine whether or not the 
offender Is re-arrested. 
Boxes 26 and 51, Jail for Men and Women. Because a term in jail 
is a less severe punishment than a prison sentence whose duration far 
exceeds that of the jail disposition, the superior court (Boxes 37 
and 39) is assumed to sentence offenders to prison, not to jail. Con­
versely, the criminal court does not sentence its offenders, who are 
usually convicted of misdemeanors or mild felonies, to the prisons; it 
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s e n t e n c e s c o n v i c t s t o j a i l . T h e r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s 
o b v i o u s . S i n c e t h e p r i s o n i s c o n s i d e r e d a h a r s h p u n i s h m e n t t h a t i s 
r e s e r v e d f o r s o c i e t y ' s w o r s t , t h o s e o f f e n d e r s who a r e c o n v i c t e d o f 
o f f e n s e s b y t h e l o w e r c o u r t d e s e r v e a m o r e l e n i e n t p u n i s h m e n t f o r a 
l e s s r e p r e h e n s i b l e c r i m e . T h i s s i m p l e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d i s ­
p o s i t i o n s o f e a c h c o u r t i s t h e o n l y o n e o f i t s k i n d f o r m u l a t e d f o r 
c o r r e c t i o n s . A l l o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o e a c h c o u r t , e v e n 
t h o u g h c a s e d i s m i s s a l ( N o d e 5 0 ) i s n o t o f c o u r s e a n a l t e r n a t i v e f o r 
t h e d e f e n d a n t who p l e a d s g u i l t y a n d i s s u b s e q u e n t l y s e n t e n c e d a t B o x 
3 7 . 
S e p a r a t i n g b o t h t h e j a i l a n d t h e p r i s o n f a c i l i t i e s a l o n g s e x u a l 
l i n e s g u a r a n t e e s t o t h e a n a l y s t t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h 
o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y c o s t s more i n a c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t s e n s e . B e c a u s e 
o f t h e s e x u a l a n d o t h e r o f f e n d e r - s p e c i f i c a t t r i b u t e s , t h e m o d e l e d 
o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n c a n q u i t e e a s i l y a n d r e a l i s t i c a l l y b e d e c o m p o s e d 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o f f e n d e r ' s t r a i t s when examining t h e e f f i c a c y o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y s c e n a r i o s . T h i s i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i s ­
t i n g u i s h e s t h i s m o d e l f r o m e a r l i e r m o d e l i n g e f f o r t s , a n e x a m p l e o f 
s u c h a n e v a l u a t i o n i s f o r t h c o m i n g i n C h a p t e r V I . 
When a n o f f e n d e r c o m p l e t e s h i s j a i l s e n t e n c e , h e i s r e l e a s e d b y 
t h e C J S t o Node 5 7 . 
B o x e s 4 0 a n d 4 1 , P r i s o n f o r Men a n d Women. A s w i t h t h e j a i l s , 
t h e p r i s o n f a c i l i t i e s a r e s e g r e g a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e x o f t h e i n ­
m a t e s ; B o x 4 0 r e p r e s e n t s t h e f a c i l i t y f o r men w h i l e B o x 41 i s t h e f a ­
c i l i t y f o r women p r i s o n e r s . A s s o o n a s a n o f f e n d e r i a r r i v e s a t 
e i t h e r f a c i l i t y , t h e m o d e l g e n e r a t e s t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e p r i s o n s e n -
90 
t e n c e , T \ . H o w e v e r , s i n c e o f f e n d e r s f r e q u e n t l y do n o t s e r v e t h e i r 
e n t i r e s e n t e n c e i n p r i s o n , t h e m o d e l t h e n g e n e r a t e s t h e a c t u a l t i m e 
s p e n t i n p r i s o n T l ^ b y m u l t i p l y i n g E ^ , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p r i s o n 
s e n t e n c e a c t u a l l y s e r v e d b y a n o f f e n d e r c o n v i c t e d o f f i n a l c h a r g e 
c , b y t h e o r i g i n a l s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n , 
T ' . = E T . . ( 4 - 1 3 ) 
i c c 1 
A f t e r a n o f f e n d e r s p e n d s T!^ y e a r s i n p r i s o n , h e i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y 
r e l e a s e d o n p a r o l e ( B o x 4 5 ) . I f h e v i o l a t e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s 
p a r o l e b e f o r e h i s t e r m i s f i n i s h e d , i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t h e w i l l b e 
r e t u r n e d t o p r i s o n t o c o m p l e t e h i s o r i g i n a l s e n t e n c e . T h a t i s , t h e 
t i m e a n o f f e n d e r s p e n d s i n p r i s o n a f t e r v i o l a t i n g p a r o l e i s : 
t m = T _ T i # ( 4 - 1 4 ) 
i c 1 i c 
T h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n i s a s s u m e d t o d e p e n d u p o n t h e 
o f f e n d e r ' s c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l . T h e t i m e t h a t a n o f f e n d e r i s o n p a r o l e i s 
a s s u m e d t o b e e x p o n e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h e t h e r o r 
n o t a p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n i s p e r p e t r a t e d . 
F o l l o w i n g a n o f f e n d e r ' s c o m p l e t i o n o f e i t h e r a p r i s o n s e n t e n c e 
o r a t e r m o n p a r o l e , h e i s r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e C J S t o Node 56 t o d e t e r m i n e 
i f he r e c i d i v a t e s . 
B o x 4 2 , A d u l t P r o b a t i o n . One o f t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t l y u s e d f o r m s 
o f c o r r e c t i o n , t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y d i s p o s i t i o n i n t h i s m o d e l i s a n o r m a l 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a q u e u e b o x . A s w i t h o t h e r p r o c e s s o r s i n t h i s s u b ­
s y s t e m , t h e s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e f i n a l c o n v i c t i o n 
l a b e l o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . When a n o f f e n d e r ' s s e n t e n c e i s c o m p l e t e d , he 
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i s a l s o r o u t e d t o Node 56. 
N o d e s 43 a n d 44, F i n e a n d S u s p e n d e d S e n t e n c e . T h e e v e n t s 
r e p r e s e n t e d b y N o d e s 43 a n d 44 r e p r e s e n t m i l e s t o n e s i n t h e p r o c e s s i n g 
o f t h e o f f e n d e r s i n c e a n y o f f e n d e r who i s r e q u i r e d t o p a y a f i n e o r 
who i s g i v e n a s u s p e n d e d s e n t e n c e i s n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y m o n i t o r e d b y 
t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m f o r t h e c u r r e n t c o n v i c t i o n . T h u s , a n 
o f f e n d e r i s i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e a s e d t o Node 57 f o l l o w i n g h i s a r r i v a l a t 
e i t h e r Node 43 o r 44. 
B o x 45, P a r o l e . When t h e o f f e n d e r a r r i v e s a t t h i s b o x , h e b e ­
g i n s h i s t i m e o f p a r o l e . T h e a v e r a g e t i m e s e r v e d o n p a r o l e a n d t h e 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n a r e b o t h a s s u m e d t o b e f u n c t i o n s o f 
t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f f e n s e ; i t i s s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l i s 
a n a c c u r a t e i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e r e q u i r e d p a r o l e t e r m . I n a d d i t i o n , i t 
c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l d e t e r m i n e s a n o f f e n d e r ' s 
p r e - d i s p o s i t i o n t o a b u s e h i s r i g h t t o a p a r o l e , t h e r e b y i n d i c a t i n g 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e v o c a t i o n a s w e l l a s t h e t i m e b e t w e e n t h e b e g i n n i n g 
a n d t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p a r o l e a c t i v i t y . A l t h o u g h c a s t i n g t h e 
p a r o l e f u n c t i o n i n t h i s m a n n e r d o e s n o t a l l o w t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t o 
s p e c i f y s e p a r a t e t i m e d i s t r i b u t i o n s f o r t h o s e o f f e n d e r s w h o s e p a r o l e 
i s r e v o k e d a n d f o r t h o s e who s u c c e s s f u l l y c o m p l e t e t h e i r p a r o l e , i t 
i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s do n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e 
e f f i c a c y o f t h e m o d e l when t h e p a r o l e a c t i v i t y i s c o m p l e t e d . 
D e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e p a r o l e o u t c o m e , t h e o f f e n d e r i s e i t h e r r e ­
l e a s e d f r o m t h e C J S t o Node 56 o r h e i s r e t u r n e d t o p r i s o n ( B o x e s 40 
o r 41) t o c o m p l e t e t h e o r i g i n a l p r i s o n s e n t e n c e . 
Node 50, C a s e D i s m i s s a l . I f f o l l o w i n g a t r i a l b y e i t h e r t h e 
92 
lower court (Box 25) or the superior court (Box 39) the charges against 
a defendant are dropped, then the model directs the offender to Node 
50. The purpose of this node is to distinguish between those offenders 
who are released from the courts and those who entered one of the cor­
rectional programs. After realizing this node, an offender is 
immediately released to Node 57. 
4.2.6 The Juvenile Justice Subsystem 
The Juvenile Justice Subsystem (JJS) is a particularly critical 
component of the CJS because a substantial percentage of first-offenders 
are under age 18 (see Belkin, Blumstein and Glass). The processors 
which represent the JJS are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Elements of the Juvenile Justice Subsystems 
Activity Number Description 
8 Juvenile Intake Hearing 
9 Juvenile Court Hearing 
10 Juvenile Pre-trial Detention 
12 Juvenile Incarceration 
13 Juvenile Probation 
14 Other Juvenile Correctional Institutions 
15 Juvenile Informal Adjustment 
Box 8, Juvenile Intake Hearing. Following his arrest by the 
police (Box 5), the intake hearing is a youth's first introduction to 
the judicial process. The purpose of this hearing is similar to 
that of the initial hearing of the adult courts. It determines 
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w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y o u t h ' s a r r e s t w a s j u s t i f i e d a n d how h e i s t o 
b e f u r t h e r p r o c e s s e d b y t h e C J S . A l t h o u g h t h e p r o c e s s i n g o f 
o f f e n d e r s a t t h e i n t a k e h e a r i n g v a r i e s w i d e l y b e t w e e n c r i m i n a l 
j u s t i c e s y s t e m s , i t i s u s u a l l y a n i n f o r m a l , c l o s e d - t o - t h e p u b l i c 
h e a r i n g w h o s e o u t c o m e s a r e t y p i c a l l y o n e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
1 . T h e j u v e n i l e i s r e l e a s e d ( N o d e 5 2 ) b e c a u s e o f h i s o b v i o u s 
i n n o c e n c e i n h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e s p e c i f i e d o f f e n s e s ; 
2 . T h e y o u t h i s s e n t t o t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t ( B o x 9 ) b e c a u s e 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c r i m e w a r r a n t s s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
b y a m a g i s t r a t e i n a f o r m a l c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g ; 
3 . T h e o f f e n d e r i s s e n t t o t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t ( v i a B o x 2 3 ) 
s i n c e h i s c r i m e i s s u f f i c i e n t l y h e i n e o u s t o w a r r a n t t h e 
h a r s h e r s e n t e n c e s i s s u e d b y t h e a d u l t c o u r t s . 
A n o t h e r o u t c o m e o f t h i s h e a r i n g i s a l s o f r e q u e n t l y o b s e r v e d . I t o c c u r s 
when a n o f f e n d e r p l e a d s g u i l t y t o t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t h i m . F o r t h i s 
m o d e l , however, i t i s assumed t h a t o n l y t h e preceed ing t h r e e outcomes 
o c c u r a n d t h a t t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t a l w a y s d e t e r m i n e s t h e y o u t h ' s i n n o ­
c e n c e o r g u i l t . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i n t a k e h e a r i n g i s a s s u m e d t o b e 
i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g i s s u e s w i t h w h i c h t h e p r o s e c u t o r 
i n t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t m u s t w r e s t l e . 
When t h e i n t a k e h e a r i n g b e g i n s , t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e d e t e r m i n e s 
w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e o f f e n d e r s h o u l d be d e t a i n e d b y t h e J u v e n i l e J u s t i c e 
S y s t e m w h i l e h i s c a s e p r o c e e d s . I f h e i s d e t a i n e d , a dummy e n t i t y i s 
c r e a t e d a t B o x 1 0 , t h e j u v e n i l e p r e - t r i a l d e t e n t i o n . I f f o l l o w i n g t h e 
i n t a k e h e a r i n g , t h e j u v e n i l e i s r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e J J S t o Node 5 2 , t h e n 
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g dummy e n t i t y i n t h e l i s t o f B o x 1 0 i s d e s t r o y e d . 
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If the offender is sent to Box 23 for processing as an adult, 
however, the dummy entity at Box 10 is released and the model deter­
mines whether or not the juvenile will be detained before receiving 
the disposition of the superior court. In this case, the probability 
that the juvenile is jailed prior to his trial is assumed to be 
identical to the probability for an adult who is arrested for the 
same offense. 
Box 9, Juvenile Court Hearing. The juvenile court hearing is 
a formal hearing wherein a youth's innocence or guilt is ascertained 
and an appropriate sentence issued. Following this hearing, if the 
defendant has been detained by the Juvenile Justice Subsystem he will 
be released from detention (i.e., the corresponding dummy entity 
residing at Box 10 is released) prior to any subsequent processing. 
Additionally, if a juvenile is to be tried in the regular courts, he 
is again subject to pre-trial detention, however, this time in the 
jail used for detaining adult offenders. 
The dispositions of the juvenile court are more numerous than 
for the intake hearing. In addition to those which are identical to 
the dispositions of the intake hearing, the following correctional 
programs for juveniles are considered: 
a. Incarceration (Box 12) 
b. Probation (Box 13) 
c. Other Institutions (Box 14) 
d. Informal Adjustment (Box 15). 
Box 10, Juvenile Pre-Trial Detention. Pre-trial detention for 
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juveniles at Box 10 is treated in an identical manner as that for 
adults at Box 22. When a youth first enters the Juvenile Justice 
System, the model determines if he is detained while awaiting fur­
ther processing. If so, a dummy entity is created by the model and 
begins processing at this box. The entity is subsequently released 
whenever the offender reaches a point in his processing that he is 
no longer to be detained. Thus, the dummy entity is released either 
when the offender is transferred to Box 23 for processing as an 
adult, when he is released to Node 52 following the court or intake 
hearings, or when he is sentenced to the care of a juvenile correctional 
program. 
Boxes 12, 13, 14 and 15, Juvenile Corrections. For this model, 
juvenile corrections has been aggregated under the following processors: 
1. Incarceration (Box 12) 
2. Probation (Box 13) 
3. Other Institutions (Box 14) 
4. Informal Adjustment (Box 15). 
Although it undoubtedly plays a role in the actual JJS, the parole of 
offenders is not explicitly considered in this model. 
Whenever an offender is sentenced to one of these programs, the 
model determines the actual time spent under the auspices of the JJS 
as a function of the crime category. Thus, the juvenile subsystem 
does not possess the detail of the adult court dispositions since 
the latter includes the final charge of the defendant. As was stated 
earlier, plea bargaining is not considered to be an important factor 
in the juvenile courts. 
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When the juvenile is released from any of these four cor­
rectional programs, he is routed to Node 53 which determines if he 
is re-arrested. 
4.2.7 The Recidivism Model 
The apparatus which models offender recidivism consists of those 
nodes and boxes which have not been described elsewhere. The one 
exception to this is sink Node 3. This special event collects statis­
tics on offenders who die. For lack of a better location, Node 3 is 
assumed to be part of the recidivism apparatus shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Elements of the Recidivism Model 
Activity Number Description 
3 Offender Death 
7 Juvenile Desistence 
18 Juvenile Desistence, Correctional Release 
19 Juvenile Recidivism Delay 
20 Juvenile Re-arrest 
27 Criminal Desistence, Prosecution Release 
34 Criminal Desistence, Jail Release 
35 Criminal Desistence, Miscellaneous Corrections 
Release 
3b Criminal Desistence, Probation Release 
46 Criminal Desistence, Prison or Parole Release 
47 Adult Recidivism Delay, Correctional Release 
48 Adult Recidivism Delay, Non-Correctional Release 
49 Adult Re-arrest 
52 Juvenile Court Release 
53 Juvenile Corrections Release 
54 Release by Prosecution 
56 Release from Severe Corrections 
57 Release From Lenient Corrections 
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T h e r e a r e n o t , i t i s a l s o a s s u m e d , a n y r e s o u r c e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
r e c i d i v i s m . T o do s o w o u l d embed t h e s o c i a l c o s t o f c r i m e i n t h e 
p r e s e n t m o d e l , b u t t h i s w i l l n o t b e a t t e m p t e d f o r t h e p r e s e n t . 
N o d e s 5 2 , 5 3 , 5 4 , 56 a n d 5 7 , R e l e a s e b y t h e C J S . W h e n e v e r a n 
o f f e n d e r i s r e l e a s e d b y t h e C J S , t h e m o d e l d e t e r m i n e s a t o n e o f t h e s e 
n o d e s w h e t h e r o r n o t h e i s r e - a r r e s t e d a t a n y t i m e i n t h e f u t u r e . T h e 
m o d e l m a k e s t h i s d e c i s i o n a b o u t e a c h o f f e n d e r b y e x a m i n i n g h i s s e x 
a n d c u r r e n t a g e . I f a p a r t i c u l a r o f f e n d e r d o e s n o t r e c i d i v a t e , h e 
i s r o u t e d t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s i n k n o d e w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s t h e o f f e n d e r ' s 
d e s i s t e n c e i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . O t h e r w i s e , i f t h e o f f e n d e r d o e s 
r e c i d i v a t e , h e i s s e n t t o e i t h e r B o x 1 9 , 47 o r 4 8 , w h i c h d e l a y s h i s 
a r r e s t f o r a n o t h e r c r i m e . 
N o d e s 7 , 1 8 , 2 7 , 3 4 , 3 5 , 36 a n d 4 6 , C r i m i n a l D e s i s t e n c e . T h e s e 
n o d e s r e p r e s e n t t h e o u t c o m e t h a t a n o f f e n d e r d o e s n o t r e c i d i v a t e i n 
t h e s e n s e t h a t h e i s n e v e r a g a i n a r r e s t e d . T h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s e n o d e s 
i s t o p u r g e a " r e h a b i l i t a t e d " o f f e n d e r f r o m t h e m o d e l a n d t o c o l l e c t 
s t a t i s t i c s o n s u c h o f f e n d e r s . T h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t i s t i c s a r e c o l l e c t e d 
w h e n e v e r a n o f f e n d e r e n t e r s a n y s i n k n o d e i n t h e m o d e l ( i n c l u d i n g N o d e 
3 ) : 
1 . A g e a n d s e x o f o f f e n d e r 
2 . Number a n d t y p e o f o f f e n s e s c o m m i t t e d 
3 . P o i n t o f r e l e a s e f r o m C J S ( v i z , s i n k n o d e n u m b e r ) 
4 . C a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t . 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e t i m e s e r i e s o f t h e a v e r a g e number o f o f f e n s e s c o m m i t t e d 
p e r o f f e n d e r a n d o f t h e a v e r a g e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a r e c o l l e c t e d o n 
o f f e n d e r s who d e s i s t d u r i n g e a c h s i x m o n t h p e r i o d o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n . 
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These performance measures are discussed further in the following chap­
ters . 
Boxes 19, 47 and 48, Recidivism Delay. The purpose of these 
three boxes is to postpone the re-arrest of an offender who has been re­
leased from the CJS and who it has been determined recidivates. As was 
discussed in Chapter II, the delay time between an offender's release 
from the Criminal Justice System and his re-arrest has been shown by 
Stollmack and Harris [64] to be distributed negative exponentially, 
based upon this finding, the distribution of these delay times is assumed 
in this model to be a negative exponential whose single parameter, A, is 
dependent upon both the age of the offender at the time of his release 
from the CJS and upon either the stage at which the offender was released 
or the type of correctional program he was subjected to. Thus, this com­
ponent possesses a greater degree of resolution than its predecessors 
JUSSIM II or, certainly, DOTSIM. (See Section 2.2.) 
The major difference between these three boxes is that recidivists 
who were released from Node 56 are routed to Box 47 whereas the recidi­
vists who are released from Nodes 54 and 57 are routed to Box 48, and 
those released from Nodes 52 and 53 are routed to Box 19. The reason for 
this differentiation is to be able to monitor the time series of adult 
recidivists who are severely penalized for their offenses (Box 47), or 
who are either only lightly penalized or who are not penalized at all 
(Box 48), and the time series of juvenile recidivists (Box 19). 
Boxes 20 and 49, Juvenile and Adult Recidivist Arrests. Whenever 
an offender recidivates, either Box 19, 47 or 48 determines the timing 
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o f h i s r e - a r r e s t a n d e i t h e r B o x 20 o r B o x 49 p r e d i c t s t h e o f f e n s e 
f o r w h i c h h e i s a r r e s t e d . A s d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n 2 . 2 , a m o d e l w h i c h 
h a s b e e n u s e d s u c c e s s f u l l y t o p r e d i c t a r e c i d i v i s t ' s new c r i m e i s a 
f i r s t o r d e r Markov c h a i n . I n u s i n g t h i s m o d e l , l i k e t h e p r e v i o u s 
e f f o r t s , a n o f f e n d e r ' s n e x t c r i m e i s s o l e l y a f u n c t i o n o f h i s l a s t 
o f f e n s e . T h u s , i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t a n o f f e n d e r ' s d e m o g r a p h i c v a r i a b l e s 
do n o t a f f e c t t h e s e t r a n s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 
O n c e t h e new o f f e n s e h a s b e e n d e t e r m i n e d , t h e o f f e n d e r i s 
r o u t e d t o e i t h e r Node 4 , t h e e v e n t w h i c h s i g n i f i e s t h e i s s u a n c e o f a 
w a r r a n t b y t h e g r a n d j u r y , o r mo re f r e q u e n t l y t o B o x 5 , a l l o t h e r 
p o l i c e a r r e s t s . I f t h e o f f e n d e r i s u n d e r t h e l e g a l a g e o f a n a d u l t , 
t h e n i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t h e i s a l w a y s a r r e s t e d a t B o x 5 a s o p p o s e d t o 
h a v i n g b e e n s e r v e d a w a r r a n t a t N o d e 4 . 
Node 3 , O f f e n d e r ' s D e a t h . B e f o r e c o m p l e t i n g t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f t h e GNS m o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m , t h i s i m p o r t a n t n o d e 
m u s t be d i s c u s s e d . When p r o c e s s i n g a n o f f e n d e r i i n t h i s m o d e l , i f t h e 
d u r a t i o n T ^ o f a n y a c t i v i t y e c a u s e s h i s a g e t o e x c e e d h i s d e a t h a g e A ^ , 
t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e a c t i v i t y i s r e d e f i n e d t o b e t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n 
t h e o f f e n d e r ' s c u r r e n t a g e A ^ a n d h i s d e a t h a g e . N a m e l y , 
IT , i f A ' - A „ . < T 
, _ e t i t i — e 
e ) ( 4 - 1 5 ) 
I A ' . - A . , i f A ' - A . > T . 
1 t i t i t i t i e 
I f T ' = A ' . - A . , t h e o f f e n d e r i s r o u t e d t o Node 3 f o l l o w i n g t h e c o m -
e t i t i ° 
p l e t i o n o f s e r v i c e a t a c t i v i t y e , a n d s t a t i s t i c s o n t h e a g e , s e x , c a r e e r 
c r i m i n a l c o s t , a n d number o f c r i m i n a l a r r e s t s o f t h e o f f e n d e r a r e t a b u -
1 0 0 
l a t e d ; t h e o f f e n d e r i s t h e n p e r m a n e n t l y r e m o v e d f r o m t h e s y s t e m . 
4.3 Summary 
T h i s c o n c l u d e s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l o f t h e 
C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e . S y s t e m . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r , t h i s m o d e l i s 
i m p l e m e n t e d u s i n g e m p i r i c a l d a t a a n d i t i s s u b j e c t e d t o v a l i d a t i o n 
t e s t i n g . I n C h a p t e r V I , e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e p l e a b a r ­
g a i n i n g p o l i c y s c e n a r i o s a r e c o n d u c t e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e how t h i s m o d e l 
may b e u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e f f e c t o f c h a n g e s i n t h e c u r r e n t p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s o n g l o b a l C J S p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s . T h e p r e c i s e 
n a t u r e o f t h e s e t e s t s w i l l b e e x p l a i n e d f u r t h e r a t t h a t t i m e s . 
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C H A P T E R V 
MODELING A S P E C I F I C C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E S Y S T E M 
5 . 0 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e m o d e l 
d e v e l o p e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . T h e s a m p l e d a t a i s p r i n c i p a l l y 
f r o m t h e C J S o f S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y , C a l i f o r n i a , a l t h o u g h c e r t a i n 
s t a t i s t i c s h a v e b e e n t a k e n e i t h e r f r o m o t h e r s y s t e m s o r f r o m t h e 
n a t i o n ' s a v e r a g e s . R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s o u r c e , c a r e h a s b e e n t a k e n 
t o e n s u r e t h e n o r m a t i v e b e h a v i o r o f t h i s m o d e l s o t h a t t h e r e s u l t s 
o f t h e t e s t s c o n d u c t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r may b e o f i n t e r e s t 
t o C J S p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n g e n e r a l . 
I n i m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s m o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m , 
t h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s m u s t b e d i s c u s s e d . F i r s t , t h e d a t a i t s e l f m u s t 
b e d e s c r i b e d . Where i t comes f r o m ; when w a s i t c o l l e c t e d ; w h a t 
a s s u m p t i o n s d o e s i t s u s e f o r c e u p o n t h e m o d e l ; a n d w h a t t r a n s f o r m a ­
t i o n s , i f a n y , w e r e r e q u i r e d b e f o r e i t c o u l d b e u s e d ? T h e s e i s s u e s 
a r e a d d r e s s e d i n S e c t i o n 5 . 1 . T h e n , s i n c e t h e m o d e l o f t h e C J S r e ­
q u i r e s t h a t s e v e r a l p a r a m e t e r s a n d t h a t t h e l e v e l s o f t h e c r i m i n a l 
j u s t i c e r e s o u r c e e x p e d i t u r e s b e i n i t i a l i z e d p r i o r t o t h e m o d e l ' s u s e , 
t h e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s m o d e l i s d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n 5 . 2 . F i n a l l y 
w i t h t h e m o d e l h a v i n g b e e n o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d , t h e i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g 
m o d e l v a l i d a t i o n a r e d i s c u s s e d . B o t h a g g r e g a t e a n d c o m p o n e n t 
b e h a v i o r s a r e e x a m i n e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a c t u a l C J S b e i n g m o d e l e d 
a s w e l l a s f o r t h e m o d e l ' s i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . M o d e l v a l i d a t i o n 
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i s t h e t o p i c o f S e c t i o n 5 . 3 . 
Upon c l o s i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f m o d e l v a l i d i t y , t h i s m o d e l 
o f t h e C J S i s f u l l y i m p l e m e n t e d a n d r e a d y f o r e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . 
5 . 1 S a m p l e D a t a 
T h i s s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s t h e d a t a u s e d i n i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e 
m o d e l o f t h e C J S . A l t h o u g h t h e i n p u t v a r i a b l e s a n d t h e i r v a l u e s a r e 
d e s c r i b e d i n t h e a p p e n d i c e s , t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o d e s ­
c r i b e t h e d a t a s o u r c e s , a n y m a n i p u l a t i o n s r e q u i r e d t o t r a n s f o r m t h e 
d a t a i n t o i t s f i n a l f o r m , a n d t h e a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h a c c o m p a n y t h e 
u s a g e o f p a r t i c u l a r d a t a . Much o f t h e d a t a f o c u s e s on t h e C J S o f 
S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y ; h o w e v e r , f r e q u e n t r e f e r e n c e s a r e made t o n a t i o n a l 
s t a t i s t i c s c o l l e c t e d b y t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e . N a t i o n a l s t a t i s ­
t i c s h a v e o n l y b e e n r e s o r t e d t o w h e n e v e r l o c a l s t a t i s t i c s h a v e n o t 
b e e n r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . 
T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n f o l l o w s c l o s e l y t h e o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n o f t h e C J S i t s e l f i n t h a t e a c h s u b s y s t e m ' s i n p u t s a r e d i s ­
c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y . ( S e e a l s o A p p e n d i c e s A a n d B . ) 
5 . 1 . 1 P o l i c e D a t a 
T h e e m p i r i c a l d a t a r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p o l i c e s u b s y s t e m d e a l s 
w i t h t h e f i r s t - o f f e n d e r f o r e c a s t s , t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s e f i r s t 
o f f e n d e r s , a n d t h e b r a n c h i n g r a t i o s o f B o x 2 . 
F i r s t - O f f e n d e r F o r e c a s t s . A s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r I V , t h e n u m b e r 
o f f i r s t o f f e n d e r s who a r e a r r e s t e d d u r i n g a n y m o n t h t f o r c r i m e j 
c a n b e d e s c r i b e d b y e q u a t i o n 4 - 2 a s , 
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w h e r e i s t h e c o n s t a n t p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l a r r e s t e e s who h a v e n e v e r 
b e f o r e b e e n a r r e s t e d a n d F . i s t h e t o t a l number o f a r r e s t s made a t 
J t 
t i m e j . D e u t s c h ' s [ 2 4 ] e m p i r i c a l l i n e a r s t o c h a s t i c f o r e c a s t i n g m o ­
d e l s a r e u s e d f o r t h e f o r e c a s t i n g f u n c t i o n o f t h e t o t a l number o f 
a r r e s t s f o r c r i m e j ; h o w e v e r , s i n c e h i s m o d e l s f o r e c a s t t h e number 
o f o c c u r r e n c e s o f e a c h c r i m e i n s t e a d o f t h e number o f a r r e s t s , a d ­
d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r y . L e t D e u t s c h ' s f o r e c a s t a t t i m e 
t f o r c r i m e j b e D . t . I f a c o n s t a n t c l e a r a n c e r a t e C . c a n b e a s s u m e d 
J t J 
f o r e a c h c r i m e a n d i f t h e a v e r a g e number o f o f f e n d e r s 0^ who a r e 
a r r e s t e d f o r a c l e a r e d o f f e n s e i s a l s o c o n s t a n t f o r e a c h c r i m e , t h e 
e x p r e s s i o n 
F . „ = 0 . C . D.„ 
J t J J j t 
h o l d s a n d ( C . D . ) i s t h e f o r e c a s t o f t h e number o f c r i m e s c l e a r e d . 
J J t 
T h e f o r e c a s t i n g f u n c t i o n s d e v e l o p e d b y D e u t s c h a r e s e a s o n a l 
i n t e g r a t e d a u t o r e g r e s s i v e , m o v i n g a v e r a g e m o d e l s . T h e p r e f e r e n c e 
f o r u s i n g s u c h d y n a m i c m o d e l s s h o u l d b e o b v i o u s : t h e y e n a b l e t h e 
t e s t i n g o f e x p e r i m e n t a l h y p o t h e s e s u n d e r t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e a g g r e ­
g a t e c r i m e r a t e i s g r o w i n g a n d s e a s o n a l . T h u s , e v e n t h o u g h s u c h 
m o d e l s a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y , b e c a u s e D e u t s c h d o e s 
p r o v i d e p a r a m e t e r e s t i m a t e s f o r L o s A n g e l e s C o u n t y , a n d b e c a u s e o f 
t h e p r o x i m i t y o f t h e s e two c o u n t i e s , t h e L o s A n g e l e s C o u n t y f o r e c a s t s 
w i l l be s c a l e d down t o r e p r e s e n t S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y c r i m e r a t e s . T h e 
f i r s t - o f f e n d e r a r r e s t r a t e f o r S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y , t h e n , i s 
V . , . = N . 0 . C . D . _ / M . ( 5 - 1 ) 
J t J J J J t j 
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w h e r e IYL i s t h e r a t i o o f t h e L o s A n g e l e s C o u n t y c r i m e r a t e t o t h e 
S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y c r i m e r a t e f o r e a c h c r i m e j a n d D ^ ^ i s D e u t s c h ' s 
f o r e c a s t f o r L o s A n g e l e s C o u n t y . E q u a t i o n 5 -1 c a n b e r e - w r i t t e n f o r 
s i m p l i c i t y a s 
V . „ = A . D . / M . ( 5 - 2 ) 
J t J J t j 
w h e r e 
A . = N . 0 . C . 
J J J J 
i s c o n s t a n t f o r e a c h c r i m e j . 
D e u t s c h [ 2 4 ] g i v e s t h e p a r a m e t e r e s t i m a t e s f o r t h e m o d e l s u s e d 
t o c o m p u t e D ^ . B e c a u s e o f t h e f o r m o f t h e s e m o d e l s , t h i r t e e n m o n t h s 
o f i n i t i a l v a l u e s a n d t h i r t e e n m o n t h s o f o b s e r v e d e r r o r s b e t w e e n t h e 
f o r e c a s t a n d t h e o b s e r v e d c r i m e r a t e a r e r e q u i r e d t o i n i t i a l i z e t h e s e 
m o d e l s . T h e L o s A n g e l e s d a t a f r o m J a n u a r y , 1974 t o J a n u a r y , 1 9 7 5 
a r e u s e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . T h e N j a r e c o m p u t e d u s i n g 1 9 6 9 , 1 9 7 0 a n d 
1 9 7 1 C a l i f o r n i a O f f e n d e r B a s e d T r a c k i n g S t a t i s t i c s ( O B T S ) [ 1 6 ] . 
A f t e r s e p a r a t i n g t h e S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y o f f e n d e r s f r o m t h e r e m a i n d e r 
o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , t h e number o f t h e o f f e n d e r s a r r e s t e d f o r e a c h 
i n d e x c r i m e who h a d no p r e v i o u s a r r e s t r e c o r d s o r who h a d a r r e s t h i s ­
t o r i e s b u t no c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s w e r e c o m p i l e d . T h e p e r c e n t a g e o f 
t h e t o t a l number o f S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y o f f e n d e r s c h a r g e d f o r c r i m e j 
who met e i t h e r o f t h e a b o v e c r i t e r i a i s N_. . A l t h o u g h t h i s a p p r o x i ­
m a t i o n i s m e r e l y t h a t , m o r e r e l i a b l e e s t i m a t e s c o u l d n o t b e f o u n d 
i n t h e t i m e a l l o w e d a n d t h e s e a t l e a s t y i e l d a r e l a t i v i s t i c s t a t e m e n t 
o f t h e t r u e f r a c t i o n s . 
1 0 5 
T h e c r i m e c l e a r a n c e r a t e s , C^, a r e t a k e n f r o m t h e 1974 
U n i f o r m C r i m e R e p o r t s ( U C R ) p u b l i s h e d b y t h e F B I [ 2 9 ; p . 4 3 ] . T h e 
a v e r a g e number o f p e r s o n s a r r e s t e d f o r e a c h c l e a r e d o f f e n s e , 0 ̂  , i s 
a s s u m e d t o b e o n e f o r e a c h c r i m e t y p e . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s a s s u m p ­
t i o n ( e v e n t h o u g h , i n t u i t i v e l y , i t s e e m s t h a t 0^ > 1 f o r a l l j ) i s 
t h a t t h e U C R s t a t i s t i c s , t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f a r r e s t d a t a , t h e m ­
s e l v e s h a v e s e v e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s ( s e e S e l l i n a n d W o l f g a n g , [ 6 0 ] ) . 
One o f t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s i s t h a t o n l y t h e m o s t s e v e r e o f f e n s e i s 
r e p o r t e d f o r a n y a r r e s t e e . A l t h o u g h i t s e e m s t h a t 0 j s h o u l d b e 
g r e a t e r t h a n u n i t y , t h e d e c l i n e i n t h e a c t u a l number o f p e r s o n s 
a r r e s t e d p e r c l e a r a n c e b r o u g h t a b o u t b y t h o s e o f f e n d e r s w h o s e a r ­
r e s t a c t u a l l y c l e a r s s e v e r a l c r i m e s r e s u l t s i n a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e 0 . . 
J 
T h u s , 0^ i s s e t t o one f o r s i m p l i c i t y . 
A v a l u e f o r t h e f o r e c a s t d i v i s o r M. i s e s t a b l i s h e d , f o r r e a s o n s 
J 
t o b e d i s c l o s e d l a t e r , i n S e c t i o n 5 . 2 . 
F i r s t O f f e n d e r A t t r i b u t e s . I n d e s c r i b i n g o f f e n d e r s i n t h i s 
m o d e l , s e v e r a l a t t r i b u t e s f o r e a c h f i r s t o f f e n d e r m u s t b e g e n e r a t e d 
u p o n h i s c r e a t i o n i n t h e m o d e l . A l t h o u g h many d e m o g r a p h i c v a r i a b l e s 
c o u l d h a v e b e e n u s e d t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n c a t e g o r i e s o f o f f e n d e r s , 
o n l y t h e o f f e n d e r ' s s e x i s u s e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e c l a s s e s . 
( W h i l e t h e a g e o f a n o f f e n d e r i s a l s o a n a t t r i b u t e o f e a c h o f f e n d e r , 
t h i s v a r a i b l e i s n o t u s e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n s u b p o p u l a t i o n s . ) 
T h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n a l o n g e t h n i c , r a c i a l 
o r o t h e r d e s i g n a t i o n i s a l s o p o s s i b l e f o r t h e m o d e l a s p r e s e n t l y 
d e s i g n e d , b u t c r e a t i n g a d d i t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s was n o t a t t e m p t e d 
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i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e t h e d a t a n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s e x a m p l e . T h e 
f o l l o w i n g s t a t i s t i c s a r e r e q u i r e d f o r e a c h o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y a n d 
f o r e a c h c r i m e j : 
1 . T h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e f i r s t o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n who 
b e l o n g t o o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y k a n d who a r e a r r e s t e d f o r 
c r i m e j ; 
2 . T h e a v e r a g e a g e o f o f f e n d e r s w h o s e a t t r i b u t e s a r e ( j , k ) , 
3 . T h e m in imum a n d max imum a g e s o f a l l ( j , k ) o f f e n d e r s ; 
4 . T h e s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n o f t h e a g e s o f t h e ( j , k ) o f f e n d e r s . 
T h e s e s t a t i s t i c s w e r e a s s e m b l e d f r o m t h e C a l i f o r n i a OBTS d a t a b a s e 
o n o f f e n d e r s f r o m S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y f o r t h e s e v e n i n d e x o f f e n s e s . 
T h e a c t u a l v a l u e s a r e shown i n A p p e n d i x B . A s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
o f f e n d e r a g e s d e m o n s t r a t e s gamma q u a l i t i e s , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g m e a n s 
a n d s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s a r e c o n v e r t e d w i t h i n GNS t o t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f 
t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h u s , when a n o f f e n d e r i s a r r e s t e d , h i s a g e i s 
d e t e r m i n e d p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y u s i n g t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e gamma 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a d a p t e d f r o m t h e e m p i r i c a l v a l u e s i n i t e m s 2 , 3 a b o v e . 
T h e a v e r a g e r e m a i n i n g l i f e t i m e o f a n o f f e n d e r w h o s e c u r r e n t 
a g e i s a ' i s u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a g e a t w h i c h a n o f f e n d e r d i e s . 
T h i s s t a t i s t i c i s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f r o m a n y a l m a n a c [ 6 6 , p . 9 6 3 ] . 
H e r e , t h e r e m a i n i n g l i f e t i m e i s a s s u m e d t o b e t h e mean o f a n e g a t i v e 
e x p o n e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n ; t h u s , b e c a u s e t h e e x p o n e n t i a l d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n i s m e m o r y l e s s , t h e number o f p e r s o n s who d i e d u r i n g a n y i n t e r v a l 
A t w o u l d b e u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d f o r e a c h g r o u p o f o f f e n d e r s w h o s e 
a g e i s a ' . A n o f f e n d e r ' s a g e a t d e a t h i s d e t e r m i n e d s t o c h a s t i c a l l y 
i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n h i s f i r s t a r r e s t . 
1 0 7 
B r a n c h i n g R a t i o s , B o x 2 . T h e a r c s e m i t t i n g f r o m B o x 2 a n d 
d i r e c t e d t o w a r d Node 4 a n d B o x 5 a r e d e f i n e d b y b r a n c h i n g p r o b a ­
b i l i t i e s f o r e a c h o f t h e i n d e x c r i m e s . T h e s e s t a t i s t i c s a r e t a k e n 
d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e 1 9 7 4 U C R [ 2 9 ; p . 1 7 5 ] . 
5 . 1 . 2 P r o s e c u t i o n a n d C o u r t D a t a 
B e c a u s e t h i s s u b s y s t e m i s t h e m o s t c o m p l e x i n t h e m o d e l , 
t h e d a t a r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h i s c o m p o n e n t e x c e e d t h o s e o f t h e o t h e r s . 
T h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s a r e r e q u i r e d : 
1 . S e r v i c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s f o r t h e p r o c e s s o r s 
2 . B r a n c h i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r t h e n e t w o r k a r c s 
3 . P r e - t r i a l d e t e n t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
4 . F i n a l c h a r g e t r a n s i t i o n m a t r i c e s f o r s u p e r i o r c o u r t 
c o n v i c t i o n s a n d g u i l t y p l e a s 
5 . C o u r t d i s p o s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r s u p e r i o r a n d c r i m i n a l 
c o u r t s 
6 . C r i m e s e v e r i t y m e a s u r e s f o r p l e a b a r g a i n i n g 
S e r v i c e D i s t r i b u t i o n s , B o x e s 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 5 , 2 8 , 37 a n d 3 9 . T h e 
s e r v i c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s u s e d f o r t h e q u e u e b o x e s w h i c h a r e a p a r t o f 
t h i s s u b s y s t e m h a v e a l l b e e n d e t e r m i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d u p o n d a t a 
f r o m t h e C a l i f o r n i a O B T S [ 1 6 ] . One b i t o f i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e f r o m 
t h i s d a t a b a s e i s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s d i s p o s i t i o n : 
1 . F e l o n y 
2 . M i s d e m e a n o r 
3 . No p r o s e c u t i o n 
I t i s a s s u m e d t h a t a f e l o n y d i s p o s i t i o n m e a n s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e 
i s t o b e t r i e d i n t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t a n d t h a t a m i s d e m e a n o r i s t o 
1 0 8 
b e t r i e d i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t . T h e OBTS a v e r a g e d e l a y b e t w e e n t h e 
t i m e t h a t a n o f f e n d e r i s c h a r g e d a n d h i s s u b s e q u e n t d i s p o s i t i o n b y 
t h e c o u r t s ( v i z , d i s m i s s a l , a c q u i t t a l , c o n v i c t i o n ) c a n b e u s e d t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o c e s s i n g t i m e s f o r t h i s s u b s y s t e m ' s p r o c e s s o r s . 
T h e s t a t i s t i c s a v a i l a b l e f r o m O B T S a r e a s s u m e d t o be b a s e d 
u p o n o f f e n d e r s who a r e a r r e s t e d ( B o x 5 ) a n d who p r o c e e d w i t h a n 
i n i t i a l h e a r i n g ( B o x 2 1 ) a n d p r o s e c u t i o n ( B o x 2 3 ) . A s s h a l l be s e e n 
s h o r t l y , t h i s a s s u m p t i o n f a c i l i t a t e s t h e e x t r a c t i o n o f s e r v i c e t i m e s 
f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g c o u r t p r o c e s s o r s a s w e l l . F o r t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g , 
t h e O B T S d a t a b a s e h a s no c a p a b i l i t y f o r g i v i n g t h i s a v e r a g e p r o c e s ­
s i n g t i m e s o t h e d e l a y t i m e s h a l l b e a s s u m e d t o a v e r a g e o n e d a y 
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h l a w s r e q u i r i n g a max imum d e l a y f o r t h i s h e a r i n g t o 
b e c o m p l e t e d . 
Now, c o n s i d e r t h e d i s p o s i t i o n w h e r e t h e p r o s e c u t o r d i s m i s s e s 
a d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . U s i n g t h e d i a g r a m o f t h e C J S m o d e l i n F i g u r e 1 , 
i f i t c a n b e a s s u m e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r d i s m i s s e s a c a s e o n l y a t 
B o x 2 3 , t h e OBTS a v e r a g e d e l a y b e t w e e n a n o f f e n d e r ' s c h a r g e a n d h i s 
f i n a l d i s m i s s a l i s p r e c i s e l y t h e p r o c e s s i n g t i m e o f B o x 2 3 . T h i s 
d a t a , i t t u r n s o u t , i s a v a i l a b l e f r o m S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y , a n d t h e 
a v e r a g e t i m e s a r e l i s t e d i n A p p e n d i x B . 
F o r t h e f e l o n y d i s p o s i t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s r o u t e d f r o m t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ( B o x 2 3 ) t o t h e g r a n d j u r y ( B o x 2 8 ) . A s s u m i n g h e i s a l s o 
a r r a i g n e d ( B o x 3 2 ) , e i t h e r a t r i a l may t a k e p l a c e ( B o x 3 9 ) o r h e may 
p l e a d g u i l t y ( B o x 3 7 ) . F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f a s s o c i a t i n g a p r o c e s s i n g 
t i m e w i t h e a c h o f t h e s e b o x e s , t h e a v e r a g e t i m e b e t w e e n t h e d e t e r m i n a -
























1. Homicide 1.0 8.5 7.0 45.9 30.4 .6 35.3 26.8 
2. Robbery 1.0 6.8 7.0 31.5 17.7 .6 13.9 7.1 
3. Assault 1.0 10.8 7.0 28.9 11.1 .6 18.1 7.3 
4. Burglary 1.0 8.7 7.0 25.4 9.7 .6 15.0 6.3 
5. Larceny 1.0 12.6 7.0 28.7 9.1 .6 17.3 4.7 
6. Auto Theft 1.0 6.0 7.0 22.9 9.9 .6 17.2 11.2 
7. Rape 1.0 10.0 7.0 30.5 13.5 .6 19.0 9.0 
Note: Columns (A), (C) and (E) are assumed values. 
Columns (B), (D) and (F) are from the California OBTS data base; 1969, 1970, 1971. [16] 
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tion of the charge and the sentence is tabulated. By assuming the 
average processing time needed by the grand jury for any case is 
seven days, the average time required by the superior court can be 
determined by subtraction: 
felony 
39,j X 3 23,j X28,j 
where ^ is the average processing time at box b for an offender 
felony 
arrested for crime j, and T\ J is the average time between the 
charge and the sentencing of an offender who has committed a felony 
according to the prosecutor's disposition of the case. These values 
for Sacramento County are summarized in Table 10. The processing 
time needed by the superior court when an offender pleads guilty 
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0.2 and 1.0 days 
since specific data is not readily available. 
Finally, for the sample of offenders whose disposition by the 
prosecutor sends them to the lower court, the average processing 
time can be computed by the expression 
_ misdemeanor 
25,j rj " T23,j' 
. „, misdemeanor . ^. , where T^ is the average time between an initial hearing 
and the lower court's disposition. These values are also tabulated 
in Table 10. 
By assuming that each processing time follows a negative 
exponential distribution, the average service time for each processor 
given by crime category completely describes the service distribution. 
The distribution of service times for processor b, crime j is 


















1. Homicide 170 106 19 45 .624 .112 .265 
2. Robbery 687 417 29 241 .607 .042 .351 
3. Assault 1204 414 301 489 .344 .250 .406 
4. Burglary 1839 948 314 577 .515 .171 .314 
5. Larceny 582 232 138 212 .399 .237 .364 
6. Auto Theft 698 303 66 329 .434 .095 .471 
7. Rape 216- 103 24 89 .477 .111 .412 
* Source: California OBTS database; 1969, 1970, 1971 [16]. 
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f(t) = 
Branching Ratios, Boxes 23, 28, 32 and Node 30. Because of 
the assumptions made in determining the service distributions of the 
superior court trial (Box 39), all offenders are routed to the arraign­
ment proceedings (Box 32) following a grand jury hearing (Box 28). 
That is, a "true bill" (Node 30) is issued by the grand jury and the 
prosecutor waives his option to declare a dead docket (Node 31) for 
every case. The assumptions are necessary, as will be recalled, 
because of the nature of the data available from OBTS. Since only 
three prosecutor dispositions are described in the OBTS data base, 
the above assumptions have enabled the calculation of the average 
processing times of the queue boxes in the subsystem. 
The OBTS data base also yields the branching probabilities 
at the prosecutor's station (Box 23). These values are computed 
directly by determining the fraction of offenders handed each dis­
position (felony, misdemeanor, acquittal) for each of the index 
crimes. Those fractions, then, are the branching probabilities of 
the corresponding arc on the network diagram. These ratios are 
computed in Table 11. 
Unfortunately, the OBTS data set does not contain the type 
of plea submitted by a defendant at the arraignment proceedings. 
Hence, to determine the branching ratios at Box 32, another source 
of information is required. Although data on the U.S. District 
Courts is not exactly what is needed here, the annual reports from 
the Department of Justice [2] do make statistics available which 
T a b l e 12. C o m p u t a t i o n o f B r a n c h i n g R a t i o s f o r B o x 32 
( A ) 
T o t a l 
D e f e n d e n t s 
( B ) 
T o t a l 
D e f e n d e n t s 
( C ) 
G u i l t y 
P l e a s 
( D ) 
C o u r t 
T r i a l s 
( D ) 
( A ) - ( B ) 
1 ( D ) 
( A ) - ( B ) 
l—1 H o m i c i d e 138 36 62 40 .608 .392 
to R o b b e r y 2365 337 1473 555 .726 .274 
3. A s s a u l t 736 179 388 169 .697 .303 
4. B u r g l a r y 285 44 212 29 .880 .120 
5. L a r c e n y 4824 706 3438 680 .835 .165 
6. A u t o T h e f t 1861 277 1308 276 .826 .174 
7. R a p e 79 19 42 18 .700 .300 
* I n c l u d e s N o l l o C o n t e n d e r e c a s e s . 
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could be considered to be rough estimates of the true data. 
The actual statistics collected are the probabilities of an offen­
der's going to trial or of his pleading guilty to the charges, given 
that he does one or the other. Since this is what is needed for the 
branching probabilities of the arcs emitting from Box 32, these 
estimates are used. The computations are shown in Table 12 for the 
fiscal year 1975. 
Pre-Trial Detention Probabilities. The pre-trial detention 
model requires that an adult be detained just prior to the initial 
hearing (Box 21) if he is to be detained at all. This decision is 
resolved stochastically: the probability that an offender is jailed 
at any time before trial is a function of the offense committed. 
For these values, the 1974 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
[74; p. 87] has been consulted. Although the desired information 
is still not directly available from this reference, a survey is 
reported from which a surrogate measure has been computed. The 
survey reported that, of the 88 participating pre-trial release pro­
jects, P^Q j percent used their jail as an alternative to releasing 
a defendant on his own recognizance when the crime is j. Although 
these ratios are not necessarily even close to the branching proba­
bilities expected for any one CJS, the national average should be 
close to these values reported by this survey. Thus, taking the 
potential for misrepresentation into account, these values are 
assumed. 
However, it should be noted that equally imprecise estimates 
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have been obtained for the probability that an offender who is 
detained before trial is still detained following the arraignment 
hearing (Box 32). For these estimates, an implementation of the 
JUSSIM model was consulted [20; p. 126]. For this study of offen­
der flows in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 2507 offenders (30.3% 
of all offenders present at the initial hearing) were in jail while 
the courts processed their cases, whereas only 1078 (13.0% of all 
offenders present at the initial hearing) were still in jail while 
awaiting the disposition of the court. By assuming that those in 
jail while awaiting trial were also in jail during the initial 
hearing, the ratio P' . = ^ .430 for all crimes j, can be & 20,j 2507 J 
interpreted as the probability that an offender who is jailed during 
the initial hearing is still in jail during the trial. 
Charge Transition Matrices. In designing the plea bargaining 
model, originally it was decided to separate the processes which 
determine an offender's conviction offense from those which determine 
the sentence duration. Thus, if a defendant were to plead guilty, 
the logic of Box 37 would determine both his conviction offense and 
his sentence, but it would do so independently. As the model evolved, 
this capability was designed into both processors of the superior 
court (Boxes 37 and 39). However, acquiring realistic data for each 
processor has proven to be a difficult task. The following assump­
tions have been made: 
1. The probability that an offender who committed crime j 
is convicted by a court trial for charge c, p. is iden-
tical to the probability p! of an offender pleading 
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guilty to charge c; 
2. Only nine conviction charges are possible: 
a. First degree murder 
b. Second degree murder 
c. Manslaughter 
d. Robbery 
e. Aggravated Assault 
f. Burglary 
g. Grand larceny 
h. Auto theft 
i. Forcible rape 
3. The probability of disposition d occurring given charge 
c is not necessarily the same for the defendant who pleads 
guilty and for the defendant who is convicted at a trial; 
4. The expected durations of particular dispositions S are not 
necessarily the same. 
These assumptions allow the simulation of differential sentencing 
policies for offenders who are convicted by trial and for those who 
plead guilty. 
With the assumption that p. = p! for all j and c, the task 
of data collection is simplified. The charge transition matrix for 
convictions, H = {p. }, is equal to the charge transition matrix for 
guilty pleas, H'= {pj c}. To determine H, the OBTS data for Sacramento 
County is used to compute the probability that an offender who is both 
arrested for crime j and who is subsequently convicted for crime j. 





























































































HOMICIDE .845 .473 .108 .419 .400 .091 .354 .028 .127 0 0 0 0 
ROBBERY 0 .473 .108 .419 0 0 0 .782 .029 .003 .162 .003 .019 
ASSAULT .006 .473 .108 .419 .003 0 .003 .017 .948 .011 .011 .006 0 
BURGLARY 0 .473 .108 .419 0 0 0 .010 .020 .857 .098 .012 .002 
LARCENY 0 .473 .108 .419 0 0 0 0 .010 .029 .914 .048 0 
AUTO THEFT 0 .473 .108 .419 0 0 0 .007 0 .014 .055 .925 0 
RAPE 0 .473 .108 .419 0 0 0 .020 .143 .041 0 0 .796 
* Values determined from Sacramento County OBTS data base. 
# Values determined from U.S. District Court data. 
1 1 8 
Then, U.S. District Court data [2; p. 423] is used to compute the 
conditional probability of the first and second degree murder, and 
manslaughter conviction labels given that a homicide has occurred. 
Since the OBTS data gives P(homicide), 
P(murder 1) = P(homicide) P(murder 1 | homicide) 
P(murder 2) = P(homicide) p(murder 2 | homicide) 
p(manslaughter) = p(homicide) p(manslaughter | homicide). 
These computations and the p_.̂  are shown in Table 13. 
Superior Court Disposition Probabilities. One of the major 
reasons for selecting the U.S. District Court data for the computation 
of the charge transition matrix is that these courts also distribute 
data on the dispositions of defendants for the charges selected 
above [2; p. 423]. The disposition probabilities for defendants 
who plead guilty are computed directly from this data. For the 
disposition of a defendant convicted by a trial, the following re­
lation is assumed to hold for the conviction states (i.e., for 
imprisonment, probation, fine, suspended sentence): 
P(disposition d) = F(conviction for charge c) x 
P(disposition d | conviction 
for charge c). 
The probabilities on the right hand side of the above expression are 
computed from the U.S. District Court data. The probability of an 
acquittal at a trial also comes directly from this data set. These 
estimates are included in Appendix B. Note that these probabilities 
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a r e e n t e r t a i n e d w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e o f f e n d e r ' s s e x . 
L o w e r C o u r t D i s p o s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t i e s . A n o t h e r r e a s o n f o r 
u s i n g t h e U . S . D i s t r i c t C o u r t d a t a i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t 
d i s p o s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s i s t h a t t h e OBTS d a t a a v a i l a b l e f o r S a c r a ­
m e n t o C o u n t y s e e m s t o be b i a s e d t o w a r d t h o s e d e f e n d a n t s who a r e c o n ­
v i c t e d . T h u s , a m o r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a r r a y o f f e l o n y d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e 
p o s s i b l e b y u s i n g t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e f e d e r a l c o u r t d a t a . F o r t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t ( B o x 25), h o w e v e r , t h i s p r e c i s i o n i s n o t a s c r i t i c a l s i n c e t h e 
f o c u s o f t h i s m o d e l o f t h e C J S i s p l e a b a r g a i n i n g i n t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t . 
T h e O B T S d a t a f r o m S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y i s , t h e r e f o r e , a n a d e q u a t e s o u r c e 
f o r d i s p o s i t i o n s b a s e d o n c r i m e t y p e b u t n o t c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l . U s a g e 
o f t h e O B T S d a t a d o e s r e q u i r e c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s : 
1 . T h e d e c i s i o n t o j a i l a n o f f e n d e r i s made i n d e p e n d e n t l y 
o f h i s s e x ; 
2 . T h e j a i l d i s p o s i t i o n ( B o x e s 2 6 , 5 1 ) i n t h e m o d e l i n c l u d e s 
t h e O B T S j a i l , j a i l a n d f i n e , a n d j a i l a n d p r o b a t i o n 
s e n t e n c e s ; 
3 . T h e s u s p e n d e d s e n t e n c e d i s p o s i t i o n ( N o d e 4 4 ) i s c o m p o s e d 
o f t h e u n s u p e r i v e d p r o b a t i o n a n d t h e o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n s 
d e s c r i b e d i n t h e O B T S d a t a . 
T h e s e r e s u l t s f r o m t h e OBTS S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y d a t a b a s e a r e a l s o 
shown i n t h e a p p e n d i x . 
C r i m e S e v e r i t y . T h e r e l a t i v e s e v e r i t y o f e a c h c r i m e c a t e g o r y 
i s r e q u i r e d f o r o n e s e t o f h y p o t h e s e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e m o d e l o f p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g . T h e a v e r a g e s e v e r i t y o f e a c h i n d e x o f f e n s e h a s b e e n 
d e t e r m i n e d b y H e l l e r a n d McEwen [ 3 3 ; p . 2 4 6 ] b a s e d u p o n t h e S e l l i n -
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W o l f g a n g s e r i o u s n e s s s c a l e [ 6 0 ] . T h e e s t i m a t e s n e e d e d a r e b o r r o w e d 
f r o m t h e i r a n a l y s i s a n d a r e d i s p l a y e d i n A p p e n d i x B . 
5 . 1 . 3 C o r r e c t i o n s D a t a 
F o r t h e c o r r e c t i o n s s u b s y s t e m , t h e r e a r e two g e n e r a l d a t a 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h e f i r s t i s t h e s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n s f o r t h e p r i s o n s , 
j a i l s , p r o b a t i o n a n d p a r o l e , a n d t h e s e m u s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y t y p e 
o f c o n v i c t i o n : 
1 . S u p e r i o r c o u r t g u i l t y p l e a ( B o x 3 7 ) 
2 . S u p e r i o r c o u r t t r i a l c o n v i c t i o n ( B o x 3 9 ) 
3 . C r i m i n a l c o u r t c o n v i c t i o n ( B o x 2 5 ) 
S i n c e t h e p a r o l e t e r m i s d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e o t h e r 
d i s p o s i t i o n s , t h e e n t i r e i s s u e o f p a r o l e d a t a i s t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n . 
L o w e r C o u r t S e n t e n c e D u r a t i o n s . B e c a u s e p r i s o n i s n o t a n 
o p t i o n f o r s e n t e n c i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t a t a l o w e r c o u r t h e a r i n g , o n l y 
j a i l a n d p r o b a t i o n a r y s e n t e n c e l e n g t h s a r e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e d i s ­
p o s i t i o n o f s u c h c a s e s . T h e e x p e c t e d d u r a t i o n s o f t h e s e s e n t e n c e s 
h a v e b e e n c o m p u t e d f r o m t h e S a c r a m e n t o C o u n t y OBTS d a t a b a s e u n d e r 
t h e same s e t o f a s s u m p t i o n s n e e d e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e d i s p o s i t i o n 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s . T h e r e s u l t s a r e shown i n A p p e n d i x B . 
S u p e r i o r C o u r t S e n t e n c e D u r a t i o n s . J a i l , i t w i l l be r e ­
m e m b e r e d , i s n o t a d i s p o s i t i o n o p e n t o t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t d e f e n ­
d a n t . T h e r e f o r e , o n l y t h e p r i s o n a n d p r o b a t i o n s e n t e n c e l e n g t h s a r e 
r e q u i r e d h e r e . F o r t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y s e n t e n c e s i t s h a l l be a s s u m e d 
t h a t t h e m e t h o d o f c o n v i c t i o n ( i . e . , g u i l t y p l e a v e r s u s t r i a l ) d o e s 
n o t i m p a c t t h e l e n g t h o f t h e s e n t e n c e . B e c a u s e o f t h e h i g h c o s t o f t h e 
1 2 1 
p r i s o n d i s p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e e x p e c t e d d u r a t i o n o f a p r i s o n t e r m 
i s a s s u m e d t o d e p e n d o n t h e m e t h o d o f c o n v i c t i o n . 
S i n c e t h e O B T S d a t a d o e s n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e p l e a 
b a r g a i n e d a n d t h e t r i a l c o n v i c t i o n s , t h e U . S . D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a t i s ­
t i c s [ 2 ; p . 4 2 3 ] s h a l l be u s e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n r e s u l t s 
o f S h i n [ 6 2 ] t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x p e c t e d p r i s o n s e n t e n c e b a s e d u p o n 
t h e m e t h o d o f c o n v i c t i o n a n d t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l . S h i n i s o n e o f 
t h e f e w e m p i r i c a l s o u r c e s w h i c h h a s c o m p a r e d t h e o b s e r v e d s e n t e n c i n g 
d i s p a r i t i e s b e t w e e n p l e a b a r g a i n e d a n d c o u r t t r i a l c o n v i c t i o n s . H i s 
s t u d y i s b a s e d on r o b b e r y a n d a s s a u l t o f f e n s e s ; i t s h o w e d t h a t t h e 
a v e r a g e p r i s o n s e n t e n c e f o r 23 d e f e n d a n t s who w e r e c o n v i c t e d a t a 
t r i a l w a s L = 6 . 0 y e a r s w h i l e f o r 4 1 1 s i m i l a r d e f e n d a n t s who 
n . g . 
p l e a d e d g u i l t y t h e a v e r a g e s e n t e n c e w a s L = 3 . 2 y e a r s . T h e w e i g h t e d 
a v e r a g e o f t h e s e p r i s o n s e n t e n c e s , 
- 2 3 ( 6 . 0 ) + 4 1 1 ( 3 . 2 ) . 
L = 23 + 4 1 1 = 3 * 3 5 y e a r s ' 
c a n b e u s e d t o c o m p u t e t h e r e l a t i v e s e v e r i t i e s o f t h e g u i l t y p l e a 
s e n t e n c e , S , a n d o f t h e t r i a l s e n t e n c e , S : 
g - n . g . 
L 
S = - g - L = 0 . 9 5 
8 * L 
L 
S = = 1 . 7 9 . 
n . g . -
B y a s s u m i n g t h a t S a n d S a r e c o n s t a n t f o r a l l n i n e c o n -
g - n . g . 
v i c t i o n s l a b e l s c , a p p r o x i m a t e p r i s o n s e n t e n c e s f o r e a c h l a b e l c a n 
b e c o m p u t e d b y t a k i n g t h e a v e r a g e p r i s o n s e n t e n c e s f o u n d i n t h e 
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literature, u and multiplying them by S and S to determine c g- n-g-
the expected sentencing disparities. Since the prison sentence 
data available from the U.S. District Courts [2; p. 423] is grouped 
by the length of the sentence, the expected duration for each charge 
c is 
I f (g)x(g) 
u = g , 
1 f (g) 
g c 
t h 
where f c(g) is the frequency for the g — group of sentences for 
t h 
charge c and x(g) is the average sentence for the g — group. Because 
of the method of reporting this data, the following is assumed: 
Assumed g Sentence Duration Limits Ave rag e Duration 
1 duration < 1 year x(l) = .5 years 
2 1 year < duration < 3 years x(2) = 2 years 
3 3 years _< duration < 5 years x(3) = 4 years 
4 duration _> 5 years x(4) = 20 years 
Both the expected prison sentences and the prison sentences for guilty 
plea and trial convictions are computed in Table 14. 
Table 14. Computation of Prison Sentences for Guilty Plea and Trial 
Convictions 
c CHARGE yc u S C R 
y s 
c ng 
1. Murder 1 18.80 years 17.86 years 31.77 years 
2. Murder 2 13.14 12.48 23.52 
3. Manslaughter 6.12 5.81 10.96 
4. Robbery 8.60 8.17 15.39 
5. Assault 3.94 3.74 7.05 
6. Burglary 5.72 5.43 10.24 
7. Larceny 4.27 4.05 7.64 
8. Auto Theft 4.52 4.29 8.09 
9. Rape 10.56 10.03 18.90 
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Because of the assumption that the probationary sentence does 
not change between the guilty plea defendant and the defendant con­
victed by a court trial (given the same conviction label), the OBTS 
data base can be used to determine the expected length of such a 
sentence because it does not distinguish between niethods of convic­
tion. The results from an analysis of the Sacramento County defen­
dants yields the expected durations found in Appendix B. Note that 
the sentence length is assumed to be the same for the three con­
viction labels of homicide. 
Parole Data. Moseley and Gerould [47; p. 54] have shown that 
significant differences exist between a man and woman's ability to 
obtain parole. For the conviction labels c used in this model of 
the CJS, their results demonstrate that the average time that a man 
actually spends in prison, is longer than for the woman, a^. 
However, by dividing by the average prison sentence, u , the propor­
tion of the sentence actually served before parole can be determined 
as a function of the sex of the offender. (See Table 15.) 
Table 15. Computation of the Proportion of the Prison Sentence 









1. Murder 1 6.75 3.67 .359 .195 
2. Murder 2 6.75 3.67 .514 .279 
3. Manslaughter 2.33 1.67 .381 .273 
4. Robbery 3.18 1.93 .369 .224 
5. Assault 1.75 1.33 .444 .233 
6. Burglary 1.83 1.25 .320 .219 
7. Larceny 1.33 1.17 .312 .274 
8. Auto Theft 1.50 0.83 .332 .184 
9. Rape 7.00 2.08 .663 .197 
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Once an offender is paroled (Box 45), he may violate the 
conditions of his release, causing his parole to be revoked and his 
return to prison. Once again, Moseley and Gerould [47; p.55] give 
some insight into such violations. They state that 22% of their 
sample violated parole within two years. For this example, then, it 
will be assumed that the time between the initiation and the revoca­
tion of an offender's parole is exponentially distributed and station­
ary across all charges; furthermore, 22% of the entire paroled 
population will be returned to prison after an average time of two 
years on parole. 
5.1.4 Juvenile Justice Data 
The Juvenile Justice Subsystem has only three data require­
ments: the branching probabilities of the intake hearing (Box 8) 
and of the juvenile court (Box 9), the service distributions of 
these two processors and of the juvenile corrections processors 
(Boxes 12, 13, 14, 15), and the pre-trial detention probabilities. 
Service Distributions for Boxes 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15. It 
has been extremely difficult to get data on the processing of juve­
nile defendants, but one major reason for this is the variety of 
ways in which juveniles are treated by the CJS since only recently does 
there seem to be any real consistency in juvenile offender processing 
[21]. Because of this data deficiency, the processing times for the 
intake hearing and the juvenile court hearing are taken from a study 
of delinquency cases in Denver [21]. According to Cohen, the author of 
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this study, "...it took an average of 76 days from the time a case 
reached the intake division of the court until a decision..." 
[21; p. 13] is made as to the court's disposition. Although the 
processing times of specific crimes are not discussed, if it is 
assumed for this model that each hearing requires 38 days, then the 
total average processing time for both of these processors is equal 
to that described, 76 days. 
Another reason that it has been difficult to acquire data on 
juvenile processing is the secrecy surrounding both the handling of 
juvenile cases and the correction of juvenile offenders. This last 
reason is why no empirical data has been found to estimate the ser­
vice distributions of the various juvenile correctional programs and 
why several assumptions are necessary to activate this section of 
the model. It is assumed that the processing times for juvenile 
incarceration (Box 12) are equivalent to the probation sentences 
for the adult offenders reported in OBTS. Although these juvenile 
sentences are not as severe as those for prison, they do reflect the 
need to incapacitate the juvenile. (See Appendix B..) 
Whenever a juvenile is informally supervised (Box 15), the 
average processing time is assumed to be equivalent to the average 
jail sentence an adult would receive in the criminal court (Box 25). 
This data, then, is also obtained from the OBTS data base for each 
crime category. 
The sentencing of a juvenile to a youth farm or similar insti­
tution is realized in this model when he is sentenced to Box 14. 
Here, the average processing time is set to the average of the 
3. Probation 
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2 2 2 0 (a Q - a N ^ a N * a r £ e P r o vides that will resemble a white noise 
process. Consequently, it is not useful for identifying or yj. 
When the aberration is an innovation, then r? will reflect the 
* k 
behavior of the AR(p) polynomial in the noise model. Fitting the 
indicated AR(p) noise model and checking for lack of fit in its 
residuals should isolate the aberrant innovation and allow for it 
to be estimated along with the noise model. 
When | <51 is moderate, r£ again cannot be relied upon to 
identify either N or u . When the aberration is an observation, 
it masks r^ in and it is expected that lower order AR and MA 
noise model polynomials will be identified. However, for an aberrant 
innovation, the correct order of the AR(p) noise model should be 
identified, while the order of the MA(q) component may be under­
estimated. In either case, examination of the model's residuals may 
correct these identification errors, but there is no guarantee that 
this will always be the remedy. 
3.3.3 Identification of Multiple Aberrations 
In fact, the difficulties in identifying a time series model 
when only a single aberration exists are minor when compared 
to the case when multiple aberrations may be found in the data 
history. Table 6 summarizes the effects on r^ of multiple aberrant 
observations or innovations. Once again, three regions of the 
signal-to-noise ratio are identified. 
2 2 
As for the solitary aberration models, when = a^, 
rk * rk c a n b e u s e d t 0 i d e n t i : f y t n e noise model. Since 6(T^) = 0 
for each period at which an aberration occurs, it may be difficult 
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ratios for Box 8 can be computed by assuming that the branching 
probabilities for juveniles tried as adults is identically zero for 
all crime types. The assumed correspondence between the Denver dis­
positions and the model's dispositions are shown along with the 
computed branching probabilities in Table 16. 
Table 16. Computation of Branching Ratios for Boxes 8 and 9 for 















1 52 216 901 .397 .521 
2 12 41 47 .125 .057 
3 13 128 357 .390 .431 
4 14 131 230 .399 .277 
5 15 28 195 .085 .235 
Pre-Trial Detention for Juveniles. As data does not appear 
to be available on the subject of pre-trial detention for juveniles, 
the probability that a juvenile is so detained is assumed equal to 
the comparable adult value. This assumption holds over all seven 
index crime categories. 
5.1.5 Recidivism Data 
Four data types are required for the recidivism model used in 
conjunction with this model of the CJS: 
1. The crime switch matrix 
2. The recidivism probabilities 
3. The recidivism delay times 
4. The mortality rates 
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Although the last item is not related to recidivism per se, it should 
be remembered that it has been included as part of this apparatus 
for lack of more appropriate location. 
The Grime Switch Matrix. This matrix is used at Nodes 20 and 
49 to determine the crime for which an offender is arrested following 
his release from the CJS. It is composed of probabilities which have 
been assumed invariant to such factors as the offender's age, type 
of release and sex. Since Blumstein and Larson [12] have already 
developed and successfully used such a matrix, theirs is also used 
here. ! 
The Recidivism Probabilities. The probability of recidivism 
was assumed in Chapter IV to be a function of an offender's age and 
sex. The major reason for this assumption is the conclusions of 
j 
Robison and Smith [58] who site the apparent ineffectuality of 
alternate correctional programs in deterring recidivism. In fact, 
these two authors go so far as to state that little difference 
exists between the correctional programs they studied in reducing 
the rate of recidivism. Given their conclusions, it makes sense 
that recidivism would be more predictable gi/en the characteristics 
of the offender. Estimates of the recidivism probabilities are given 
for a three year follow-up study in the FBI's 1974 Uniform Crime 
Reports [29; p. 50], Although these probabilities may be understated 
because of the relative shortness of the follow-up period, they are 
used without adjustment here. These values are reported in Appendix 
B . 
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The Recidivism Delays. Although the recidivism probabilities 
are functions of the offender's personal characteristics (age and sex), 
it seems reasonable that the delay between an offender's release from 
the CJS and his subsequent re-arrest be a function of the type of CJS 
disposition for his last offense. Although there does not exist any 
empirical evidence to either support or refute this premise, it is 
assumed for this implementation of the CJS model. To determine reci­
divism delays, Stollmack and Harris [64] show that the delay distri­
bution for recidivism can appropriately be described by a negative 
exponential distribution. These results are used here. 
The 1974 Uniform Crime Reports [29; p. 51] give probabilities 
of recidivism based upon the two desired factors. Since these statis­
tics were collected as part of the three year follow-up study mentioned 
earlier, If the process is assumed stationary, the average time until 
re-arrest, t, can be determined by solving 
where f(t) is the density function of the delay process. But since 
Stollmack and Harris have shown that 
the average time between release and re-arrest, 3 , can be determined 
as follows: 
P(t < 3 years) = f(t)dt 




P = P(t _< 3 years) = 1 - exp (- 3/3) 
and 3 = (5-3) 
Ln(l - P 3) . 
Thus, by computing a value of 3 for each index offense and each 
disposition using P^ from the UCR statistics, the desired delay 
distributions are completely defined. The computed average times 
are shown in Appendix B. 
The Mortality Rates. Offender mortality rates are required in 
the event that a modeled offender does not desist in committing offenses. 
The mortality rates used for this model assume that an offender's 
longevity is not affected by his criminal status. The average re­
maining lifetime for a person of a particular age group is given in 
most almanacs [66; p. 963]. The values used for this model are shown 
in Table 17. 
Table 17. Average Remaining Lifetime of Offenders Who Are a Years Old 
Age Average Remaining Average Remaining 
Grouping Lifetime, Males Lifetime, Females 
10 < a < 15 57.8 65.6 
15 < a < 20 53.0 60.7 
20 < a < 25 48.3 55.8 
25 < a < 30 43.9 51.1 
30 < a < 35 39.6 46.4 
35 < a < 40 35.2 41.7 
40 < a < 45 31.0 37.2 
45 < a < 50 26.8 32.7 
50 < a < 55 23.0 28.5 
55 < a < 60 19.4 24.5 
60 < a < 65 16.3 20.7 
65 < a < 70 13.5 17.2 
70 < a < 75 10.9 13.8 
1 3 1 
5.2 Model Initialization 
The next phase required for implementation of this model of 
a criminal justice system is its initialization. This phase entails 
the fixing of several parameters which depend upon the realization of 
the queues in the network. Specifically, it will be recalled that 
a divisor which relates the crime rate of Los Angeles to that of 
Sacramento County is needed for the virgin arrest forecaster. This 
divisor is determined first. Next, since the queues themselves must 
be allowed to build up to a condition of steady-state, the length of 
the period during which the transient response is no longer evident 
is determined. The final requirement for initializing the model is to 
determine an appropriate cost for each resource and upper bounds on 
their usage. The cost of each resource is determined based upon actual 
costs and the level of usage in the model. 
5.2.1 The Forecast Divisor 
For the input to this model, forecasting functions developed 
by Deutsch [24] have been borrowed. Earlier in this chapter, it was 
decided that a divisor M. for each crime j, was needed to scale the 
J 
forecasts of Deutsch's Los Angeles crime rates in order to approximate 
the rates for Sacramento County. Recall that the virgin arrest fore­
cast at time t, defined in equation 5-2, is 
V = A . D../M. , Jt J Jt j 
where D. is Deutsch's forecast at time t of crimes reported, and A . 
Jt J 
is a constant relating D to the virgin arrest rate for crime j. 
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To determine , the 1974 Uniform Crime Reports [29] were 
examined and the appropriate ratios developed. These M^ are shown 
in Table 18 along with the resulting initial values of the corresponding 
crime rates , V . 







Murder 37 1 20 1 30 1 
Robbery 25 2 20 3 30 2 
Assault 22 8 20 9 30 6 
Burglary 10 21 20 11 30 7 
Larceny 5 66 20 17 30 11 
Auto Theft 16 5 20 4 30 3 
Rape 15 2 20 1 30 1 
In trying to simulate the model, it was discovered that the 
proposed initial forecasts caused the model to terminate prematurely. 
That is, the build-up of offenders in the queues exceeded the capacity 
of the model prior to the estimated run length. ( At this point, the 
run length was approximated at 50 years, 25 years each for initiali­
zation and experimental periods. This would at least allow a criminal 
career of average length to be simulated during each epoch.) The 
executable form of this model requires 221,600 octal words on a CDC 
Cyber 74, segmenting the program as much as practical. Because of its 
already large size, increasing the capacity of the GNS list processing 
arrays was considered undesireable. Thus, the decision was made to make 
M. a constant over all crime categories in order to scale the forecasts 
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to a manageable size. After trying several values, notably = 20, 
the run length of 50 years was still not achieved; however, When M̂ ' = 30, 
a little extra capacity would be available for increasing the experi­
mental period of the simulation. 
Table 18 summarizes these steps. It should be noted that, 
although the magnitude of the differences (̂ -̂  ~ ^IJ) ^ a s c n a r ig e <i f ° r 
any pair of crimes j and when is set to either 20 or 30, ranking 
the V' or the V" on the basis of magnitude maintains the same order 
on j as when the are ranked. Thus, setting M̂ . = 30 preserves the 
relative level of exposure of crimes in this modeled CJS as expected 
in the actual Sacramento County CJS. 
Another observation worth noting is that the overall behavior 
of the various queues in the model did not change between = 20 and 
= 3 0 . It appears, therefore, that the modeled CJS is sensitive only 
to the magnitude of ML and that differences in result only in 
proportional changes in the model's behavior. This should be true so 
long as the resource levels are unconstrained. In a constrained 
environment, however, a reduction in £L accompanied by a proportional 
reduction in the resource constraint, might result in significant 
differences in the two responses. 
5.2.2 The Initialization Period 
Prior to actually experimenting with a simulation model which 
deals with queueing phenomena, two parameters must be determined. One 
parameter, the initialization run length, prescribes the amount of time 
that the model is simulated in order to pre-load the queues in the 
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network. The second parameter is normally called, simply, the run 
length. It is the amount of time simulated beyond the initialization 
period in which the experiments are performed. Thus, any simulation 
experiment may be considered to be composed of initialization data 
(which is usually discarded, according to Kleijnen [41; pp. 69-73]) 
and of experimental data. 
To determine the length of the initialization period, a sample 
run of the model is executed and an attempt is made to ascertain when 
the transient phase of the network is completed. The boxes which 
collect the recidivists who are released from the CJS are the critical 
processors of the network. When these processors reach steady-state, 
the remainder also should be in this condition since the other proces­
sors eventually route their offenders to one of the recidivism boxes: 
1. Juvenile Recidivism (Box 19) 
2. Adult Recidivism, Harsh Disposition (Box 47) 
3. Adult Recidivism, Lenient Disposition (Box 48) 
Examining the simulated time series of the number of offenders stored 
at each box (Figure 2), an immediate observation is that none of these 
plots stabilizes at an average level. However, with the growth in the 
crime rates and the recycling of offenders back into the CJS, the level 
of activity at each processor is expected to grow at some near constant 
rate. Thus, rather than looking for the stabilization of a plot, the 
stability of a process is sought. From Figure 2, the three plots all 
th 
seem to have entered a period of constant growth beyond the 20 year. 
The length of the initialization period is, therefore, 20 years. This 
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value also has a great deal of intuitive appeal as the average 
criminal career should last approximately 7 years [29; p. 48], 
thereby allowing most of the offenders who were arrested at day one 
of the initialization period to desist in their criminal pursuits by 
the time t = 20 arrives. 
Years 
Figure 2. Time Series of Recidivists Released From the CJS 
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To determine the run length of the experimental epoch, most 
discrete event simulations compute the number of observations required 
to test a hypothesis at a desired level of significance. Such a 
procedure is used in order to minimize the cost of executing the 
simulation model; however, it is usually done only for models which 
are stationary in both the mean and in the variance of the performance 
measure of interest. Since this model of the CJS is not to be used 
for the testing of specific hypotheses, other factors must be 
considered: 
1. The length of the average criminal career 
2. The capacity restrictions of GNS 
3. The responsiveness of the model to parameter changes. 
Considering the first two factors together, the approximate length of 
the normative criminal career is 7 years and the capacity of GNS allows 
on the order of 50 years of simulated history including the initiali­
zation phase. Therefore, the length of the experimental period should 
be at least 7 years but not much bigger than 30. Taking the model's 
responsiveness into account, the initialization period required 20 
years to stabilize. Because of this slowness to reach steady-state and 
the need to test changes to the model, the longest possible run length 
should ensure that the model will achieve steady-state following a 
perturbation. Further analysis of GNS's capacity reveals that a 
total of 55 years can safely be simulated. Therefore, the run length 
is taken to be 35 years. 
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5.2.3 Resource Costs 
The final two steps required to initialize this model of the 
CJS is to determine the resource constraints and costs. Because of 
the level of resource aggregation proposed in Chapter IV, there 
does not exist a one-to-one correspondence between a unit of resource 
k and a particular resource of the actual CJS. That is, the resources 
of this model are imaginary, contrived using certain notions of how 
resources are normally used. This method of implementing resources 
should be enhanced before definite conclusions are drawn from this 
model, but for the current work such an artifice simplifies the data 
collection requirements and at the same time it should not detract from 
the experimental results. 
To determine the cost of each resource in the model, a sample 
run has been made and the average number of offenders A ̂  using each 
resource k determined for the first 12 months of the experimental 
phase of the simulation. (See Table 19.) The total annual cost of 
each resource, A^» is based upon U.S. government statistics for 
Sacramento County [71; pp. 171, 197, 228, 247, 273]. These estimates 
are divided by the number of days in each simulated year to arrive at 
the average daily cost of each resource, A^. The expected cost per 
resource unit per offender day is simply the ratio of A^ to A^. 
This ratio, 
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T a b l e 19. C o m p u t a t i o n o f t h e E x p e c t e d D a i l y C o s t P e r O f f e n d e r 
k \ \ = ^ 3 6 0 c, = A ; /A. k k k 
R e s o u r c e 
Number 
A v e r a g e 
U s a g e 
T o t a l A n n u a l 
C o s t ( x 1000) 
A v e r a g e D a i l y 
C o s t ( x 1000) 
E x p e c t e d D a i l y 
C o s t P e r O f f e n d e r 
1 21.75 $ 3330 $ 9.25 $ 425 
2 6.42 9270 25.75 4010 
3 2.75 1534 4.26 1550 
4 15.00 1813 5.04 336 
5 7.17 1223 3.40 474 
6 6.3.17 2348 6.52 103 
7 413.58 3008 8.36 20 
8 960.00 3469 9.64 10 
9 8.33 436 1.21 145 
10 4.50 882 2.45 544 
i s u s e d a s t h e c o s t o f p r o c e s s i n g a n o f f e n d e r f o r o n e d a y u s i n g r e s o u r c e 
k . B o t h t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i n g c o s t o f t h e e n t i r e C J S a n d t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n 
o f r e s o u r c e k t o a n o f f e n d e r ' s c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a r e b a s e d u p o n t h e 
v a l u e o f C ^ ( c f . , C h a p t e r I V ) . 
5.2.4 R e s o u r c e C o n s t r a i n t s 
I n d e v e l o p i n g t h e r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t s f o r t h i s e x a m p l e , i t s e e m s 
t h a t n o t a l l o f t h e r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d p o s s e s s a f i x e d u p p e r b o u n d o n 
t h e i r c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e r e a s o n i s t h a t t h e m o d e l d o e s n o t c u r r e n t l y 
t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t s e v e r a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s w h i c h n a t u r a l l y a r i s e u n d e r 
c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , i f a p o l i c y i s t e s t e d w h i c h c a u s e s 
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a surge of offenders to enter the prisons, then an upper bound would 
cause a queue of offenders waiting for prison. Since such a queue 
does not normally develop in the prison system, other mechanisms must 
be at work. Either, 
1. Offenders who have nearly completed their sentences are 
released; 
2. The prosecutor foresees that the prisons are becoming over­
crowded and he begins offering greater charge reductions for 
guilty pleas, thereby reducing the number of defendants who 
are eligible for prison sentences; 
3. Extra capacity is acquired. 
Although these alternatives are by no means indicative of the 
responses that would be taken in all circumstances, they do show the 
types of adjustments that can be made with increased demands on a CJS 
processor. Since the objective of the runs in the following chapter 
is to examine scenarios which deal specifically with the prosecutor and 
the superior court, only the resources which deal directly with these 
two entities should be constrained. Therefore, the response of the 
CJS to increased demand on processors with unconstrained resources is 
assumed to be the third option in the above prison example. Furthermore, 
the acquisition of new capacity is assumed to cost nothing; only the 
cost of processing offenders by CJS resources is ever considered in 
this example. 
Only two resource types are to be constrained, the prosecutor 
and the superior court resources (numbers 1 and 3, respectively). A 
test run of the unconstrained model shows that the usage of both in-
1 4 0 
c r e a s e s a t a s l o w b u t a p p a r e n t l y e x p o n e n t i a l r a t e . T h e f o l l o w i n g m o d e l 
i s p o s t u l a t e d : 
V k - V i ) k ( 1 + i ) 
V k - Y k ( 1 + o t _ 1 , ( 5 " 4 ) 
w h e r e B , i s t h e r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t f o r r e s o u r c e k a t m o n t h t , a n d q 
t , k 
i s t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h . F o r a n a n n u a l g r o w t h r a t e r compounded m o n t h l y , 
q = r / 1 2 . ( 5 - 5 ) 
F i g u r e 3 s h o w s t h e u s a g e o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e s o u r c e f o r t h e 
u n c o n s t r a i n e d r u n a l o n g w i t h t h r e e p r o p o s e d c o n s t r a i n t s f o r r = 2 . 0 % , 
2 . 5 % a n d 3 .0% g r o w t h . ( T h e i n i t i a l v a l u e B.. , i s d e t e r m i n e d b y i n -
I , ic 
s p e c t i o h , b a s e d u p o n e s t i m a t e s o f A , a ^ , t h e s a m p l e v a r i a n c e o f r e s o u r c e 
u s a g e . When a d d i t i o n a l t e s t r u n s w e r e made f o r e a c h o f t h e v a l u e s o f 
r , t h e r = 2 . 0 % r u n c a u s e d t h e number o f o f f e n d e r s i n t h e m o d e l t o 
e x c e e d G N S ' s c a p a c i t y . L i k e w i s e , t h e r = 3 . 0 % r u n w a s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 
b e c a u s e l i t t l e q u e u e i n g r e s u l t e d . T h e r = 2 . 5 % r u n i s s a t i s f a c t o r y , 
h o w e v e r , a n d t h i s r a t e o f g r o w t h i s u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e r e m a i n d e r o f 
t h i s r e s e a r c h . A s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s p e r f o r m e d f o r t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t 
r e s o u r c e s e l e c t e d a r a t e o f g r o w t h o f 2 . 5 % a s w e l l . 
F o r some o f t h e w o r k u s i n g t h i s m o d e l , a n a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f t h e b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t 5 - 4 s h a l l b e r e q u i r e d . T h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n ­
s t r a i n t t h a t i s r e q u i r e d m i g h t b e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e s u b s i d y v e r s i o n 
o f 5 - 4 , w h e r e a t t i m e t ^ t h e u p p e r b o u n d o n r e s o u r c e k e x p e r i e n c e s 
a p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e l e v e l o f r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e . T o d e v e l o p 
t h i s c o n s t r a i n t m a t h e m a t i c a l l y , d e f i n e t h e u n i t i m p u l s e f u n c t i o n a s 
8 0 
Number o f 




4 0 T 
30 f 
2 0 t 
10 + 
2 0 24 28 32 36 4 0 
Y e a r s 
3 .0% A n n u a l G r o w t h M o d e l 
2 . 5 % A n n u a l G r o w t h M o d e l 
2 . 0 % A n n u a l G r o w t h M o d e l 
44 48 52 56 
F i g u r e 3 . C o m p a r i s o n o f U n c o n s t r a i n e d U s a g e o f t h e P r o s e c u t o r ' s 
R e s o u r c e s t o T h r e e C a n d i d a t e G r o w t h M o d e l s 
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1 if t = t 
6\ (t) = 
0 0 otherwise 
If s is defined as the subsidy rate, then equation 5-4 can be 
re-written for the subsidized resource constraint, as, 
B (5-6) 
For the purpose of this research, the time t^ at which the subsidi­
zation of resource k would begin immediately follows the initiali­
zation epoch. 
5.3 Model Validation 
Evaluating model validity or, from the empiricists perspective, 
model adequacy, is a difficult task that should require considerable 
effort on the part of the analyst. Shannon [61] has identified the 
various viewpoints which model builders have espoused over the years. 
There is the rationalist perspective which supports a model on the 
ground that the basic assumptions of the model are intuitively appealing. 
The empiricist, on the other hand, requires support for the model's 
validity in the form of statistical or other tests of the assumptions 
and resulting outputs. Several such tests are, of course, available 
in the literature [41] [30][61]. The pragmaticist, meanwhile, 
concentrates on the input-output transformation of the model, using 
whatever empirical and rationalist tools that may be available. 
for validating a model. The first stage, primarily rationalistic, re­
quires the reconciliation of model structure at the component level 
Shannon [61; pp. 215-217] has suggested a three-staged approach 
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to observation and to theory. The second stage is related to the 
first in that component validation is emphasized, but the empiricist's 
approach is now assumed by the analyst. The third and final stage of 
Shannon's validation procedure makes use of the pragmaticist's 
perspective, and the input-output transformations are examined using 
whatever approach (empirical or rationalistic) is necessary. In reality, 
Shannon's scheme for testing model validity is not new [ 77.], but his 
structuring of the process in such detail is. The best test of any 
validation process is that the resulting model is used confidently 
by someone aware of both its capabilities, its limitations and its 
weaknesses. 
For the model of the CJS, Shannon's staged approach to model 
validation is followed. For the first stage, however, nothing more 
will be said. The description of the model in Section 4.2 and its 
implementation in Section 5.1 contain the necessary description and 
justification of the component's assumptions and behaviors. In 
addition, the final sections of Chapter III justify the structure of 
the plea bargaining component of the model, so nothing more is required 
for this stage of validation. 
5.3.1 Component Validation 
Of the second and third stages of validation, the second is per­
haps the easiest for this model. As part of his dissertation, Rhodes 
[57] investigated the validity of his model of plea bargaining using 
regression analysis on data from U.S. and Minnesota District Courts. 
Thus, Rhodes empirically validated the plea bargaining mechanisms used 
in this thesis. To validate these mechanisms as they are implemented 
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in the simulation model (cf., Section 4.2.4), three runs of the model 
are made under the following scenarios. 
1. The Constrained Model implements the r = 2.5% annual 
resource growth constraint defined by equations 5-4 and 
5-5. 
2. The Basic Plea Bargaining Model, often referred to as the 
Basic Model, implements the resource constraint, in 1 
above; however, it also requires that the prosecutor 
respond to the length of the pre-trial delay as described 
in Section 4.2.4. The baseline queue length is assumed to 
be QQ = 10 for equation 4-5. 
3. The Subsidy Model is the Basic Plea Bargaining Model with 
an s = 10% increase in the prosecutor's budget implemented 
during the first year of experimental operation (i.e., during 
t h 
the 2 1 — year of simulation); thus, B , is defined by 
t, Jc 
equation 5-6. 
These three polices shall together be referred to as the primary policy s 
The effect that each of these policies has on the length of the 
pre-trial queue (Boxes 37 and 39) is shown in Figure 4. As expected, 
the pre-trial queue hovers nominally at a length of 10 for the Basic Plea 
Bargaining Model as well as for the Subsidy Model. Note, however, that 
in either case the prosecutor over-responds because of his lack of fore­
sight. When the prosecutor's budget is also increased by 10% as in the 
Subsidy Model, an oscillating pattern is developed in the queue length 
because of the conflicting goals of the prosecutor's first and second de­
cisions. When his first decision increases the queue, the second 
1 4 5 
Number o f 
O f f e n d e r s 
2 0 30 4 0 5 0 60 
Y e a r s 
F i g u r e 4 . T h e S u p e r i o r C o u r t P r e - T r i a l Queue 
L e n g t h f o r t h e P r i m a r y P o l i c y S e t 
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simultaneously attempts to reduce it after some stochastic delay time. 
This delay causes the oscillations in the pre-trial queue length. 
With the primary policy set having been validated with respect 
to the pre-trial queue, the next step is to verify that the remainder 
of the model responds to these policy variations as it should. As an 
example of how the validation process has proceeded for the other CJS 
components, the recidivism delay boxes are examined. Displayed in 
Figure 5 are the effects that the primary policy set has on the numbers 
of free recidivists awaiting re-arrest at Boxes 19, 47, and 48. 
The number at Box 19 is relatively constant between policies because 
the flow of juveniles changes little when superior court parameters are 
changed. The number of recidivists at either Box 47 or Box 48, however, 
does change from one policy to the next. In the figure, the short 
dashes represent the Constrained Model, the solid line represents the 
Basic Plea Bargaining Model, and the long dashes plot the Subsidy Model's 
results. Comparing the responses in Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the 
Basic and the Subsidy models are behaving as they should. In going 
from the Constrained to the Basic Model for the period from year 20 
to year 45,the Basic M odel forces the release of offenders in order to 
reduce the length of the pre-trial queue. After year 45, the drastic 
reduction in the pre-trial queue already experienced in the Constrained 
Model requires more offenders to be prosecuted, thereby increasing the 
number of recidivists at Box 47 and at Box 48. 
The Subsidy Model plots in Figure 5 also demonstrate the be­
havior described earlier in Figure 4. The graph for Box 48 demon­
strates the same oscillating behavior witnessed earlier; the graph 
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for Box 47, however, does not. The reason for this difference is 
that the delays until Box 47 is realized dampen this 
response considerably. Beyond about the 4 5 ^ year, the number of 
recidivists at both boxes begins to grow as in the Basic Plea 
Bargaining Model. 
The remaining components of the CJS model have not been 
validated from the empiricist's perspective; however, the internal 
consistency of the model as witnessed during the validation of the 
several responses to the primary policy set is reassuring. Because 
of this reassurance and the hypothetical nature of the experimental 
data and of the resource and cost components, further empirical 
validation of the model's components seems unnecessary. 
5.3.2 Input-Output Validation 
Validating the input to output transformation is described here 
rather briefly. Because of the several assumptions required in gathering 
the data, rather than a vigorous analysis of the output vis-a-vis 
observed system responses, only a few important transformations are 
discussed. The emphasis of this section is on the output's consistency 
with observed behavior, not on the exact duplication of real world 
phenomena'. To ensure that the behavior of the model is not unstable, 
i.e., extremely sensitive to basic assumptions, an appraisal of policy 
feasibility and model stability is given in Chapter VI, Sections 6.1.2 
and 6.2.2. 
Career Arrests. One of the output measures which is of particular 
interest in this analysis is the recidivism rate for each criminal, i.e., 
the average number of arrests during a criminal career. Plots of these 
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t i m e s e r i e s f o r m a l e a n d f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s i n F i g u r e 6 show t h a t t h e 
d u r a t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n p e r i o d i s a t l e a s t l o n g e n o u g h f o r t h e s e 
s e r i e s t o s t a b i l i z e . T a b l e 20 s u m m a r i z e s t h e a v e r a g e number o f a r r e s t s 
p e r c r i m i n a l c a r e e r o f a n a t i o n w i d e s a m p l e o f o f f e n d e r s c o l l e c t e d b y 
t h e F B I [ 2 9 ] a s w e l l a s c o m p a r a b l e r e s u l t s f r o m t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r ­
g a i n i n g M o d e l . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two s o u r c e s i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
T h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e s i m u l a t e d s t a t i s t i c i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d t o 
o n e - h a l f t h a t o f t h e n a t i o n a l s a m p l e . I n a d d i t i o n , r a n k i n g t h e c a t e ­
g o r i e s d o e s n o t a m e l i o r a t e a n y d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e two s o u r c e s . P a r t 
o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l s u r v e y 
g i v e s a s n a p s h o t o f t h e r e c i d i v i s m p r o b a b i l i t i e s u s e d i n t h e C J S m o d e l 
a n d o f t h e number o f c a r e e r a r r e s t s ; a n o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t t h e 
r e c i d i v i s m p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e n o t t i m e i n v a r i a n t . P e r h a p s , t h e m o r e 
r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s t h a t 24% o f t h e m a l e a n d 12% o f t h e 
f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s d i e i n t h e C J S m o d e l b e f o r e t h e i r c r i m i n a l c a r e e r s w o u l d 
n a t u r a l l y e n d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t o c h a s t i c s i n v o l v e d . A l t h o u g h d a t a i s 
n o t a v a i l a b l e t o s u p p o r t o r r e f u t e e i t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e 
c r i m i n a l c a r e e r , t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e h i g h d e a t h r a t e s i s c a u s e d b y t h e 
e x p o n e n t i a l a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e r e m a i n i n g l i f e t i m e o f a n o f f e n d e r ( c f . , 
S e c t i o n 5 . 1 . 1 " F i r s t O f f e n d e r A t t r i b u t e s " ) . R e g a r d l e s s o f t h i s a p p a r e n t 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y , t h e e x p o n e n t i a l a s s u m p t i o n w i l l n o t b e c h a n g e d ; h o w e v e r , 
b e f o r e t h e m o d e l i s e v e r u s e d f o r p o l i c y a n a l y s i s , t h i s i s s u e m u s t b e 
r e s o l v e d . N o t e t h a t i n F i g u r e 7 , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e number o f 
o f f e n s e s c o m m i t t e d d u r i n g m a l e a n d f e m a l e c r i m i n a l c a r e e r s a p p e a r s t o 
b e e x p o n e n t i a l . T h i s r e s u l t a g r e e s w i t h t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f A v i - I t z h a k 
a n d S h i n n a r [ 5 ] a n d t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s , t h e a n a l y t i c a l m o d e l - b u i l d e r s . 
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T a b l e 2 0 . C o m p a r i s o n o f E m p i r i c a l a n d M o d e l - G e n e r a t e d Number o f 
A r r e s t s D u r i n g a C r i m i n a l C a r e e r 
L a s t C r i m e 
C o m m i t t e d 
U C R : C a r e e r 
A r r e s t s 
M o d e l : 
M a l e A r r e s t s 
M o d e l : 
F e m a l e A r r e s t s 
H o m i c i d e 4 1 . 7 4 1 . 3 2 
R o b b e r y 5 1 . 5 8 1 . 4 6 
A s s a u l t 3 1 . 5 9 1 . 3 4 
B u r g l a r y 4 1 . 5 3 1 . 2 5 
L a r c e n y 3 1 .91 1 . 3 5 
A u t o T h e f t 5 2 . 3 5 2 . 0 5 
R a p e 3 2 . 7 1 2 . 4 5 
A V E R A G E 4 1 . 9 0 1 . 4 5 
C a r e e r C r i m i n a l C o s t . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t o u t p u t m e a s u r e i s t h e 
c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t . T o d a t e n o t h i n g c o n c l u s i v e h a s b e e n d e r i v e d 
c o n c e r n i n g t h i s m e a s u r e , b u t f o r C J S m o d e l i n g i t i s i d e a l l y s u i t e d 
f o r c o s t o p t i m i z a t i o n . F i g u r e 8 s h o w s t i m e s e r i e s o f t h e c a r e e r 
c r i m i n a l c o s t o f b o t h m a l e a n d f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s . A l t h o u g h t h e s e s e r i e s 
do h a v e a l a r g e v a r i a n c e , t h e i r m e a n s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s t a n t . T h i s 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y e n c o u r a g i n g s i n c e i t v e r i f i e s t h a t t h e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
p e r i o d i s a t l e a s t a s l o n g a s n e c e s s a r y t o r e m o v e t h e t r a n s i e n t r e ­
s p o n s e s ( s e e S e c t i o n 5 . 2 . 2 ) . T h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e s e r i e s a r e c o n s t a n t 
i n t h e f a c e o f t h e r i s i n g a n n u a l C J S c o s t ( a l s o shown) i s f u r t h e r 
v e r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m o d e l s i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e t o t a l a n n u a l c o s t 
i s r i s i n g b e c a u s e o f t h e i n c r e a s e s i n t h e v i r g i n a n d r e c i d i v i s t a r r e s t 
r a t e s . 
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F i g u r e 8 . T i m e S e r i e s o f C a r e e r C r i m i n a l a n d T o t a l A n n u a l 
C J S C o s t s f o r t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g M o d e l 
T h e e x p e c t e d v a l u e s o f t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
$ 4 9 , 6 1 9 f o r men a n d $ 3 6 , 6 9 7 f o r women f o r t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g 
M o d e l . T h e s e m e a s u r e s w i l l o f c o u r s e c h a n g e f r o m o n e r u n t o t h e n e x t 
a n d , a s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r , t h e y w i l l b e u s e d a s a 
p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e i n e x p e r i m e n t i n g w i t h p l e a b a r g a i n i n g . 
C J S R e s o u r c e C o s t . One i n p u t - o u t p u t c o m p a r i s o n t h a t c a n b e 
made v e r y e a s i l y d e a l s w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c o s t s i n t h e 
s y s t e m . Remember , i n T a b l e 1 9 t h a t e s t i m a t e s o f t h e c o s t p e r o f f e n d e r 
p e r y e a r w e r e d e r i v e d f o r e a c h o f t h e t e n r e s o u r c e c a t e g o r i e s . U s i n g 
t h e K o l m o g o r o v - S m i r n o v g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t t e s t , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e s e 
c o s t s c a n b e c o m p a r e d t o t h e p e r c e n t a g e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e t o t a l C J S 
1 5 3 
c o s t o f e a c h o f t h e r e s o u r c e s f o r a n y s i n g l e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e m o d e l . 
T h e p e r c e n t a g e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f e a c h r e s o u r c e k t o t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i n g 
c o s t o f t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g M o d e l i s shown i n T a b l e 21 a s F, ( A ) . 
AC 
T a b l e 2 1 . V a l i d a t i o n o f t h e C o s t M o d e l U s i n g t h e K o l m o g o r o v - S m i r n o v 
G o o d n e s s - o f - F i t T e s t . 
A ' 
A k k 
R e s o u r c e 
A ; / I O O O 
k 
k k 
F K ( A ) I F (A) 
k K M 
1 $ 9 . 2 5 . 1 2 2 . 1 7 9 . 1 2 2 . 1 7 9 . 0 5 7 
2 2 5 . 7 5 . 3 3 9 . 1 1 6 . 4 6 1 . 2 9 5 . 1 6 6 
3 4 . 2 6 . 0 5 6 . 0 6 9 . 5 1 7 . 3 6 4 . 1 5 3 
4 5 . 0 4 . 0 6 6 . 0 8 6 . 5 8 3 . 4 5 0 . 1 3 3 
5 3 . 4 0 . 0 4 5 . 0 6 1 . 6 2 8 . 5 1 1 . 1 1 7 
6 6 . 5 2 . 0 8 6 . 1 1 8 . 7 1 4 . 6 2 9 . 0 8 5 
7 8 . 3 6 . 1 1 0 . 1 4 9 . 8 2 4 . 7 7 8 . 0 4 6 
3 9 . 6 4 . 1 2 7 . 1 5 6 . 9 5 1 . 9 3 4 . 0 1 7 
9 1 . 2 1 . 0 1 6 . 0 3 1 . 9 6 7 . 9 6 5 . 0 0 2 
10 2 . 4 5 . 0 3 2 . 0 3 4 . 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 0 
T O T A L 7 5 . 8 8 . 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 
w h i l e t h e e m p i r i c a l ( i n p u t ) v a l u e s o f t h e c o s t p e r r e s o u r c e y e a r a r e 
shown a s A ^ . T h e s t a t i s t i c , 
i s c o m p u t e d f o r e a c h r e s o u r c e k . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e K o l m o g o r o v - S m i r n o v 
t e s t , i f 
max. ^ , 
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then reject the hypothesis that the observed distribution cost is 
equal to the actual cost distribution. The computed value of d^ for 
ten observations (each resource type represents one observation) and 
a - .20 is .322. Since D = .166, the hypothesis is not rejected and 
the cost model is accepted for this particular run. 
The significance of this result is important as it shows that 
the method of initializing the resource and cost components of the 
model, the distribution of resources to the processors, and the 35-
year run length together provide a reasonable cost model for the CJS. 
Although this test does not validate the magnitude of the costs, it 
does show that the estimate of costs and the usage rate per offender 
are satisfactory for this run length. Since the actual total cost 
depends upon the virgin and recidivism crime rates, little more than 
internal validity is required for the total cost to be validated and 
this fact was demonstrated earlier. Thus, the cost model is a reason­
able approximation. 
5.4 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the empirical 
data used to experiment with the model of the CJS, to initialize the 
model so that these experiments can be performed, and to discuss the 
validity of the model so that its limitations can be considered in 
evaluating the experimental results. Each topic has been covered in 
succession and the model, despite some limitations in the data, seems 
to pass several tests of internal validity. The following chapter 
reports on these experiments with the plea bargaining model. 
1 5 5 
C H A P T E R V I 
A N A L Y S I S O F P L E A B A R G A I N I N G S T R A T E G I E S 
6 . 0 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
W i t h a f u l l y i m p l e m e n t e d a n d v a l i d a t e d m o d e l i n h a n d , t h e 
n e x t a n d p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s t e p i n m o d e l i n g i s t h e d e s i g n 
a n d a n a l y s i s o f e x p e r i m e n t s u s i n g t h e m o d e l t o d r a w i n f e r e n c e s 
a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e a c t u a l C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m . T h e 
p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i m e n t s t o be c o n d u c t e d e x a m i n e s e v e r a l p o l i c y s c e n a r i o s 
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e f a c t o r s s i t e d i n C h a p t e r I I I a s h a v i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t 
i m p a c t on t h e o u t c o m e s o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g . I n i t i a l l y , t h e p r e - t r i a l 
d e l a y i s a l l o w e d t o i m p a c t t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g o u t c o m e f o r o f f e n d e r s 
i n t h e s y s t e m ; t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h i s r e s p o n s e h a s o n t h e a v e r a g e 
c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a n d o n r e c i d i v i s m i s a s c e r t a i n e d . B e c a u s e i t i s 
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s i z e o f t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y w i l l a l w a y s s e r v e t o 
r e g u l a t e p l e a b a r g a i n e d o u t c o m e s , t h i s m e c h a n i s m i s r e t a i n e d i n t h e 
m o d e l f o r t h e r u n s i n w h i c h c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n i m p a c t s t h e p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . T h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h i s 
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s a l t e r n a t e l y t h e s e v e r i t y o f a n o f f e n d e r ' s 
m o s t r e c e n t c r i m e a n d t h e number o f a r r e s t s t h a t h a v e o c c u r r e d d u r i n g 
a n o f f e n d e r ' s c r i m i n a l c a r e e r . T h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e c a s e - s p e c i f i c 
i n f o r m a t i o n h a s o n t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g d i s p o s i t i o n i s f o r m u l a t e d i n 
S e c t i o n s 3 . 2 a n d 3 . 3 a n d i t s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i n t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g 
m o d e l h a s b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n 4 . 2 . 2 . A n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r i s 
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considered to impact the plea bargaining decisions. An increase in 
the prosecutor's budget (the Subsidy Model) is also a factor in the 
quasi-experimental design of this chapter. 
Although the proposals developed in this chapter are not an 
exhaustive treatment of alternatives to current plea bargaining 
policy, it should be emphasized that the purpose here is to examine 
policy scenarios which impact the cost of processing a career criminal 
and which change the recidivism rate; however, this analysis is 
one example of the potential that the simulation approach has for the 
evaluation of CJS policy. The quasi-experimental design used approaches 
the type of design that might be used in actual evaluations; the 
analysis of the data and the sample output displayed demonstrate how 
the information generated from a simulation model of the Criminal 
Justice System can be useful in performance evaluation studies. 
6.1 The Experimental Design 
The effect on plea bargaining of having either the severity of 
the most recent offense or an offender's previous arrest history is 
the same according to Section 3.3.2. If this information is available 
to the prosecutor prior to his deciding to prosecute a case, then the 
offender who has committed the most severe offens'e and who has been 
arrested several times in the past is more likely to be prosecuted than 
a first offender who has committed a less severe crime. Intuitively, 
such a priori information affects the offender's convictability, 
The bigger cK is, the greater is the likelihood that a case will be 
prosecuted. For the second plea bargaining decision, whether or not 
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a defendant pleads guilty, the large <K offender is more likely to 
plead guilty since doing so almost guarantees him sentencing leniencies 
through charge reduction over a trial conviction. This result assumes 
that the prosecutor's caseload is excessive and that he can spend only 
a fixed amount on cases that go to trial and a different, but constant, 
amount on cases where a guilty plea is achieved. (See Section 3.2.) 
This effect that a priori information has on plea bargaining is 
considered the normative response. That is, the above outcomes are 
expected if the prosecutor is not specifically directed by an "optimi­
zing" policy structure. The purpose of this section is to describe 
candidate policies to be tested and to explicitly define the performance 
criteria to be used for these tests. The policies to be tested are 
each compared to the Basic Plea Bargaining Model described in the 
previous chapter, Section 5.3.1. This Basic Model is assumed to be 
the prosecutor's normal response when case-specific a priori information 
is not available. 
6.1.1 Performance Measures 
The objective of this analysis as stated once before is to 
simultaneously reduce recidivism and the cost of processing offenders. 
Because of the nature of a discrete event simulation model, both of 
these measures may be analyzed from the viewpoint of the individual 
offender. Thus, the career criminal cost, defined earlier as the 
total CJS cost of processing an offender during his entire criminal 
career, is an excellent choice for a performance measure. In addition, 
the observed number of arrests during a criminal career is also an 
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excellent performance criterion. For these experiments, time series 
of the average number of arrests and of the average career criminal 
cost of those criminal careers which ended during time t are recorded; 
however, as it happens that these series are stationary in their means 
(cf., Figures 6 and 8), the time series may be replaced by their 
averages without considerable loss of information. The objective of 
this analysis, then, is to simultaneously minimize the average number 
of offenses during a criminal career and the average career criminal 
cost; a related problem requires the minimization of the total CJS 
cost over the planning horizon (assumed equal to the run length). 
Since there is not any one best answer, both of these problems are 
addressed. 
One difficulty with trying to optimize the CJS using the recidi­
vism and CJS cost measures is that they are inversely related. A 
policy that reduces either the CJS cost or the career criminal cost 
may be doing so by prematurely releasing defendants and thereby 
increasing the rate of recidivism. Conversely, a policy which increases 
either the CJS cost or the career criminal cost is undoubtedly either 
routing offenders deeper into the CJS (i.e., through the courts and 
corrections) or increasing their sentences. Thus, a definite trade-off 
exists between cost on one hand and recidivism on the other. 
However, there should also exist a set of policies for which a 
"social" optimum exists. Such a solution can be determined by con­
verting the average number of arrests per criminal career into an 
expected social cost (in dollars) that society endures beyond the normal 
CJS costs when an offender commits a crime. Define the social cost of 
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a single crime as y. The expected cost to society of a criminal 
career under experimental policy v is, 
e (y) = Y 6 + C (6-1) 
V V V 
where $ v is the average number of arrests during a criminal career 
that is observed under policy v , and is the average career criminal 
cost for policy v . Thus, with the appropriate selection of y» a 
social optimum may be found by choosing v such that 
For this study, y is chosen initially to be $10,000. 
6.1.2 Policy Feasibility 
Another performance measure not yet discussed is related not to 
optimization specifically but to policy feasibility. In Chapter V, it 
was decided that only those CJS resources which are directly associated 
with plea bargaining (namely, the prosecution and the superior court) 
would be constrained for these experiments and that all other resource 
levels would be unconstrained. This action was taken in order to not 
complicate the analysis of policies in which queues develop which have 
no meaning in reality. Furthermore, not constraining the other eight 
CJS resources allows a reasonable amount of gradual expansion to take 
place without the complications of adding a fixed amount of capacity 
at one instant. 
Feasibility of the activity levels of each of the remaining 
processors in the CJS network, then, must be a pre-requisite for an 
(6-2) 
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optimal policy scenario. However, because of the dimimutive level of 
activity of all other CJS processors in comparison to that of the 
male prisons (cf., Figure 9), only the latter will be examined for 
policy feasibility. The criterion for policy feasibility, therefore, 
requires that an imaginary upper bound be placed on the prison popu­
lation. This upper bound, (UB)t, is a function of the level of activity 
at time t in the prisons for men of the Basic Plea Bargaining Model: 
(UB) t = (1 + p)B t (6-3) 
where p is the percentage tolerance allowed on the prison population 
and B^ is the number of male prisoners at time t from the Basic Plea 
Bargaining Model. Thus, an infeasible policy is one whose male 
prison population exceeds (UB)^ at any point during the simulation. 
The tolerance p is assumed to be 25%. 
From Figure 9, it is clear that the current feasibility criterion 
is not violated for either the Constrained or the Subsidy Models. 
Hence, the policies represented by these two alternatives are feasible. 
If, on the other hand, the activity levels of other corrections 
processors were examined, a similar bound on their activity levels 
might cause an alternative to be rejected as infeasible. Take the case 
of the male jail population in Figure 9. An upper bound of 
(UB)J. = 1.25 B£ , 
where B̂ . is the activity level at time t for the Basic Model, would 
cause the Constrained Model to be rejected. 
The reason the Constrained Model in Figure 9 is not infeasible 
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F i g u r e 9. M a l e P r i s o n a n d J a i l P o p u l a t i o n s f o r P r i m a r y P o l i c y S e t 
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is that the increase in the male jail population is accompanied by a 
decline in the male prion population, and this reduction in the prison 
population entirely off-sets the increase in the jail population. 
Although the counter-balancing of increases and reductions in the 
Corrections Subsystem will not always net out to a reduced convict 
population, whenever the prison population drops an increase is felt 
in the jail level because of the forces at work in the model. Some 
preliminary analysis of recidivism shows that the rate of recidivism 
does not change dramatically over the planning horizon, so a change in 
the corrections populations must be attributed to the court subsystem; 
however, since the sentencing model does not change, the plea bargaining 
apparatus must cause the change in these population levels. Thus, an 
increase in the prison population is accompanied by a decline in the 
jail population, and vice versa. Because prison sentences are consi­
derably longer than jail sentences, a decrease in the prison population 
will cause a smaller increase in the jail population, whereas a 
decrease in the jail population will cause a much higher increase in 
the prison population. As a result, the prison population size is the 
better predictor of policy feasibility since the only other increase 
in the corrections population would be precipitated by a general in­
crease in the conviction rate which would also increase the size of 
the prison population. 
As for the non-correctional processors, placing a feasibility 
constraint on them would have little effect. The operation of the 
Juvenile Justice Subsystem is essentially independent of the plea 
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bargaining alternative chosen. The court and prosecutor processors, 
meanwhile, are protected from infeasible activity levels by the 
prosecutor's continual response to the pre-trial delay. Preliminary 
analysis of the pre-trial detention processors shows activity levels 
far below the male prison level (30 versus 900); thus, the male popu­
lation seems to be the best criterion for policy feasibility. This 
issue will be further explored along with the other performance 
measures during the presentation of the results of the simulation 
experiments. 
6.1.3 Plea Bargaining Scenarios 
The objective for this study of plea bargaining alternatives 
is the simultaneous reduction in recidivism and cost with respect to 
the entire CJS and the statistics of the average offender. Although 
the response of plea bargaining to increases in an offender's con­
victability when a priori information is available is the same regard­
less of the type of information available (Table 3), the cost of each 
is not. For the severity of an offense, such information is usually 
available to the prosecutor from police reports. Thus, acquisition 
of the severity of a crime does not increase the cost of processing 
a defendant. Acquiring the number of times that an offender has already 
been arrested, however, does cost the CJS for the maintenance, storage, 
and acquisition of an offender's arrest records. Thus, such information 
does require additional capital outlays. Two questions immediately 
arise which are worth examining using a simulation model: 
1. Which type of information produces the desired responses of 
reduced recidivism and costs, and 
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2. Does the extra cost of the information retrieval system 
required for acquiring the arrest histories of offenders 
outweigh the benefit of having such information available 
to the prosecutor? 
In Chapter III, the "normative" response of plea bargaining to 
a priori information was given. That is, those responses are expected 
unless new policy is established. Suppose that a new policy is im­
plemented that requires the prosecutor to not allow the higher con­
victability (<K) defendants to negotiate a plea. To compensate, the lower 
$^ defendants must be convinced to plead guilty. Such a scenario is 
desirable from the point of view that the higher the crime severity of 
the most recent offense and the more an offender has been arrested, the 
greater the likelihood of a court trial and of a longer period of 
incapacitation. If the ability to convince the low-$^ offender to 
plead guilty is assumed, then this scenario would produce interesting 
results that should be examined carefully. This scenario is denoted 
the "special" response to a priori information to differentiate it 
from the normative response of Chapter III. 
To implement the special response to a priori information in the 
simulation model, recall that in Chapter IV, weighting functions were 
developed to alter the branching probabilities of Boxes 23 and 32 and 
of Node 30. Implementing this special response to plea bargaining 
merely requires that the weighting function for Box 32 (the arraignment 
hearing) be altered. The weighting function (at time t for offender i 
who commits crime j) which replaces equation 4-11 for the special 
1 6 5 
r e s p o n s e i s 
w i j t • ( G t V / ( I i J i> • ( 6 " 4 ) 
w h e r e G t , H ^ , 1^ a n d J \ a r e d e f i n e d i n C h a p t e r I V . T h u s , t h e n e t 
r e s u l t i s t h a t t h e r e c i p r o c a l s o f t h e two i n f o r m a t i o n f a c t o r s i s 
a s s u m e d f o r t h e s p e c i a l r e s p o n s e t o p l e a b a r g a i n i n g . 
R e c a p i t u l a t i n g , t h e f o l l o w i n g e f f e c t s s h o u l d b e t e s t e d : 
1 . T h e n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e t o t h e number o f c r i m i n a l a r r e s t s 
i n a n o f f e n d e r ' s c a r e e r ( h i s a r r e s t r e c o r d o r h i s t o r y ) , 
2 . T h e n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e m o s t r e c e n t 
c r i m e c o m m i t t e d , 
3 . T h e s p e c i a l r e s p o n s e t o a n o f f e n d e r ' s a r r e s t r e c o r d , 
4 . T h e s p e c i a l r e s p o n s e t o c r i m e s e v e r i t y . 
T h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l n o t b e t e s t e d . S i n c e i t 
s e e m s l i k e l y t h a t u n d e r a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e p r o s e c u t o r m u s t r a t i o n 
t r i a l s w h e n e v e r t h e p r e - t r i a l q u e u e b e c o m e s l a r g e , t h e m e c h a n i s m 
d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r V a n d c a l l e d t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g M o d e l i s 
m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e s e e x p e r i m e n t s . T h u s , a n y o u t p u t m u s t b e 
c o n s i d e r e d t o b e t h e r e s u l t o f t h e s p e c i f i e d e f f e c t a s w e l l a s t h e e f ­
f e c t o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e s p o n s e t o p r e - t r i a l d e l a y . 
F o r e a c h o f t h e s e f o u r s c e n a r i o s , a d d i t i o n a l t e s t s c a n b e made 
o n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e e f f e c t s a n d a n a c c o m p a n y i n g i n c r e a s e 
( a s s u m e 10%) i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t ( i . e . , t h e S u b s i d y M o d e l 
d e s c r i b e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r ) . T h u s , t h e t o t a l number o f s c e n a r i o s 
t o be t e s t e d i s 4 x 2 = 8 : 
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1. Two runs of the Basic Model for the normal and special 
responses to an offender's arrest history, 
2. Two runs of the Basic Model for the normal and special 
responses to the severity of an offender's crime, 
3. Two runs of the Subsidy Model for the two responses to an 
offender's arrest history, 
4. Two runs of the Subsidy Model for the responses to the 
severity of the offender's crime. 
The results for the Basic and Subsidy Models without a priori informa­
tion are also reported for completeness. Thus, the results for ten 
runs shall be reported in the analysis of this quasi-experimental 
design. 
6.1.4 Variance Reduction 
Because of the time limitations, an analysis of the most appro­
priate set of variance techniques for this model has not been attempted. 
One technique which is often resorted, however, is to use a set of ran­
dom numbers common to each experimental run [ 30]. This technique has 
been used here with an unknown degree of success. 
6.2 Experimental Results 
The ten scenarios described in Section 6.1.3 have been executed 
using the GNS model described in Chapter IV and implemented in Chapter V. 
The following naming conventions for these scenarios are assumed. The 
Basic Plea Bargaining Model, called the Basic Model, assumes that the 
prosecutor adapts to the length of the pre-trial delay only; the Subsidy 
Model assumes this same response to the pre-trial queue but accompanied 
by a 10% increase in the available number of prosecution servers at the 
T a b l e 2 2 . S i m u l a t e d P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e s 
E x p e r i m e n t a l R u n 
T o t a l C J S 
C o s t ( $ x 10 ) 
A v e r a g e M a l e 
R e c i d i v i s m 
( N o . O f f e n s e s ) 
A v e r a g e 
M a l e C a r e e r 
C r i m i n a l C o s t 
A v e r a g e C J S 
C o s t P e r 
M a l e A r r e s t 
A v e r a g e S o o i a l 
C o s t P e r M a l e 
C a r e e r C r i m i n a l 
1 . B a s i c M o d e l $ 1 3 8 1 . 6 ( 1 . 2 4 ) $ 1 . 906 ( - . 7 6 ) $ 4 9 , 6 1 9 ( 1 . 6 7 ) $ 2 6 , 1 5 7 ( 1 . 1 4 ) $ 6 8 , 6 7 9 ( 2 . 0 2 ) 
2 . - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 1 2 9 6 . 5 ( - . 6 0 ) 1 . 979 ( . 4 1 ) 4 6 , 5 6 0 ( - . 4 8 ) 2 3 , 6 9 9 ( - . 4 9 ) 6 6 , 3 5 0 < : - . 4 5 ) 
3 . - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 1 2 8 3 . 5 ( - . 8 8 ) 2 . 0 1 8 ( 1 . 0 5 ) 4 5 , 8 0 0 ( - 1 . 0 1 ) 2 2 , 8 1 2 ( - 1 . 0 8 ) 6 5 , 9 8 0 ( : - . 8 4 ) 
4 . - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 1 3 7 9 . 7 ( 1 . 2 0 ) 1 . 8 5 7 ( - 1 . 5 5 ) 4 8 , 9 1 0 ( 1 . 1 7 ) 2 6 , 5 5 0 ( 1 . 4 0 ) 6 7 , 4 8 0 { . 7 5 ) 
5 . - S p e c i a l H i s t o r y 1 2 9 0 . 2 ( - . 7 4 ) 1 . 9 5 6 ( . 0 5 ) 4 6 , 9 1 4 ( - . 2 3 ) 2 4 , 1 4 2 ( - . 2 0 ) 6 6 , 4 7 4 ( - . 3 2 ) 
6 . S u b s i d y M o d e l 1 3 7 6 . 1 ( 1 . 1 2 ) 1 . 919 ( - . 5 5 ) 4 8 , 4 0 6 ( . 8 2 ) 2 5 , 6 0 9 ( . 7 7 ) 6 7 , 5 9 6 ( . 8 7 ) 
7 . - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 1 3 0 4 . 1 ( - . 4 3 ) 2 . 0 0 4 ( . 8 2 ) 4 6 , 2 5 6 ( - . 6 8 ) 2 3 , 3 8 9 ( - . 6 9 ) 6 6 , 2 9 6 ( - . 5 1 ) 
8 . - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 1 2 8 8 . 1 ( - . 7 8 ) 2 . 0 3 8 ( 1 . 3 7 ) 4 6 , 2 9 4 ( - . 6 7 ) 2 2 , 7 6 9 ( - l . l l ) 6 6 , 6 7 4 ( - . 1 1 ) 
9 . - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 1 3 7 7 . 7 ( 1 . 1 6 ) 1 . 8 5 8 ( - l . 5 3 ) 4 8 , 5 2 5 ( . 9 0 ) 2 6 , 4 6 7 ( 1 . 3 5 ) 6 7 , 1 0 5 ( . 3 5 ) 
1 0 . - S p e c i a l H i s t o r y 1 2 6 4 . 7 ( - 1 . 2 9 ) 1 . 9 9 5 ( . 6 8 ) 4 5 , 1 5 4 ( - 1 . 4 7 ) 2 2 , 8 2 5 ( - 1 . 0 7 ) 6 5 , 1 0 4 ( - - 1 . 7 7 ) 
E x p e c t e d V a l u e 1 3 2 4 . 2 1 . 9 5 3 4 7 , 2 4 4 2 4 , 4 4 2 6 6 , 7 7 4 
S t a n d a r d D e v i a t i o n 4 6 . 1 . 062 1 4 2 5 1 5 0 6 940 
S i m p l e C o r r e l a t i o n 
t o M a l e R e c i d i v i s m - . 8 7 7 1 . 0 0 0 - . 8 7 0 - . 9 7 5 - . 6 6 0 
1 6 8 
start of the experimental epoch. The normative response to crime se­
verity is labeled "Normal Severity" while the normative response to an 
offender's arrest record is labeled "Normal History." These normative 
responses were described in Chapter III. The special responses to 
a priori information, described in Section 6.1.3, are distinguished by 
the terms "Special Severity" and "Special History" for the runs in which 
the crime severity and the arrest record of an offender are available to 
the prosecutor. 
6.2.1 Performance Optimization 
The results of the performance measures for each of the ten runs 
of the model are shown in Table 22. Whereas, the total CJS cost 
statistic is determined over both the initialization and the experi­
mental periods of the simulation, the remaining statistics are computed 
exclusively over the 35 years of the experimental period. In addition, 
for ease of interpretation, each statistic is accompanied in paren­
theses by its normalized equivalent. That is, define ^ as the 
th 
I— statistic in Table 22 for run v. The normalized value of t z n 
v 
requires the linear transformation 
* ' V = V / « V . ' ( 6 " 5 ) 
where E^ and are the expectation and variance operators defined for 
th 
the Z — statistic as 
h ( \ v ) = To f S . , V (6-6) 
1 6 9 
a n d - E 2 
( 6 - 7 ) 
T h e r e f o r e , i f 
l i k e w i s e , i f 
I , v 
< 0 t h e s t a t i s t i c 
> 0 t h e n 
I n c r e a s i n g t h e Number o f P r o s e c u t o r s . I n T a b l e 2 2 , t h e t o t a l 
C J S c o s t s t a t i s t i c s p o i n t t o t h e S p e c i a l H i s t o r y S u b s i d y M o d e l ( v = 1 0 ) 
a s b e i n g o p t i m u m , w h i l e t h e a v e r a g e m a l e r e c i d i v i s m m e a s u r e s h o w s t h e 
N o r m a l H i s t o r y B a s i c M o d e l ( v = 4 ) t o b e o p t i m u m . F u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n 
o f t h e s e two p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s c o n f i r m s t h a t a d e f i n i t e n e g a t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p (p = - . 8 7 7 ) e x i s t s b e t w e e n C J S c o s t a n d r e c i d i v i s m . T h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s a n t i c i p a t e d b e c a u s e o f t h e t r a d e - o f f b e t w e e n r e d u c e d 
r e c i d i v i s m t h r o u g h i n c a p a c i t a t i o n a n d t h e c o s t o f a t t a i n i n g g r e a t e r 
i n c a p a c i t a t i o n . 
( v = l , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) h a s a l o w e r r a t e o f r e c i d i v i s m t h a n i t s c o u n t e r p a r t 
S u b s i d y M o d e l ( v = 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . I n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o s e ­
c u t o r ' s s t a f f b y 10%, t h e r e f o r e , i n c r e a s e s t h e e x p e c t e d r e c i d i v i s m 
r a t e f o r e a c h o f f e n d e r . T h i s i n c r e a s e i n r e c i d i v i s m r e s u l t s f r o m t h e 
b u i l d - u p i n t h e p r e - t r i a l q u e u e . T h i s t r i a l b a c k l o g i s p r e c i p i t a t e d 
b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s e n d i n g m o r e o f f e n d e r s t o t h e c o u r t s e v e n t h o u g h 
t h e c o u r t r e s o u r c e s h a v e n o t i n c r e a s e d t o h a n d l e t h e e x t r a l o a d . T h u s , 
a l t h o u g h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a f f h a s i n c r e a s e d , t h e t e n d e n c y o f t h e 
p r e - t r i a l q u e u e t o b e l o n g e r f o r t h e S u b s i d y M o d e l c a u s e s m o r e o f f e n ­
d e r s t o b e r e l e a s e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r b e f o r e t r i a l a n d t h e r a t e o f 
I t i s a l s o e a s y t o s e e i n T a b l e 22 t h a t e a c h B a s i c M o d e l 
1 7 0 
T a b l e 2 3 . E x p e c t e d D i f f e r e n c e s i n T o t a l M a l e A r r e s t s 
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1 0 9 5 1 6 8 0 - 7 3 5 750 195 1 4 7 0 1 9 8 0 - 7 2 0 1 3 3 5 
2 0 5 8 5 - 1 8 3 0 - 3 4 5 - 9 0 0 3 7 5 8 8 5 1 8 1 5 240 
3 0 - 2 4 1 5 - 9 3 0 - 1 4 8 5 - 2 1 0 3 0 0 - 2 4 0 0 - 3 4 5 
4 0 1 4 8 5 930 2 2 0 5 2 7 1 5 15 2 0 7 0 
5 0 - 5 5 5 720 1 2 3 0 - 1 4 7 0 5 8 5 
6 0 1 2 7 5 1 7 8 5 - 9 1 5 1 1 4 0 
7 0 5 1 0 - 2 1 9 0 - 1 3 5 
8 0 - 2 7 0 0 - 6 4 5 
9 0 2 0 5 5 
1 0 0 
N o t e : T h i s a n a l y s i s a s s u m e s t h a t 1 5 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n s c o m p r i s e t h e m a l e 
o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n . T a b l e e n t r i e s a r e : 
A r r e s t s ( v ) - A r r e s t s ( v ) 
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recidivism to be higher than for the Basic Model. 
Although the exact number of recidivists who desist in their 
criminal activities varies from one run to another, approximately 
15,000 males desisted during the exponential epoch of each run. 
Using this estimate of the number of criminal careers who are 
completed during the 35 year horizon, the expected number of arrests 
of this population for any run v is 
Arrests (v) = 15000 3 v (6-8) 
The expected increase in the number of arrests by changing from 
current policy to policy is shown in Table 23 for each policy 
pair. Using this table, several pieces of information can be ob­
tained. Policy v = 4 it seems dominates all other policies since 
for each = 4, the table entries are non-negative while for = 4, 
the table entries are all non-positive. Thus, policy v = 4 has the 
lowest recidivism rate of these scenarios, but policy v = 8 has the 
highest recidivism rate of all the alternatives. 
In addition, if an analyst is considering increasing a prose­
cutor's budget by 10%, then by comparing policies - 1 through 5 
with the corresponding policy of the Subsidy Model (v^ = + 5) 
it is clear that such a change always increases recidivism. Such 
increases ranging from a minimum of 15 arrests for = 4 and 
= 9 to a maximum of 585 arrests for = 5 and = 10. The 
largest difference between any two scenarios occurs for the policy 
pair v = 4 and v = 8 (the dominating policies). At 18.1% of the 
total number of offenders who desisted during the experimental period, 
1 7 2 
t h e s a v i n g s i n c r i m e s c a n b e q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t , 78 i n d e x o f f e n s e s 
p e r y e a r i n t h e c a s e o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m p o l i c y 8 t o p o l i c y 4 . 
T h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e r e c i d i v i s m r a t e f o r t h e S u b s i d y M o d e l s o v e r 
t h e B a s i c M o d e l s i s f u r t h e r d e m o n s t r a t e d b y d i v i d i n g t h e a v e r a g e 
c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t o f t h e m a l e o f f e n d e r f o r e a c h m o d e l b y i t s 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g a v e r a g e r e c i d i v i s m r a t e . T h e r e s u l t may b e i n t e r p r e t e d 
a s t h e a v e r a g e C J S c o s t p e r m a l e a r r e s t ( s e e T a b l e 2 2 ) . T h i s c o s t 
i s s m a l l e r i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e f o r t h e S u b s i d y v e r s i o n s (v = 6 t o 1 0 ) 
o f t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g M o d e l s ( v = 1 t o 5), s u b s t a n t i a t i n g 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e c i d i v i s m i s i n c r e a s e d f o r t h e S u b s i d y M o d e l s 
b y r e d u c i n g t h e i n c a p a c i t a t i o n e f f e c t o f t h e C J S . 
R e s p o n d i n g t o A p r i o r i I n f o r m a t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n now a r i s e s : 
What o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be g l e a n e d f r o m t h e s e p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s ? 
O n c e a g a i n l o o k i n g a t t o t a l C J S c o s t a n d r e c i d i v i s m , t h e s p e c i a l 
r e s p o n s e s t o a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n h a v e i n a l l c a s e s a l o w e r t o t a l C J S 
c o s t a t t h e e x p e n s e o f h i g h e r r e c i d i v i s m t h a n t h e n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e s 
t o t h e same t y p e o f i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s e f f e c t i s n o t d i c t a t e d b y t h e 
r e s p o n s e t o a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n ; r a t h e r , i t i s o v e r w h e l m e d b y t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e s p o n s e t o p r e - t r i a l d e l a y . S i n c e t h e s p e c i a l r e s p o n s e 
t o a p r i o r i i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e h i g h $ ^ o f f e n d e r n o t be 
a l l o w e d t o n e g o t i a t e a p l e a ( o r a t l e a s t r e d u c e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f h i s 
d o i n g s o ) , i f t h e r e i s a g r e a t e r number o f h i g h <K o f f e n d e r s b e i n g 
p r o s e c u t e d , t h e p r e - t r i a l d e l a y w i l l i n c r e a s e a s m o r e o f f e n d e r s a r e 
r o u t e d t o t h e l o n g e r s e r v i c e t i m e p r o c e s s o r , t h e c o u r t t r i a l . T h i s i s 
u n d o u b t e d l y w h a t h a p p e n s when t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s a n o f f e n d e r ' s a r r e s t 
r e c o r d b e c a u s e t h e a v e r a g e r a t e o f r e c i d i v i s m i s h i g h e r f o r men t h a n 
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for women. The latter is only 13% of the offender population. 
With more men going to trial then for the normal response to an 
offender's arrest record, the prosecutor's response to the pre-trial 
queue rations the courts more carefully and more offenders with 
lower $. are released before trial. 
1 
When the severity of an offense is available to the prosecutor, 
however, the formulation of the model causes all offenses but murder, 
assault and rape to be less severe than the norm. For the normal 
response, offenders who commit the less severe offenses are increasing­
ly more likely to negotiate guilty pleas, whereas those offenders who 
committed murder, assault or rape are more likely to be sent to trial. 
For the special response, however, the murder, rape and assault cases 
are more likely to plead guilty while the other cases go to trial. 
This, of course, occurs unless the pre-trial queue also impacts the 
process. When this happens for the special response, since there are 
more burglary, larceny, auto theft and robbery cases than there are 
murder, rape and assault cases, the pre-trial queue grows until the 
prosecutor observes the growth and responds by releasing offenders 
before they are convicted. This action on the part of the prosecutor 
reduces the total CJS cost while increasing recidivism. 
Optimizing Social Costs. From the total CJS cost and the 
average male recidivism performance measures, it is not clear exactly 
which policy is a social optimum. The trade-off between CJS cost and 
recidivism clouds the issue and makes optimization most difficult. 
Even the average career criminal cost statistic for men demonstrates 
T a b l e 2 4 . R a n k i n g P o l i c y A l t e r n a t i v e s on t h e B a s i s o f C a r e e r C r i m i n a l S o c i a l C o s t o f M a l e O f f e n d e r s 
R a n k V M o d e l 
e 
V 
e - e * 
V 
1 5 , 0 0 0 ( e v - e * ) 
1 10 S u b s i d y - S p e c i a l H i s t o r y $ 6 5 , 1 0 4 $ o $ o 
2 3 B a s i c - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 6 5 , 9 8 0 876 1 3 . 1 4 x 1 0 9 
3 7 S u b s i d y - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 6 6 , 2 9 6 1 1 9 2 1 7 . 8 8 x 1 0 9 
4 2 B a s i c - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 6 6 , 3 5 0 1 2 4 6 1 8 . 6 9 x 1 0 9 
5 5 B a s i c - S p e c i a l H i s t o r y 6 6 , 4 7 4 1 3 7 0 2 0 . 5 5 x 1 0 9 
6 8 S u b s i d y - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 6 6 , 6 7 4 1 5 7 0 2 3 . 5 5 x 1 0 9 
7 9 S u b s i d y - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 6 7 , 1 0 5 2 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 2 x 1 0 9 
8 4 B a s i c - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 6 7 , 4 8 0 2 3 7 6 3 5 . 6 4 x 1 0 9 
6 S u b s i d y M o d e l 6 7 , 5 9 6 2 4 9 2 3 7 . 3 8 x 1 0 9 
10 1 B a s i c M o d e l 6 8 , 6 7 9 3 5 7 5 5 3 . 6 3 x 1 0 9 
_ m in imum 
N o t e : e v < Y ) = Y 6 v + C ^ a n d e = v { e ^ } 
w h e r e y = $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 i s t h e e x p e c t e d s o c i a l c o s t o f a s i n g l e c r i m e , 
3^ i s t h e a v e r a g e r e c i d i v i s m p e r m a l e o f f e n d e r , 
C i s t h e a v e r a g e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t . 
1 7 5 
a n i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o m a l e r e c i d i v i s m . T h u s , o t h e r m e a s u r e s 
m u s t b e u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e a s o c i a l l y o p t i m a l p o l i c y f o r p l e a b a r ­
g a i n i n g . 
I n e q u a t i o n 6 . 1 , a m e a s u r e w a s p r o p o s e d w h i c h c o m b i n e s t h e c o s t 
a n d t h e r e c i d i v i s m e l e m e n t s o f t h e C J S p e r f o r m a n c e v e c t o r . T h i s 
s t a t i s t i c , r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e s o c i a l c o s t o f p o l i c y v , a d d s t h e 
e x p e c t e d c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t t o t h e e x p e c t e d c o s t t o s o c i e t y 
i n c u r r e d e v e r y t i m e a n o f f e n d e r i s a r r e s t e d . T h u s , t h e new s t a t i s t i c 
m e a s u r e s t h e t o t a l C J S c o s t a n d t h e t o t a l c o s t o f t h e c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d 
b y o f f e n d e r s o v e r t h e i r e n t i r e c a r e e r s . C o m p u t i n g t h e e x p e c t e d s o c i a l 
c o s t o f t h e m a l e c r i m i n a l c a r e e r f o r e a c h o f t h e p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
t h e s o c i a l o p t i m u m e * d e f i n e d b y e q u a t i o n 6 - 2 o c c u r s f o r v = 1 0 , t h e 
S p e c i a l H i s t o r y S u b s i d y M o d e l . 
R a n k i n g t h e p o l i c i e s i n T a b l e 24 a c c o r d i n g t o i n c r e a s i n g s o c i a l 
c o s t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t s a v i n g s c a n b e made b y c h o o s i n g t h e 
s o c i a l o p t i m u m ; t h e m i n i m u m c o s t b e t w e e n t h e o p t i m a l p o l i c y a n d t h e 
n e x t m o s t d e s i r a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e i s ( e ^ - e * ) = $ 8 7 6 p e r m a l e c r i m i n a l 
c a r e e r . U n d e r t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t 1 5 , 0 0 0 o f f e n d e r s w i l l d e s i s t d u r i n g 
t h i s 35 y e a r p e r i o d , $ 1 3 . 4 m i l l i o n c a n b e s a v e d b y c h o o s i n g t h e S p e c i a l 
H i s t o r y S u b s i d y M o d e l o v e r t h e S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y B a s i c M o d e l . A l t h o u g h 
t h i s s a v i n g s i s o n l y 1.3% o f t h e e x p e c t e d $ 9 8 9 . 7 m i l l i o n c o s t o f t h e 
l a t t e r m o d e l , t h e r e a l s a v i n g s i s r e a l i z e d b e t w e e n t h e B a s i c M o d e l , 
t h e p o l i c y s t r u c t u r e c u r r e n t l y e x i s t i n g , a n d t h e f i r s t - r a n k e d m o d e l . 
T h i s s a v i n g s i s $ 3 5 7 5 p e r m a l e c r i m i n a l c a r e e r o f $ 5 3 , 6 2 5 m i l l i o n 
o v e r t h e 3 5 - y e a r h o r i z o n . F o r t h e $ 1 0 3 0 . 2 m i l l i o n t o t a l C J S 
F i g u r e 1 0 . M a l e P r i s o n P o p u l a t i o n When C r i m e 
S e v e r i t y i s A v a i l a b l e t o P r o s e c u t o r 
F i g u r e 11. M a l e P r i s o n P o p u l a t i o n When A n O f f e n d e r ' s C r i m i n a l 
A r r e s t H i s t o r y i s A v a i l a b l e t o t h e P r o s e c u t o r 
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c o s t c o m p u t e d f o r 1 5 , 0 0 0 d e s i s t i n g o f f e n d e r s , t h e s a v i n g s r e a l i z e d i n 
c h a n g i n g f r o m t h e c u r r e n t p o l i c y t o t h a t o f t h e S p e c i a l H i s t o r y S u b s i d y 
M o d e l a m o u n t s t o 5 . 2 % o f t h e t o t a l e x p e c t e d c o s t . 
6 . 2 . 2 P o l i c y F e a s i b i l i t y 
A n y p o l i c y s c e n a r i o c h o s e n f o r p o s s i b l e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i s 
t e n t a t i v e u n t i l i t s f e a s i b i l i t y h a s b e e n r e s o l v e d . T h e c r i t e r i o n f o r 
f e a s i b i l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d e a r l i e r r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s i z e o f t h e m a l e 
p r i s o n p o p u l a t i o n m u s t n o t e x c e e d a t a n y t i m e 125% o f t h e s i z e o f t h e 
p r i s o n p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e B a s i c M o d e l . T o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y 
o f a l l o f t h e p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e B a s i c M o d e l , t h e s i z e o f t h e 
m a l e p r i s o n p o p u l a t i o n f o r e a c h s c e n a r i o i s p l o t t e d a s a d i s c r e t e t i m e 
s e r i e s i n F i g u r e s 1 0 a n d 1 1 . O n l y two o f t h e s e t i m e s e r i e s e v e n a p ­
p r o a c h t h i s f e a s i b i l i t y b o u n d , t h e n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e t o a n o f f e n d e r ' s 
c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y o f b o t h t h e B a s i c a n d o f t h e S u b s i d y M o d e l s . I n 
F i g u r e 1 1 , t h e s e n e a r - v i o l a t i o n s o c c u r d u r i n g t h e f i r s t t e n y e a r s o f 
t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l e p o c h o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n . T h u s , e v e n t h o s e p o l i c i e s 
w h i c h a p p r o a c h t h e c r i t e r i o n o f i n f e a s i b i l i t y do s o f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d . 
T h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e B a s i c M o d e l i s s u c h t h a t t h e m a l e p r i s o n p o p u l a t i o n 
g r o w s r a p i d l y e n o u g h t h a t t h e d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n i n m a t e l e v e l s b e t w e e n 
e i t h e r r u n w h i c h i s s u s p e c t a n d t h e B a s i c M o d e l c a n be v i e w e d a s 
a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e g r o w t h o f t h e B a s i c P l e a B a r g a i n i n g M o d e l . T h u s , a 
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i o n d o e s n o t a c t u a l l y e x i s t f o r a n y 
o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s s h o w n . 
O t h e r i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t i m e s e r i e s i n F i g u r e s 
1 0 a n d 11 f o l l o w w i t h o u t f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n . 
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The Basic Model versus the Subsidy Model: The magnitude 
of the time series of the male prison inmate population 
is generally larger for the Basic Model than for the 
corresponding Subsidy Model. 
The Crime Severity Effect: The normative and the special 
plea bargaining responses to the severity of an offense 
for either the Basic or the Subsidy Model force the size 
of the inmate population to be smaller than that of the 
Basic Plea Bargaining Model (Figure 10). 
a. The male inmate populations for the runs of the Special 
Severity scenario are generally lower than for the Normal 
Severity Model; however, 
b. The inmate level of the special response approaches 
the inmate level of the normal response for the Basic 
and the Subsidy Models. 
The Criminal History Effect: The plea bargaining response 
to an offender's arrest record produces varying results 
(Figure 11). 
a. The Normal History responses to the Basic and Subsidy 
Models yield levels of the male prison population that are 
essentially the same as the prison population for the 
Basic Model without a priori information; 
b. The special response for the Basic Model results in a 
prison population whose time series resembles that of 
the Special Severity alternatives. 
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c. The Special History Subsidy Model yields a male 
prison population which is smaller than that of any 
other scenario at any time. 
6.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The final selection of a policy scenario for implementation in 
an actual CJS depends, of course, on many factors, some of which are 
realized in this model. For the many factors which either have not or 
could not have been adequately modeled, rather than repeat these experi­
ments for a number of factors which are of secondary importance, the 
sensitivity of the performance measures to parameter changes can be 
evaluated. Even though such analyses might seem as important, 
the actual cost of the repeated execution of the simulation model may 
be prohibitive. For this example, the simulation model required 
85,000 words of storage on a CDC Cyber 74 computer (100,000 words 
available), and it executed using approximately 2 hours of CPU time 
for each run. Because of the cost to execute this model and the slow 
turn-around precipitated by the size of the model and the length of 
each run. examining the effects of several other factors may be 
prohibited. 
A less expensive alternative to conducting experiments on secon­
dary effects, sensitivity analysis on the performance function can yield 
considerable insight at a significant savings. For example, the 
social cost function, 
e (Y) = Y 6 + C 
v v v 
is a function of the parameter y» the expected cost to society of each 
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crime an offender commits. Earlier, y was arbitrarily set at $10,000 
and the Special History Subsidy Model (v = 10) was chosen as the 
optimal. But it is not exactly clear what value y should assume, and 
it would be highly instructive to determine the range of y over which 
policy v = 1 0 is an optimum. In addition, if other polices were to 
become optimal, knowing the range of y over which each policy was the 
optimum would allow a policy-maker some flexibility in choosing y. 
To determine the range of y for which policy v is an optimum 
requires that the extreme points of the convex set defined by e v(y) 
for all v and y 2 0 D e determined. However, this amounts to finding 
the non-negative intersection points of e^(y) and e^ (y) for all v^v^. 
Algebraically, this requires setting e^(y) = e^ (y) and solving for 
V , V Q , the social cost per crime where policy v and have the 
same career criminal social cost: 
C - C 
- _ v v 
Yv,v — 2_ . ( 6 _ 9 ) 
0 \ " K 
These results are shown in Table 25. The smallest positive value of 
Y . then is the social cost per criminal arrest beyond which vn = 10 v,10 R J 0 
is no longer optimal. The result is policy 9 at Y Q N = $24,606. 
Therefore, policy 1 0 is optimal for $ 0 < y < $24,606. Repeating this 
operation for vrt = 9, remembering that Y „ > yn . _ , the result is 0 v, 9 _ 9,10 
that policy 9 is optimal over the range 
$24,606 _< y < $385,000. 
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Table 25. Determining y f ° r the Career 
Criminal Social Cost for Men 
\ o v X 10 9 4 
1 50,168 -22,791 8,020 
2 87,875 16,239 23,368 
3 -28,087 17,031 23,217 
4 27,217 385,000 
5 45,128 16,438 24,323 
6 42,789 1,950 15,177 
7 -122,444 15,541 21,503 




Finally, repeating this procedure for = 4, all values of Y v 4 a r e 
less than $385,000. Thus, there exist three optimal policy candidates 
based on the career criminal social cost and the selection of one of 
these would depend on the actual value of y for a particular CJS: 
10 if $0 j<_ y < $24,606 
1 
v* = \9 if $24,606 <. y < $385,000 
4 if $385,000 _< y 
It should be noticed that each of these three policies requires the 
prosecutor to respond to an offender's arrest record. 
The selection of an optimal policy would require that such 
information be made available to CJS administrators. If the true value 
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of y is less than $385,000, the optimal policy dictates that a 10% 
increase in the prosecutor's budget (viz, in the number of prosecuting 
attorneys) be made over the budget of the Basic Plea Bargaining Model, 
whereas for y > $385,000 the prosecutor's budget should not be increased 
beyond current spending levels. In addition, if the true value of 
Y is less than $24,606, policy 10 is optimal and the prosecutor should 
force those offenders who have more extensive criminal records to go 
to trial (the special response to an offender's arrest record) even 
though the resulting rate of recidivism is higher for each male offen­
der. If the true value of y is greater than or equal to $24,606, 
however, the repeat offender should be allowed to negotiate a guilty 
plea in order to reduce the male recidivism rate. 
6.2.4 Female Offenders 
In examining the results of experiments with plea bargaining, 
the evaluation in the previous two sections has focused on the male 
career criminal. This was done primarily because the male offender is 
such a dominate factor in the generation of crime. From the analysis 
of those offenders who desist in their criminal careers during the 
35 year epoch of the simulation, 87.2% of the total were men. This 
estimate is not surprising as the percentage of the first offender 
population which is male varies between 81.5% and 99.0% for the 
seven index offenses. However, because plea bargaining policy affects 
the female offender as well as the male, this section is included, 
1. To appraise the differences between the male and the female 
career criminals, 
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2. To evaluate the effect that each of the proposed plea 
bargaining scenarios has on the female's career in crime 
and on the cost of the average career of the female 
offender, and 
3. To re-examine the optimality of those policies cited for 
the male criminal when the woman's criminal career is 
included in the performance criterion. 
Career Criminal Profiles. Not only are there dramatic 
differences between the number of male career criminals (approximately 
15,000) and the number of female career criminals (approximately 2,200) 
which desist during the 35-year runs, but other differences which 
reflect differential CJS treatment and recidivism tendencies exist 
as well. Specifically, the average recidivism rate for men for the 
ten runs is 1.953 crimes per criminal career, while the same rate for 
women is 1.495 crimes per criminal career. The average career criminal 
cost for men is also significantly greater than that for women. This 
disparity is partially explained by the differences in the recidivism 
rates for each sex, but it is also explained by the differences between 
the average CJS cost per male arrest and the average cost per female 
arrest. The average CJS cost per female arrest is 9.1% smaller than 
the comparable figure for men, the average recidivism for women is 
23.5% smaller than the rate for men, and the reduction in the career 
criminal cost for women is 30.1% of that for the male offender. Thus, 
the expected CJS cost of processing a women over her entire life is 
approximately 70% that of any man. This of course is not to say that 
women are treated less harshly by the CJS; rather, there exists a 
T a b l e 2 6 . S i m u l a t e d P e r f o r m a n c e M e a s u r e s f o r F e m a l e O f f e n d e r s 
E x p e r i m e n t a l R u n 
A v e r a g e F e m a l e 
R e c i d i v i s m 
( N o . O f f e n s e s ) 
A v e r a g e F e m a l e 
C a r e e r C r i m i n a l 
C o s t 
A v e r a g e C J S 
C o s t P e r 
F e m a l e A r r e s t 
E x p e c t e d S o c i a l 
C o s t P e r F e m a l e 
C a r e e r C r i m i n a l 
1. B a s i c M o d e l 1 . 4 5 6 (-1.18) $ 3 6 , 6 9 1 ( 1 . 6 7 ) $ 2 4 , 9 8 4 ( 1 . 4 4 ) $ 5 1 , 2 5 1 ( 1 . 7 0 ) 
2. - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 1 . 4 9 2 ( - . 0 9 ) 3 2 , 8 0 3 (-.11) 2 2 , 5 1 5 (. 1 6 ) 4 7 , 7 2 3 (-.14) 
3. - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 1 . 5 2 8 ( 1 . 0 0 ) 3 2 , 4 9 0 (-.25) 2 1 , 3 8 7 (-.43) 4 7 , 7 7 0 (-.12) 
4. - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 1 . 4 7 2 ( - . 7 0 ) 3 4 , 7 1 1 ( . 7 6 ) 2 3 , 6 9 3 ( . 7 7 ) 4 9 , 4 3 1 ( . 7 5 ) 
5. - S p e c i a l H i s t o r y 1 . 5 0 9 ( . 4 2 ) 3 2 , 3 2 1 (-.33) 2 0 , 9 5 4 (-.65) 4 7 , 4 1 1 (-.30) 
6. S u b s i d y M o d e l 1 . 4 6 7 ( - . 8 5 ) 3 4 , 9 1 9 ( . 8 6 ) 2 4 , 0 2 6 ( . 9 4 ) 4 9 , 5 8 9 ( . 8 3 ) 
7. - N o r m a l S e v e r i t y 1 . 5 2 1 ( . 7 9 ) 3 3 , 0 2 0 (-.01) 2 1 , 7 0 0 (-.27) 4 8 , 2 3 0 ( . 1 2 ) 
8. - S p e c i a l S e v e r i t y 1 . 5 3 3 ( 1 . 1 5 ) 2 9 , 5 8 7 (-1.57) 1 9 , 1 0 3 (-1.61) 4 4 , 9 1 7 (-1.60) 
9. - N o r m a l H i s t o r y 1 . 4 3 8 (-1.73) 3 4 , 5 0 4 ( . 6 7 ) 2 4 , 2 8 9 ( 1 . 0 8 ) 4 8 , 8 8 4 ( . 4 7 ) 




t e n d e n c y f o r women n o t t o r e c i d i v a t e a s many t i m e s a s t h e m a l e 
o f f e n d e r a n d t h e r e i s a t e n d e n c y f o r a women n o t t o c o s t t h e C J S 
a s much p e r a r r e s t a s do m e n . I n t h e m o d e l , t h i s l a s t f a c t c a n be 
a t t r i b u t e d , t o t h e m o r e l e n i e n t s e n t e n c e s t h a t women r e c e i v e t h a n 
m e n . 
P e r f o r m a n c e O p t i m i z a t i o n , F e m a l e O f f e n d e r s . I n T a b l e 26 
a p p e a r s t h e r e s u l t s f o r women w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e r u n - b y - r u n 
a c c o u n t i n g o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e f a c t o r s d e v e l o p e d f o r m a l e o f f e n d e r s 
t h a t w a s s h o w n i n T a b l e 2 2 . A s b e f o r e , t h e a c t u a l v a l u e o f e a c h 
s t a t i s t i c i s a c c o m p a n i e d b y i t s n o r m a l i z e d v a l u e i n p a r e n t h e s e s 
( c f . , e q u a t i o n s 6 - 5 , 6 - 6 , 6 - 7 ) . I t w a s j u s t n o t e d t h a t t h e e x p e c t e d 
v a l u e s o f t h e s e s t a t i s t i c s w e r e a l l l o w e r f o r women t h a n f o r m e n . 
I t s h o u l d a l s o be o b s e r v e d t h a t a g r e a t s i m i l a r i t y e x i s t s b e t w e e n 
t h e s t a t i s t i c s f o r men a n d f o r women. I n p a r t i c u l a r , b e s i d e s t h e 
f a c t t h a t e a c h s t a t i s t i c i s a l w a y s s m a l l e r f o r women t h a n f o r men f o r 
e a c h r u n o f t h e same p o l i c y s c e n a r i o , t h e n o r m a l i z e d s t a t i s t i c s f o r 
men a n d women d i f f e r i n s i g n o n l y f o r t h e v = 2 m o d e l , t h e N o r m a l 
S e v e r i t y B a s i c M o d e l . Y e t , t h i s d i s p a r i t y o c c u r s f o r v a l u e s o f t h e 
n o r m a l i z e d s t a t i s t i c c l o s e t o z e r o ( t h e a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e i s 0 . 5 0 
f o r t h e C a r e e r C r i m i n a l C o s t a n d i t i s 0 . 6 5 f o r t h e a v e r a g e C J S c o s t 
p e r a r r e s t ) . T h e r e f o r e , t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s do n o t d e m o n s t r a t e a n y 
r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e s i n t h e h a n d l i n g o f e a c h s e x f o r t h e v = 2 m o d e l . 
A s o b s e r v e d f o r t h e m a l e o f f e n d e r s , a n I n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
e x i s t s b e t w e e n t h e r e c i d i v i s m r a t e o f f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s , o n t h e o n e 
h a n d , a n d t h e c o s t o f p r o c e s s i n g o f f e n d e r s o n t h e o t h e r ( T a b l e 2 7 ) . 
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Table 27. Summary Statistics for Male and Female Offenders. 











Value 1.953/1.495 47,243.8/33042 24441.9/22212.1 66773.8/47992.0 
Standard 





1.000/.915 -.870/-.761 -.975/-.829 -.660/-.711 
Because of the difficulty in choosing a policy which results in the 
minimization of both of these factors, the career criminal social cost 
statistic, for y = $10,000 was used for performance optimization in 
Section 6.2.1. As was the case for male offenders, the minimum social 
cost for women occurs for policy v = 10, the Special History Subsidy 
Model, and the maximum social cost occurs with the Basic Plea Bar­
gaining Model, v = 1. 
Referring now to Table 28, the expected savings in the number 
of crimes committed by women over the 35 year planning horizon differs 
greatly from the results for men given in Table 23. Only policy 
v = 10 dominates all other policies in that the recidivism rate for 
women is higher for v = 10 than any other alternative. 
Performance Optimization, All Offenders. Rather than make the 
decision about the optimality of one policy scenario over another by 
1 8 8 
T a b l e 2 8 . E x p e c t e d D i f f e r e n c e s i n T o t a l F e m a l e A r r e s t s 
v l \ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 79 1 5 8 35 116 24 1 4 3 169 - 3 9 171 
2 0 79 - 4 4 37 55 63 90 - 1 1 8 92 
3 0 - 1 2 3 - 4 1 134 15 11 - 1 9 8 13 
4 0 81 - 1 1 1 0 8 134 - 7 5 136 
5 0 - 9 2 26 53 - 1 5 6 55 
6 0 1 1 9 1 4 5 - 6 4 1 4 7 
7 0 26 - 1 8 3 29 
8 0 - 2 0 9 2 
9 0 211 
10 0 
N o t e : T h i s a n a l y s i s a s s u m e s t h a t 2 , 2 0 0 p e r s o n s c o m p r i s e t h e f e m a l e 
o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n T a b l e e n t r i e s a r e : 
A r r e s t s ( v 0 ) - A r r e s t s ( v . ) 
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Table 29. Expected Differences in Total Number of Arrests 
\ V 2 
V l \ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 1174 1838 -700 866 219 1613 1941 -759 1506 
2 0 664 -1874 -308 -845 438 975 1933 332 
3 0 -2538 -971 -1351 -195 311 -2598 -332 
4 0 1566 919 2313 2849 -60 2206 
5 0 -647 746 1283 -1626 640 
6 0 1394 1930 -979 1287 
7 0 536 -2373 -106 
8 0 -2909 -643 
9 0 2266 
10 0 
Note: This analysis assumes that 2200 female and 15,000 male offenders 
belong to the offender population. Entries are 
Arrests (v ) - Arrests (v.) . 
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r a t i o n a l i s t i c m e t h o d s , c o m b i n i n g t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a n d r e c i ­
d i v i s m m e a s u r e s u s e d f o r t h e m a l e a n d f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s a n d c o n d u c t i n g 
s e n s i t i v i t y a n a l y s e s o n t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n w i l l 
r e s u l t i n a m o r e i n f o r m e d d e c i s i o n . 
F i r s t , T a b l e 29 d i s p l a y s t h e c o m b i n e d s a v i n g s i n c r i m e s 
c o m m i t t e d b y men a n d women o v e r t h e 35 y e a r s p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n . N o t e 
t h a t i f = 1 i s t h e c u r r e n t p o l i c y , t h e g r e a t e s t i n c r e a s e i n t h e 
number o f c r i m e s o c c u r s f o r p o l i c y = 8 , t h e s e c o n d h i g h e s t i s 
V£ = 3 , a n d t h e t h i r d a n d f o u r t h h i g h e s t p o l i c i e s a r e = 7 a n d 
V2 - 1 0 , r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s r a n k i n g o f t h e f o u r w o r s t t r a n s i t i o n s 
f o r = 1 , t h e r e f o r e , h a s n o t b e e n d i s t u r b e d f r o m when t h e s a v i n g s 
i n c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d w a s c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f o r m a l e o f f e n d e r s . A s 
o c c u r r e d e a r l i e r , t h e g r e a t e s t s a v i n g s i n c r i m e a p p e a r s when t h e 
c u r r e n t p o l i c y i s = 9 a n d t h e p o l i c y t o b e a d o p t e d i s V2 = 8 . 
I d e n t i f y i n g d o m i n a t i n g p o l i c i e s f o r t h e c o m b i n e d m a l e a n d f e m a l e 
r e c i d i v i s m r a t e s , o n l y p o l i c y v = 8 d o m i n a t e s a l l t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
a n d i t d o m i n a t e s b e c a u s e c r i m e i n c r e a s e s w h e n e v e r i t i s c h o s e n . T h e 
d o m i n a n c e o f p o l i c y 8 i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e m a l e 
o f f e n d e r a n a l y s i s ; h o w e v e r , f o r t h i s c o m b i n e d m e a s u r e , p o l i c y 4 d o e s 
n o t d o m i n a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e g r e a t e s t s a v i n g s i n c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d . 
T h e r e i s n o t a p o l i c y w h i c h m e e t s t h i s c r i t e r i a f o r t h e c o m b i n e d 
c r i m e r a t e s . 
A n o t h e r a n d , p e r h a p s , m o r e e f f e c t i v e way t o e x a m i n e t h e 
e f f i c a c y o f o n e p o l i c y m o d e l o v e r a n o t h e r i s t o c o m b i n e t h e c a r e e r 
c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r men a n d f o r women i n t o a s i n g l e s t a t i s t i c . 
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A w e i g h t e d p e r f o r m a n c e f u n c t i o n i s o n e . m e t h o d t h a t h a s b e e n 
s e l e c t e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . D e f i n e t h e w e i g h t e d c a r e e r c r i m i n a l 
s o c i a l c o s t a s 
e f ( y ) = F e A y ) + M e ( Y ) ( 6 - 1 1 ) 
v v , f v , m 
w h e r e F i s t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e t o t a l o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n t h a t 
a r e women, M = ( 1 - F ) i s t h e p e r c e n t a g e t h a t a r e m e n , e f ( Y ) I S 
t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r women u s i n g p o l i c y m o d e l v , a n d 
e ( Y ) i s t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r men u s i n g p o l i c y m o d e l 
v , m 
v . T h e v a l u e o f F i s d e t e r m i n e d t o b e 1 2 . 8 % , t h e r e f o r e , m = 8 7 . 2 % . 
A s b e f o r e , y i s t h e s o c i a l c o s t p e r c r i m e a n d i t i s a s s u m e d t o be 
e q u a l f o r men a n d f o r women. B e c a u s e e q u a t i o n 6 - 1 0 w e i g h t s t h e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n o f e a c h o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y t o t h e o b j e c t i v e e ^ ( y ) b y i t s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n , a n o t h e r p e r f o r m a n c e c r i t e r i a m i g h t 
b e d e s i g n e d w h i c h w e i g h t s e a c h s u b p o p u l a t i o n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e 
o b j e c t i v e e q u a l l y , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e n u m b e r o f o f f e n d e r s i n e a c h 
c a t e g o r y : 
e " ( y ) = e A y ) + e ( y ) . ( 6 - 1 2 ) 
v v , f v , m 1 
T h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s e two m e a s u r e s i s t h a t t h e m i n i m i z a t i o n o f 
e ^ ( y ) p l a c e s e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e o n e a c h i n d i v i d u a l o f f e n d e r , w h e r e a s 
e ' ^ ( y ) p l a c e s e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e o n t h e s u b p o p u l a t i o n o f men a n d 
o n t h e s u b p o p u l a t i o n o f women. 
T h e v a l u e s o f e ' ( Y ) a n d e M ( y ) a r e s h o w n i n T a b l e 3 0 f o r e a c h 
v v 
p o l i c y v a n d yassumed e q u a l t o $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . A l t h o u g h t h e r a n k i n g s a r e 
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Table 30. Ranking Policy Alternatives on the Basis of Career Criminal 
Social Cost for Men and Women 
V e f 
V 




Rank (e'̂ ) 
1 $66448 10 $59965 10 
2 63966 4 57036 5 
3 63649 2 56875 3 
4 65170 8 58455 8 
5 64033 6 56942 4 
6 65291 9 58592 9 
7 63984 5 57263 6 
8 63889 3 55795 2 
9 64773 7 57994 7 
10 62494 1 54909 1 
not exactly the same for e f and e", there are tremendous similarities: 
J v v 
1. Policy v = 1 lies at the bottom of each ranking while 
v = 10 occurs at the top; 
2. Policies v = 3 and v = 8 are a l t e r n a t e l y ranked 2 and 3 on 
each list, Indicating that these policies may be Inter­
changeable for a social optimum with y = $10,000; 
3. The positions of policies v = 2, 5 and 7 on each list are 
merely two different permutations of the ranks 4, 5 and 6; 
thus, these policies may be interchangeable; 
4. Policies ranked 7, 8, 9, 10, ( v = 9, 4, 6, and 1, respec­
tively) do not change their positions in the two lists; 
their desirability is, therefore, fixed at levels unde­
sirable vis-^-vis those policies whose ranks are 1 through 
6. 
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S e n s i t i v i t y A n a l y s i s , C o m b i n e d O b j e c t i v e . I n S e c t i o n 6 . 2 . 3 , 
t h e v a l u e o f y w a s a l l o w e d t o v a r y i n o r d e r t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
p o l i c y m o d e l c o u l d be s e l e c t e d w h i c h m i n i m i z e d t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l 
s o c i a l c o s t f o r a n y e s t i m a t e o f y. T o r e p e a t t h i s p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e 
w e i g h t e d o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w t h a t 
a t l e a s t t h e r a n g e o v e r w h i c h a p o l i c y i s o p t i m a l w o u l d c h a n g e f r o m 
t h e c a s e when o n l y m a l e o f f e n d e r s a r e c o n s i d e r e d a n d , p e r h a p s , t h e 
o p t i m a l p o l i c y s e t i t s e l f may c h a n g e . 
T o d e v e l o p a n e s t i m a t e o f y o f t h e f o r m o f e q u a t i o n 6 - 8 f o r 
t h e w e i g h t e d s o c i a l c o s t f u n c t i o n , f i r s t r e d e f i n e t h e w e i g h t s F a n d 
M = ( 1 - F ) t o b e F ' a n d M' w h o s e v a l u e s a r e u n r e s t r i c t e d . T h u s , 
( y ) = F ' e _ ( Y ) + M' e ( (Y) • ( 6 - 1 3 ) v » i v , m 
E q u a t i n g t h e w e i g h t e d s o c i a l c o s t f u n c t i o n s f o r two p o l i c i e s v a n d V Q , 
a n e s t i m a t e o f y» m a y b e f o u n d t o be 
M ' ( C - C ) + F ' ( C . - C . ) 
v , m v Q , m v , f v , f 
Y v , v n = M T e r ~ 3 ) + F ' ( 3 . - 3 J ( 6 ~ 1 4 ) 0 v Q , m M v , m ' v , f v , f 
w h e r e C i s t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t o f p o l i c y r f o r m a l e o f f e n d e r s , 
r , m r J 
C r i s t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t o f p o l i c y r f o r f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s , 3 r , f * J r , m 
i s t h e r e c i d i v i s m r a t e o f p o l i c y r f o r m a l e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s , 3 r ^ i s 
t h e r e c i d i v i s m r a t e o f p o l i c y r f o r f e m a l e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s , M 1 i s t h e 
w e i g h t g i v e n t o t h e m a l e s u b p o p u l a t i o n , a n d F ' i s t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o 
t h e f e m a l e s u b p o p u l a t i o n . 
D e t e r m i n i n g t h e r a n g e o f y o v e r w h i c h a p o l i c y i s o p t i m a l , two 
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cases are evaluted: FJ = 12.8%, Mj = 87.2% and F^ = = 1. 
For both cases, policy 10 is optimal over a range of y a n ^ policy 
9 is optimal over the remainder of the range of y. (See Table 31.) 
Table 31. Determining y' for the Combined Career Criminal Social 
Cost for Men and Women 
r 10 VO
 10 9 
1 55,144 -27,916 70,551 -49,712 
2 86,139 17,181 83,362 20,949 
3 -49,876 17,444 -221,294 18,956 
4 30,857 -103,486 119,645 -17,939 
5 51,381 17,803 73,547 22,450 
6 47,336 891 61,518 -3,289 
7 -230,630 15,726 1,187,000 16,389 
8 -27,310 15,218 -32,214 25,993 
VO
 27,285 — 36,485 — 
10 — — — — 
M'= .872, F'= .128 F'= M'= 1.0 
This contradicts the results for male offenders alone where policy 4 
also became optimal for y $385,000. The fact that policies 10 and 
9 are both optimal is re-assuring in that the choice of the optimal 
policy set is indifferent to the weights F 1 and M'; this is not to 
say, however, that the choice of the optimal policy is indifferent to 
the values of F 1 and M 1 or to the value of y. 
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6 . 3 Summary 
I t w a s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r t o d e s c r i b e a n d a n a l y z e ' 
e x p e r i m e n t s c o n d u c t e d o n t h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t 
o f p l e a b a r g a i n i n g s c e n a r i o s o n t h e e f f i c a c y o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e C J S . 
S e v e r a l p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r : 
1 . T o t a l C J S c o s t o v e r t h e p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n , 
2 . A v e r a g e number o f o f f e n s e s p e r c r i m i n a l c a r e e r , 
3 . A v e r a g e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t , 
4 . T o t a l i n d e x c r i m e s p r e v e n t e d o v e r t h e p l a n n i n g h o r i z o n , 
5 . A v e r a g e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t . 
T h e l a s t m e a s u r e , t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t , w a s c h o s e n a s t h e 
g l o b a l p e r f o r m a n c e c r i t e r i a b e c a u s e o f t h e s t r o n g n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p w h i c h e x i s t s b e t w e e n C J S c o s t a n d t h e r a t e o f r e c i d i v i s m . 
U s i n g t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t t o e v a l u a t e t h e a l t e r n a ^ 
t i v e s , h a v i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r r e s p o n d t o a n o f f e n d e r ' s c r i m i n a l r e c o r d 
r e s u l t s i n t h e m in imum s o c i a l c o s t p e r o f f e n d e r c a r e e r . H o w e v e r , t h e 
v a l u e o f t h e s o c i a l c o s t p e r o f f e n s e y a n d t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o e a c h 
o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y ( m a l e s v e r s u s f e m a l e s ) d e t e r m i n e s how t h e p r o s e c u t o r 
s h o u l d r e s p o n d a n d i t a l s o d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r o r n o t i n c r e a s i n g t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t w i l l i m p r o v e t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t . I f 
no w e i g h t i s g i v e n t o t h e f e m a l e s u b p o p u l a t i o n , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d 
s e n d t o t r i a l t h e f i r s t o f f e n d e r s i f y > $ 2 4 , 6 0 6 . I f y £ $ 2 4 , 6 0 6 , h o w ­
e v e r , h e s h o u l d s e n d t h o s e o f f e n d e r s who a r e known t o be r e p e a t e r s t o 
t r i a l . I n a d d i t i o n , i f y <_ $ 3 8 5 , 0 0 0 i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t 
b y 10% i n o r d e r t o p r o s e c u t e m o r e o f f e n d e r s r e d u c e s t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l 
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s o c i a l c o s t . 
I f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o women f o r r e d u c i n g 
t h e i r c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t i s i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e p e r c e n t a g e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e c r i m i n a l p o p u l a t i o n o r i f i t i s t h e same f o r 
b o t h o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r i e s , t h e n d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y s e t s r e s u l t . F o r 
e i t h e r w e i g h t d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h e o p t i m a l p o l i c y s t r u c t u r e r e q u i r e s 
t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t b e i n c r e a s e d b y 10% a n d t h a t t h e 
a r r e s t r e c o r d be u s e d t o d i s p o s e o f e a c h d e f e n d a n t a t t h e p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n p o i n t . H o w e v e r , t h e v a l u e o f Y a g a i n d i c t a t e s 
how t h e p r o s e c u t o r i s t o d i s p o s e o f d e f e n d a n t s . F o r e i t h e r w e i g h t 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , w h e n Y i s l o w t h e p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d s e n d t o t r i a l t h o s e 
o f f e n d e r s who h a v e b e e n a r r e s t e d a t l e a s t o n c e b e f o r e . When Y i s 
l a r g e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d a l l o w t h e r e p e a t o f f e n d e r t o n e g o t i a t e 
a g u i l t y p l e a a n d s e n d t o t r i a l t h e f i r s t - o f f e n d e r . T h e t h r e s h o l d 
o f y a t w h i c h t h i s p o l i c y c h a n g e o c c u r s v a r i e s d e p e n d i n g o n t h e 
w e i g h t d i s t r i b u t i o n . I f t h e women a r e w e i g h t e d i n p r o p o r t i o n t o 
t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n t h e t h r e s h o l d 
v a l u e o f y o c c u r s a t $27,285; i f women a r e w e i g h t e d t h e same amoun t 
a s a r e m e n , t h i s t h r e s h o l d o c c u r s a t $36,485. 
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C H A P T E R V I I 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
7 .1 Summary o f R e s u l t s 
T h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s r e s e a r c h w a s t o d e v e l o p a d i s c r e t e e v e n t 
s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e 
s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t i n m o d e l i n g t e c h n o l o g y . I n C h a p t e r I I , t h e e x i s t i n g 
m o d e l s o f t h e C J S w e r e s u r v e y e d i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i n b o t h t h e 
s t r e n g t h s a n d t h e w e a k n e s s e s o f t h e s e e a r l i e r w o r k s , a n d a summary 
o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t w o r k s w e r e t a b u l a t e d . F r o m 
t h i s c o m p i l a t i o n o f m o d e l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i t w a s o b s e r v e d t h a t n o t 
o n e o f t h e s e e a r l i e r m o d e l s p o s s e s s e s a m a j o r i t y o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s 
t h a t a r e l i s t e d . T h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l d e v e l o p e d f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h , 
h o w e v e r , p o s s e s s e s many o f t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . B e c a u s e t h e r e ­
s u l t i n g m o d e l i s a s i m u l a t i o n a s o p p o s e d t o a n a n a l y t i c a l w o r k , i t 
i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d b y t h e i n a b i l i t y t o s o l v e t h e m o r e c o m p l e x 
m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s . T h i s f l e x i b i l i t y i n m o d e l i n g l a r g e - s c a l e 
s y s t e m s i s n o t p u r c h a s e d w i t h o u t a c o s t ; h o w e v e r , t h e m o r e g e n e r a l 
t h e m o d e l t h e g r e a t e r a r e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n c o l l e c t i n g d a t a , i n 
a n a l y z i n g t h e m o d e l ' s o u t p u t , a n d i n c r e a s i n g a u s e r ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n 
o f t h e m o d e l ' s v a l i d i t y a n d i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . 
I n C h a p t e r I I I , a r e s o u r c e - c o n s t r a i n e d e c o n o m i c m o d e l o f p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g w a s e x a m i n e d . A f t e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t s u c h a m o d e l i s 
a d a p t a b l e t o a s i m u l a t i o n , t h e e f f e c t o n p l e a b a r g a i n e d o u t c o m e s 
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w a s p o s t u l a t e d when d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f c a s e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a r e 
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r . T h e e x p e c t e d r e s p o n s e t o s u c h i n f o r ­
m a t i o n w a s f o r m u l a t e d u n d e r t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s p e c i f i c p o l i c y 
d i r e c t i v e s h a d n o t b e e n g i v e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r c o n c e r n i n g how t h e i n ­
f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d be u s e d t o d i s p o s e o f o f f e n d e r s . 
T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d i n 
C h a p t e r I V . T h e GNS m o d e l d e v e l o p e d c o n s i s t s o f t h e f o l l o w i n g 
m a j o r C J S c o m p o n e n t s : p o l i c e , p r o s e c u t i o n a n d c o u r t , c o r r e c t i o n s 
a n d j u v e n i l e j u s t i c e s u b s y s t e m s . Some o f t h e m o d e l ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s 
f o l l o w . 
1 . T h e m o d e l h a s t h e a b i l i t y t o t r a c e t h e c r i m i n a l c a r e e r s 
o f o f f e n d e r s . 
2 . Q u e u e i n g , r e s o u r c e c o n s t r a i n t a n d c o s t i n g e l e m e n t s h e l p 
t o d e s c r i b e C J S o p e r a t i o n s . 
3 . A r e c i d i v i s m m o d e l d e t e r m i n e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y a n d d e l a y 
u n t i l r e - a r r e s t a s a f u n c t i o n o f a n o f f e n d e r ' s s e x , a n d 
o f h i s l a s t o f f e n s e a n d C J S d i s p o s i t i o n . 
4 . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n s o f C J S s u b s y s t e m s a n d t h e e f f e c t s t h a t 
p o l i c y c h a n g e s h a v e o n r e s o u r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d o n s y s t e m 
p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s c a n b e e x p l o r e d . 
5 . A s u f f i c i e n t l y d e t a i l e d C J S s t r u c t u r e a l l o w s t h e 
e x a m i n a t i o n o f a v a r i e t y o f s c e n a r i o s d e a l i n g w i t h 
s u c h a s p e c t s o f C J S p o l i c y a s d e t e r r e n c e , d e t e r m i n i s t i c 
s e n t e n c e s , t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f p a r o l e , a l t e r n a t i v e p r e - t r i a l 
r e l e a s e p r o g r a m s , a n d j u v e n i l e j u s t i c e p o l i c y i n a d d i t i o n 
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t o p l e a b a r g a i n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
T h e m o d e l ' s o u t p u t c o n s i s t s o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t i s t i c s : 
1 . R e s o u r c e u s a g e s t a t i s t i c s 
2 . C J S c o s t e s t i m a t e s 
3 . Q u e u e i n g s t a t i s t i c s 
4 . C a r e e r c r i m i n a l s t a t i s t i c s 
5 . C r i m e a n d r e c i d i v i s m e s t i m a t e s 
I n C h a p t e r V , t h i s m o d e l w a s i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h d a t a c o l l e c t e d 
f r o m r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a g e n c i e s . I n a d d i t i o n , i t w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d 
t h a t a h e u r i s t i c p r o c e d u r e c a n b e u s e d s u c c e s s f u l l y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e 
m o d e l ' s r u n l e n g t h . T h e o u t p u t f r o m s a m p l e r u n s w a s a l s o v a l i d a t e d 
b y s e v e r a l t e s t s w h i c h c o n c e n t r a t e d o n c o m p o n e n t , i n p u t - o u t p u t t r a n s ­
f e r f u n c t i o n , a n d i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y i s s u e s . One t e s t w h i c h t h e 
m o d e l f a i l e d t o p a s s w a s i t s u n d e r s t a t e m e n t o f t h e a v e r a g e number 
o f o f f e n s e s p e r c r i m i n a l c a r e e r . T h i s i n a d e q u a c y w a s e x p l a i n e d a s 
b e i n g d u e i n p a r t t o t h e e x p o n e n t i a l a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e l e n g t h o f t h e 
r e m a i n i n g l i f e t i m e o f o f f e n d e r s . H o w e v e r , t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
a n o t h e r m o d e l o f t h e l i f e o f a c r i m i n a l w a s l e f t a s a t o p i c f o r f u ­
t u r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
I n i n i t i a l i z i n g t h e m o d e l , i t w a s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a 2 . 5 % a n n u a l 
g r o w t h r a t e c a n be u s e d t o c o n s t r a i n t h e c o u r t a n d p r o s e c u t i o n 
r e s o u r c e u s a g e w i t h o u t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t i n g t h e q u e u e i n g b e h a v i o r o f 
t h e s y s t e m o v e r t h e n e x t 35 y e a r s . T h i s r e s u l t s u b s u m e s t h a t t h e 
f i r s t o f f e n d e r a r r e s t r a t e s a r e f o r m u l a t e d a s n o n - s t a t i o n a r y m o d e l s 
w h o s e p a r a m e t e r s c o r r e s p o n d t o D e u t s c h ' s e s t i m a t e s [ 2 4 ] f o r 
L o s A n g e l e s C o u n t y . 
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I n C h a p t e r V I , s e v e r a l p o l i c y s c e n a r i o s w e r e e x a m i n e d u s i n g 
two m e a s u r e s o f t h e s o c i a l c o s t o f c r i m e , t h e t o t a l a n d t h e c a r e e r 
c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t s , i n o r d e r to d e m o n s t r a t e how s u c h a m o d e l 
m i g h t b e u s e d t o a n a l y z e p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h e s o c i a l c o s t 
m e a s u r e s w e r e c h o s e n b e c a u s e o f t h e s t r o n g n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
b e t w e e n r e c i d i v i s m o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d C J S c o s t o n t h e o t h e r . T h u s , 
b y c o m b i n i n g b o t h o f t h e s e m o r e common p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s i n t o 
a m e a s u r e o f t h e s o c i a l c o s t t o s o c i e t y ( e i t h e r t o t a l o r p e r c r i m i ­
n a l c a r e e r ) , a m u c h s i m p l e r o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l o p t i m i z a t i o n p r o b l e m i s 
d e r i v e d . T o c o m p l e m e n t t h i s o p t i m i z a t i o n p r o c e s s , a m e t h o d o f 
e x a m i n i n g t h e s e n s i t i v i t y o f t h e p o l i c y d e c i s i o n t o t h e s i n g l e 
p a r a m e t e r o f t h e s o c i a l c o s t m o d e l w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d . T h i s r e q u i r e d 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n p o i n t s f o r t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f t h e 
c o n v e x s e t d e f i n e d b y t h e s o c i a l c o s t m o d e l s f o r e a c h p o l i c y . 
H a v i n g t h e s e i n t e r s e c t i o n p o i n t s , t h e n , d e f i n e s t h e r a n g e o f t h e 
p a r a m e t e r o v e r w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y i s o p t i m a l . 
A n o t h e r i s s u e a d d r e s s e d i n C h a p t e r V I d e a l s w i t h t h e c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c s o f t h e o f f e n d e r p o p u l a t i o n . S e v e r a l p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s 
w e r e r e p o r t e d f o r m a l e a n d f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s . I t w a s shown t h a t t h e 
c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t a n d r e c i d i v i s m f o r men i s h i g h e r t h a n f o r women. 
H o w e v e r , m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e s u m m a r i z a t i o n o f p e r f o r m a n c e m e a s u r e s 
f o r o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r i e s , t h e o p t i m i z a t i o n o f s o c i a l c o s t s s h o w e d how 
a p p l y i n g d i f f e r e n t i m p o r t a n c e w e i g h t s t o t h e o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r i e s 
c a n p r o d u c e d i f f e r e n t o p t i m a l p o l i c y s e t s , w h e r e a n o p t i m a l p o l i c y 
s e t i s d e f i n e d a s t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s w h i c h a r e 
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o p t i m a l f o r a g i v e n w e i g h t v e c t o r o v e r some r a n g e o f t h e s o c i a l 
c o s t p a r a m e t e r . S i n c e s e v e r a l p o l i c i e s w e r e a l s o shown t o h a v e a 
d i f f e r e n t i m p a c t o n e a c h o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y , s e v e r a l w e i g h t i n g 
f u n c t i o n s w e r e e x a m i n e d . 
R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e w e i g h t v e c t o r s a s s u m e d , t h e m in imum c a r e e r 
c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t w a s o b t a i n e d w h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o r r e s p o n d s t o 
t h e number o f p r e v i o u s a r r e s t s o f e a c h o f f e n d e r . H o w e v e r , t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e w e i g h t f o r e a c h s e x d i c t a t e d t h e r a n g e o f t h e s o c i a l c o s t 
p e r c r i m e o v e r w h i c h e a c h p o l i c y w a s o p t i m a l a n d w h e t h e r o r n o t 
a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o r e d u c e t h e 
c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s o c i a l c o s t o f a p o l i c y . T h e r e s u l t s f o r e a c h 
w e i g h t v e c t o r u s e d showed t h a t , i f t h e s o c i a l c o s t p e r c r i m e w a s 
l o w , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d t r y t o s e n d t o t r i a l a l l o f f e n d e r s who 
h a v e b e e n a r r e s t e d a t l e a s t o n c e b e f o r e . I f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e 
s o c i a l c o s t p e r c r i m e i s h i g h , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s h o u l d a l l o w r e c i d i v i s t s 
t o p l e a d g u i l t y w h i l e s e n d i n g f i r s t o f f e n d e r s t o t r i a l w h e n e v e r 
p o s s i b l e . 
7 . 2 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r F u r t h e r R e s e a r c h 
T h e s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l w h i c h i s a p r o d u c t o f t h i s r e s e a r c h c a n 
b e u s e d t o a d d r e s s a w i d e r a n g e o f C J S p o l i c y a r e a s . H o w e v e r , b e f o r e 
a n y f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i v e e x p e r i m e n t a l e f f o r t s a r e m a d e , a d d i t i o n a l 
w o r k o n t h e m o d e l i t s e l f I s s u g g e s t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e f o l l o w i n g 
a r e a s m i g h t b e c o n s i d e r e d : 
1 . T h e c o s t m o d e l c a n b e e x p a n d e d t o i n c l u d e a n n u a l f i x e d 
c o s t s f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o c e s s o r s ; 
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2 . T h e r e s o u r c e m o d e l m i g h t b e e x p a n d e d t o i n c l u d e 
a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e t y p e s s o t h a t a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e 
e x i s t s b e t w e e n a s e r v e r i n t h e m o d e l a n d a n a c t u a l s e r v e r ; 
3 . T h e m o d e l o f t h e l i f e t i m e o f a n o f f e n d e r s h o u l d be 
r e - f o r m u l a t e d i n o r d e r f o r t h e number o f a r r e s t s p e r 
o f f e n d e r t o c o m p a r e m o r e f a v o r a b l y w i t h t h o s e 
d e v e l o p e d b y t h e F B I [ 2 9 ] ; 
4 . A m o d e l o f d e t e r r e n c e i s m i s s i n g f r o m t h e c u r r e n t s i m u ­
l a t i o n w h i l e a n y i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a c t u a l p o l i c y a l t e r ­
n a t i v e s s h o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e s u c h a s p e c t s i n t o t h e e x ­
p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n ; 
5 . F u r t h e r e n h a n c e m e n t o f t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n 
f u n c t i o n s s h o u l d b e b a s e d u p o n a b e t t e r s t u d i e d m o d e l t h a n 
t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n f u n c t i o n s d e v e l o p e d i n C h a p t e r V I , 
a l t h o u g h t h e p l e a b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f s h o u l d 
n o t n e e d r e v i s i o n . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a b o v e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , b e c a u s e t h e t i m e t o 
e x e c u t e t h i s m o d e l i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y two CPU h o u r s o n a CDC C y b e r 7 4 , 
w a y s t o r e d u c e t h e e x e c u t i o n t i m e s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d . Two w o r k a b l e 
s u g g e s t i o n s a r e t h a t some o f t h e d e t a i l i n t h e m o d e l b e a g g r e g a t e d 
i n t h o s e s u b s y s t e m s i n w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r s t u d y d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h i s 
l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n . A n o t h e r p o t e n t i a l r e m e d y f o r t h e c o s t o f 
e x e c u t i n g t h i s m o d e l i s t o u s e a s c a l i n g f a c t o r f o r t h e v i r g i n 
a r r e s t r a t e s . F u r t h e r e f f o r t s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d d e t e r m i n i n g 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n p e r f o r m a n c e l e v e l s o f t h e s c a l e d v e r s i o n a n d t h e 
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f u l l s i z e s y s t e m . H o w e v e r , i t w a s n o t e d i n C h a p t e r V t h a t 
s c a l i n g down t h e f o r e c a s t s d i d n o t p r o d u c e a n y o b s e r v a b l e c h a n g e 
i n t h e s h a p e o f t h e t i m e h i s t o r i e s p r o d u c e d b y t h e m o d e l . S i n c e 
s c a l i n g t h e i n p u t s t r e a m t o r e d u c e t h e e x e c u t i o n t i m e r e q u i r e m e n t s 
a l s o s h o r t e n s t h e l e n g t h o f t h e q u e u e i n g l i s t s , f o r e c a s t 
s c a l i n g w o u l d b e a n e x c e l l e n t way t o d e c r e a s e c o m p u t e r e x e c u t i o n 
c o s t s a n d s t o r a g e n e e d s f o r t h i s m o d e l . 
A P P E N D I X A 
I N P U T D E S C R I P T I O N 
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A P P E N D I X A 
I N P U T D E S C R I P T I O N 
T h r e e t y p e s o f i n p u t s a r e r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s GNS m o d e l o f 
t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m : 
1. GNS - r e q u i r e d d a t a 
2. C J S - s p e c i f i c d a t a 
3 . A v i r g i n a r r e s t e e f o r e c a s t i n g f u n c t i o n 
GNS I n p u t s 
T h e f i r s t c a t e g o r y i s t h e d a t a r e q u i r e d t o i m p l e m e n t t h e 
m o d e l u s i n g G N S . T h a t i s , d a t a s p e c i f y i n g t h e m o d e l ' s s t r u c t u r e , 
t h e GNS f a c i l i t i e s t o b e u s e d , a n d t h e s t a t i s t i c s t o b e c o l l e c t e d 
f o r t h e m o d e l ' s o u t p u t a l l b e l o n g t o t h i s f i r s t c a t e g o r y . T h u s , 
t h i s d a t a p r e p a r e s t h e G e n e r a l i z e d N e t w o r k S i m u l a t o r f o r t h e s p e c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e C J S m o d e l a n d t h e s u b r o u t i n e s , w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e 
t h i s s t r u c t u r e , g i v e n i n A p p e n d i x D . S i n c e t h e s e p a r a m e t e r s do 
n o t c h a n g e t h r o u g h o u t t h e e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , t h e a c t u a l d a t a u s e d i s 
d i s p l a y e d i n A p p e n d i x B w h i l e t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e v a r i a b l e s may 
b e f o u n d i n t h e GNS R e f e r e n c e M a n u a l [ 3 6 ] . 
T h e s e c o n d t y p e o f i n p u t r e q u i r e d i s s p e c i f i c t o t h i s m o d e l 
o f t h e C J S , a n d i t i s f e d t o t h e m o d e l u s i n g t h e FORTRAN m a c r o 
n a m e l i s t . T h e r e a r e t e n n a m e l i s t v a r i a b l e s i n u s e . F o l l o w i n g i s 
a d e s c r i p t i o n o f e a c h n a m e l i s t ( i n t h e o r d e r t h a t e a c h m u s t a p p e a r 
C J S I n p u t s 
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i n t h e i n p u t f i l e ) . S a m p l e d a t a i s shown i n A p p e n d i x B . 
PARAM N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t p o s s e s s e s t h e b a s i c p a r a m e t e r s o f t h e m o d e l o f 
t h e C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e S y s t e m . 
ADULT i s t h e a g e a t w h i c h a n o f f e n d e r i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be a n 
a d u l t . 
DUMP i s a l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e . I f i t i s t r u e , t h e i n p u t d a t a i s 
e c h o e d b e f o r e t h e s i m u l a t i o n b e g i n s . 
I C C C i s t h e d i v i s o r w h i c h r e d u c e s t h e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l c o s t 
s t a t i s t i c t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e p r i n t i n g o f a h i s t o g r a m 
( s e e a l s o M I C C C ) . 
MBEGIN i s t h e number o f t h e m o n t h i n w h i c h t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
b u d g e t i s c h a n g e d , a n d i t i s a l s o t h e m o n t h i n w h i c h 
a m a n a g e m e n t i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m ( s e e M I S ) b e c o m e s 
a v a i l a b l e f o r t r a c k i n g r e c i d i v i s t s . 
M E H I S i s a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p a r a m e t e r . I t i s s e t t o 1 i f e a c h 
o f f e n d e r ' s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y a f f e c t s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
f i r s t d e c i s i o n , 2 i f i t a f f e c t s t h e s e c o n d d e c i s i o n , 3 
i f i t a f f e c t s b o t h d e c i s i o n s , a n d 0 o t h e r w i s e . 
MEQUE i s a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p a r a m e t e r . I f t h e c u r r e n t s i z e o f 
t h e p r e - t r i a l q u e u e r e l a t i v e t o a b a s e v a l u e ( s e e S I N I T Q ) 
a f f e c t s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n , t h e n MEQUE = 1 ; 
i f o n l y t h e s e c o n d d e c i s i o n , MEQUE = 2 ; b o t h d e c i s i o n s , 
MEQUE = 3 , O t h e r w i s e , MEQUE = 0 . 
MERES i s a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p a r a m e t e r w h i c h i s 1 i f t h e p r o s e ­
c u t o r ' s f i r s t d e c i s i o n i s a f f e c t e d b y i n c r e a s e s i n h i s 
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b u d g e t , 2 i f h i s s e c o n d d e c i s i o n i s a f f e c t e d , 3 i f b o t h 
a r e a f f e c t e d , o r 0 i f n e i t h e r . ( S e e a l s o P R G . ) 
i s a p l e a b a r g a i n i n g p a r a m e t e r w h i c h i s 1 i f t h e s e v e r i t y 
o f e a c h o f f e n d e r ' s l a t e s t o f f e n s e a f f e c t s t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
f i r s t d e c i s i o n , 2 f o r t h e s e c o n d d e c i s i o n , 3 f o r b o t h , o r 
0 f o r n e i t h e r . 
i s t h e number o f b a r s r e s e r v e d f o r t h e h i s t o g r a m o f c a r e e r 
c o s t . 
i s t h e c o s t p e r o f f e n d e r p e r d a y o f m a i n t a i n i n g a m a n a g e m e n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m w h i c h i s u s e d t o t r a c k r e c i d i v i s t s , 
i s t h e number o f f i n a l c h a r g e s a v a i l a b l e f o r c o n v i c t i n g a 
d e f e n d a n t i n t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t . 
i s t h e number o f c r i m e c a t e g o r i e s ( i n i t i a l c h a r g e s ) e x a m i n e d 
i s t h e number o f c o r r e c t i o n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
s u p e r i o r a n d c r i m i n a l c o u r t s . N D I S P d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
m e a n t h e number o f s e p a r a t e f a c i l i t i e s , s i n c e f o r e x a m p l e 
e a c h s e x may b e a s s i g n e d t o a d i f f e r e n t f a c i l i t y f o r t h e 
same d i s p o s i t i o n ( e . g . , p r i s o n ) . 
i s t h e number o f t i m e s n a m e l i s t F L O U T i s i n p u t . 
i s t h e number o f d e m o g r a p h i c c a t e g o r i e s o f o f f e n d e r s b e i n g 
s i m u l a t e d . 
i s t h e n u m b e r o f t i m e s n a m e l i s t S T I M E i s i n p u t , 
i s t h e number o f c o r r e c t i o n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 
s u p e r i o r a n d c r i m i n a l c o u r t s w h i c h r e q u i r e a p e r i o d o f 
s u p e r v i s i o n b y t h e C J S . 
i s t h e p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s b u d g e t t h a t 
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o c c u r s a t t i m e MBEGIN i f M E R E S > 0 . ( I t i s e x p r e s s e d a s a 
d e c i m a l f r a c t i o n . ) 
RGROW i s a v e c t o r w h o s e e l e m e n t s a r e t h e g r o w t h r a t e s f o r e a c h 
o f t h e C J S r e s o u r c e s . ( E x p r e s s e d a s d e c i m a l f r a c t i o n s . ) 
R T I M E i s t h e number o f y e a r s f o l l o w i n g T I N I T L d u r i n g w h i c h C J S 
r e s o u r c e s t a t i s t i c s a r e c o l l e c t e d . 
S I N I T Q i s t h e b a s e l i n e v a l u e o f t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t ' s p r e - t r i a l 
q u e u e ( B o x e s 3 7 , 3 9 ) l e n g t h w h i c h i s u s e d t o a f f e c t t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s p l e a b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s . 
T R A C E F i s a l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e t h a t , when t r u e , c a u s e s t h e f o r e c a s t s 
o f t h e v i r g i n a r r e s t r a t e s f o r e a c h c r i m e t o b e p r i n t e d f o r 
e a c h s i m u l a t e d m o n t h . 
T S T O P i s t h e number o f y e a r s ( r u n l e n g t h ) t o b e s i m u l a t e d d u r i n g 
t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l e p o c h . 
T I N I T L i s t h e number o f y e a r s r e q u i r e d t o i n i t i a l i z e t h e m o d e l . 
O F F E N D E R N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t i s r e p e a t e d NOC t i m e s , o n c e f o r e a c h d e m o g r a p h i c 
c a t e g o r y b e i n g s i m u l a t e d . T h e p u r p o s e o f e a c h r e p e t i t i o n i s t o 
d e s c r i b e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f e a c h o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y . T h e n u m b e r 
o f d e m o g r a p h i c c a t e g o r i e s m u s t a l w a y s be a m u l t i p l e o f t w o . T h e o d d 
n u m b e r e d c a t e g o r i e s m u s t d e s c r i b e m a l e o f f e n d e r s ; t h e e v e n n u m b e r e d 
c a t e g o r i e s m u s t d e s c r i b e f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s . T h e f o l l o w i n g a r e v e c t o r s 
w h o s e e l e m e n t s c o r r e s p o n d t o e a c h o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e s : 
A B A R i s t h e a v e r a g e a g e o f f i r s t a r r e s t f o r t h e o f f e n d e r s i n 
e a c h c a t e g o r y . 
AMAX i s t h e maximum r e c o r d e d a g e a t w h i c h a n o f f e n d e r i s 
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a r r e s t e d . 
AMIN i s t h e m in imum r e c o r d e d a g e a t w h i c h a f i r s t - o f f e n d e r i s 
a r r e s t e d . 
A S D i s t h e s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n o f t h e f i r s t a r r e s t a g e f o r e a c h 
o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e s . 
CAT i s t h e o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y n u m b e r . CAT = 1 , 2 , . . . , N 0 C . 
P P O P r e p r e s e n t s t h e p e r c e n t a g e ( d e c i m a l ) o f t h e v i r g i n a r r e s t 
p o p u l a t i o n t h a t c o m m i t s e a c h o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e s a n d 
t h a t i s a l s o a member o f t h e a s s o c i a t e d o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r y . 
H e n c e , summing PPOP o v e r a l l NOC o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r i e s f o r 
a n y s i n g l e o f f e n s e y i e l d s o n e . 
S T I M E N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t i s a l s o r e p e a t e d s e v e r a l t i m e s ( s e e N S B O X ) . I t s 
p u r p o s e i s t o d e s c r i b e t h e s e r v i c e t i m e s w h i c h v a r y b y c r i m e t y p e 
f o r e a c h q u e u e b o x i n t h e n e t w o r k . E a c h b o x m u s t a l s o be l i s t e d 
a s a s t a r t c o n t r o l b o x i n t h e GNS n e t w o r k d e s c r i p t i o n . ( T h a t i s , 
S T A R T C = T R U E . ) 
I D i s t h e q u e u e b o x number a s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e n e t w o r k 
d i a g r a m a n d a s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e BOX n a m e l i s t o f t h e GNS 
i n p u t d a t a . 
T B A R i s a v e c t o r o f s e r v i c e t i m e s f o r t h e q u e u e b o x i d e n t i f i e d 
a s I D . E a c h e l e m e n t i n T B A R i s t h e a v e r a g e number o f d a y s 
r e q u i r e d t o s e r v i c e a n o f f e n d e r who c o m m i t s o n e o f t h e 
N C R I M E o f f e n s e t y p e s . E x p o n e n t i a l s e r v i c e d i s t r i b u t i o n s 
a r e a l w a y s a s s u m e d . 
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FLOUT N a m e l i s t 
T h e n a m e l i s t F L O U T i s u s e d t o i n p u t c r i m e - s p e c i f i c b r a n c h i n g 
r a t i o s f o r NEBOX o f t h e e n d c o n t r o l b o x e s i n t h e GNS i n p u t d a t a 
(ENDC = T R U E ) . 
A R C i s a n a r r a y o f b r a n c h i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s . F o r e a c h a r c 
i d e n t i f i e d i n I D A R C S , b r a n c h i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s m u s t be 
i m p u t f o r e a c h o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e t y p e s . F o r s i m p l i c i t y , 
e a c h r o w o f t h i s m a t r i x s h o u l d b e r e s e r v e d f o r o n l y one 
a r c , a n d i t s h o u l d c o n t a i n N C R I M E e l e m e n t s . 
I D i s t h e number o f t h e b o x w h o s e o u t p u t a r c s a r e d e s c r i b e d 
b y t h i s n a m e l i s t . 
I D A R C S i s t h e number o f t h e s u c c e s s o r b o x e s t o w h i c h t h e s e 
o u t p u t a r c s a r e d i r e c t e d . E a c h v a l u e m u s t c o r r e s p o n d i n 
t h e p r e c i s e o r d e r t o t h o s e b o x e s l i s t e d a s s u c c e s s o r s o f 
I D i n t h e GNS i n p u t d a t a ( T h a t i s , I D A R C S ( i ) = I F O L L ( i ) 
f o r i = 1 , . . . , N A R C ) . 
NARC i s t h e number o f a r c s e m a n a t i n g f r o m b o x I D . 
C R I M E S N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t c o n s i s t s o f s e v e r a l a r r a y s w h i c h d e s c r i b e 
c r i m e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n . 
A J A I L i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a n a d u l t a r r e s t e e i s d e t a i n e d 
( j a i l e d ) by t h e C J S b e f o r e t r i a l . T h e r e e x i s t N C R I M E e l e m e n t s 
f o r t h i s v e c t o r . 
ANO i s t h e a v e r a g e number o f a r r e s t s i n a n o f f e n d e r ' s c a r e e r , 
g i v e n t h a t h i s l a t e s t o f f e n s e i s o n e o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e 
t y p e s . 
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C J A I L i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a n a d u l t o f f e n d e r , who i s d e t a i n e d 
b y t h e C J S b e f o r e h i s t r i a l , i s s t i l l u n d e r i t s c u s t o d y a t 
t h e t i m e o f h i s t r i a l . NCRIME p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e i n p u t . 
S E V E R E i s a v e c t o r w h i c h c o n t a i n s m e a s u r e s o f t h e r e l a t i v e s e ­
v e r i t y o f e a c h o f t h e NCRIME o f f e n s e c a t e g o r i e s . 
S W I T C H i s t h e c r i m e - s w i t c h m a t r i x . I t i s a n N C R I M E - b y - N C R I M E a r r a y 
o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s w h i c h p r e d i c t s , b a s e d o n t h e l a t e s t c r i m e 
f o r w h i c h t h e o f f e n d e r i s a r r e s t e d , t h e c r i m e t y p e i f t h e 
o f f e n d e r i s a r r e s t e d a g a i n . T h e r o w s o f t h e m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t 
t h e o f f e n s e a n d t h e c o l u m n s t h e s u b s e q u e n t o r p r e d i c t e d o f f e n s e . 
Y J A I L i s a n N C R I M E - e l e m e n t v e c t o r o f t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t a 
j u v e n i l e o f f e n d e r w i l l b e d e t a i n e d b y t h e C J S b e g i n n i n g 
w i t h t h e j u v e n i l e i n t a k e h e a r i n g a n d e n d i n g a t t h e 
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e j u v e n i l e c o u r t ' s h e a r i n g . 
P L E A N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e m a t r i c e s w h i c h d e a l w i t h p l e a 
b a r g a i n i n g . 
BARGAN i s a n a r r a y o f p r o b a b i l i t i e s w h i c h p r e d i c t s t h e c o n v i c t i o n 
c h a r g e b a s e d u p o n t h e o f f e n s e c a t e g o r y u n d e r w h i c h t h e 
o f f e n d e r w a s l a s t a r r e s t e d . E a c h o f t h e NCHARG r o w s o f 
t h e m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t s one o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s , w h i l e 
e a c h c o l u m n r e p r e s e n t s o n e o f t h e NCRIME c r i m e c a t e g o r i e s . 
P D I S P i s a n a r r a y o f s e n t e n c i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s . E a c h row o f t h i s 
m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t s o n e o f t h e N D I S P s e n t e n c i n g d i s p o s i t i o n s 
o f t h e c o u r t s . E a c h row m u s t c o n t a i n 15 e l e m e n t s , t h e 
f i r s t NCHARG o f w h i c h a r e t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t o f f e n d e r s 
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w h o s e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s a r e g i v e n a r e s e n t e n c e d t o t h e 
r e s p e c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n . T h e l a s t ( 1 5 - N C H A R G ) e l e m e n t s 
o f e a c h r o w m u s t b e z e r o e s . 
P S D U R i s a n a r r a y o f s e n t e n c e l e n g t h s f o r t h e N S D I S P d i s p o s i t i o n s 
w h i c h r e q u i r e C J S m o n i t o r i n g o f a n o f f e n d e r . E a c h r o w o f 
t h i s m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t s o n e o f t h e s e d i s p o s i t i o n s , a n d 
i t m u s t c o n t a i n 15 e l e m e n t s . T h e f i r s t NCHARG e l e m e n t s 
o f a r o w a r e t h e s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n s ( i n d a y s ) c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n c h a r g e s . T h e r e m a i n i n g e l e m e n t s o f e a c h 
r o w m u s t be z e r o e s . 
COURT N a m e l i s t 
T h e COURT n a m e l i s t c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e m a t r i c e s t h a t p r e d i c t 
t h e c o n v i c t i o n a n d s e n t e n c i n g s t a t e s o f o f f e n d e r s w h o s e c a s e s a r e 
t r i e d b e f o r e a j u s t i c e o f t h e s u p e r i o r c o u r t . 
C O N V I C i s a m a t r i x o f c o n v i c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s w h i c h i s c o n s t r u c t e d 
e x a c t l y l i k e BARGAN f r o m t h e P L E A n a m e l i s t . 
T D I S P i s a n N D I S P - b y - 1 5 m a t r i x c o m p o s e d o f s e n t e n c i n g p r o b a b i l i ­
t i e s f o r t h e N D I S P d i s p o s i t i o n s . T h i s m a t r i x i s c o n s t r u c t e d 
l i k e P D I S P f r o m n a m e l i s t P L E A . 
T S D U R i s a n m a t r i x o f s e n t e n c e l e n g t h s ( i n d a y s ) o f t h o s e 
d i s p o s i t i o n s w h i c h r e q u i r e C J S m o n i t o r i n g . T h i s m a t r i x i s 
i n p u t e x a c t l y l i k e P S D U R . 
L C O U R T N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t c o n s i s t s o f two m a t r i c e s w h i c h d e s c r i b e t h e 
s e n t e n c i n g s t a t e s o f t h e l o w e r ( c r i m i n a l ) c o u r t . 
D I S P L i s c o m p o s e d o f t h e s e n t e n c e p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r t h e N D I S P 
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(a) An AR(1) Transient with e = 1 
(l-.80B)ut = fijSj 
(b) An AR(1) Transient with e = 1 
(l + .80B)ut = 6^1 
(c) An AR(2) Transient with e= 1: 
(1-.80B + .40B 2)u t = 6 
g=95 
g=2.261 
(d) An MA(1) Transient with e = 1 
u t = (l + .SOB^Sl 
0 
(e) An MA(2) Transient with e= 1: 
= (1 + .80B + .40B2) 6 Sj 
L X L 
(F) An ARMA(1,1) Transient with 
e-l: x 
(1-.80B) = (1+.80B)61St 
Figure 12. Examples of Transient Mean Functions for Stationary 
Initially Relaxed Time Series Models with e = 1 
2 1 4 
d i s p o s i t i o n s . S i n c e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s a r e i g n o r e d i n 
t h e l o w e r c o u r t , t h i s m a t r i x i s s t r u c t u r e d e x a c t l y l i k e 
T D T S P w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t t h e s e v e n c o l u m n s r e p r e s e n t 
t h e c r i m e l a b e l s i n s t e a d o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s . I f 
N C R I M E i s l e s s t h a n s e v e n , t h e n t h e f i n a l ( 7 - N C R I M E ) 
c o l u m n s a r e a l l z e r o - f i l l e d . 
S D U R L i s t h e s e n t e n c e d u r a t i o n i n d a y s f o r e a c h N S D I S P d i s p o s i t i o n 
w h i c h r e q u i r e s C J S m o n i t o r i n g . E a c h row r e p r e s e n t s o n e 
o f t h e s e d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e f i r s t NCRIME e l e m e n t s o f 
t h e row a r e c o m p o s e d o f s e n t e n c e l e n g t h s f o r t h e c r i m e 
c a t e g o r i e s . A l l o t h e r e l e m e n t s o f t h e m a t r i x a r e z e r o . 
P A R O L E N a m e l i s t 
W i t h t h e i s s u e o f p r i s o n e r p a r o l e c u r r e n t l y u n d e r s c r u t i n y , 
t h e p a r o l e m o d e l m u s t be w e l l d e v e l o p e d . T h i s n a m e l i s t i n p u t s t h e 
n e c e s s a r y c h a r g e - s p e c i f i c p a r o l e d a t a . 
DPAROL i s a v e c t o r , t h e f i r s t NCHARG e l e m e n t s o f w h i c h a r e t h e 
a v e r a g e number o f d a y s t h a t a n o f f e n d e r c o n v i c t e d o f o n e 
o f t h e f i n a l c o n v i c t i o n l a b e l s i s o n p a r o l e . T h e 
r e m a i n i n g ( 1 5 - N C H A R G ) e l e m e n t s a r e z e r o . 
P R I S O N P i s a v e c t o r r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p r i s o n 
s e n t e n c e t h a t f e m a l e o f f e n d e r s a c t u a l l y s e r v e b e f o r e t h e i r 
r e l e a s e o n p a r o l e . T h e l a s t ( 1 5 - N C H A R G ) e l e m e n t s o f t h e 
v e c t o r a r e z e r o . 
P R I S O N M i s a v e c t o r r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e s e n t e n c e 
t h a t a m a l e p r i s o n e r a c t u a l l y s e r v e s b e f o r e h i s r e l e a s e 
o n p a r o l e . T h e f i n a l ( 1 5 - N C H A R G ) e l e m e n t s o f t h e v e c t o r 
2 1 5 
a r e z e r o . 
P V I O L i s a v e c t o r r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a p a r o l e 
v i o l a t i o n w h i c h r e s u l t s i n t h e o f f e n d e r ' s r e t u r n t o 
p r i s o n . T h e f i n a l ( 1 5 - N C H A R G ) e l e m e n t s a r e z e r o . 
R E C L D N a m e l i s t 
T h i s n a m e l i s t s e r v e s t o i n p u t t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f r e c i d i v i s m 
a n d t h e d e l a y s b e t w e e n a n o f f e n d e r ' s r e l e a s e f r o m t h e C J S a n d h i s 
s u b s e q u e n t r e - a r r e s t . T h e r e - a r r e s t p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e b a s e d u p o n 
t h e a g e a n d s e x o f t h e o f f e n d e r , w h i l e t h e d e l a y s a r e b a s e d u p o n h i s 
a g e a n d u p o n t h e t y p e o f C J S d i s p o s i t i o n . T h e a c t u a l a g e o f a n 
o f f e n d e r , A G E , i s g r o u p e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f o l l o w i n g a l g o r i t h m : 
T h u s , o n l y s e v e n a g e c a t e g o r i e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d . E a c h o f t h e f o l l o w ­
i n g i n p u t v a r i a b l e s a r e v e c t o r s ; e a c h e l e m e n t i n a v e c t o r c o r r e s p o n d s 
t o a p a r t i c u l a r a g e c a t e g o r y . 
I A G E = A G E / 5 . - 2 
I E ( I A G E . L E . O ) I A G E = 1 
I F ( I A G E . G E . 7 ) I A G E = I A G E - 1 
I F ( I A G E . G E . 8 ) I A G E = 7 
D E L D I S i s t h e d e l a y ( i n d a y s ) u n t i l r e - a r r e s t o f t h o s e o f f e n d e r s 
w h o s e c a s e s a r e d i s m i s s e d o r who a r e t h e m s e l v e s a c q u i t t e d 
o f a l l c h a r g e s . 
D E L F I i s t h e d e l a y ( i n d a y s ) u n t i l r e - a r r e s t o f t h o s e o f f e n d e r s 
who a r e f i n e d . 
D E L P A R i s t h e d e l a y ( i n d a y s ) u n t i l a n o f f e n d e r who s u c c e s s f u l l y 
c o m p l e t e s p a r o l e i s r e - a r r e s t e d . 
D E L P R I i s t h e d e l a y ( i n d a y s ) u n t i l t h e r e - a r r e s t o f a n o f f e n d e r 
who i s r e l e a s e d f r o m p r i s o n . 
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D E L P R O i s t h e d e l a y ( i n d a y s ) u n t i l t h e r e - a r r e s t o f a n o f f e n d e r 
who i s e i t h e r s e n t e n c e d t o a p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d o r who 
r e c e i v e s a s u s p e n d e d s e n t e n c e . 
P R O B F i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a woman w i l l b e r e - a r r e s t e d . 
PROBM i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a man w i l l be r e - a r r e s t e d . 
F o r e c a s t i n g F u n c t i o n 
T h e t h i r d a n d f i n a l i n p u t f o r t h i s GNS m o d e l o f t h e C r i m i n a l 
J u s t i c e S y s t e m i s a f o r e c a s t i n g f u n c t i o n w h i c h p r e d i c t s t h e number 
o f v i r g i n a r r e s t s f o r e a c h s i m u l a t e d m o n t h a n d c r i m e . T h e f o l l o w i n g 
r e q u i r e m e n t s e x i s t f o r t h i s f u n c t i o n : 
1 . T h e name o f t h e f u n c t i o n m u s t b e F O R C A S T 
2 . T h e i n p u t p a r a m e t e r s a r e 
a . T h e f o r e c a s t m o n t h 
MONTH = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . , 1 2 ( T S T 0 P - T I N I T L + 1 ) 
b . T h e c r i m e c a t e g o r y 
I C R I M E = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . , N C R I M E 
3 . T h e o u t p u t o f t h e f u n c t i o n i s t h e n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s 
a r r e s t e d d u r i n g MONTH f o r I C R I M E who h a v e n e v e r b e f o r e 
b e e n a r r e s t e d . 
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GNS D a t a 
SRUN I 0 R U N = 1 , MENTRY=6M»0, N A T R I B = 6 , H B 0 X * 5 7 , NB0X=<»9, 
N E T R L = 9 . E 5 , NOPREM=.TRUE.• 
NTRACE s O• KARD sO t NODIAG=#TRUE,, NOOMP=*TRUE«• N S I N K = 6 , N S 0 U R = 1 , 
R E S C = , T R U E # , M R E S = 1 0 , H H R E S s l t t 
Q J E = . T R U E , , NQB0X*2<», I P R T Y = 2 , 
C O S T - . T R U E . t I R A T E = 0 , I S T U P = 0 , NGRP*7, 
U T I M E = 0 . , U I N = . T R U E . , UOUT=.TRUE#, U S T C = . T R U E # , U E N C = . T R U E . , 
SEND 
S R E S I N HAXL= 2<t, 9 9 9 9 9 , 3 , 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 , 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 , 9 9 9 9 9 , 99999 t 
KOST= % 2 5 , % 0 1 0 , 1 5 5 f t 3 3 6 , K7kt 1 8 3 , 2 8 , 1 8 . 1 * 5 . 5M»t 
SEND 
SBOX I D - I t ENDC=#TRUE. , N F R L = 8 , N P * L * 1 , O U R = 3 0 . . I F O L L = l , SEND 
SBOX I D = 2 . E N 0 C = # T R U E , , N P R L = 1 , I P O L L = 4 . 5 . D U R = 0 . , $ENO 
SBOX I D = 3 , S I N K s . T R U E . t S T A R T C - . T R U E * t N P R L = 1 , D U R = 0 . . SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 . . STARTC=#TRUE«, N P R L = 1 , I F 0 L L = 2 8 , O U R = 0 . . SENO 
SBOX 1 0 = 5 . QBOXs .TRUE. t N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R = 0 , 1 , S T A R T C = . T R U E . . 
ENDC=.TRUE#, OUR=0 . . I F 0 L L = 8 . 2 l . J 6 R P = 1 . SENO 
SBOX 1 0 = 7 . S I N I O . T R U E . , S T A R T C = * T R U E , • N P R L - l t DUR=0#, SEND 
SBOX I D = 8 , Q B O X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R = 0 , S , 8 . 1 . 0 . 
I F 0 L L = 9 . 2 3 . 5 2 , STARTC=»TRUE#• ENDC=#TRUE. , D U R = 0 . . J G R P = 2 . SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 9 , Q B O X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , NSERtf=9«E5 , I F 0 L L = 1 2 . 1 3 . 1 1 . . 1 5 . 2 3 . 5 2 . 
L R = 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 . S T A R T C - . T R U E . t E N D C = . T R U E . , D U R = 0 . , J G R P = 2 . SEND 
SBOX I D = 1 0 . QBOX=«TRUE# t N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R * 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 8 , 1 , 
I T Y P E * 1 2 , J G R P » 7 , SENO 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 2 , Q B 0 X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 * E 5 , N S E R V = 9 # E 5 , L R = 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 . 0 , 0 , 
S T A R T C * * T R U E * . E N O C = . T R U E . , OUR=0. , J G R P = 3 » I F 0 L L = 5 3 . SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 3 , Q B O X = . T R U E . , M P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R Y = 9 . E 5 , L R = 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
S T A R T C = . T R U E . , E N D C = . T R U E . . O U R = 0 . . J G R P = 3 , I F 0 L L = 5 3 , SEND 
SBOX I D = 1 < . , Q B O X = . T R U E . , N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R = 0 , 0 , 0 , 8 , 0 . 1 , 8 . 8 . 8 . 
STARTC=»TRUE*, E N D C = . T R U E . , OUR=0. , J G R P = 3 . I F 0 L L = 5 3 . SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 5 . Q B O X - . T R U E . , N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 . E 5 . L R = 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . I . 0 . 0 . 0 , 
STARTC=«TRUE*, ENDC=,TRUE*» OUR*(U, J G R P = 3 , I F 0 L L = 5 3 , SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 8 , S I N K = . T R U E . , S T A R T C = . T R U E • . N P R L = 1 . D U R = 0 . , SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 1 9 , QBOX=,TRUE«, N P R L = 9 # E 5 , N S E R V = 9 , E 5 , X F O L L = 2 0 , S T A R T C = , T R U E , , 
OUR=0«. SENO 
SBOX 1 0 = 2 0 . S T A R T C = . T R U E . . E N C C » . T R U E . , N P R L * 1 . I F 0 L L = 4 , 5 , OUR=0«, SENO 
SBOX 1 0 = 2 1 , QBOX=*TRUE», N P R L = 9 * E 5 , N S E R V = 9 « E 5 , L R = 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , I F 0 L L * 2 3 . 
STARTC=«TRUE*, O U R = 0 . , J G R P = * , SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 2 2 . Q B O X = . T R U E . , N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 * E 5 , L R = 8 , 8 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 
I T T P E = 1 2 , J G R P = 7 . SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 2 3 , Q B O X = , T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 , E 5 , L R = 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 
S T A R T C = « T R U E , , ENOC=,TRUE«, I F 0 L L = 2 5 . 2 8 . 5 % . D U R = 0 . . J G R P = % , SEND 
SBOX 1 0 = 2 5 , QBOX=.TRUE«, N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R = 0 . 0 . 8 , 1 , 8 , 0 , 0 , 8 , 0 , 1 , 
STARTC=*TRUE«, E N O C = , T R U E . , OUR=0 . , I F O L L * 2 6 , < . 0 , < . 1 , 1 . 2 , * 3 5 0 , 5 1 , 
J G R P = 5 . SEND 
SBOX I D = 2 b . Q 8 0 X = , T R U E . . N P R L = 9 * E 5 , N S E R V = 9 # E 5 , L R » 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
X F O L L = 5 7 , STARTC=*TRUE«, E N D C * , T R U E . , DUR*0« , J G R P * 6 , SEND 





























I D = 2 7 . S I N K = . T R U E . t STARTC S « T R U E • . N P R L ' l t O U R = 0 . . SENO 
I D * 2 8 . Q B O X = . T R U E . , N P R L = 9 « E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 t L R * 1 # 0 . 8 . 0 . 1 . • . 0 . 1 . 0 . 0 , 
I F O L L = 2 9 . 3 l ) . STARTC=.TRUE» . ENOC=.TRU£«t OUR*Q«, J G R P = * . SEND 
I D = 2 9 . E N O C - . T R U E . t D U R « 0 . . N P R L * 1 , I F 0 L L « 5 % , SEND 
I D = 3 0 , E N D C * . T R U E . , D U R = 1 , . NPRL*1» I F O L L * 3 1 . 3 2 . SEND 
I D = 3 i , E N D C S . T R U E . , D U R M . t NPRL*l t IFOLL*5*» . SEND 
I D = 3 2 . E N D C = . T R U E . , D U R = 0 . . N P R L = 1 . I F 0 L L * 3 7 . 3 9 . SENO 
1 0 - Z k t S I N K = » T R U E # . STARTC=#TRUE«, NPRL=1» D U R * 0 . , SEND 
1 0 = 3 5 . S I N K - . T R U E . t S T A R T C S . T R U E • * N P R L = 1 , D U R = 0 . , SEND 
1 0 = 3 6 . S I N K = . T R U E . . STARTC*«TRUE«t N P R L * 1 » OUR'O. t SENO 
1 0 = 3 7 . Q B O X - . T R U E * . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S £ R V = 9 . E 5 . L R = 1 . 0 . l . O . f . O . l . t . t . I , 
ENOC*.TRUE. t I T Y P E * 6 t P A R A M = « 2 . 1 . . I F 0 L L = 2 6 , 4 0 , * 1 . * 2 . % 3 . 5 0 , 5 1 . 
J 6 R P = 5 . SEND 
I D = 3 9 . Q B O X = , T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V s 9 t E 5 t L R = 1 . 0 . 1 . 0 . 0 . • . 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 . 
S T A R T C = . T R U E . . E N O C = . T R U E . . OUR=0 . , I F 0 L L = 2 6 . V O , < » 1 , h Z 9 k Z , k k , 5 8 . 5 1 t 
J S R P = 5 . SEND 
1 0 = 4 0 . Q B O X = . T R U E , . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S £ R V = 9 . E 5 , L R 3 0 , 0 . 1 * 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 
J 6 R P = 6 . E N 0 C = . T R U E . . S T A R T C = . T R U E . • OUR*Q.t IFOLL * * . 5 , 5 6 . SENO 
ID=«»1. Q B O X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R * 0 * 0 * 0*0* 0 , 0* 1 * 0 * 0 * 
J C R P - 6 * E N 0 C = . T R U E . . S T A R T C = . T R U E . . DUR=0*. IFOLL=<»5 . 5 6 . SENO 
I0=*»2. QBOX=.TRUE. t N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 . E 5 . L R = 0 , 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . • . 0 . 1 , 0 . 
J G R P = 6 . S T A R T C S . T R U E « * ENDC S «TRUE«* OUR*0«t I F O L L = 5 6 . SENO 
XD-l>3* ENDC- .TRUE** DUR=0.* NPRL=1» I F 0 L L * 5 7 . SEND 
XD=«tt* E N D C = . T R U E . . D U R = 0 , . N P R L = 1 . I F O L L = 5 7 . SENO 
ID=<»5. Q B O X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 , L R M , 0 . 0 . 8 . 0 . • . 0 , l , t , 
J G R P = 6 . S T A R T C = . T R U E . t E N D C s . T R U E . t O U R = 0 . , I F 0 L L = < . 0 . * 1 . 5 6 . SENO 
I 0 = < . 6 . S I N K = . T R U E , . S T A R T C = . T R U E . . N P R L * 1 * D U R = 0 . . SENO 
X D - V 7 , QBOX=.TRUE.t N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S E R V = 9 . E 5 . I F 0 L L = * 9 . STARTC S «TRUE» * 
O U R = 0 . . SEND 
I D = * 8 . Q 8 0 X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 , N S £ R V = 9 . E 5 , I F O L L = % 9 , S T A R T C * . T R U E . , 
O U R = 0 . . SENO 
1 0 = 4 9 . S T A R T C = . T R U E . . EN DC** T R U E . . N P R l = l , I F O L L = 4 . 5 . OUR»0». SENO 
1 0 = 5 0 . E N O C - . T R U E . * N P R L = 1 . D U R = 0 . . I F O L L * 5 7 . SENO 
1 0 = 5 1 . Q B O X = . T R U E . . N P R L = 9 . E 5 . N S E R V = 9 . E 5 . L R = 8 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 . 0 . 0 . 
J G R P = 6 . S T A R T C * . T R U E • . E N O C - . T R U E . 
1 0 = 5 2 . E N D C = . T R U E . . D U R = 0 . . NPRL=1 
I D = 5 3 . E N D C = , T R U E . . D U R = 0 , , N P R L - 1 
I D = 5 V , E N O C - . T R U E . « OUR-O.t NPRL=1 
I D - 5 6 , E N O C - . T R U E . t D U R = 0 . f NPRL=1 
I D = 5 7 , E N O C = . T R U E . , D U R = 0 , , NPRL=1 
D U R = 0 . . I F O L L = 5 7 . 
I F 0 L L = 7 . 1 9 . SENO 
X F 0 L L * 1 6 , 1 9 * SENO 
I F O L L = 2 7 , 4 . d . SENO 
I F 0 L L * 3 6 , « t 6 t * > 7 9 SENO 
I F 0 L L = 3 * . . 3 5 , 4 » 6 , SENO 
SENO 
SSTAT 
I N * f 6 t 
0 . 1 9 . 2 2 . 
2 3 . 2 5 . 2 6 . 2 6 . 3 7 . 3 9 . 
4 0 . 4 2 . 4 5 . 4 7 . l t O . 
H I S T I - 8 . . 
H I S T L « 0 . * 
N C E L L ' O , 
FSHOT*360« 
T C A L L * 3 6 0 , 
H C E L L - 5 5 , 
SEND 
2 2 0 
C J S D a t a 
SPARAH NCRIHE=7, NCHARG=9, N D I S P = 6 , N S 0 I S P = 3 , O U M P = . F A L S E . , NOC*2, 
A D U L T = 1 8 . » N S B 0 X = 1 2 , NEB0X=9 , T R A C E F = . F A L S E . , S I N I T Q s l Q * , 
HBEGIN=2*6 , HEQUE=3, HERES=3t H E S E Y * 3 , MEHIS=0 , M I S = 0 . P R G » 0 . 1 0 , 
R T I H E = 5 5 . « T S T 0 P = 5 5 . 1 0 , T X N I T L * 2 0 . 0 0 , I C C C = 1 5 0 0 , H I C C C = 5 0 , 
SENO 
SOFFENDR C A T = 1 . , 
P P 0 P = . 8 7 5 , . 9 5 3 * . 9 0 5 . . 8 9 7 , • 8 1 5 , • 9%6, . 9 9 0 , 
A B A R = 3 2 . 9 , 2 5 . 9 . 3 0 . V . 2 6 . 2 . 3 1 . 3 , 2 1 . . 8 , 2 7 . 2 , 
ASO» 1 3 . 0 . 6«<t. 1 1 . 9 . 9 * 3 , 1 1 . 5 , 8 . 6 , 9 . 2 , 
AMIN= 1 6 . . 1 6 . . 1 1 . . 1 1 . . 1 6 . , 1 6 . , 1 6 . , 
AMAX= 7 0 . . 6 5 . . 7 5 . . 7 5 . . 7 0 . . 7 0 . , 6 5 . , 
SENO 
SOFFENDR C A T « 2 . , 
P P 0 P = . 1 2 5 , . 0 1 * 7 . . 0 9 5 . . 1 0 3 . • 1 8 5 , • 0 5 % , . 0 1 0 , 
A B A R = 3 5 . 0 , 2 5 . 8 . 3 3 . 6 . 2 7 * 8 . 3 1 . 2 , 2 1 . . - 1 . . 2 2 « 5 , 
ASD= 9 . 2 . 7 . 6 , 1 2 . 1 , 9 . 7 , 1 0 . 2 , 7 , 7 , • 5 , 
AMIN= 2 1 . . 1 6 . , 1 6 . , 1 6 . , 1 6 . . 1 6 * , 2 1 . , 
ANAX= 5 5 . , 5 0 . , 6 5 * , 6 5 . . 6 5 . . 5 5 . . 2 5 . , 
SENO 
SSTIHE I D = 5 , T B A R = 7 » 1 . 0 , SEND 
SSTIME 1 0 = 8 , T B A R = 7 » 3 8 . , SEND 
SSTIHE I D = 9 , T B A R = 7 » 3 8 . , SEND 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 1 2 , T B A R = 1 6 8 0 . , 1 4 8 8 . , 1 3 6 2 . , 1 1 . 1 5 . . 1 3 9 2 . , 1 % 6 Q . , 1 6 2 0 • t SEND 
SSTZHE 1 0 = 1 3 . TBAR= 8 8 5 . . 8 0 0 . . 7 1 8 * , 7 * 8 . , 7 3 7 . , 7 7 0 . , Ok 6 . , SEND 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 1 1 . . TBAR= 8 8 5 . . 8 0 0 * , 7 1 8 . . 7 1 . 8 * . 7 3 7 . , 7 7 0 # , 8 1 . 8 . , SENO 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 1 5 , TBAR= 9 0 . . 1 1 1 . 1 , 7 3 . 6 , 8 1 . 7 , 8 2 . 8 , 7 9 . , 7 5 . 1 , SENO 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 2 1 , T B A R = 7 » 1 . 0 , SENO 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 2 3 , TBAR= 8 . 5 . 6 * 8 , 1 0 . 8 . 8 . 7 , 1 2 . 6 , 6 * 0 , 1 0 . • t SENO 
SSTIHE I D = 2 5 , TBAR= 2 6 . 8 , 7 * 1 , 7 * 3 , 6 . 3 , % . 7 , 1 1 . 2 , 9 . Ot SEND 
SSTIHE I D = 2 8 . T B A R = 7 » 7 . 8 , SEND 
SSTIHE 1 0 = 3 9 , TBAR= 3 0 « % , 1 7 * 7 , l U l i 9 . 7 , 9 . 1 , 9 . 9 , 1 3 4 5 , SEND 
SFLOUT 1 0 = 2 . NARC=2, I D A R C S = 4 . 5 , 
A R C = . 0 5 0 , . 0 9 1 . . . 1 2 7 , . 1 8 9 , # 2 7 5 , . 1 6 2 , • 0 8 7 , 
. 9 5 0 , . 9 0 6 . . 8 7 3 , . 8 1 1 . • 7 2 5 , • 8 3 8 , # 9 1 3 , 
SENO 
SFLOUT I D = 6 , NARC=3, I D A R C S * 9 , 2 3 , 5 2 , 
A R C = . 6 0 3 , . 1 . 7 9 . . 6 0 3 , * 1 . 7 9 . « % 7 9 , * % 7 9 , # 6 0 3 , 
« . , • • « 0 . . 8 . , 0 . , 0 . , 0 . , 
. 3 9 7 , . 5 2 1 , . 3 9 7 , . 5 2 1 . . 5 2 1 , • 5 2 1 , • 3 9 7 , 
SEND 
SFLOUT 1 0 = 9 , NARC=6, X 0 A R C S » 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 % , 1 5 , 2 3 t 5 2 , 
A R C = . 1 2 5 , . 0 5 7 , . 1 2 5 , . 0 5 7 . • 0 5 7 , • 0 5 7 , • 1 2 5 , 
. 3 9 0 , . 1 . 3 1 . , 3 9 0 . . 1 . 3 1 , • % 3 1 , • % 3 1 , 4 3 9 0 , 
. 1 * 0 0 . . 2 7 7 , . t O O , . 2 7 7 , • 2 7 7 , • 2 7 7 , • M O , 
. 0 8 5 , # 2 3 5 , . 0 8 5 , . 2 3 5 . • 2 3 5 , • 2 3 5 , • 0 8 5 , 
0»» 0 « , 0 « * 0 * , 0 . , 0« t a . . 
SENO 
2 2 1 
IDARCS**. 5, 
,127. . 1 8 9 . «£75 
873* *811t .725 
X0ARCS*25* 20). 
,250, , 1 7 1 , .237 
3M», •SIS* «399 
, * 0 6 , .311.* .36% 
SFLOUT 10=21, NARC*2* 
ARC*,850» . 0 9 * . 
• 9 5 0 * . 9 0 6 . 
SEND 
SFLOUT 10*23* MARC=3. 
ARC*«112* , 0 * 2 , 
• 62<»* •607* • 
•265* . 3 5 1 , 
SENO 
SFLOUT 10*28* NARC*2* IDARCS=29. 38* 
ARC* 0«* 0«* 8.* • • • 0. 
1*« 1.* 1* • 1« * 1* 
SEND 
SFLOUT 1 0 = 3 0 , NARC=2» IDARCS*31* 32* 
ARC* 0*. 0., 0** 8», 0* 
1** 1** it* 1** 1* 
SENO 
SFLOUT 10*32* NARC*2* IDARCS=37. 3 9 . 
A R C * . 6 0 8 , . 7 2 6 , .697* .080. .035 
•392 * •274* »303* . 1 2 0 , .165 
SEND 
SFLOUT ID*%9* NARC*2* IDARCS***. 5* 
ARC**050* «09*« . 1 2 7 . «189* «275 






995* . 1 1 1 . 
*3*» #>4>77* 
% 7 1 * »*12* 
8«* 





0 . . 
!•• 
.826* . 7 0 0 . 
1 7 * * «300* 
1 6 2 , 
838* 
• • 8 7 . 
,913. 
SHITCH=.025. • 825* • 150* •too. • 280* • 188* • 1 8 0 , 
• 015* . 0 1 0 , • 350* • 0 6 0 , • 358* • 115* • 180* 
• 025* • 8*0* • 150* • 300* • 885* • 2 0 0 , • 2 0 0 , 
• 010* • 020* • 135* • 063* • A>59* • 2 8 2 , • 831* 
• 018* • 020* • 1*0. • 025* • * 0 0 * • 275* • 130* 
• 018* • 027* • 0*5. • 828, • 390* • 222* • 278* 
• 828* • 150* • 110* • 2 6 8 , • 208, . 1 * 0 , • 128* 
S E V E R E = 3 3 . 3 . 6 « * 3 . 9.7%* 2.6*, 2*26* 2*29* 15.3* 
VJAIL* . 5 2 3 . • 209* • 216* . 1 3 6 , • 136* • 136* • 36** 
AJAIL* . 5 2 3 . • 209* • 216* • 1 3 6 , • 136* • 136* • 3 6 % , 
CJAIL* »*30* • * 30* • * 3 0 . • * 3 0 , • * 30* • % 3 0 , • * 3 0 , 
AN0= 1*8* 1*8* 1*8* U 8 , 1*8* 1«8* 1«8* 
SENO 
SPLEA 
BARGAN*.4S8* 8»* • 883* o « . 8», 8** 0.. 
• 891* • •. 0 . * 8«, 0 . , • * • 8 . . 
• 35** 8., • 883* 8 « , 8«* 8*, e»* 
• 828* • 7 8 3 . • 017* 4 8 1 0 , 0.* • 907* • 820* 
• 127* • 829* • 9*9* • 8 2 0 , • 818* 8*, • 1*3* 
0., • 803* • 811* • 858* • 029* • B1A>* • 8*1* 
8., • 163* • O i l . • 098* • 913* •055* 8 # , 8.* • 883* • 886* • 812* • 8*8, . 9 2 * . 8., 
0., • 819* 0*. • 8 0 2 , o«* 8., • 796, 
38*0.* 
P 0 I S P * . 9 1 8 , 
6 » 0 a , 
• 7 8 8 , . % 9 0 , . 8 9 * , . * 5 8 , «590« « 3 9 6 , * 6 8 B , « * 5 8 , 
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• 0 9 0 , • 3 1 1 « 4 5 1 8 * • 1 0 6 . %%98, • t o o . • 5 8 * . 
6 » 0 . * 
6 * 0 . * 
• • • • • * 8 . » • • • • 0 5 0 . • 1 1 0 * • • 1 6 * 
6 * 0 . * 
0 . . 8 , * • • • 0 . . • 0 1 0 * o . . • 0 0 * . 
6 * 0 . * 
6 » 0 « * 
P S O U R = 6 * 3 0 . . * * 9 3 . . 2 0 9 2 * * 2 9 * 1 . * 1 3 * 6 * . 1 9 5 5 * 
6 * 0 . * 
1 6 8 8 . . 1 6 8 0 . . 1 6 6 0 * * 1 * 6 0 * * 1 3 6 2 . . 1 * 1 5 . 
6 » l • * 
0 « * 0 . « 0 . * 0 . * 0 * , 0 . 
6*0 • * 
SENO 
SCOURT 
C 0 N V I C = . * 0 8 , 0** • 0 0 3 * 0 . * 8*, , 0 . . 0«i 
. 8 9 1 , 8 « * 0 . * 8 * . 0 . , 8 « * 8 « , 
• 3 5 * « 0** • 8 0 3 * 0 . * 8*i 0 . . 0*, 
. 0 2 8 , > • 7 8 3 . • 8 1 7 * • 8 1 8 * 0 « , , . 0 0 7 , • 0 2 0 , 
. 1 2 7 , • 8 2 9 * • 9*9* • 8 2 8 * • 8 1 8 , 0 . , • 1 * 3 , 
0 . , > • 0 0 3 * • 8 1 1 * • 8 5 8 * • 8 2 9 , , . 0 1 * . • 8 * 1 
S . t • 1 6 3 * • 8 1 1 * • 098* • 9 1 3 , » 4 0 5 5 * 0 . , 
8 . , • 8 0 3 * • 006* • 8 1 2 * . 0 * 8 , • . 9 2 * . S« i 
8 . i • 0 1 9 * 0 . . • 0 0 2 * 0*, > 8 « * • 7 9 6 , 
3 8 * 8 . i 
T D I S P z . 6 5 5 * • 6 5 6 * • * 5 * , • 6 6 7 * • * 2 3 , • 5 6 1 * • 3 8 3 * • 6 6 0 * * % 1 7 * 
6 * 0 . . 
• 0 6 5 * • 2 8 1 * • * 7 2 . » 1 0 3 * • * 6 0 * • 3 9 * * • 5 6 5 * • 3 0 7 * # * 7 7 * 
6 » 0 « * 
• 060* • 0 6 3 * • 0 7 * * • 8 3 8 * • 0 6 1 * • 0 1 6 * • 0 3 2 * • 0 2 9 * • 889* 
6 » 0 . . 
8 « * 0 . . 0 . . 0 . * • 0*7* • 0 1 8 * • 0 1 6 * • 00** • 8 1 7 * 
6 * 0 . * 
8 « * 0 . * 0 . . 8 » * • 0 09* O r , # 0 0 * . 8 « * 8** 
6 * 0 . 
1 5 » 0 « 
T S D U R = 1 1 * 3 7 . . 8 * 6 7 . . 3 9 * 5 . . 5 5 * 0 . , 2 5 3 8 * * 3 6 8 6 
6 * 0 . * 
1 6 8 0 . * 1 6 8 0 * * 1 6 8 0 . . 1 * 8 8 . . 1 3 6 2 . . 1 * 1 5 
6 » 0 » * 
0 • • 8 . . 8 « * 8 « * 0 . , 8 
6*0 • * 
SEND 
tLCOURT 
D I S P L « 0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . , 0 . . 0* 
• 809* • 1 5 8 * . * * 7 . • * 5 1 . • * 0 7 , • 3 8 8 , • 6 6 0 
8«* 0 . . 0 . * 8 . * 0 . , 0 . . 8 . 
• 8 3 7 * • 0 5 3 * • 8 7 9 * • 8*** • 0 6 1 , • 0 2 3 * 8 .* 
0 . . • 0 1 8 * • 8 8 2 , • 8 2 0 * 8*, • 8 1 8 * • 828 
• 8 7 * , • 7 7 2 * • * 7 2 , • * 8 5 , • 5 3 3 , • 5 7 9 * • 3 2 8 
• 3 1 6 , « 5 2 3 * 
0 . » 8 .* 
• 8 0 * * . 8 1 9 * 
0 » * 8** 
0 . » • • « 
1 * 5 8 . . 1 5 * * . . 3 6 1 1 . . 
1 3 9 2 , . 1 * 6 0 . . 1 6 2 0 * . 
8* . 0* , 0 . , 
, 2 7 5 0 * , 2 9 1 2 * , 6 8 0 * . . 
• 1 3 9 2 * , 1 * 6 0 * * 1 6 2 0 * * 
* 0 * , 8 , , 6»* 
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SDURL= 0 . * 0 . . 0 . . 0 . * 0 . . 0 . * 0 * . 
1 3 8 1 . , 1 2 3 9 . . 1 3 V V . . 1 3 7 V . . 1 3 7 7 . . 1 3 8 0 * , 1 V 2 8 . . 
9 0 , . 1 1 1 . 1 . 7 3 . 6 . 8 1 . 7 . 8 2 . 8 . 7 9 . 0 . 7 5 . 1 . 
SEND 
SPAROLE 
PRISONM= . 3 5 9 . . 5 1 V . . 3 8 1 . . 3 6 9 . . V W . . 3 2 0 . . 3 1 2 . . 3 3 2 . . 6 6 3 . 6 * 0 . . 
PRISONF* . 1 9 5 . . 2 7 9 . . 2 7 3 . . 2 2 V . . 2 3 3 * . 2 1 9 . . 2 7 V . . 1 8 V . . 1 9 7 . 6 * 0 . . 
PVIOLs . 2 2 0 . . 2 2 0 . . 2 2 0 . # 2 2 0 . # 2 2 0 . # .220 . • ' 2 2 0 . . 2 2 0 . # 2 2 0 . 6 * 0 % . 
D P A R O L = 9 » 7 3 0 . , 6 » 0 # , 
SENO 
SRECID 
PROBHs • 6 7 9 . . 6 3 9 . • 6 2 2 . • 5 9 7 * • 5 3 3 * • V 8 7 . • 3 3 6 * 
PROBF= • WO • • V 7 3 . • V 6 8 . • W 3 * . 3 3 V * . 2 9 7 * • 1 7 7 , 
DELPRO= 1 0 V 0 . . 1 3 7 9 . . 1 5 9 5 . . 1 8 6 8 . . 2 1 9 2 * • 2 V 2 3 . . V615.f* 
DELFI= 1 0 V 0 . . 1 0 6 6 . . 1 0 5 1 . * 1 1 7 V . * 1 3 3 9 . . 1 5 9 1 . * 2 3 5 V . , 
DELDIS= 1 0 6 6 . . 1 1 1 6 . . 1 0 8 7 . * 1 1 V 1 . * 1 V 5 8 . « 1 6 8 8 . * 2 7 0 7 . . 
DELPARs 5 V 0 . , 9 1 1 . . 1 0 V V . . 9 6 5 . . 1 3 6 1 * * 1 V 1 8 . . 2 5 1 6 * , 
D E L P R I * 9 V 0 . . 8 V 6 . . 8 6 8 . * 1 0 0 8 . * 9 1 1 . . 1 1 V 8 . * 1 5 5 9 . , 
SENO 
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F o r e c a s t i n g F u n c t i o n 
c 
FUNCTION FORCAST (MONTH, I C R I H E ) 
C 
C THIS FUNCTION DETERMINES THE VIRGIN ARREST RATE FOR HONTH AND 
C CRIME S P E C I F I E D . 
C 
C 
REAL N C R I M E S C 7 , 1 * I , A ( 7 , 1 * > ,THETA<7> , T H E T 1 2 < 7 > 
• , D I F 1 2 ( 7 ) , P C L E A R ( 7 > , P V I R G ( 7 > 
C 
DATA LMONTH/0/ 
DATA I S E E O / 6 0 6 1 7 / 
C 
OATA T H E T A / . 8 0 6 , . * 2 7 , . 5 1 9 , . 5 2 2 , « 3 9 3 , . 5 0 2 , , 7 1 9 / 
OATA T H E T 1 2 / 0 . , . 8 2 5 , . 6 9 8 . . 7 3 8 . . 7 5 . . 7 1 * . * 0 / 
OATA D I F 1 2 / 0 . , 5 * 1 . * 8 . / 
C 
DATA P C L E A R / . 8 , . 2 7 , . 6 3 , . 1 8 , . 2 , . 1 5 , « 5 l / 
DATA P V I R G / . 2 * * . . 1 9 6 , . 2 * 5 , . 2 0 6 , . 2 i 6 , . 2 5 9 , # * 2 7 / 
C 
C I N I T I A L VALUES OF FORECAST FUNCTIONS CBEGINNING J A N . , *7%) 
OATA < < N C R I M E S ( I , J > , J ~ 1 , 1 * > , I * 1 , 7 > / 
• 3 9 . , 3 3 . , * 6 . , 3 8 . , 3 7 . , * l ) . , * 0 . , 3 5 . , * 2 . , 3 5 . , 5 5 . , * 7 . , 5 3 . , 0 . , 
• 1 3 1 0 . , 1 1 1 1 . , 1 0 5 9 . , 1 0 5 8 . . 1 0 6 7 . , 9 9 9 . . 1 0 5 8 , . 1 0 9 8 . . 1 0 2 5 . . 
* 1 1 6 8 . . 1 3 6 9 . . i * 0 « „ . 1 2 9 5 . . 8 . . 
• 1 2 5 5 . , 1 1 0 0 , , 1 3 0 2 , , 1 3 2 7 . , 1 3 8 7 . , 1 * 5 2 . , 1 * 5 6 . , 1 3 7 8 . , 1 * 3 0 . , 
* 1 3 6 6 . , 1 3 9 5 . , 1 1 8 3 , , , 1 2 1 8 . 
• 6 0 8 7 . , 5 1 8 9 » , 5 7 0 6 . , 5 * 7 * . , 5 * 0 6 . . 5 3 0 6 . , 5 * 8 6 . , 5 3 6 7 . , 5 3 6 5 . , 
• 6 1 3 8 . , 5 7 7 5 . , 6 5 0 0 * , 6 9 1 0 . , t . , 
• 7 * 2 6 . , 6 9 0 2 . , 7 * 7 * . , 6 6 3 9 . , 7 1 2 3 . , 6 8 0 5 . , 7 0 5 8 . . 7 2 0 1 . , 6 9 2 6 . , 
• 7 7 3 3 . , 7 5 6 1 . . 7 9 * 1 . . 8 * 7 9 . . 0 . . 
^ 2 7 6 9 . . 2 5 0 0 . . 2 6 7 3 . , 2 5 0 5 . , 2 5 2 9 , , 2 * 6 5 . , 2 * 5 6 . , 2 5 6 2 * , 2 5 5 7 . , 
• 2 7 6 1 . , 2 6 2 7 . , 2 7 7 2 . , 2 7 3 1 . , 0 . , 
• 1 8 * . , 1 6 * . M 7 0 . , 1 3 9 . . 1 5 3 , . 1 6 7 « , 1 6 6 « , 1 7 7 « , 1 8 * . . 1 6 * . , 
• 1 6 * . , 1 6 3 . . 1 * 0 . . 6 . / 
C 
C VALUES OF I N I T I A L FORECAST ERRORS 
OATA < < A ( I , J ) , J = 1 , 1 * > , 1 = 1 , 7 ) / 
* 1 * » 0 . , 
• 5 1 . 6 , * l * 0 . 5 , - 2 1 3 . 7 , 2 5 * 7 , 5 2 , 0 , f 9 . 3 , ? > 1 5 « 2 , 3 5 « * , r 6 7 . 8 , 2 * 7 , 
• 2 2 * . 3 , 2 6 . 5 , - 2 2 . * , 8 . . 
• * 8 . 5 . - 1 2 0 . 7 . - 2 1 . 7 . 7 9 . 8 . - 3 2 . 7 . 2 3 . 2 . - 5 0 . 7 , - 8 . 9 , 5 2 . 0 , - 5 1 . 9 , 
• 1 1 3 . 0 , - 1 6 8 . 1 , • 8 . 8 . 0 * . 
* - 1 7 1 . 9 . - 7 2 2 . 1 . r 2 0 * . * . 2 2 5 . 8 . - * 5 . * . 1 6 6 . 6 . - 7 . 5 . r 3 6 9 . 5 , 1 0 9 . 6 , * 6 6 . 6 , 
• - 1 0 5 . 6 . * 7 6 . 6 , 6 5 2 . 0 . 0 . . 
• 1 2 0 . 6 . - 2 8 6 . 2 . * 1 7 3 . 5 . - 2 0 3 . 9 . 2 6 6 . 5 . R 2 7 . 0 . 6 7 * 6 . 3 0 * * 2 . 2 6 . 3 . 
• 2 8 6 . 6 . 1 * * . 1 . 1 2 3 . 3 . 6 9 0 . 9 . 0 . . 
• 1 3 . l . * 6 9 . 1 . - 1 2 3 . 2 . - 2 3 . 3 , 5 6 . 1 , 3 7 . 6 , - l * l . l , 2 5 . 8 . 1 2 1 • 2 t 
« • 9 . 9 , % « 0 , f 3 1 « 8 , f 8 8 < * , 8 » , 
• 1 * * 8 . / 
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DETERMINE TIME INDICES 
IF(MONTH . E Q . LMONTH) 6 0 TO 1 
IH0NTH S H0NTH+13 
IPER=M0D(IM0NTH,1%) 
I F ( I P E R . E Q . f ) I P E R = 1 % 
I P E R 1 = I P E R - 1 
I F ( I P E R l . E Q « t > X P E R l * 1 4 
I P E R A 1 = I P £ R 1 
I F ( M 0 N T H . G T . 1 > I P E R A 1 * 1 * 
I P E R 2 = I P E R * 2 
I F ( I P E R 2 . G E . 1 5 ) I P E R 2 = I P E R » 1 2 
I P E R A 2 = I P £ R 2 
I F ( M 0 N T H . G T . 1 2 ) I P E R A 2 * 1 * 
I P E R 3 = I P E R * 1 
I F ( I P E R 3 . G E . 1 5 ) I P E R 3 = I P E R - 1 3 
I P E R A 3 - I P E R 3 
I F ( M 0 N T H . G T . 1 3 > I P E R A 3 = 1 V 
LHONTH=MONTH 
FORECAST NUMBER OF OCCURANCES OF EACH CRIME TYPE 
1 NCRIMESCICRIME. IPER) * N C R I M E S ( I C R I M E , I P E R 1 ) 
• + 0 I F 1 2 ( I C R I M E ) • ( N C R I M E S ( I C R I M E . I P E R 2 ) - N C R I M E S ( I C R I M E . I P E R 3 ) > 
* f T H E T A C I C R I M E ) * A ( I C R I H E , I P E R * 1 ) 
• + T H E T 1 2 ( I C R I M E ) » ( - A ( I C R I M E . I P E R A 2 ) + T H E T A ( I C R I M E ) » A ( I C R I M E . I P E R A 3 ) ) 
DETERMINE TOTAL ARRESTS 
A R R E S T S = P C L E A R ( I C R I M E ) ' N C R I M E S ( I C R I M E . I P E R ) 
DETERMINE VIRGIN ARREST RATE 
F O R C A S T = P V I R G ( I C R I M E ) ' A R R E S T S 
SCALE FORECASTS 
FORCAST=FORCAST/30 . 
I F ( F O R C A S T . G E . l ) RETURN 
B=RAND<ISEED) 
F 0 R C A S T = 1 . 8 0 




A P P E N D I X C 
SAMPLE OUTPUT 
T h e o u t p u t c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s a p p e n d i x i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e t y p e s 
o f s t a t i s t i c s a n d g r a p h i c a l a n a l y s i s t h a t a r e p r o d u c e d b y t h e m o d e l 
d e v e l o p e d f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e q u e u e i n g t i m e s e r i e s 
shown a r e f o r o n l y o n e p r e c e s s o r i n t h e C J S n e t w o r k a n d t h e o f f e n d e r 
a n a l y s i s i s r e s t r i c t e d t o m a l e c a r e e r c r i m i n a l s . R e p o r t s a r e a l s o 
o u t p u t f o r o t h e r p r o c e s s o r s a n d f o r a l l o t h e r o f f e n d e r c a t e g o r i e s a s 
w e l l , b u t f o r b r e v i t y t h e y a r e n o t r e p r o d u c e d h e r e . 
T R A C E T H E E X E C U T I O N O F M M 1 
A T N O N T H 2 R E S O U R C E U S A C E 1 1 4 . 7 . 2 . •. 4 * 6 7 . »«» 9 1 1 . 9 . 2 . A T N O N T H 2 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! • • 
AT N O N T H 2 H A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 4 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 
A T N O N T H 3 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 1 9 . 6 . 1 . 1 2 . 5 . 6 6 . 4 2 7 . • 9 6 . 7 . 4 . 
A T N O N T H 3 P R E - T R I A L O U t U t l 
A T N O N T H 3 H A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 4 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 
A T N O N T H 4 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 2 1 . 7 . 1 . 1 3 . 3 . 6 7 . 4 3 6 * • 7 9 . t . %. A T N O N T H 4 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! • . A T N O N T H 4 H A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 4 • 9 9 9 9 9 . 3 * 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 
A T N O N T H 3 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 2 4 . 4 . 1 * •* 4 * 6 7 . »••* • • 3 . 1*4 2 . 
A T N O N T H » P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! 9. 
A T N O N T H 5 H A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 4 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 * 9 9 . 
A T N O N T H 6 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 2 4 . • • 2 . 1 1 . • * 6 6 . 3 9 9 . • 9 1 . 1 1 . ». A T N O N T H 6 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! «. A T N O N T H 6 N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 6 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 4 9 9 9 9 9 * 
A T N O N T N 7 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 2 6 . 7 . 3 . I S . I t . 6 7 . 9 9 1 « • 9 9 . 1 6 . 1 . 
A T N O N T H 7 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! 1 2 . 
A T N O N T H 7 
* 
N A M . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 2 6 . 
* 
9 9 9 9 9 . >. 9 9 9 * 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 * 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 * 9 9 9 . 9 * 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 * * . 
• 
A T N O N T H 
% 
4 1 • R E S O U R C E U S A G E 1 
t 
3 6 . 9* 2 . 3 1 . 6* 
» 
1 2 9 . 6 6 4 * 1 3 6 7 . 2 % . 
• 
*. 
A T N O N T H 4 1 • P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! I . 
A T N O N T N h i t N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 6 2 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 7 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . * * 9 9 9 « 99999*1 
A T N O N T H h i t R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 5 2 . 4 . 3 . 2 2 . 1 7 . 1 3 9 . 6 7 9 . 1 3 6 3 . 2 % . 6 . 
A T N O N T H 4 1 9 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! I . 
A T N O N T H 4 1 9 N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 6 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 7 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 * 9 * 9 . 
A T N O N T H 4 2 • R E S O U R C E U S A G E l 6 3 . 7 . 9* 2 3 . ! •« 1 3 7 * 6 7 S * 1 3 « 9 . E 6 « M 
A T N O N T H 4 2 1 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! • . A T N O N T H 4 2 1 N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 6 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 7 , 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 4 9 9 9 9 . 
A T N O N T H 4 2 1 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! M . 9 . 7 . 3 9 . 1 2 . 1 3 6 . 6 7 9 . 1 3 6 9 . 3 9 . 6* 
A T N O N T H 4 2 1 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! 1 3 . 
» T N O N T H hZl N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 6 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 7 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 4 9 9 9 9 * . 
A T N O N T H 4 2 2 R E S O U R C E U S A G E ! 5 6 . 7 . 7 . 3 7 . 1 9 . 1 3 4 . 6 6 * . 1 3 7 7 . 2 6 * » » 4 
A T N O N T H 4 2 2 P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! 9 . 
A T N O N T N 4 2 2 N A X . R E S O U R C E L E V E L S ! 6 3 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 7 , 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 * 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 * 9 9 9 . 9 9 9 9 9 . 9 9 * 9 9 « 
A T T I N E 1 9 4 3 5 . 9 9 S I M U L A T I O N R U N S U C C E S S F U L L Y T E R M I N A T E S M I T N 1 * 3 7 9 S I N K N O D E S R E A L I Z E O S I N C E T I N I T L • 2 9 . 
T H E T O T A L N U M B E R O F F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A F T E R 2 1 . I S 2 9 7 2 4 
T H E T O T A L N U M B E R O F R E C I D I V I S T A R R E S T S A F T E R 2 * * • • I S 2 9 9 9 7 
F O R C R I M E 1 1 1 H O M I C I D E 1 I* 4 2 2 F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N O 2 * 6 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S M E N A O E 
F O R C R I M E 2 i 1 R O B B E R Y >. 1 5 1 2 F I R S T * O F F £ N S E A R R E S T S A N O 6 6 3 R E C I D I V I S T A R R E S T S A R E N A O E 
F O R C R I M E 3 1 A S S A U L T >. 4 6 3 1 F I R S T . O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N O 2 6 7 1 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S M I N A O E 
F O R C R I M E 4 I 1 B U R G L A R Y >. 4 7 6 i F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N O 2 1 3 4 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S A M N A M F O R C R I M E 5 i 1 G . L A R C E N Y >, 7 4 2 7 F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N O 6**2 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S A R C N A O E 
F O R C R I M E 6 1 1 A U T O T H E F T I 1. 1 S 9 1 F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N O 4 * 9 9 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S A R E N A O E 
F O R C R I M E 7 1 1 R A P E 1 1. 4 2 2 F I R S T - O F F E N S E A R R E S T S A N D 3 1 6 6 R E C I O I V I S T A R R E S T S M I N A O f 
NOTE: RESOURCE STATISTICS ARE C I Y W FOR EACH OF THE 1 0 RESOURCE TTPXS 
USED IN THE MODEL. THE PRE-TRIAL QUEUE IS THE NUMBER OF OFFENDERS 
WAITING FOR SERVICE AT BOXES 37 and 39 OF THE SUPERIOR COURT. 
# # # # T I M E A N D C O S T S T A T I S T I C S # # # # 
N O . O F 
S T A T . T Y P E 0 8 S . M E A N 
T O T A L C O S T 1 1 3 0 < . 0 9 7 1 1 7 * 0 3 1 
# # # # G R O U P C O S T S T A T I S T I C S #### 
G R P N O * M E A N C O S T X 
1 1 6 9 ^ 8 2 * t 6 9 . 5 1 7 1 2 * 9 9 6 
2 9 5 1 0 2 0 0 6 * 7 6 9 7 * 2 9 3 
3 1 6 2 9 8 5 0 9 3 * 5 2 7 1 2 * < f 9 8 
k 3 0 7 1 8 0 3 2 6 . 2 7 9 2 3 * 5 5 5 
5 1 8 6 1 ^ 3 3 8 ^ * 1 7 3 l*.*27<r 
6 3 < * 7 0 2 6 6 3 0 * 3 3 7 2 6 * 6 1 0 
7 3 6 1 7 7 2 0 1 * 7 5 2 2 . 7 7 k 
T I M E S H O T N O * 
P O L I C E 
J U V E N I L E C O U R T 
J U V E N I L E C O R R E C T I O N S 
P R O S E C U T I O N & P R E - T R I A L H E A R I N G S 
L O W E R * S U P E R I O R C O U R T S 
C O R R E C T I O N S 
P R E - T R I A L O E T E N T I O N 
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SC NO* STAT. TYPE LEVI L MEAN 
1 EXP UTLZ 63 29*302 
1 OVEROMND 63 0.000 1 COST 63 2*7026565*511 1 COST X 18*942 
2 EXP UTLZ 99999 2.131 
2 OVERDMND 99999 0*000 2 COST 99999 16948246 9*482 2 COST X 12*996 
3 EXP UTLZ 7 2*981 
3 OVERDMND 7 0*000 3 COST 7 91651951*807 3 COST X 7*026 
4 EXP UTLZ 99999 16*496 
4 OVERDMND 99999 0*000 4 COST 99999 123276172*082 4 COST X 9* *V 53 
5 EXP UTLZ 99999 7*747 
5 OVERDMND 99999 0*000 5 COST 99999 72842660*317 5 COST X 5*566 
6 EXP UTLZ 99999 79*773 
6 OVEROMND 99999 0*000 6 COST 99999 162985098*473 6 COST X 12*498 
7 EXP UTLZ 99999 442*023 
7 OVEROMND 99999 0*0 00 7 COST 99999 175359344*900 7 COST X 13*447 
6 EXP UTLZ 99999 865*433 
6 OVERDMND 99999 0*000 a COST 99999 171667285*343 6 COST X 13*164 
9 EXP UTLZ 99999 12*576 
9 OVERDMND 99999 0*000 9 COST 99999 36177201*741 9 COST X 2#774 
10 EXP UTLZ 99999 4*970 
10 OVEROMND 99999 0*000 10 COST 99999 53626367*367 10 COST X 4*112 
**#* RESOURCE STATISTICS *§## 
2 3 0 
• M M TIME SHOT KUHbER. *i ***** 
TINE VALUc CUMULATIVE TOTAL CJS COST 
0 32955.00 6S910.00 90065.01 131020.00 
360.00 *6*1*.000 . • . 
720.00 *7616.000 . . . 
1000*00 5*3**.000 . . . 
1**0.00 53761.. 000 • • • 
1000.00 50*02.000 . . • 
2160.00 65077.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••*•••••••••••••••». . . 
2520.00 71736.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••«• . • 
20*0.00 6X721.. 000 . . . 
32*0.00 60001.000 , , 
3600.00 682S3.000 . , 
3960.00 62321.000 . . . 
*320.00 70970.000 , . 
*600.00 76521.. 000 . , 
5)1.0.00 7*713.000 . . 
5*00.00 75692.000 . . 
5760.00 79109.000 . » 
(128.80 65093.000 ,•.••.»...•»»».»•.»».•...•»•»•»»•.•••»»..»»••••».». . y 
6*00.00 69307.000 , . 
66*0.00 6*.89.000 . , 
7200.00 70719.000 , » 
7560.00 71807.000 . , 
7920.00 69175.000 . , 
0200.00 77721.. 000 , . 
06*0.00 70931.000 , , 
9000.00 80050.000 , , 
9360.00 69398.000 , , 
9720.00 76863.000 • • 
10000.00 03925.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••«•••*•• , , 
18i.HS.S0 75523.000 , , 
10800.00 852*6.000 , , 
11160.00 9*09*. 000 . . 
11520.00 91562.000 . , 
11880.00 93610.000 , . 
1221.6.00 82292. 000 , . 
12600.00 9569*.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , , 
12960.0 0 99022.000 .•••••••.••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••«••••••••••••###•••••••#•••••»•• , 
13320.00 103205.000 .•••••»•»••••••••••»••••••••••»•••••••••»••••»•••»••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••• . 
13680.00 91.917. 000 .•..••»...»..•.••...••..•..•.....•.•»•.•.•••..••.••..•..•»••.•.••».•••»•» , # 
1*0*0.00 9521*.000 , , 
1**00.00 1*1899.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»••»••»»»•»••••••••»»•»»»»»»»»»•»»»•»»•»»••••»•• . 
1*760.00 92697.000 .•»•••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . . 
15120.00 105890.000 .•••••••.••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••#*••# . 
15*80.00 111222.000 .••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••• # 
158*0.00 102512.000 , 
16200.00 109550.000 .•••••••••••••••••••.•.•••••••.»•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
1656 0.00 12 7165.000 .•»»»»»»»»»»•»»»•»»•»•»»»»»»»•»•»•»»•»»»»••»•»••»»•»»••»»••»»»»•»»»»•»•••»»•••••••»»»»••••••»••*• , 
16920.00 111772.000 .••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
17280.00 112283.000 .•••••••»••••••••••••••.•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••» , 
176*0.0 0 121082.000 .•••••••»••.••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , 
18000.0 0 113507.000 .•»•»..»..•••.»•.....».•.....»•........•»•..•..•.•.•.....•......•......•...•.•••••.•••» , 
1*360.00 128657.000 .•••»•.•.••.»•»••••.•••••»•••.»•.•.••»•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•••••»•.•.•••••••••••••••••••••• . 
10720.0 0 110*36.00 0 .•»••».•.••»•».•••••••.••••.••»•.•...•.»•••••••••••••••••#•••••••••••••.••••••••••••• # 
19080.00 126)9*.000 .•••••..•.•»••.......•......».......•......••...•....•...•.......•...•.•••»»...»•...••»»»•••••••• . 
19**0.0 0 117218.000 .•••••••••••.••..••.••..»•••••••.•..•.•..••••.••••••.••.•••.•.••••••».»•»•••••••••••••#••• . 
19«00.00 131820.000 .••.•.•»•..•.»•...»•.............................,...•......•...•......•.•.....••.••»»»•••••••••••••» 
##*# QUE S T A T I S T I C S #### 
QUE NO. S T A T . TYPE ME AN 
5 NUMB BUSY SERVER 2 . 1 3 1 
5 QUEUE LENGTH 0 . 0 0 0 
5 SYSTM LINE LNGTH 2 . 1 3 1 
5 WAITING TIME 0 . 0 0 0 
5 BUSY 7. 84 . 4 1 9 
5 NUMBER BALKED 0 . 0 0 0 
5 E N T I T I E S PASSED 4 2 3 0 7 . 0 0 0 
5 COST 1 6 9 4 8 2 4 6 9 . 5 1 7 
5 COST X 12.996 
6 NUMB BUSY SERVER 9 . 5 1 5 
6 QUEUE LENGTH 0 . 0 0 0 
6 SYSTM LINE LNGTH 9 . 5 1 5 
8 WAITING TIME 0 . 0 0 0 
8 BUSY 7. 99.867 
8 NUMBER BALKED 0 . 8 0 0 
8 E N T I T I E S PASSED 5 0 5 3 . 0 0 0 
8 COST 63415875.325 
8 COST 7. 4.863 
9 NUMB BUSY SERVER 4 . 7 5 4 
9 QUEUE LENGTH 0 . 0 0 0 
9 SYSTM LINE LNGTH 4 . 7 5 * 
9 WAITING TIME 0 . 8 0 0 
9 BUSY X 9 8 . 4 6 6 
9 NUMBER BALKED 0 . 0 0 0 
9 E N T I T I E S PASSED 2 5 3 4 . 0 0 0 
9 COST 3 1 6 8 6 1 3 1 . 4 4 5 
9 COST 7. 2 . 4 3 0 
• • • 
• • • • • . 
3 7 NUMB BUSY SERVER . 3 7 2 
3 7 QUEUE LENGTH 3 . 7 6 V 
3 7 SYSTM LINE LNGTH 4 . 1 5 6 
3 7 WAITING TIME 6 . 1 0 6 
3 7 BUSY X 3 1 . 7 7 3 
3 7 NUMBER BALKEO 0 . 0 0 0 
3 7 E N T I T I E S PASSED 1 2 2 8 6 . 0 0 0 
3 7 COST 1 4 5 6 0 1 3 2 . 6 1 8 
3 7 COST X 1 , 1 1 6 
3 9 NUMB BUSY SERVER 2 . 6 0 9 
3 9 QUEUE LENGTH 1 . 5 8 1 
3 9 SYSTM LINE LNGTH 4 . 1 9 0 
39 WAITING TIME 7 . 1 8 3 
3 9 BUSY X 9 2 . 4 5 6 
3 9 NUMBER BALKEO 0 . 0 0 0 
3 9 E N T I T I E S PASSED 4 3 5 4 . 0 0 0 
3 9 COST 1 3 0 3 7 8 5 8 4 * 5 2 6 
3 9 COST X 9 . 9 9 8 
232 




























































1 . 000 
25 fffff 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF BUST SERVERS I BOX 391 









1 . 000 .•••*•*•»»****»»** 
0. 000' • 2.000 























• •••• TINE SHOT NUMBER 26 MfM 
TIME VALUE AVERAGE QUEUE LENGTH (BOX 391 
0 1.50 3.01 *.50 6. 
360.06 0.060 4 
72i.il 0.000 
iiai.ii t.000 * • 1**0.•• ••too • • • liii.ii 0.000 • 2160.00 0.000 • * • 2520.ti • 2ii0.it 3.000 
32lti.it 0.000 • 3600.00 0.000 « • 3960.00 0.000 • • » * *320.00 • • *680.00 3.000 • 50*0.00 2.000 • 5*00.00 0.000 • 5760.00 0.000 4 
ftl2i.it 3.000 
6**0.0 0 0.000 • • 6**0.00 1.000 • * 72i0.t* 0.000 • 7560. Oi 0.000 
7920.01 
0280.0 0 0.000 • • » 06*0.00 0.000 a 
9000.•• » 
9360.00 
*72i.Oi t.oot • * 10000.00 »*>** . 
10**0.00 6.066 • a * 10600.00 
11160.01 2. 606 








1**00.66 0.000 * 
1*760.00 2.000 » 
15126.66 • 15*06.•• 0.000 
156*0.66 0. 000 • * 16266.80 » 
16561.00 0. 000 






1*000.01 2.888 a 
19**0.0 0 0.066 • I9iit.0i *.tti * 
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VALUE AVERAGE RESOURCE COST (BOX 39t 
0 3770.50 7557.00 11335.50 15116.11 
2519.108 .«>•>•>•>•>•>••••••••••• 
2519.100 .«>••>•>••••••••••••• . . . . 
2519.tOO . . . . 
5030.000 . . . 
7557.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••» . # 7557.000 . % 5031.000 .• . t 
7557.000 . # 
0.000 • • « . . 
7557.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••«»•••••••••» . f 
5031.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•• . . . 
5031.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••>••••>•• . . . 
2519.011 ••••••• . . . . 
7557.000 . # 
2519.000 . . . . 
0.000 . . . . . 5130.000 .••#•••••••••>•>•>•#•#••>•••>••>••>••>••#• . . . 
0. 000 . . . . . 
2519.OOt . . . . 
2519.000 . . . . 
7557.OOt .••••••••••»•••••»•»••••••••»•••••••••»•••••••»•••• . m 
7557.00 0 . # 7557.100 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••»• , # 5030.000 . , , 
7557.000 . . 
503B.O0O .•••••••••»••••••••••••##»••#••••• . . . 
7557.000 . f 
7557.000 
10176.100 . . 
2519.000 .•>•>••••••••••••••• . . . . 
2519.000 . . . . 
10076.100 ,999999999999999999999999999999999)9999,999*99999999999999999999999999 , . 
10176.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••^••••^•^••••••••••••m , . 
11076.000 . . 
11076.000 ,9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 . . 
10076.000 * ,
5030.000 . . . 
10076.000 .••»••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••#••••••••••••• . . 
12595.0 00 .99999»99999999999999999999999*999999999*9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 . 
0.000 . . . . . 
7557.000 . . 
10076.000 .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••• . . 
5030.000 . . . 
7557.000 . 
12595.000 .•••••••••••••••••••••«••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
• • i f f FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM f f f f f 
CRIME 
FREQUENCIES 









. f f f f f 
OFFENSES COMMITTED 
OFFENDER CATEGORY 1 (MEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 32003 
f f f f f FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM f f f f f 
FREQUENCIES 
0 25 50 75 100 
NODE « • • 
3 . f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f . . . . 
7 . f f f . . . . 
16 . f f f • • • • 
27 * f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f . . • 
3% . f f f f f f . . . . 
35 . f • . • • 
36 . f f f f f f f f f f f f t i • • • • 
t>6 . f f f f f f f f f f . . . • 
SINK BOX REALIZATIONS 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (MEN! 
SAMPLE SIZE « 15972 
##### FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM ##••# 
FREQUENCIES 
FROM TO 
25 50 75 10 
BELOW 
5.00 
1 0 . 0 0 





































i f f 
•••••••••••••• 




INITIAL AGE OF OFFENDER 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (MEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 24759 
M f M FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM • • • • • 
FREQUENCIES 
25 50 75 
FROM TO 
BELOW 1.00 •#»»#»#»#################################f########, 
1 .00 2.00 • ##Mf • • • • • • i f ••••######### 
2.00 3.0 0 • • • • • • • • • • • i f . 
3 .00 4.00 • • M M 
4.00 5.00 . » • • 




9.00 10 .00 
1 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 
ABOVE 1 1 . 0 0 « • « 
NUMBER OF OFFENSES PER OFFENDER 
OFFENDER CATEGORY 1 (MEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 159Z2 
10 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS HOMICIDE = 1 . 9 5 N = 303 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS ROBBFRY = 1.69 N = 808 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS ASSAULT 1 .69 N = 2822 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS BURGLARY = 1 . 5 9 N = 2743 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS G. LARCENY = 1.98 N = 5202 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS AUTO THEFT = 2 .42 N = 2503 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME IS RAPE 2.99 N = 1 4 3 1 
##### FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM f f f f f 
FREQUENCIES 
0 25 50 75 100 
FROM TO • • • • • • • • 
BELOW 5*00 • . . • . 
5.00 10 .00 
10 .00 1 5 . 0 0 • f 
1 5 . 0 0 20.00 • f i i i P f f f f f 
20.00 25.00 
25.00 30.00 • i i i i f f f f f f f f f f f 
30.00 35.00 
35.00 40.00 
40.00 45.00 • i i i r i f f f f f f f 
45.00 50.00 • f f f i J i f f 
50.00 55.00 • i 
55 .00 60.00 • f 
60.00 65.00 • i 
65.00 70.00 • f f 
70.00 75.00 • i i 




ABOVE 95.00 . . , 
FINAL AGE OF OFFENDER 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (HEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 15972 
f f f f f FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM f f f f f 
FREQUENCIES 
25 50 75 100 
FROM 
BELOW 5.00 • 
5.00 10 .00 * 
1 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 0 • 
1 5 . 0 0 20.00 •< 
20.00 25*00 *i Pff 
25.00 30.00 •< Pf f f 
30.00 35.00 . 1 Pff f f f 
3 5 . 00 40*00 •< P f f f f f f 
40.00 45.00 •< P f f f f f f f 
45.00 50.00 . 1 Pf f f f f f 
50*00 55.00 •< P f f f f f f 
55*00 60.00 • < Pff f f f 
60.00 65.00 •< P f f f f f f f 
65*00 70.00 . ! 
70.00 
75.00 »i 
75.00 80.00 •< Pf f ff 
80*00 85*00 • 
85.00 90 • 
90.00 95.00 • 
ABOVE 95.00 • 
OFFENOER DEATH AGE 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (MEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 15972 
*#»»» FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM #»#»» 
FREQUENCIES 
FROM TO 
25 50 75 100 
BELOM 1 . 00 
1 .00 2 . 00 
2.00 3, 00 
3.00 <t, 00 
t.OO 5, 00 
5.00 6, 00 
6.00 7, 00 
7.00 8. 00 
6.00 9. 00 
9.00 1 0 , 00 
10*00 1 1 . 00 
1 1 . 0 0 1 2 . 00 
1 2 . 0 0 1 3 , 00 
1 3 . 0 0 1*>« 00 
lt.OO 1 5 , 00 
1 5 . 0 0 1 6 , 00 
16 .00 1 7 , 00 
1 7 . 0 0 1 8 , 00 
1 8 . 0 0 1 9 , 00 
19 .00 20, 00 
20.00 2 1 , 00 
2 1 . 0 0 22, 00 
22.00 23 , 00 
23 .00 2<t. 00 
2 * . 00 25, 00 
25.00 26, 00 
26.00 27, 00 
27.00 28, 00 
28.00 29, 00 
29.00 30. 00 
30.00 3 1 , 00 
3 1 . 0 0 32 , 00 
32.00 3 3 , 00 
33 .00 3<t, 00 
3*>.Q0 3 5 , 00 
35.00 36. 00 
36.00 37, 00 
37.00 38. 00 
38.80 39, 00 
39.00 %0, 00 
*>0.00 t l . 00 
t l . 0 0 t z , 00 
*>2.00 00 
*>3.00 «•«•. 00 
*>*>.0 0 hS» 00 1*5.0 0 kb, 00 t>6.00 %7, 00 *>7.00 M , 00 M . 0 0 <»9, 00 
ABOVE »>9, 00 
2 6 . CAREER CRIMINAL COST t 1500 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (MEN) 
SAMPLE SIZE = 15972 
239 


































































































































AVERAGE RECORDED VALUE 
27270.09 94997.79 
TINE SERIES OF CAREER CRIMINAL COST 
OFFENDER CATEGORY 1 MEN! 
240 
••••• TXNC SHOT ••••• 
7 j i i . i i 
rriii.it 
7921.11 
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VlLltf 6VUUGC MECOROtO VIvUC 
I .59 1 . 1 1 1.66 (.(1 
1.771 M . M M M . M M M M M M . M M . M M . M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M . 
1.444 . M M M M M . M M M M M M M M M M M M M M . M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M . 
1.661 , 
1.116 , 
1.7*J .• ••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1.I5J . • ••••••••••••••••••••»•••••••••••••••••*•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , 
1.125 .•••••••»••••••••••••»•••»••••••••••••••»•••••••••••••••*••••••••••••»•••••••••••••• . 
1.7Jt .•••«.••»•••••••••••.•.•.•••••••.••.••••••••«•••••••••.•«*••••»••••••••••••••••• , 
1.91* • • • . . . . . . . . . . 
l . l*J .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•••••»•••••••»••••••»•»••• . 
2.121 .•••••«•»•••••••••••••«•••••.•••••••••••••••••••#•••••••••••»•••• . 
2.005 .••••.••••»•••••••»•»•••••••••••••••••••.•••..••••••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
2.199 .•••«•»•••«•••••••»»••.•••••«•»•«•••••••••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»•• . 
1.952 * . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . M M . 
2. l".l • • • . . . . . . M M * . M M . 
1.197 . 
2.112 • . • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • •»• • • • . 
1.9»7 .•••••••••••»•••«•••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••«•••••••••••• * 
1.169 . . . . . . • • • M . . M . . » . » . . . M M . . M » . M M M . . M M M . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
1.797 . • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••••••••••• . 
1.1*2 .•••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••*•••••••••••••#••••••.•.•••••••••••»••••••••••••• . 
2.105 ••••»• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •••••• . 
1.97J .•••••••»•«#••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••#•••••••••••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••• , 
2.195 . •••••••••••••••••••••*• . •••••»• • • • • • # • • • • • • M M M M M M M * . 
1.607 . . . . . . . . . M M . . . • • . 
2.174 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • « • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M . M . M . M M . . 
2*000 • ••• ••••••••••••••••••••• * 
2.019 • • • •••• ••• . .•••.••#..••.•••••••• , 
1.157 .•••••« • » • • • • • # • • M M . . M M • * 
1.467 . « . . M M . » M . . . . . . . . » M M M . . . . M M . » • • • • • • • • . . » • • . . . . . . . . . . . . » . . * # 2.1S7 .•••••••••••••»•••••••••••»••»••••••« ••»•••••• .•• . . » . . . . , . , . . . . . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . • , • • • • f 
2.129 • • • • • » . . • # • • . . . M M . . . . . . . . . M M . 
2.11 J .•• • ••••••••••• •••• . . .*.**•.. . 
2.101 .• , 1.975 .••••»»••• • M » M M . . M M . M . . M M . M M M . M M M » . 
2.112 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• * . . * .»* . . . . . . . . . . . . . « . . . . . ** .* • .* . 
2.17* • • . 
1.651 .••••••.•••••••••*••••••••*•••••«•«•••••••••••••••••»•••»••»••••••••••••••••.•••»•••• . 
2.162 .•• ••....•#••.•••.••....# « . . . « *. . . . . .*•• . 
2.15J .••«••»• M • • » • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . M . M M M M M * , l ibb . • » • • » • . . . . . M M • • . • • • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • » • • . . • • • M M M M M M M . . . . . . . • • • » » » , 
2.1J6 . • • . . •»• ••••»• . 
1.92* , M • • • • • « » « • • • • • • . • • M . . M » . » M . M . M M . M » M » . M M . M . M . » M M M M . . M • » • • • • . 
2.1*5 .•••»••»»•••»••••••» • • • M » M M M . . . M M M M M M . M M . . . M M . . . « M M M M . . . M M M M M M . , 
2.209 .• • • • ••••••»•••••••••••••• 
2.012 . • • • • » • . M M . . • . • . • . . . • » • . • • . • . • • . • . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • M M M M . . . M . M . M . » • » • • • . 
2.17* • • • • • • • * M M M M , 
1.917 .•••».»•»»••••»•••••»•••••»•••••»• • .• . 
2.121 .•••••»•.•••••••••••••»••••••••••••••••»•••»••••••••»••»••••••••••••• • • • • • • . •»• . • • • • • • • • • • • • . 2.007 .•»•• • . . . . • . . . « . . • . • . . • • . . • . • . . . . . . » . • . . . • . • . . . . • • . . . . . . • . . • . . . . • . . . • • . » • •» • • • • • • . •» • • • , 2.162 •...••.«..•...•••.••.•.•«••.•.•••••••••••••«•»•.••••.»•.»••»•••.••••»•••»••.•••••••••« . 
2.151 ,•».•••.••••••«••••»•»•••»•••••••••»••••»••» . 
2.111 . M M . . » » . » » M . • • . • • • » • • • • • • • • . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2.109 . . • • » • » • » • • » . • . • • • • • » • • • • • » • • » » • • • « • • » » . • • » • » » • . • • • « • • • • • • • • • • M . , 
2.8J5 . • • • . » . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • # • . • • • . • M t t M M . 
2.05J • • « • • « « • » • • • « ••••• . 
1.1*2 ,•••••••••••.••••••••••••••••.••.•»•••••.•»•••••••»••••»...•» * .* . .» . .* .* . . . 
2.0*0 .•••••»•».••.••••••.•»••.•»•••.•.•••.•••••••••••••»••••.•»»..,»•»•......,•...,.#•#••••#•••••• . 
2.1 JJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . # 2.161 .•••••»•»•••••••••.»•••••.•. .••. .••.•••.•••••»•.••••••••. .• .• . # 
2.111 . M M . M » . . M « M . M . M . . » « . M . M « . . . . » . . . , 
2.162 . • • • M M . 
2.H.5 . M . M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . * . . . . . . * » . » . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1.9*9 . • • .» • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . •» . . • •» • 
* • • » • • • • 
2.10J . • • M M M M . M M . M . . M . . M M ^ 
2.1*7 . . . . M . . M M M M . . * . . , 
TiMC sinus o r mmaen or amuses pes QfriHOt* 
OFFENDER CHICORY 1 IHENI 
fffff TINE SHOT fffff 
2 4 1 





























































































































































































TIME SERIES 07 (CAREER COSTI/tNUNBER OF OFFENSES) 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 INENI 
(((•( TIHt SHOT ***** 
2h2 







































































































































TINt SERIES OF AVERAGE AGE OF OFFENOER 
OFFENOER CATEGORY 1 (NENI 
243 
A P P E N D I X D 
C J S S U B R O U T I N E L I S T I N G S 
244 
c 
SUBROUTINE U S E R B ( K O D E , 0 1 . D 2 , 0 3 , 0 4 , 0 5 , 0 6 , D 7 , 0 0 , 0 9 , N R E S . L O C R E S . 
• I F R E Q , A T R I B , T S , I A T R I B > 
C 
C PURPOSE! TO INPUT SPECIAL USER-SUPPLIED DATA 




• M B E G I N , A C S , P R G , M E Q U E , M E R E S , M E S E V , H E H I S , M I S , M O N T H S , I Y E A R S , 
• D C C C , M I C C C , S C C C , S N O F S , I C O F , T S T O P , T I N I T L , I E R R O R , A N O , T R A C E F , 
• A N 0 F S < 4 , 7 > , N 0 < 4 , 7 ) , R S U H ( 1 0 ) , R S Q ( 1 0 ) , R M A X ( 1 0 ) , R N U N , R T I N E , S A G E 
» , R G R O W ( 1 0 ) , S I N I T Q 
COMMON/BASE/ARRAY(56000) ,UOATA(3 000) 
C 0 N M 0 N / G L 0 B A L / C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , F S H 0 T , I R , I P , I G 0 , I F R 0 M , I T S 1 , I F R 1 , I A V A I L , 
• I D R U N , I T O , I R A T E , I S T U P , I P R T Y , I S P S E G , I F U L L * I S P 1 , I S P 8 , I S P 9 , 
• I S P 1 0 , I S P 1 1 , I S P 1 2 , I S P 1 5 , I S P 2 1 , I P I , I P 2 , I P 3 , I P 4 , I P 5 , I P 6 , 
• I P 7 , I P 8 . I P 9 . I P 1 0 , I P 1 1 , I S E E 0 , I T 0 P , I P 1 5 F , I P 1 5 , I P 1 6 . I P 1 7 , 
• I P 1 8 , I P 1 9 , I P 2 0 , I P 2 1 , I P 2 2 , I P 2 3 , I P 2 4 , J H A L F , K , L 0 C R 2 , 
•MAXAR, MAXUO, MAXIA, MAXID, MHST, MENTRY, MRES, M B 0 X , N R E S 1 , 
•MMRES, MDELET, MWORK, MV, MCELL, NQBOX,NFVAR,NST, 
• N E R R , NOHPAS, NPASS, NBOX, NGRP, NETRL, NTRACE, NCALL, N S I N K , 
• N Q B 1 , NQB2, NSOUR, NDBOX, NRB0X, NATRIB, N C E L L , T C A L L , U T I M E , 
• I S W 1 , I S W 2 , I S M 3 , ISW4, I S W 5 , V A R 1 , V A R 2 , VAR3, VAR4, VAR5, L I N E * 
• N R A T E , IWRITE* I P A S S , KSUM,LTOP, TNOH, TLAST* 
•NODMP, CONT* COST* END* NXTMOO,QUE, R E S C , RESCHG, S E P R T , 
• S T O E P , TMCOST,UIN, UOUT, UFORM, STCHG,NOPREM, L U 1 , L U 2 , L U 3 , L U 4 , 
• L U 5 , L U 6 , L U 7 , L U 8 , L U 9 , L U 1 0 . L L A G . LLSEGM, LORS 
C 
LOGICAL L U 1 , L U 2 , L U 3 , L U 4 , L U 5 , L U 6 , L U 7 , L U 8 , L U 9 , L U 1 0 , L L A G , 
• L L S E G M , LORS* DUMP, TRACEF 
LOGICAL CONT, COST, END, NXTMOO,QUE, R E S C , RESCHG, S E P R T , 
• S T O E P , TMCOST,UIN, UOUT, UFORM, STCHG,NOPREM, NOOMP 
C 
INTEGER 0 1 , 0 2 , D 3 , D 4 , D 5 , D 6 , D 7 , D 8 , D 9 , S U B N 
INTEGER N R E S ( 0 1 , 0 4 ) , I F R E Q ( 0 8 , D 9 ) , L O C R E S ( 0 4 , 0 5 ) , I A T R I B ( D 2 , D 3 ) , 
• I A C 5 8 0 0 0 ) , L O C ( I O O ) , I U D A T A ( 3 0 0 0 ) , NP(IOO) 
INTEGER C R I M E ( 7 ) , I D A R C S ( 7 ) , 0 U M ( 2 0 , 2 ) 
C 
REAL A T R I B ( 0 2 , 0 3 ) , T S ( D 6 , D 7 ) , A ( 5 8 0 0 0 ) 
REAL P R 0 B M ( 7 ) , P R 0 B F ( 7 ) , 0 E L P R 0 ( 7 ) , 0 E L F I ( 7 > , O E L D I S ( 7 ) , 
• D E L P A R ( 7 ) , D E L P R I ( 7 > , A N 0 ( 7 > , S C R A C H ( 2 8 0 ) , I C O F ( 4 ) , S C C C ( 4 ) , S N O F S ( 4 ) , 
• S A G E ( 4 ) 
REAL ARC ( 7 , 7 ) , S W I T C H ( 7 , 7 ) , B A R G A N ( 7 , 1 5 ) , 
• C 0 N V I C ( 7 , 1 5 ) , T D I S P ( 1 5 , 7 ) , T S 0 U R ( 1 5 , 4 ) , P D I S P ( 1 5 , 7 ) , 
• P S D U R ( 1 5 , 4 > , T B A R ( 7 ) , S E V E R E ( 7 ) , D I S P L ( 7 , 7 ) , S D U R L ( 7 , 4 ) , 
• T A R C C 7 ) , D E M 0 ( 7 , 6 , 6 ) , Y J A I L ( 7 ) , A J A I L ( 7 ) , C J A I L ( 7 ) , 
• P P 0 P C 7 ) , A B A R ( 7 ) , A S D C 7 ) , A M I N « 7 I , A M A X ( 7 ) , P R I S 0 N M ( 1 5 ) , P R I S 0 N F ( 1 5 ) , 
















OATA N A X A R C / 7 / 
OATA SUBN/8HUSERB / 
C 
C NANELISTSI 
N A N E L I S T / S T I H E / I O t T B A R 
N A H E L I S T / F L O U T / I D , N A R C , I O A R C S t A R C 
NAMELIST/PARAH/NCRIME,NCHARG,NOISP,NSOISP,OUNP, ISEEO, 
•NOC,ADULT,NSBOX,NEBOX,MEQUE,NERE S , H E S E V , M E H I S , H I S , 
• P R G , I C C C , N I C C C , T S T O P , T I N I T L , H B E G I N , T R A C E F , R T I M E . R G R O H , S I N I T Q 
N A N E L I S T / C R I M E S / S M I T C H , S E V E R E , A N O , Y J A I L * A J A I L , C J A I L , T S E V E R 
NAMELIST/OFFENDR/CAT,PPOP,ABAR,A SO,ANIN,ANAX 




N A N E L I S T / R E C I D / P R O B N , P R O B F , D E L P R O , D E L F I , O E L O I S , O E L P A R , O E L P R I 
C 
C 
I F ( K 0 0 E . E Q . 2 ) G 0 TO 1 
C 
C • • # • # # # # # • • # • • # # # # • # • • # • # • # # • # # # • # # • # # # • # # # # # # # # # # # • # # # § # # • • # # § • # 
C SAVE DIMENSIONS OF CERTAIN GNS ARRAYS 
C # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # • # # # # # # # # # # # # # • # # # # # # # # # • # # » • • # # # # c 
I F ( K O O E . N E . l > C A L L E R R I N ( 0 , 0 , 8 H U S E R B , 8 H I L L E G A L , 
• 8HSUBR0UTI,8HNE CALL ,8H ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 8 0 0 , 9 8 8 0 ) 
0 6 = I T S 1 
D7=HCELL 
D8=IFR1 
D9 S NCELL 
RETURN 
C 
C • # # • # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # • # # # # # # • # # # # # • # # # # • # # # # # # • # # # # # # • # # # # # • # # • # # 
C READ AND STORE USER OATA IN ARRAYS UOATA ANO IUOATA 
C • # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # • # # # • # • # # # # # # # • * # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # • # • # # # • • • # # • # # c 




( I A ( 1 ) , A l l ) , ARRAY! 1 ) , L O C ( D ) , 
( U O A T A ( l ) , l U O A T A ( l ) , N P ( 1 ) I 
( S C R A C H ( l ) , O E N O ( l , l , l ) , O U N ( 1 , 1 ) , S W I T C H ( 1 , 1 ) , 
8 A R G A N ( 1 , 1 ) , C O N V I C ( 1 , 1 ) , O I S P L ( 1 , 1 ) , P R I S O N M ( l ) , 
P R O B N ( l ) 1 
( S C R A C H ( 5 0 ) , T B A R ( l ) , A R C ( 1 , 1 ) , S E V E R E ( 1 ) , S O U R L ( 1 , 1 ) , 
P R I S O N F ( l ) , P R O B F ( l ) ) 
<SCRACH<60) , OELP0UH1H 
( S C R A C H ( 7 0 ) , O P A R 0 L ( 1 ) , DELFI ( 1 ) ) 
( S C R A C H ( 8 0 ) , O E L D I S ( D ) 
(SCRACH(IOO) , T A R C ( l ) , P V I O L ( l ) , O E L P A R ( l ) ) 
( S C R A C H ( l l O ) , I D A R C S ( 1 ) • P O I S P ( 1 , 1 ) , T D I S P ( 1 , 1 ) , 
OELPRI ( 1 ) ) 












I S E E D - 6 0 6 1 7 
I C C C - 1 O 0 0 
MICCC»200 
T S T O P S 5 0 
T I N I T L * 0 
MBEGIN=0 
N D I S P - 1 
N S D I S P = l 
R T I N E - 1 . 
OO 1 1 I G = 1 , M R E S 
1 1 RGROW(IB)*Q, 
S I N I T Q - 0 « 
READ(8,PARAN) 
I F ( M E Q U E . L E . O ) S INITQ=0 
T I N I T L = A H A X 1 ( 0 . , T I N I T L ) 
T I N I T L = A H I N 1 ( T S T 0 P , T I N I T L > 
R T I M E - A M I N 1 ( R T I M E , ( T S T O P - T I N I T L ) ) 
R T I M E = ( R T I H E * T I N I T L I » 3 6 0 « 
DCCC*ICCC 
I F ( M E R E S . L E . O ) P R G = 0 . 
OO 1 8 I G = 1 . M R E S 
1 8 R G R 0 H ( I G 1 * R G R 0 H C I G ) / 1 2 P 
C 
C PERFORM ERROR CHECKS 
MENTRUMTSTOP»360*FSHOT)/TCALL>1 
IF(HCELL-MENTRU) 1 0 , 5 0 , 5 1 
1 0 T S T O P = ( ( M C E L L - 1 ) » T C A L L * F S H O T ) / 3 6 0 « 
W R I T E ( 6 . 7 ) TSTOP 
7 FORMAT(1H0, 'USER INPUT WARNING! TSTOP «NE« MCELL*. 
• 10X,»NEW TSTOP = » , F 1 0 * 2 ) 
I F ( T S T O P . L E . T I N I T L ) STOP 
5 0 INDLST*IP2<.+ I S P 1 2 
I F ( M A X I A - I N O L S T ) 8 , 5 1 , 5 1 
8 W R I T E ( 6 , 9 ) MAXIA.INOLST 
9 FORMAT(1H0.*USER INPUT ERROR! MAXIA = » . I 7 . * »GT* ACTUAL » » , 5 I 7 ) 
STOP 
C 
C N P ( I - 1 , N P N ) ARE POINTERS TO SUBARRAYS OF UOATA 
5 1 N P N S 3 2 
INO-NPN 
C 
C READ OFFENOER OATA 
NCODEM 
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I F ( D U M P ) M R I T E ( 6 , 2 > 
2 FORMAT(* FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES AND I N D I C E S * . 
• * OF USER INPUT ARRAYS CONTAINING P R O B A B I L I T I E S * / > 
3 FORMAT C 1 0 X , ! * > , • . NAMES » , A 1 Q , * I N D I C E S * * , . 
• 1 0 X . A 1 0 , * = * , 1 5 , 1 0 X . A 1 O , • > * • , , X 5 1 
OO 1 2 N=l ,NOC 
READC0.OFFENOR) 
OO 1 2 I K = 1 , N C R I M E 
OEMOCIK»N,l>-CAT 
D E M 0 < I K , N , 2 i = P P 0 P ( I K i 
D E M 0 ( I K , N , 5 ) * A M I N ( I K > 
DEM0( IK,N,6 )=ANAXCIK> 
C CONVERT MEAN AND STD. OEV. TO PARAMETERS OF GAMMA OISTN. 
D E M O d K . N , * ) = A S D ( I K ) * A S D ( I K ) 
0 E M 0 ( I K , N , 3 ) - A B A R C I K ) / O E M O ( I K » N , * » 
OEMO(IK,N,<t )=ABAR(IKf * 0 E M 0 ( I K , N , 3 ) 
I F ( O E M O ( I K , N . « > ) . G T . 1 0 0 « ) D E N 0 C I K , N . * > , * 1 # 
1 2 CONTINUE 
C 
C STORE OFFENDER DATA 
N P < l 2 i * I N O * l 
NARRAY=10HOENO(2) 
NIND1-10HCRIME 
OO 3 0 6 I K = l , N C R I M E 
NC0DE=NC0DE*1 
I F ( O U M P ) M R I T E ( 6 , 3 ) N C O O E . N A R R A Y . N I N 0 1 « I K 
DO 3 0 6 N=l ,NOC 
00 306 J * 1 . 6 
IND=IND+1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . N E . 2 ) G 0 TO 3 0 6 
I F ( N . G T . 1 ) 0 E M 0 ( I K , N , J > = 0 E M 0 ( I K « N • J ) + O E M O ( I K . N - l , J ) 
I F ( N . E Q . N 0 C . A N D . D E M 0 ( I K . N 0 C , 2 I . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G 0 TO 4>00 
I F ( D E M O ( I K . N , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) G O TO *>0 0 
3 0 6 UDATA(IND)=DEMO(IK,N, J ) 
C 
C STORE S E R V I C E TIMES IN UOATA CSTIHE SUBARRAY) 
N P ( 3 ) = I N D * 1 
DO 1 0 0 I = l , N S B O X 
C READ S E R V I C E TIMES—EACH ARRAY MUST HAVE 7 VALUES 
R E A 0 ( 6 * S T I M E ) 
O U M ( I , l ) = I D 
00 1 0 0 J = l , N C R I M E 
IND=IND+1 
1 0 0 UDATA(INC)=TBAR(J ) 
C 
C CREATE POINTERS FOR SUBARRAY STIME AND STORE IN IPST 
N P ( l ) s l N D * l 
DO 97 I D ' l . H B O X 
D U M ( I D . 2 ) = 0 
00 90 J * 1 . N S 8 0 X 
90 I F ( 0 U M ( J . l ) . E Q . I 0 ) 0 U M ( I 0 . 2 ) = N P ( 3 ) - K J f l ) » N C R I M E 
IND=IND+1 
97 IUDATA(IND)*DUM(I0 ,2 ) 
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c 
C STORE ARC TRANSITION P R O B A B I L I T I E S 




OO 200 I = 1 . N E B 0 X 
C READ ANO STORE MATRIX* EACH SOURCE NODE HUST 
C HAVE 7 CRIME ENTRIES PER ARC 
READ(8 .FLOUT) 
D U M ( I , l ) = I O 
IF(NARC.GT.MAXARC)GO TO A>03 
I F ( I 0 . E Q . 2 3 ) G 0 TO 1 3 
I F ( I D . E Q . 3 0 ) G O TO 1 4 
I F ( I D . E Q * 3 2 ) G 0 TO 1 5 
GO TO 1 7 
1 3 I F ( I 0 A R C S ( 1 ) * N E * 2 5 ) G 0 TO 404 
I F ( I D A R C S < 2 ) . N E . 2 8 ) G 0 TO 404 
I F ( I D A R C S ( 3 ) . N E * 5 4 ) G 0 TO 404 
GO TO 1 6 
1 4 I F ( I D A R C S ( 1 ) . N E * 3 1 ) G 0 TO 4 0 5 
I F ( I 0 A R C S ( 2 ) * N E * 3 2 ) G 0 TO 4 0 5 
GO TO 1 6 
1 5 I F ( I D A R C S ( 1 ) . N E . 3 7 ) G 0 TO 406 
I F ( I D A R C S ( 2 ) * N E * 3 9 ) G 0 TO 406 
1 6 00 1 3 0 J = 1 , N A R C 
NCOOE-NCOOE-fl 
I F ( D U M P ) W R I T E ( 6 , 3 ) N C O O E , N A R R A Y , N I N D 1 , I D , N I N D 2 , I O A R C S ( J > 
00 1 3 0 K 1 * 1 , N C R I M E 
IND=INO-»-l 
C TEST CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) G O TO 1 2 8 
T A R C ( K 1 ) = A R C ( K 1 , J ) 
GO TO 1 2 9 
1 2 8 T A R C ( K 1 ) = T A R C ( K 1 ) * A R C ( K 1 , J > 
1 2 9 I F ( T A R C C K l ) * G T * 1*05 )GO TO 400 
I F ( J » E Q * N A R C * A N 0 * T A R C ( K l ) * L T * * 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G O TO 4 0 0 
U O A T A ( I N O ) = A R C ( K 1 , J l 
1 3 0 I F ( J . E Q . 1 . A N O . K 1 . E Q . 1 ) O U M ( I , 2 ) * I N D 
GO TO 2 0 0 
1 7 CALL L O C F ( I O , l , L O C P , L O C P P > 
00 1 4 0 J = 1 , M A R C 
I F ( I O A R C S ( J ) . N E . I A ( L O C P ) > G O TO 4 0 1 
L 0 C P = L 0 C P * 1 
NCODE = NCOOE-H 
I F ( O U M P ) H R I T E ( 6 . 3 ) N C O O E . N A R R A V . N I N 0 1 . I O V N I N 0 2 . I O A R C S ( J ) 
00 1 4 0 K l = l , N C R I M E 
IND*IND*1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) A R C ( K 1 , J ) = A R C ( K l , J H > A R C ( K l , v l > l > 
I F ( A R C ( K 1 , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) G O TO 400 
I F ( J . E Q . N A R C . A N O . A R C ( K 1 , J > * L T * . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G O T O 400 
U 0 A T A ( I N D ) * A R C ( K 1 * J ) 
1 4 0 I F ( J . E Q . 1 . A N D . K 1 . E Q . 1 ) O U M ( I , 2 ) « I N O 
2 0 0 CONTINUE 
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c 
C CREATE POINTERS TO ARC ANO STORE I N SUBARRAY IPARC 
N P ( 2 ) = I N D + 1 
OO 2 0 1 IO=l,MBOX 
I N D = I N 0 + 1 
IUDATA(IND)=0 
DO 2 0 1 J = l . N E B O X 
2 0 1 I F ( D U M ( J . l ) . E Q . I D ) I U D A T A ( I N D ) = D U M ( J , 2 ) 
C 
C READ CRIME SEVERITY I SNITCH MATRICES I P R E - T R I A L DETENTION PROB* 
00 2 0 2 I = 1 , N C R I M E 
2 0 2 S E V E R E ( I ) = 1 . 0 
T S E V E R = 0 . 
READ(8,CRIMES) 
C 
C STORE CRIME SWITCH MATRIX 
N P ( 5 ) s l N O * l 
1 0 = 0 
NARRAY=1OHSWITCH 
NIN01>10HORIG CRIME 
DO 220 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
NCOOE=NCODE*l 
IF(DUMP)WRITE(6*3)NCODE* N A R R A Y * N I N D 1 , 1 
DO 2 2 0 J - 1 , N C R I M E 
I N 0 = I N 0 * 1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) S W I T C H ( J , I ) = S W I T C H ( J , I ) * S W I T C H ( J - 1 , I ) 
I F ( S W I T C H ( J , I ) . G T . l . 0 5 ) G O T O 400 
I F ( J . E Q . N C R I M E . A N D . S W I T C H ( J , I ) . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G O T O 400 
2 2 0 U D A T A ( I N D ) = S W I T C H ( J , I ) 
C 
C COMPUTE AVERAGE CRIME SEVERITY TO BE USED IN THE PROCESSING OF 
C INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT OFFENSE OF THE OEFENOANT 
ACS = 0 
DO 2 2 1 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
2 2 1 ACS=ACS«-SEVERECI) 
ACS-ACS/FLOAT(NCRIME) 
IFCTSEVER . G T . O . ) A C S = T S E V E R 
C 
C STORE CRIME S E V E R I T I E S 
N P ( 1 4 ) = I N D + 1 
DO 3 0 8 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
IND=IN0-H 
38 6 U D A T A ( I N D ) s S E V E R E d ) 
C 
R E A 0 ( 8 , P L E A ) 
C 
C STORE PLEA BARGAINING TRANSITION MATRIX 
N P ( 6 ) s I N 0 * l 
NARRAY=10HBARGAN 
NIND1*10HARREST CHG 
00 3 0 0 1 * 1 , N C R I M E 
NCOOE=MCOOE+l 
IF (OUMP)WRITE(6 ,3 )NCOOE.NARRAV,HINDI , I 
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00 3 0 1 J - l t N C H A R G 
INO=INO+l 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) B A R G A N ( I , J ) * B A R G A N ( I , J ) + B A R G A N ( I . J r * l ) 
I F C J . E Q . N C H A R G . A N D . B A R G A N ( I , J ) . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 > G 0 TO 4>00 
IFCBARGANCI , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) GO TO *00 
300 U D A T A ( I N O ) = B A R G A N ( I . J ) 
C 
C STORE PLEA DISPOSITION MATRIX 
NPC6)«XN0+1 
NARRAY=10HPOISP 
N I N 0 1 = 1 0 H P L E A CHARG 
DO 3 0 2 1 = 1 , N C H A R G 
NCOOEsNCOOE+l 
I F ( O U M P ) W R I T E(6 , 3 ) N C 0 0 E , N A R R A Y , N I N D 1 , I 
00 3 0 2 J = l , N D I S P 
I N 0 = I N 0 + 1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F C J . G T . l ) P D I S P ( I . J ) = P D I S P ( I . J ) * P D I S P < I . J » f l ) 
I F ( P D I S P ( I , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) GO TO %00 
I F ( J . E Q . N D I S P . A N D . P D I S P C I . J ) . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G O T O %00 
3 0 2 U O A T A ( I N O ) = P D I S P ( I , J ) 
C 
C STORE PLEA BARGAINEO SENTENCE OURATION 
N P ( 1 0 ) = I N D + 1 
00 30l» 1 = 1 , N C H A R G 
00 3 0 * J = 1 , N S 0 I S P 
IND=IND+1 








00 3 0 1 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
NC0DE=NC0DE*1 
I F ( O U M P ) W R I T E(6 , 3 ) N C 0 D E , N A R R A Y , N I N D 1 , I 
00 3 0 1 J = 1 . N C H A R G 
I N D = I N 0 + 1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) C 0 N V I C ( I . J ) = C 0 N V I C ( I . J ) + C 0 N V I C ( I . J - 1 ) 
I F ( C O N V I C ( I t J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) G O TO *00 
I F C J . E Q . N C H A R G . A N D . C O N V I C C I . J ) . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G O T O * 0 0 
3 0 1 U O A T A ( I N D ) = C O N V I C ( I . J ) 
C 
C STORE SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL DISPOSITION MATRIX 
N P ( 9 ) * I N D + 1 
NARRAY=10HTOISP 
NIN01=10HCONV CHARG 
00 3 0 3 1 * 1 , N C H A R G 
NC00E=NC00E+1 
IF(OUHP)WRITE(6,3)NCOOE . N A R R A T , N I N D 1 , X 
00 3 0 3 J * 1 , N 0 I S P 
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IND=IND+1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) T O I S P < I , J > = T D I S P ( I , J ) + T D I S P ( I , J - 1 ) 
I F < T D I S P ( I , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 ) G O TO 400 
I F ( J . E Q . N D I S P . A N O « T D I S P ( I , J ) . L T . . 9999999)GO TO 4 0 0 
3 1 3 U D A T A ( I N O ) = T D I S P ( I f J ) 
C 
C 
C STORE TRIAL SENTENCE DURATION 
N P ( 1 1 ) = I N D * 1 
DO 3 0 5 1 = 1 , N C H A R G 
DO 3 0 5 J = 1 , N S D I S P 
IND=IND+1 




C STORE LOWER COURT SENTENCE PROBABILITES 
N P ( 1 3 ) = I N D + 1 
NARRAY-10HDISPL 
N I N D 1 - 1 0 H C R I H E 
DO 3 0 7 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
NCODE=NCODE+l 
IF(DUMP)WRITE(6«3)NCOOE«NARRAV«NIND1«I 
DO 3 0 7 J = 1 , N D I S P 
INO=INO*1 
C STORE CUMULATIVE P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
I F ( J . G T . l ) O I S P L C I , J ) = O I S P L ( I , J ) + O I S P L ( I , J l l ) 
I F C D I S P L ( I , J ) . G T . 1 . 0 5 > G O T O 4Q0 
I F ( J . E Q . N D I S P . A N D . D I S P L ( I , J ) . L T . . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ) G 0 T 0 A>00 
3 0 7 U D A T A ( I N O ) = O I S P L ( I , J ) 
C 
C STORE LOWER COURT SENTENCE OURATIONS 
I J K = I N D * 1 
00 3 1 3 1 = 1 , N C R I M E 
00 3 1 3 J = 1 , N S 0 I S P 
I N 0 = I N 0 + 1 
3 1 3 U D A T A ( I N O ) = S D U R L ( I , J ) 
IND=IND*1 
I U O A T A ( I N O ) » I J K 
C 
C STORE P R E - T R A I L DETENTION P R O B A B I L I T E I S I JUVENILE 1 ADULT 
N P ( 1 5 ) = I N D < - 1 
JNO-IND 
NARRAYslOHA/Y J A I L 
NIND1=10HCRIME 
00 3 0 9 I = 1 , N C R I M E 
J N 0 = J N 0 + 1 
NC0DE=NC0DE+1 
I F ( D U M P ) W R I T E ( 6 , 3 ) N C O 0 E , N A R R A Y , N I N 0 1 , I 
I F < Y J A I L < I > . G T . 1 . 0 5 . 0 R . A J A I L ( I ) . G T . 1 . 8 5 ) G O TO 400 





3 0 9 U 0 A T A ( I N D > * C J A I L < I > 
C 
C READ PAROLE DATA 
00 3 1 0 1 = 1 . N C H A R G 
P R I S O N M ( I > = 1 . 
P R I S O N F ( I > = 1 . 
3 1 0 P V I O L < I > = 0 . 
READ(OtPAROLE) 
C 
C STORE PAROLE DATA 
N P < 1 6 ) « I N 0 + 1 
00 3 1 1 I * 1 . N C H A R G 
IND=IND+1 
3 1 1 UDATA(INC)=PRISONM(I) 
00 3 1 2 1 = 1 . N C H A R G 
IND=IND*1 
3 1 2 UDATA(IND)=PRISONF(I> 
N P ( 1 7 ) = I N D + 1 
00 3 1 7 1 = 1 . N C H A R G 
IND=IND+1 
3 1 7 UDATA(IND)=DPAROL(I) 
00 3 1 6 1 = 1 . N C H A R G 
IND=IND+1 
3 1 6 UDATA(IND)=PVIOL( I ) 
C 
C READ R E C I D I V I S M DATA 
DO 3 1 9 1 = 1 . 7 PROBM(I>=a. 
3 1 9 P R O B F ( ! > = • • 
READ(6«RECI0> 
C 
C STORE RECIDIVISM P R O B A B I L I T I E S 
N P ( 1 6 > = I N D * 1 
00 3 1 4 1 = 1 . 7 
I N 0 = I N D + 1 
I N 1 * I N 0 * 7 
UDATA(IND)=PROBF(I ) 
3 1 4 UDATA(INl )=PROBM(I ) 
IND=IN1 
C 
C STORE RECIDIVISM DELAY TIMES 
N P ( 1 9 ) = I N 0 * 1 
DO 3 1 5 1 = 1 . 7 
IND=IND+1 
I N l = I N 0 + 7 
I N 2 s l N l * 7 
I N 3 = I N 2 + 7 
I N 4 = I N 3 * 7 
UOATA(IND)*OELPRO(I> 
U D A T A ( I N 1 > = 0 E L F I ( I > 
U D A T A ( I N 2 ) = D E L 0 I S ( I > 
UOATA(IN3)«OELPAR(I ) 
3 1 5 U D A T A ( I N 4 ) « 0 E L P R I ( I I 
XMD»IN4 
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C CREATE POINTERS FOR USER S T A T I S T I C S 
N P ( 2 0 ) = I N O * l 
N P ( 2 1 i s N P ( 2 0 i + N O C * l 
HP(22)=NP(21>+N0C+20+1 
NPC23)=NP(22t"fN0C»NCRIME<rl 
NPC2<*)=NPC23 i*N0CM2 'H 
NPC25) =NP<2*>>+N0C»8-H 
N P ( 2 6 ) =NP(25)-«-N0C»MICCC+l 
M 0 N T H S = I F I X C T S T 0 P » 1 2 « ) r I F I X ( T X N l T L * 1 2 « ) 
IYEARS-MONTHS/6 
NP(2 ,* )=NP(26 l - fN0C»IYEARS 
NPC28)=NPC27>*N0C»IYEARS 
N P ( 2 9 ) = N P ( 2 8 ) + N 0 C » I Y E A R S 
NP<30>=NP<29>•NOC»IYEARS 
N P ( 3 1 ) = N P ( 3 0 ) + N O C » 2 0 + 1 
N P ( 3 2 ) = N P ( 3 1 ) * N 0 C * 2 0 * 1 
C 
C I N I T I A L I Z E S T A T I S T I C S COLLECTION ARRAYS 
I N 1 = N P < 2 0 > 
I N 2 = N P C 2 6 ) - 1 
DO 3 1 6 I N D = I N 1 , I N 2 
3 1 6 IUDATA(IND)=8 
I B = N P ( 2 0 ) 
IUDATA(IB)sNOC 
I B = N P < 2 1 > 
I U O A T A ( I B ) = 2 0 
I B * N P ( 2 2 1 
IUDATA(IB)=NCRIHE 
I B = N P ( 2 3 ) 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = 1 2 
IB=NP(2*>) 
I U 0 A T A ( I B » = 8 
I B = N P ( 2 5 ) 
IUDATA(IB)=MICCC 
I N 1 = N P ( 3 0 ) 
I N 2 = N P ( 3 2 ) - 1 
00 3 2 0 I N D = I N 1 , I N 2 
3 2 0 IUDATA(INO)=0 
I B = N P ( 3 0 » 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = 2 0 
I B = N P < 3 1 > 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = 2 0 
C 
C I N I T I A L I Z E TIME S E R I E S COLLECTION ARRAYS 
I N 1 = N P ( 2 6 ) 
I N 2 = N P ( 3 0 ) - 1 
00 3 2 1 I N D = I N 1 , I N 2 
3 2 1 UDATACINO#»0. 
00 3 2 1 1 I N D = 1 , N 0 C 
S C C C ( I N O ) = 0 . 
S N O F S ( I N D ) = 0 . 
ICOF( IND>»0 
3 2 1 1 SA6E( INO)sO» 
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c 
00 3 2 2 I C R I H E * 1 * NCRIME 
DO 3 2 2 I B = 1 , N 0 C 
A N O F S ( I B , I C R I M E ) = 0 . 
3 2 2 N O ( I B , I C R I M E ) = 0 
C 
DO 3 2 3 I = 1 . M R E S 
RSUM(I ) -Q 
R S Q ( I ) = 0 
RMAX(I )=0 
3 2 3 RNUM=0 
C 
C CHECK THE S I Z E OF THE USER ARRAY 
IF(NP(NPN).GT.MAXUO)GOTO 4 0 2 
C 
IF(DUMP) WRITE(6*5 ) 
5 F O R M A T ( 1 H 0 . 1 0 X , - T H E R E ARE NOT ANY OBVIOUS ERRORS IN THESE** 
• • P R O B A B I L I T I E S * ) 
C 
C ECHO CHECK THE USER DATA 
CALL U S E R 0 ( 0 1 , D 2 , D 3 , D 4 , D 5 , 0 6 , 0 7 , D 8 , D 9 , N R E S , L 0 C R E S , I F R E Q , 




C fffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff##ffff ffffffffffffffffffffffIfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ffff 
C ERRORS OCCURREO IN USER INPUT OATA 
C f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
c 
• 1 0 H NE 1 I H t .NARRAY)•RETURNS(500*5OOi 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 1 CALL E R R I N ( I D , I O A R C S ( J ) , S U B N , 1 0 H I N C O R R E C T ,10HORDERING 0 , 
• 1 0 H F ARCS FOL*10HLOMING B O X ) . R E T U R N S ( 5 0 0 , 5 0 0 ) 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 2 W R I T E ( 6 , 4 ) N P ( N P N ) , MAXUD 
4 FORMAT(1H0*» S I Z E REQUIRED FOR USER A R R A Y I » , I 6 , 
• • S I Z E A L L 0 C A T E D l » , I 6 ) 
CALL E R R I N ( 0 , 4 7 , S U B N , 1 0 H I N S U F F STO,10HRAGE IN UO, 
• lOHATAl CHECK,18H MAXUDl ) . R E T U R N S ( 5 0 0 , 5 0 0 ) 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 3 WRITE ( 6 , 6)ID.NARC.MAXARC 
6 FORMAT(• ERROR IN USERBI ff OF FOLLOWER BOXES OF BOX** 
• 1 4 , • I S M I S S P E C I F I E D f • 2 1 1 0 ) 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 4 CALL E R R I N ( I O , I D , S U B N , 1 0 H F O R BOX 2 3 , 1 0 H I IOARCS « 
•10HMUST BE 2 5 . 1 0 H . 2 0 , 5 4 ) . R E T U R N S ( 5 0 0 , 5 0 0 ) 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 5 CALL E R R I N ( I D , I D , S U B N , 1 0 H F O R BOX 3 0 , 1 0 H l IOARCS « 
•10HHUST BE 3 1 . 1 0 H , 3 2 ) . R E T U R N S ( 5 0 0 , 5 0 0 ) 
GO TO 5 0 0 
4 0 6 CALL E R R I N ( I O , I O , S U B N , 1 0 H F O R BOX 3 2 . 1 0 H I IOARCS * 
•1BHMUST BE 3 7 , 1 8 H , 3 9 ) , R E T U R N S ( 5 8 8 , 5 8 0 ) 






SUBROUTINE U S E R C ( 1 0 * I A D R * N , V A L » N N , 0 1 » D 2 * 0 3 * 0 * . 0 5 * 0 6 * 0 7 , 0 6 » D 9 * 
• N R E S * L O C R E S , I F R E Q * A T R I B , I A T R I B * T S ) * RETURNS(MQXI*HXYZ) 
C 
C PURPOSES TO EXECUTE SPECIAL USER-SUPPLIEO LOGIC 
C OURING SIMULATION OF MODEL. 
C 
c 
COMMON/BASE/ARRAY(5600 0 ) , U D A T A ( 3 0 0 0 ) 
COHMON/CJS/NCRIME*CRIME*NCHARG*NDISP*NSDISP*OUHP*NPN*ADULT* 
• HOC,MBEGIN,ACS,PRG,MEQUE,MERES . H E S E V . M E H I S . H I S . M O N T H S . I Y E A R S * 
• D C C C . M I C C C S C C C S N O F S . I C O F . T S T O P , T I N I T L , IERROR, ANO.TRACEF, 
• A N 0 F S ( * * 7 ) ,N0(%*7) .RSUM(IO) , R S Q ( I O ) ,RMAX ( 1 0 ) ,RNUM,RTIME,SAGE 
• , R G R O W ( 1 0 ) , S I N I T Q 
C 0 M M 0 N / G L 0 B A L / C 1 * C 2 * C 3 * F S H 0 T , I R , I P , I G O , I F R 0 M . I T S 1 . I F R 1 . I A V A I L . 
• I D R U N , I T O , IRATE* I S T U P . I P R T Y , I S P S E G , I F U L L * I S P 1 * I S P 8 * I S P 9 * 
• I S P 1 0 , I S P 1 1 . I S P 1 2 . I S P 1 5 * I S P 2 1 * I P I * I P 2 . I P 3 * I P * . I P S . I P 6 , 
• I P 7 , I P 8 * I P 9 . I P 1 0 . I P 1 1 . I S E E D . I T 0 P . I P 1 5 F . I P 1 5 * I P 1 6 * I P 1 7 * 
• I P 1 8 , I P 1 9 . I P 2 0 . I P 2 1 , I P 2 2 , I P 2 3 . I P 2 * , JHALF* K* L 0 C R 2 . 
•MAXAR, MAXUO* MAXIA* HAXID* MHST. MENTRY* HRES* M B 0 X . M R E S 1 . 
•MNRES* MDELET* NMORK* NV* NCELL* NQBOX*NFVAR*NST« 
•NERR* NOMPAS* NPASS* NBOX* NGRP. NETRL, NTRACE* NCALL* NSINK* 
• N Q B 1 , NQB2, NSOUR* NDBOX, NRBOX, NATRIB* NCELL*TCALL.UTIME. 
• I S W 1 * I S W 2 , I S M 3 * I S M * * I S W 5 , V A R 1 , V A R 2 , VAR3, V A R * , VAR5* L I N E * 
•NRATE* I WRITE* I P A S S * KSUH* LTOP. TNOW, TLAST* 
•NODHP* CONT. COST* END. NXTMOD.QUE. RESC* RESCHG* SEPRT* 
•STOEP* TMCOST.UIN. UOUT. UFORM. STCHG*NOPREM* L U 1 , LU2* L U 3 . L U * . 
• L U 5 * L U 6 , L U 7 , L U 6 , L U 9 . L U 1 0 . L L A G , LLSEGM, LORS 
C 
LOGICAL L U 1 , L U 2 , L U 3 , L U * . L U 5 . L U 6 . L U 7 , L U 8 . L U 9 . L U 1 0 * LLAG* 
• L L S E G M . LORS 
LOGICAL CONT* COST* END* NXTMOD.QUE. RESC* RESCHG* SEPRT* 
• S T O E P . TMCOST* U I N . UOUT* UFORM* STCHG, NOPREM, NOOHP 
LOGICAL TRACEC* TRACED* TRACEF, TRACEQ. TRACER 
C 
INTEGER 0 1 . 0 2 . 0 3 , D * . D 5 . D 6 . D 7 . 0 6 . D 9 . S U B N . R A C E X . I A R R E S T ( 7 ) , 
• R A R R E S T ( 7 ) « C R I M E ( 7 ) , NP(IOO) 
INTEGER I A ( 5 8 0 0 0 ) , L O C ( 1 0 0 ) * N R E S ( 0 1 * 0 * ) * L 0 C R E S ( D t * 0 5 ) • 
• I F R E Q ( 0 8 * 0 9 ) * I U D A T A ( 3 0 0 0 ) * I A R R A Y ( 5 8 0 0 0 ) , I A T R I B ( 0 2 , 0 3 ) 
C 
REAL A ( 5 ) . A 1 ( 5 ) . A 3 ( 5 ) . T S ( D 6 . 0 7 ) » A T R I B ( 0 2 , D 3 ) , 
• M M 0 R T ( 1 7 ) , P I ( 3 ) . F M O R T ( 1 7 ) . N 0 R M 1 ( * ) . A N D ( 7 ) , I C O F ( * ) , S C C C ( * ) . 
• S N O F S ( * ) . S A G E ( * ) , R E S L V ( 1 0 ) , R E S ( 1 0 ) 
C 
EQUIVALENCE ( A R R A Y ( 1 ) , I A R R A Y ( 1 ) * I A ( 1 ) , L O C ( 1 ) ) , 
• ( U O A T A ( l ) , I U D A T A ( l ) , N P ( 1 ) ) 
C 
OATA A l / 0 . , 0 . * 9 9 9 9 « * l « J * t « > / 
DATA A 3 / 0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 1 * , 0 . / 
OATA NORMl /0« , -2*>*2*>**75 / 
OATA SUBN/OHUSERC / 
OATA I A R R E S T * R A R R £ S T / 1 * » 0 / 
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D A T A P R 0 B M 1 , P R 0 B M 2 / 1 # , 1 . / 
O A T A J S E E O / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 / 
D A T A I C O F S / 0 / 
O A T A N O N T H l / O / 
D A T A M U L T / 1 0 / 
O A T A L A D R / O V 
D A T A I E R R S / 0 / 
O A T A R R / 1 . / 
O A T A T R A C E C . T R A C E D , T R A C E Q . T R A C E R / • F A L S E . • • F A L S E . , . T R U E . • . T R U E . / 
D A T A M M O R T / 5 7 . 8 , 5 7 . 8 , 5 7 . 6 , 5 3 . 0 . 4 8 . 3 . 4 3 . 9 , 3 9 . 6 , 3 5 . 2 , 3 1 . 0 , 2 6 . 8 , 2 3 . , 
• 1 9 . 4 , 1 6 . 3 , 1 3 . 5 , l t U 9 . 9 » , 7 # 5 / 
O A T A F M O R T / 6 5 . 6 , 6 5 . 6 , 6 5 . 6 , 6 0 # 7 , 5 5 . 8 , 5 1 . 1 , 4 6 . 4 , 4 1 . 7 , 3 7 . 2 , 3 2 . 7 , 
* 2 6 . 5 , 2 4 . 5 , 2 0 . 7 , 1 7 . 2 , 1 3 . 8 , 1 1 . 3 , 8 . 9 / 
C 
C G N S I N L I N E F U N C T I O N S ! 
M S E R V ( I ) = I A ( L O C ( 3 1 ) + I - l ) 
K R A T E ( I ) = I A ( L 0 C ( 1 9 ) + I - 1 ) 
L C d , J ) = L O C ( I ) + J - 1 
M A X L V ( I ) = I A ( L 0 C ( 2 4 ) + I - 1 ) 
N O W L V ( I ) = I A ( L O C ( 2 5 ) + I t j l ) 
L O G L S ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 6 , D ) 
L O G D S ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 5 , I ) > 
N E X T ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 3 9 , D ) 
I N I T Q ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 2 8 , I ) ) 
K O S T R ( I ) = I A ( L O C ( 2 6 ) + I - l ) 
N W A I T ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 3 4 , I ) ) 
I O L E ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 3 2 , I > ) 
L I S T ( I ) = I A ( L C ( 4 0 , I ) > 
C 
C I N L I N E F U N C T I O N S T O D E C O D E U S E R I N P U T D A T A 
I S T A K I , J , K ) = I U D A T A ( N P ( 1 9 + I ) • J • ( K - l ) » I U D A T A ( N P ( 1 9 + 1 ) ) ) 
S E V E R E ( I ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 1 4 ) + I - 1 ) 
D E M 0 ( K , I , J > = U 0 A T A ( N P ( 1 2 ) + 6 » ( I r l > - K J - 1 > + N 0 C * 6 » ( K - D ) 
A J A I L ( I ) - U O A T A ( N P ( 1 5 ) + N C R I M E + I - 1 ) 
C J A I L ( I ) = U D A T A ( N P < 1 5 ) * 2 * N C R I M E + I - 1 ) 
V J A I L ( I ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 1 5 ) + I - 1 ) 
I P S T ( I » J ) = I U D A T A ( N P ( 1 ) * I - 1 ) * J » 1 
P A R O L E ( 1 . J ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 1 5 - K I ) * I - 1 ) 
R E C I D ( I 0 E L , I A G E , I R S > = U D A T A ( N P ( 1 8 + I D E L ) • 7 » ( I R S - 1 ) + I A G E ) 
T O I S P d . J ) = U 0 A T A ( N P ( 9 ) + ( I - l ) m 0 I S P * J ? l ) 
P D I S P ( I » J ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 6 ) * ( I - 1 ) * N 0 I S P + J - 1 ) 
C O N V I C d , J ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 7 > + ( 1 - 1 ) • N C H A R G + J - 1 ) 
B A R G A N d , J ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 6 ) + ( I i l ) » N C H A R G + J l l ) 
S W I T C H ( I , J ) * U D A T A ( N P ( 5 ) • ( 1 * 1 ) • N C R I N E - K l ^ l ) 
T S O U R d * J ) = U O A T A ( N P ( l l ) * ( I * l ) t N S D I S P * J - / l ) 
P S D U R ( I . J ) = U O A T A < N P ( 1 0 ) 4 ( 1 - 1 ) * > N S O I S P * J - 4 ) 
I P A R C ( I ) = I U D A T A ( N P ( 2 ) - H » 1 ) 
D I S P L d , J ) = U D A T A ( N P ( 1 3 ) + ( I - 1 ) § N D I S P < K » 1 ) 
S D U R L ( I , J ) = U D A T A ( I U D A T A ( N P ( 1 5 ) - 1 ) - K I - 1 ) » N S D I S P + J - 1 ) 
C 
C I N L I N E F U N C T I O N S T O D E C O D E O F F E N D E R A T T R I B U T E S 
F A G E ( I A D R ) = A M 0 D ( A T R I B ( I A D R , 3 ) • 1 0 0 0 . ) 
F R A C E X ( I A D R ) = A M O D ( A T R I B ( I A O R . 3 ) , 1 0 0 1 0 . ) / l t 0 0 . * . 5 
F S E X d A D R ) = A M O O ( F R A C E X ( I A O R ) , 2 . ) 
F C R I M E ( I A D R ) * A M 0 0 ( A T R I B C I A 0 R , 3 ) . 1 0 0 0 0 0 * ) / 1 0 0 0 0 * } + « 5 
F O E A T H d A O R ) « I F I X ( A T R I B ( I A O R . 3 ) / 1 0 0 0 0 0 . ) / 1 0 # 
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C 
GO TO ( 6 0 0 1 , 2 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 1 , %000, 1 1 0 0 , 1 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 1 ) , N 
C 
C 
C 9999999999999#######99999999999999i*#***fOffff§§§§§lit 9 1 § § § § § f f i f f f f # 
C ERROR OCCURRED WITH USER INPUT DATA I TERMINATE RUN 
C 99f##999999999999999ii##*#f#fff*ffffffff###*f*###«•«•*#•••#••«••#•#•• 
c 
1 8 0 0 I F ( I E R R O R . G T . O ) GO TO 1 8 0 2 
I A S I Z E * I S P 1 2 * I P 2 A > 
I F ( M A X I A . L T . I A S I Z E ) GO TO 1 0 0 1 
C 
H R I T E < 6 , 1 2 ) NOHPAS 
1 2 FORMAT ( 1 H 1 , * , OX . " T R A C E THE EXECUTION OF R U N * , I 7 / 1 H 0 ) 
D I N I T L = T I N I T L * 3 6 Q . 
DO 1 0 0 3 I G = 1 . M R E S 
RGROW(IG)=RGROH(IG)+ l . 
1 0 0 3 R E S L V ( I G ) = M A X L V ( I G ) 
GO TO 1 1 1 0 
C 
1 0 0 1 H R I T E ( 6 , 1 6 ) MAXIA 
1 6 FORMAT(1H0,*GNS ERRORS ARRAY C A P A C I T Y * , 1 7 , * EXCEEOED*) 
1 0 0 2 ITO=5 
GO TO 9 0 0 2 
C 
C END CONTROL BOX I t CREATE VIRGIN ARRESTEES USING TIME S E R I E S FORCA 
C i 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 * 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
C 
1 1 8 8 I F U D . N E . 1 I G O TO 5880 
C 
1 1 1 0 MONTH=TNOWY30.«-1.05 
C 
C INCREASE THE PROSECUTOR*S RESOURCES, AND COST FOR MIS 
IF(MONTH«NE«MBEGIN)GO TO 60 
I F ( M E R E S * L E « 0 ) G O TO 58 
P P - 1 . 
I F ( M £ R E S , N E « 3 ) PP*2# 
R R = 1 . < M P R G / P P ) 
R E S L V f l ) = R E S L V ( 1 ) * ( 1 . * P R G > 
5 0 I 8 = L 0 C ( 2 6 ) 
I F ( M E H I S . G T . O ) I A ( I B ) = K O S T R ( 1 ) • M I S 
C 
C FOR I N I T I A L I Z A T I O N PERIOD. RESET FORECAST TIME TO MONTH«l 
C AND DETERMINE P R E - T R I A L QUEUE LENGTH FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS 
60 IFCTNOW-OINITL) 6 1 , 6 1 , 6 2 
6 1 MONTH1=MONTH"1 
6 2 HONTH=MONTH»MONTHl 
C 
C FORECAST NUMBER OF OFFENDERS} INSERT INTO IN-PROGRESS L I S T OF BOX 2 
C SET ARREST OATE 
I F ( T R A C E F ) M R X T E 1 6 , 1 1 ) TMOW 
41 FORMAT(1H8,*AT TIME* »F18 ,*2> 
DO 1 0 6 I C R I M E = 1 , N C R I M E 
NOF=FORCAST(MONTH,ICRIME) 
I F ( N O F . L T . l ) 60 TO 1 0 5 
I F ( T N O M . G E . D I N I T L ) I A R R E S T ( I C R I M E ) = I A R R E S T ( I C R I M E ) * N O F 
OATEsTNOW 
D D A T E = 2 9 . 9 5 / F L 0 A T ( N 0 F ) 
DO 1 0 0 I K = l , N O F 
DATE-DATE+DDATE 
IADR=0 
CALL E N T E R ( - 2 , 1 , I A D R , J A O R , D A T E , D 2 , D 3 , A T R I B ) . R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0 ) 
I B = L O C ( 4 0 ) - H A D R - l 
I A ( I B ) = 2 
DETERMINE OFFENDER'S DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (RACE, SEX) 
B=RANO(JSEED) 
00 70 R A C E X « 1 , N 0 C 
I F ( B . L E . D E M 0 ( I C R I M E . R A C E X . 2 ) ) G O TO 7 1 
RACEX=N0C 
DETERMINE OFFENDER'S AGE 
A ( 2 ) = D E M 0 ( I C R I M E . R A C E X , 5 ) 
A ( 3 ) = D E H 0 ( I C R I M E . R A C E X . 6 ) 
A(4) -DEMO(ICRIME «RAC£X,4>) 
A ( 5 ) = D £ M O ( I C R I M E . R A C E X . 3 ) 
CALL GAMMO(JSEEO.AGE*A) 
I A G E = A G E / 5 - + l -
I B = N P ( 3 0 ) + IAGE + ( P A C E X - j l ) » I U D A T A ( N P ( 3 0 ) ) 
I U O A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 1 1 . I A G E . R A C £ X ) + 1 
DETERMINE OFFENDER'S AGE AT DEATH 
ADD-MMORT(IAGE) 
I F ( M 0 D ( R A C E X . 2 ) , E Q « 0 ) A D D - F M O R T ( I A G E ) 
A 3 ( 3 ) = D E M 0 ( I C R I M E . R A C E X . 6 ) - A G E 
A 3 ( 5 ) = A D 0 
CALL E R L N G ( I S E E D . A D D . A 3 ) 
DAGE=AGE*ADD 
SAVE OFFENDER'S CHARACTERISTICS 
I C O O l = R A C E X » 1 0 0 0 . 
ICOD2*ICRIME»10000 .> 
I C O D 3 s I F I X ( O A G E * > 1 0 « ) » 1 0 0 0 0 0 « 
A T R I B ( I A D R . 3 ) = A G E * I C 0 0 1 + I C O D 2 + I C O D 3 
I N I T I A L I Z E SCRATCH ATTRIBUTE 
A T R I B ( I A O R , 4 > ) * 0 . 
I N I T I A L I Z E CAREER CRIMINAL COST 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 5 ) * 0 « 
I N I T I A L I Z E NUMBER OF ARRESTS 
A T R I B ( I A O R . 6 ) = 1 + 1 0 0 » I C R J M E 
ARRAY OVERFLOW. TERMINATE SIMULATION 
I F ( M E N T R Y - I A O R - 2 5 ) 9 0 * 1 0 0 * 1 0 0 
TSTOP*TNOM/360»*»001 
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T I N I T L = A M I N 1 < T S T O P , T I N I T L ) 
D I N I T L = T I N I T L * 3 6 0 # 
MCELL=AMIN1 ( (TSTOP*t>« n i • FLOAT (NCELL)) 
M R I T E ( 6 , 1 5 ) TNOH.IAOR 
1 5 FORMAT(1H0«*AT T I H E * , F 1 Q , 2 , 1 5 X « * ARRAY OVERFLOW ZS EXPECTED*, 
* * WITH NEW OFFENDER AT ADDRESS*, 1 5 ) 
I E R R S = I E R R S + 1 
60 TO 1 1 8 
C 
1 1 0 CONTINUE 
C 
I F ( T R A C E F ) W R I T E ( 6 , 2 ) MONTH,ICRIME,NOF,IAOR 
2 FORMAT(• AT MONTH * , I 7 , 6 X , * THE C R I M E * , 1 2 , * FORECAST I S * , 
* I 1 0 , * > X , * WHILE THE ADDRESS OF THE LAST OFFENDER I S * , 1 5 ) 
C 
1 0 5 CONTINUE 




C COLLECT TIME S E R I E S OF AVERAGE CAREER CRIMINAL COST, AVERAGE 
C NUMBER OF OFFENSES PER OFFENDER, AVERAGE RATIO OF THESE S E R I E S , AND 
C AVERAGE AGE AT OESISTANCE (AVERAGES COMPUTED OVER HALF-YEAR PERIOO 
1 1 0 I F ( N . E Q . 6 ) GO TO 9 0 0 1 
IF(MONTH«LE«1) GO TO 1 6 0 
I F ( H O D ( ( M O N T H - l ) , 6 ) , N E . O ) GO TO 1 6 0 
IYEAR=(N0NTH*»l) /6«f»l# 
I F ( I Y E A R , G T « I Y E A R S ) GO TO 1 6 1 
00 1 5 5 I O F = l , N O C 
I = N P ( 2 6 ) • ! Y E A R * ( I O F » l ) * I Y E A R S 
J = N P ( Z 7 ) + I Y E A R + ( I 0 F - 1 ) * I Y E A R S 
I J = N P ( 2 8 ) • I Y E A R * C I O F - 1 ) • I Y E A R S 
I J 1 = N P ( 2 9 ) • I Y E A R + ( I O F ? f l ) * I Y E A R S 
I F ( I C O F I I O F ) . E Q . O ) GO TO 1 4 9 
6 = I C 0 F ( I 0 F ) 
U O A T A ( I ) s S C C C ( I O F ) / B 
U D A T A ( J ) r S N O F S ( I O F ) / B 
U O A T A ( I J ) - S C C C ( I O F ) / S N O F S ( I O F ) 
U O A T A ( I J 1 ) = S A G E ( I 0 F ) / B 
GO TO 1 5 0 
1*>9 U O A T A ( I ) = 0 , 
U D A T A ( J ) = 0 . 
U D A T A ( I J ) * 0 . 
U D A T A ( I J 1 ) = 0 . 
1 5 8 S A G E ( I O F ) = 0 . 
I C O F ( I O F ) = 0 . 
S N O F S ( I O F ) s O . 
1 5 5 S C C C ( I O F ) = Q . 
C 
C COLLECT S T A T I S T I C S ON RESOURCE USAGE BETWEEN OINITL ANO RTINE 
1 6 0 I F ( M O N T H . L E . l ) GO TO 200 
IF(TNOW.GT.RTIME) GO TO 1 8 8 
00 1 7 0 I K * 1 , M R E S 
R E S ( I K ) * M A X L V ( I K ) * N O N L V ( Z K ) 
R S U M ( I K ) s R S U M ( I K ) • R E S ( Z K ) 
2 6 0 
R S Q ( I K ) = R S Q ( I K ) * R E S ( I K ) » » 2 
1 7 0 R H A X ( I K ) = A H A X 1 ( R M A X ( I K ) , R E S ( I K ) ) 
RNUM=RNUM*1 
I F ( T R A C E R ) W R I T E ( 6 , 2 7 ) N O N T H , ( R E S ( I K ) « X K - 1 , M R E S ) 
2 7 FORMAT(1H8,»AT MONTH • , I 7 , 6 X , » R E S O U R C E U S A G E H % 6 X , 1 0 F 8 t > 0 ) 
I F ( . N O T . T R A C E Q ) GO TO 1 6 0 
IQTRIAL=NWAIT(37)*NWAIT(39) 
W R I T E ( 6 , 2 9 ) MONTH,IQTRIAL 
2 9 FORMAT(• AT MONTH » , I 7 , 6 X , » P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E l » , 5 X , I 7 , » # » ) 
C 
C UPDATE MAX. LEVEL OF RESOURCES 8ASE0 UPON MONTHLY GROWTH RATES 
1 8 0 00 1 8 1 I G = 1 , M R E S 
R E S L V ( I G ) s R E S L V ( I G ) * R G R O W ( I G ) 
R S = R E S L V ( I G ) » M A X L V ( I G ) 
I B * L 0 C ( 2 4 ) « - I G - 1 
I A ( I B ) =MAXLV(IG)«-RG 
I 8 * L 0 C ( 2 5 ) * I G - 1 
1 8 1 I A ( I B ) = N O W L V ( I G ) * R G 
I F ( . N O T * TRACER) GO TO 200 
I B 1 = L 0 C ( 2 4 ) 
I B 2 = L 0 C ( 2 4 ) « - N R E S - 1 
W R I T E ( 6 , 2 8 ) M O N T H , ( I A ( I B ) , I B * X B 1 , I B 2 ) 
2 8 FORMAT ( • AT MONTH • , I 7 , 6 X , » M A X . RESOURCE L E V E L S t » , 1 0 ( I 7 , » « ? » ) ) 
C 




C 999999999999999999999999999999999999999########ffff ffff ffffff ffff ffffffffffff ffffffffffffff 
C FOR OFFENDER WHO I S J A I L E D BEFORE T R I A L , SAVE TIME DETENTION BEGINS 
C 9999999999999999999999999999999999 999 9999999999999999999##t###f###### 
c 
2 0 0 0 I F ( I D . E Q . I O ) GO TO 2 0 0 1 
I F ( I D . E Q . 2 2 ) GO TO 2 0 0 1 
GO TO 8000 
C 
2 0 0 1 V A L ' 9 9 9 9 . 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = A T R I B ( I A D R , 1 ) 
RETURN 
C 
c #*######»######fffff##*#fiff i ff i f f##•#######•###•####fffff 
C START CONTROL LOGIC C §»§§§§§§9*§§§§9§9§§§§§§§§§9§§f*9§§§*§§§*»§§§t§§§9§§§§§§9 
C 
400 0 I C R I N E s F C R I H E ( I A D R ) 
AGE=FAGE(IADR) 
C 
GO TO ( 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 0 2 1 , 4 0 0 1 , 8 0 0 0 , 490 0 , 4 0 1 1 , 4 0 8 1 , 6 0 0 0 , 
* 6 0 0 0 , 4 0 0 1 , 4 0 0 1 , 4 0 0 1 , 4 0 0 1 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 5 0 0 , 4 6 0 0 , 
* 4 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 0 , 4 0 0 1 , 6 0 0 0 , 4 0 0 1 , 4 1 0 5 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 0 0 1 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 
* 8 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 4 0 0 1 , 4 1 0 4 , 
4 1 0 4 , 4 1 0 5 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 4 1 2 0 , 4 9 0 0 , 4 5 0 0 , 4 5 0 0 , 4 6 0 0 , 6 0 0 1 , 
* 4 1 1 5 , 6 0 1 1 , 6 0 1 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 ) , 1 0 
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C DETERMINE SERVICE TIMES! 
4001 A1(5)=U0ATA(IPST(ID,ICRIME)) 
CALL ERLNG(ISEE0,ST,A1), RETURNS(9000) 
C 












C UPDATE AGE OF OFFENDER 
ATRIB(IADR,3)=ATRIB(IA0R,3)*TAGE1 
C 
C UPDATE CAREER COST 
IFUNOT.RESOGO TO 4013 
TCOST=Q. 





4fll3 IF(I0.EQ.21)G0 TO 44121 
IF(I0,EQ,6)G0 TO 4820 
RETURN 
C 
C ENTER OFFENDER INTO PRE-TRIAL OETENTION 
4>020 B-RANO(JSEED) 
IF(B.GT,YJAIL(ICRINE))GO TO 4023 
IX=10 
GO TO 4022 
4>021 8=RAN0(JSEE0) 
IF(B,GT.AJAIL(ICRIME) )GO TO 4823 
IX=22 
C SAVE TIME OFFENDER ENTERS PRE-TRIAL DETENTION 
4>022 ATRIB(IA0R,4)»TN0M 
C INSERT DUMMY ENTITY INTO THE MAITING LIST OF EITHER BOX 10 OR 22 
CALL RELEASUO,IX,TRACED,IA<L0*C<1>) ,IA(LOC(3) ) ,IA (LOC(5) ) , 








€ PAROLE VIOLATION, FINISH REMAINDER OF SENTENCE (BOXES 40, 41) 
4184 IF(ATRIB(IA0R.4).GT.0)GO TO 4105 
ST**ATRIB(IA0R,4) 
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A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 > = 9 9 9 9 . 
GO TO 4 0 1 0 
C 
C DETERMINE SENTENCE DURATION FOR ADULTS XN PRISON OR ON 
C PROBATION USING FINAL CHARGE ANO PLEA TYPE (BOXES 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 2 6 , 5 1 ) 
4 1 0 5 I C H A R G = A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) / 1 0 0 * « - . 0 5 
I F U C H A R G . L E . O . O R . ICHARG*GT.NCHARG) WRITE ( 6 , 8 ) ID* ICHARG 
6 FORMAT ( 1 H 0 , * G N S ERRORS AT BOX*-* I 3 » * » FINAL CHARGE I S » , I 3 ) 
J O = A N O D ( A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) , 1 0 0 * ) + « 0 0 1 
I D I S P - 1 
I F ( I 0 * E Q . 4 2 ) I 0 I S P * 2 
I F ( I 0 . E Q * 2 6 . 0 R * I D * E Q * » 5 1 # I D I S P * 3 
I F C J D - 3 7 ) 4 1 1 0 , 4 1 1 1 , 4 1 0 9 
4 1 0 9 S T - T S D U R ( I C H A R G , I 0 I S P ) 
GO TO 4 1 1 2 
4 1 1 0 S T - S O U R L ( I C H A R G , I D I S P ) 
GO TO 4 1 1 2 
4 1 1 1 S T - P S D U R ( I C H A R G , I O I S P ) 
4 1 1 2 A 1 ( 5 ) « S T 
CALL E R L N G ( I S E E 0 , S T , A 1 ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0) 
I F ( I O * E Q * 4 0 ) G O TO 4 1 1 5 
I F ( I D . E Q . 4 1 ) G 0 TO 4 1 1 5 
GO TO 4 0 1 0 
C 
C DETERMINE THE ACTUAL TIME SERVED IN PRISON, STORE NEGATIVE OF 
C REMAINDER OF SENTENCE IN CASE OF PAROLE VIOLATION ( 1 0 = 4 0 , 4 1 ) 
4 1 1 5 EST«ST 
ST=PAROLE(ICHARG•1> » E S T 
LEFEM=FSEX(IADR) 
IF (LEFEH«EQ« 0)ST = PAROLE(NCHARG+ICHARG«1)*EST 
I S T = ( S T - E S T ) * 1 0 0 0 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = I S T M 0 0 - I C H A R G 
GO TO 4 0 1 0 
C 
C ( I D = 4 5 ) OFFENDER RELEASED ON PAROLE 
4 1 2 0 B=RAMD(JSEED) 
I C H A R G = - A M 0 D ( A T R I B ( I A 0 R , 4 ) , 1 0 0 . ) • • 0 5 
I F d C H A R G . L E . O .OR* ICHARG*GT.NCHARG) WRITE ( 6 , 8 ) ID, ICHARG 
A 3 ( 3 ) = 3 6 0 0 . 
A 3 ( 5 ) ^ P A R O L E ( I C H A R G , 2 ) 
CALL E R L N G ( I S E E D . S T , A 3 ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0 ) 
PAR-PAROLE(ICHARG+NCHARG*2) 
I F ( B . G T . P A R ) G O TO 4 1 2 1 
C PAROLE VIOLATIONS RETURN TO PRISON 
I S T = A T R I B ( I A O R . k i ) / 1 0 0 . 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = F L O A T ( I S T ) / 1 0 0 0 * > 
GO TO 4 0 1 0 
C NO PAROLE VIOLATIONS COMPLETE PAROLE 
4 1 2 1 ATRIB( IADR,4 )*9999*> 
GO TO 4 0 1 0 
C 
C DETERMINE RECIDIVISM DELAY, UPDATE AGE OF OFFENDER (BOXES 1 9 * 4 7 , 4 8 ) 
4 5 0 0 A 3 ( 3 ) * 1 0 * * 5 
A 3 ( 5 ) * A T R I B C I A D R * 4 > 
CALL E R L N G ( I S E E D » S T » A 3 ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0 ) 
2 63 
T A G E l * S T / 3 6 0 . 
TAGE=AGE+TAGE1 
OAGE=FDEATH(IADR) 
IF(TAGE.LT.OAGE)GO TO 4501 
ST=.05*ST 
IF(DAGE.GT.AGE) ST=(OAGE-AGE)t360. 




CALL SORT(6* ATRIB,IA(LOC(39)i,IA DR,LTOP,02,03) 
RETURN 
C 
C DETERMINE NEW OFFENSE FOR REPEAT OFFENDER (BOXES 20,49) 
4600 B=RAND(JSEEO) 
00 4601 J=l,NCRIME 
IF(B.LE.SWITCH(ICRIHE,J))60 TO 4602 
4601 CONTINUE 
J=NCRIME 







ATRIB (IAOR, 3) = IOAGE*100000*J*1DO Q 0 + R A C E X M 0 0 0 + A G E 
RETURN 
C 
C COLLECT STATISTICS AT SINK NODES 
C (OFFENDER EITHER OIES OR HE IS REHABILITATED) 




C COLLECT OFFENDER CATEGORY (RACE I SEX) STATISTICS 
RACEX=FRACEX(IAOR) 
IF(RACEX.GE.l.OR.RACEX.LE.NOC) GO TO 4901 
WRITE(6,4) RACEX,IO,IPREO 
4 FORMAT (1 HO••>CJS ERRORS OFFENOER CATEGORY * * , I 4 , * AT -SINK N O D E ' , 
• 1 4 , * PRECEOEO BY BOX»,I4> 





C COLLECT AGE HISTOGRAM 
4902 I = A G E / 5 . * 1 . 
SAGE(RACEX)=SAGE(RACEX)*AGE 
IMAX=IUDATA(NP(31)) 
IF(I.GT.l.AND.I.LE.INAX) GO T9 4903 
WRITE(6,5) AGE,IO,IPREO 
5 FORMAT(1H0»*CJS ERRORS OFFENOER AGE «l*FI42i* A T SINK N O D E * , 
• 1 4 , * PRECEDED BY BOX*, 14) 
I«IMAX 
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4 9 0 3 I B = N P ( 3 1 ) * I * ( R A C E X « 1 ) » I U 0 A T A ( N P ( 3 1 ) ) 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 1 2 . I . R A C E X ) * 1 
C 
C COLLECT THE DEATH AGE FOR HISTOGRAM 
DAGE=FDEATH(IADR) 
I F ( D A G E . G T . . l ) I = DAGE/5«.*1 
I F d . G T . l , A N D . I . L E . I M A X ) GO TO 4904 
WRITE(6,10) DAGE. IO . IPREO 
1 0 F O R M A T ( 1 H 0 , » C J S ERRORI OFFENDER DEATH AT AGE * » , F 8 « 2 , 
* • AT SINK N O D E * , 1 4 , • PRECEDED BY BOX*. 1 4 ) 
I - IMAX 
4 9 0 4 I B = N P ( 2 1 ) + I + ( R A C E X « l ) » I U O A T A ( N P ( 2 1 ) ) 
I U 0 A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 2 , I , R A C E X ) * 1 
C 
C COLLECT NUMBER OF OFFENSES COMMITTED FOR TIME S E R I E S 
I C - A T R I B ( I A 0 R . 6 ) • • 0 5 
N0FS=MOD ( I C 1 0 0 ) 
I B = N P ( 2 3 ) * N 0 F S « M R A C E X - 1 ) » I U 0 A T A ( N P ( 2 3 ) ) 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 4 , N O F S , R A C E X ) * l 
SHOPS (RACEX) =SNOFS (RACEX) 4-NOFS 
A N O F S ( R A C E X . I C R I M E ) = A N O F S ( R A C E X . I C R I M E ) • NOFS 
NO(RACEX . I C R I M E ) = N O ( R A C E X , I C R I M E ) * 1 
C 
C COLLECT OFFENSE TYPES FOR HISTOGRAM 
DO 4 9 0 9 1 = 1 . N O F S 
JslO»«l(I«-l) 
K = 1 0 * » ( I * 2 ) 
I 0 1 = M O D ( I C . K ) 
I O = I 0 1 / J 
I F d O . G E . 1 . A N O . 1 0 . L E . N C R I M E ) GO TO 4 9 0 0 
WRITE(6.25) I 0 , I P R E O , I C , K , I 0 i , J , I O 
2 5 FORMAT(* GNS ERRORS S I N K = » , I 5 , » P R E D E C E S S O R S , 1 5 , M O D ( » . I 1 0 , 
• • , I 1 0 , » ) * » , I 1 0 , » DIVIDED B Y » , I 1 0 , » EQUALS * , I 1 0 ) 
1 0 = 7 
4906 X B = N P ( 2 2 ) + I 0 + ( R A C E X » 1 ) » I U D A T A ( N P ( 2 2 ) ) 
4 9 0 9 I U O A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 3 . 1 0 . R A C E X ) * 1 
C 
C COLLECT SINK BOX NUMBERS FOR HISTOGRAM 
O I D = I D / 1 0 * 1 
GO TO ( 4 9 2 0 , 4 9 2 1 , 4 9 2 2 , 4 9 2 3 , 4 9 2 4 ) , 0 1 0 
4 9 2 0 1 = 1 
I F ( I D . E Q . 7 > 1 = 2 
GO TO 4 9 2 5 
4 9 2 1 1 = 3 
GO TO 4 9 2 5 
4 9 2 2 1 = 4 
GO TO 4 9 2 5 
4 9 2 3 1 = 1 0 - 2 9 
GO TO 4 9 2 5 
4 9 2 4 1 = 6 
4 9 2 5 I B = N P ( 2 4 > + I * ( R A C E X * 1 ) * I U D A T A ( N P ( 2 4 ) I 




C ACCUMULATE CAREER CRIMINAL COST FOR MONTHLY AVERAGE 
C C C = A T R I B ( I A D R * 5 ) 
S C C C ( R A C E X ) * S C C C ( R A C E X ) * C C C 
C 
C STORE CAREER CRIMINAL COST HISTOGRAM 
I s C C C / D C C C + 1 
I H A X = I U D A T A ( N P ( 2 5 ) ) 
I F ( I . L E . I M A X ) GO TO 4 9 3 0 
I=IMAX 
4 9 3 0 I B = N P ( 2 5 ) + I * ( R A C E X - 1 ) * I U 0 A T A ( N P ( 2 5 ) ) 
I U D A T A ( I B ) = I S T A T ( 6 . I . R A C E X ) + 1 
C 
C TERMINATE SIMULATION 
4990 Y E A R = T N O H / 3 6 0 . + . 0 0 1 
I F ( Y E A R . L T . T S T O P ) RETURN 
I P A S S = 0 
I F ( I E R R S . L E . O ) W R I T E ( 6 * 3 ) TNOM. I C O F S . T I N I T L * LADR 
3 FORMAT(1H0 . • A T T I M E » * F 1 0 . 2 * 3 X » » S I M U L A T I O N RUN SUCCESSFULLY** 
• • TERMINATES WITH *>*I5*«> SINK NODES REALIZEO SINCE T I N I T L = • 
• * F 6 . 2 / 2 1 X , ' L A R G E S T OFFENDER ADDRESS I S * , I 5 ) 
I F ( I E R R S . G T . O ) WRITE(6*26) TNO*W 
2 6 FORMAT(1H0 »*AT T I M E * . F 1 0 . 2 , 3 X , • S I M U L A T I O N TERMINATES*) 
NARREST=0 
DO 4 9 9 5 I K = 1 . N C R I M E 
4 9 9 5 N A R R E S T S N A R R E S T * I A R R E S T ( I K ) 
W R I T E ( 6 * 1 ) T I N I T L * NARREST 
1 FORMAT ( 1 H 0 . 2 0 X . M H E TOTAL NUMBER OF F I R S T - O F F E N S E ARRESTS AFTER * . 
* F 6 . 2 * ^ I S * * U 0 ) 
NARREST=0 
00 4996 I K = 1 . N C R I M E 
4996 NARREST S NARREST+RARREST(IK) 
W R I T E ( 6 * 1 3 ) T I N I T L * NARREST 
1 3 FORMAT(21X**THE TOTAL NUMBER OF R E C I D I V I S T ARRESTS AFTER * . 
• F 6 . 2 * » I S * * U 0 / 1 H Q ) 
W R I T E ( 6 * 1 4 ) ( I * C R I M E ( I ) * I A R R E S T ( I ) * R A R R E S T ( I ) * I = 1 * N C R I M E ) 
1 4 FORMAT(20X»* FOR C R I M E ^ * I 2 * * ( • * A 1 0 , * ) • * * I 1 0 * ^ F I R S T - O F F E N S E ^ * 
• • ARRESTS A N D * . I 1 0 . * R E C I D I V I S T ARRESTS ARE MADE*) 
RETURN 
C 
C # # # # # # * # # # # * * t f # f # # f i f f O f t t i f f i f # f f f i f f f f f # # f f # f f f f i f f f f f f f # i f f f f f f f f « f f f f f f f f f f 
C ENO CONTROL LOGIC 





C I F DECEASEO. GO TO BOX 3 I COLLECT S T A T I S T I C S 
DAGE=FDE ATH(IADR) 
I F ( D A G E . G T . , l ) G O TO 5 0 0 2 
ATRIB (IADR* 4 ) sIO+«> 0 0 1 
NN S 3 
RETURN 
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5 0 0 2 GO TO ( 6 0 8 0 , 5 1 0 2 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 5 1 0 5 , 6 0 0 8 , 8 1 0 0 , 5 0 0 6 . 5 0 8 6 . 8 0 0 0 , 
* 8 1 1 I , 5 1 1 4 , 5 1 1 4 , 5 1 1 4 , 5 1 1 V , 6 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 5 1 0 2 , 
* 600 0 * 6 0 0 0 * 5 7 0 0 * 6 0 0 0 * 5 3 2 0 * 5 1 2 0 , 8 0 0 0 * 5 0 0 6 * 5 1 1 6 * 5 7 0 0 * 
* 5 1 1 6 * 5 7 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 5 3 0 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 5 4 0 0 , 5 1 2 3 , 
* 5 1 2 3 , 5 1 2 5 , 5 1 2 0 , 5 1 2 0 , 5 1 2 1 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 8 0 0 0 , 5 0 0 6 , 5 1 2 0 , 
* 5 1 2 0 , 5 6 0 0 , 5 6 0 1 , 5 6 1 4 , 8 0 0 0 , 5 6 1 0 , 5 6 1 5 ) , ID 
C 
C P R O B A B I L I S T I C SELECTION OF SUCCESSOR BOX, NN, TO BE RELEASED 
5006 CALL L O C F ( I O , l , L O C P , L O C P P > 
IC=0 
J = I P A R C ( I D ) - 1 
B - R A N D ( J S E E D ) 
DO 5 0 0 3 IND=LOCP,LOCPP 
BAL=UOATA(J+NCRIME*IC+IC«IME) 
I F ( B * L E * B A L ) G O TO 5 0 0 4 
I C = I C * i 
5 0 0 3 CONTINUE 
IND=LOCPP 
5 0 0 4 NN=IA(IND) 
I F ( I D , E Q . 9 ) G 0 TO 5 5 0 0 
I F ( I D . E Q . 8 . A N D . N N . N E . 9 ) G O TO 5 5 0 0 
I F ( N N * L T « 5 2 ) RETURN 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = I D + * 0 0 1 
RETURN 
C 
C ADDITIONAL END CONTROL LOGIC* 
C 
C I D = 2 , 2 0 









C 1 0 = 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 
5 1 1 4 NN=53 
A T R I B ( I A O R , 4 ) = I D + « > 0 0 1 
RETURN 
C 
C I D = 2 9 , 3 1 
5 1 1 6 NN=54 
GO TO 5 5 0 0 
C 
C 1 0 = 2 6 , 4 3 , 4 4 , 5 0 , 5 1 
5 1 2 0 NN=57 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = I D * * 0 0 1 
RETURN 
C 
C I D = 4 5 l PAROLE TERMINATED M/O VIOLATIONS, RELEASE OFFENOER FROM C J S 
5 1 2 1 I F ( A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) . L E * 0 * ) G O TO § 1 2 2 
NN=56 
A T R I B C I A 0 R , 4 i * I 0 * * t t l 
RETURN 
2 6 7 
C 1 0 = 4 5 1 PAROLE VIOLATION* RETURN OFFENOER TO PRISON TO COMPLETE SEN 
5 1 2 2 LEFEM=FSEX(IADR) 
NN=40 
I F ( L E F E M . E Q . 0 ) N N = 4 1 
RETURN 
C 
C I D = 4 0 . 4 1 l INCARCERATION TERMINATED* RELEASE OFFENDER FROM C J S 
5 1 2 3 I F ( A T R I B C I A D R » 4 ) . L T . O . l GO TO 5 1 2 % 
NN=56 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = I D + . 0 0 1 
RETURN 
C 
C EARLY RELEASE FROM PRISON OFFENDER I S ON PAROLE 
5 1 2 4 NN=45 
RETURN 
C 
C 1 0 = 4 2 
5 1 2 5 NN=56 
A T R I B ( I A O R , 4 ) = I D + . O B 1 
RETURN 
C 
C DETERMINE THE SUPERIOR COURT DISPOSITION AFTER A GUILTY PLEA 
5 3 0 0 B=RAND(JSEEO) 
00 5 3 0 1 ICHARG=1*NCHARG 
BAR=BARGAN(ICRIME*ICHARG) 
I F ( B . L E . B A R ) G O TO 5 3 0 2 
5 3 0 1 CONTINUE 
ICHARG=NCHARG 
5 3 0 2 B 1 = R A N D ( J S E E O ) 
00 5 3 0 3 I 0 I S P = 1 , N D I S P 
B A R 1 = P 0 I S P ( I C H A R G , I O I S P ) 
I F ( B 1 . L E . 8 A R 1 ) G 0 TO 5 4 0 4 
5 3 0 3 CONTINUE 
I D I S P s N O I S P 
GO TO 5 4 0 4 
C 
C DETERMINE LOWER COURT'S DISPOSITION 
5 3 2 0 B=RAND(JSEED) 
00 5 3 2 1 I D I S P = 1 , N D I S P 
B A R = O I S P L ( I C R I M E . I O I S P ) 
I F ( B * L E * BAR)GO TO 5 3 2 2 
5 3 2 1 CONTINUE 
I D I S P = N D I S P 
5 3 2 2 ICHARG=ICRIME 
GO TO 5 4 0 4 
C 
C DETERMINE SUPERIOR COURT T R I A L DISPOSITION 
5400 B=RAND(JSEEO) 
00 5 4 0 1 ICHARG=1,NCHARG 
8AR=C0NVIC(ICRIME*ICHARG) 
I F ( 8 . L E . B A R ) G 0 TO 5 4 0 2 
5 4 0 1 CONTINUE 
ICHARG=NCHARG 
§ 4 0 2 6 1 * R A N D ( J S E E O ) 
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00 5 4 0 3 I 0 I S P = 1 , N D I S P 
B A R 1 = T 0 I S P ( I C H A R G , I D I S P ) 
I F ( B 1 . L E . B A R 1 ) G 0 TO 5 4 0 4 
540 3 CONTINUE 
I O I S P = N D I S P 
5 4 0 4 I T = A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) * , 0 5 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = I C H A R G » 1 0 0 + I 0 + . 0 5 
LEFEM=FSEX(IAOR) 
5 4 1 0 GO TO ( 5 * 1 1 , 5 * 1 2 , 5 * 1 3 , 5 * 1 * , 5 * 1 5 , 5 * 1 6 ) , I O I S P 
5 4 1 1 NN=*0 
I F ( L E F E M . E Q « 0 ) N N = * 1 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
5 * 1 2 NN=42 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
5 4 1 3 NN=50 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
5 4 1 4 NN=43 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
5 4 1 5 NN=44 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
5 4 1 6 NN=26 
I F ( L E F E M . E Q . O ) N N = 5 1 
GO TO 5 5 0 1 
C 
C LOCATE OFFENDER OETAINEO BEFORE TRIAL 
5 5 0 0 I T = ATRIB ( I A O R , * ) + . 0 5 
5 5 0 1 I F ( I T . G E . 0 ) G O TO 5 5 0 2 
I F C N N . L T . 5 2 ) RETURN 
A T R I B ( I A O R , 4 ) * I D + t < 0 0 1 
RETURN 
5 5 0 2 «AOR«LTOP 
K0=22 
I F ( I D , E Q , 8 . O R , I D . E Q , 9 ) K D = 1 0 
5 5 0 3 I F ( K A O R . G T * 0 ) G 0 TO 5 5 0 5 
MES1=10HUNABLE TO 
MES2 S 1OHLOCATE DET 
MES3=10HAIMED OFFE 
NES4*10HNDER 
CALL E R R S I M ( I 0 , f / K 0 , S U B N , M E S l , M E S 2 , M E S 3 , M E S 4 ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0 , 9 0 0 2 ) 
5 5 0 4 KAOR sNEXT(KAOR) 
GO TO 5 5 0 3 
5 5 0 5 I F ( L I S T ( K A D R ) . N E . K D ) G O TO 5 5 0 4 
Z J = A T R I B C K A O R * 4 > 0 5 
I F ( I J . N E . I T ) G O TO 5 5 0 4 
C 
C UPDATE CAREER CRIMINAL COST DUE TO P R E - T R I A L OETENTION 
ST=TN0W-ATRIB(KADR,4) 
TCOST*0. 
DO 5 5 0 6 I R S = 1 , M R E S 
R C O S T * N R E S ( K D , I R S ) * K O S T R ( I R S ) « S T 
5 5 0 6 TCOST=TCOST*RCOST 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 5 ) = A T R I B ( I A O R , 5 ) + T C O S T 
C 
C REMOVE OFFENDER FROM P R E - T R I A L DETENTION 
ATRIB(KADR*l)*TNOH 
CALL S O R T ( 6 , A T R I B , IA (LOC ( 3 9 ) ) ,KAOR, LTOP, 0 2 , 0 3 ) 
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I F ( N T R A C E . G T . O ) 60 TO 5 5 0 7 
IF(TRACEO) W R I T E ( 6 . 9 ) TNCW,KD, KA OR, NOWPAS 
9 FORHAT(* AT T I M E * , F 1 0 . 2 , * A C T I V I T Y * , 1 7 , * (AT L I S T LOCATION*, 
* 1 7 , * ) COMPLETED ON R U N * , 1 7 ) 
C 
5 5 0 7 I F ( N N . E Q . 2 3 ) G 0 TO 5 5 2 0 
I F ( N N , L T . 5 2 > RETURN 
A T R I B ( I A D R , < » ) = I O + . 0 0 1 
RETURN 
C 
C JUVENILE I S TRIED AS AN ADULT 
5 5 2 0 6 = R A N 0 ( J S E E D ) 
B A R = A J A I L ( I C R I M E ) 
I F ( B . L E . B A R ) G O TO 5 5 2 1 
C JUVENILE I S NOT DETAINED BEFORE TRIAL AS AN ADULT 
A T R I B ( I A D R , 4 ) = - 9 9 9 9 , 
RETURN 
C 
C JUVENILE I S DETAINED AS AN ADULT 
5 5 2 1 ATRI8( IADR,4)=TN0W 
IX = 2 2 
CALL R E L E A S ( I D , I X , T R A C E D , I A ( L 0 C ( 1 ) ) , I A ( L O C ( 3 ) ) , I A ( L 0 C ( 5 ) ) , 
* I A ( L 0 C ( 6 ) ) , I A ( L 0 C ( 9 M , I A ( L O C ( l * > ) ) , I A ( L 0 C ( 2 9 ) ) , I A ( L O C ( 3 0 ) ) , 
* I A ( L O C ( 3 2 > ) , I A ( L 0 C ( 3 4 > ) , T N 0 W , N 0 H P A S , I P , I A ( L 0 C ( 2 ) > , 




C DETERMINE I F JUVENILE OFFENDER RECIDIVATES 
C I D * 5 2 
5 6 0 0 I R E L = 3 
I F 0 L = 1 9 
NN = 7 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
C I D = 5 3 
5 6 0 1 I P R E = A T R I B ( I A D R , « » ) t l l 
I F 0 L * 1 9 
NN=18 
GO TO ( 5 6 0 5 * 5 6 0 2 , 5 6 0 4 , 5 6 0 3 1 , I P R E 
5 6 0 2 I R E L = 1 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 0 3 I R E L = 2 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 0 4 I R E L = 4 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 0 5 I R E L = 5 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
C 
C DETERMINE I F ADULT OFFENOER RECIDIVATES 
C 1 0 = 5 6 
5 6 1 0 I P R E = A T R I B ( I A 0 R , 4 ) 
I F U P R E - 4 2 ) 5 6 1 3 , 5 6 1 2 , 5 6 1 1 
5 6 1 1 NN=*>6 
I F 0 L = 4 7 
XREL*% 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 1 2 I F 0 L = * 7 
I R E L = 1 
NN=36 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 1 3 I R E L = 5 
NN=*6 
I F O L = * 7 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
J 1 0 = 5 * 
5 6 1 * I F 0 L = * 8 
I R E L = 3 
NN=27 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
) 1 0 = 5 7 
5 6 1 5 I F 0 L = * 8 
I P R E = A T R I B ( I A D R . * > 
I F ( I P R E . N E , 2 6 . A N 0 . I P R E , N E , 5 1 ) 6 0 TO 5 6 1 6 
NN=3* 
I R E L = 5 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 1 6 NN=35 
I F U P R E - * * ) 5 6 1 6 , 5 6 1 7 , 5 6 1 9 
5 6 1 7 I R E L = 1 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 1 6 I R E L = 2 
GO TO 5 6 2 0 
5 6 1 9 I R E L = 3 
DETERMINE I F OFFENOER RECIDIVATES 
5 6 2 0 B=RAND(JSEED) 
I A G E * A G E / 5 , - 2 , 
I F ( I A G E . L E . 0 ) I A G E = 1 
I F ( I A G E . G E . 7 ) I A G E = I A G E - 1 
I F ( I A G E . G E , 6 ) I A G E = 7 
LEFEM^FSEX(IADR) 
I S E X = L E F E M * 1 
C * R E C I O ( 0 , I A G E , I S E X ) 
I F ( B . G T . C ) R E T U R N 
N O F S = A T R I B ( I A D R , 6 ) + . 0 5 
NDFS=MOD(NOFS,100) 
I B = N P ( 2 3 ) 
1 F ( N 0 F S . G E , I U 0 A T A ( I B ) ) RETURN 
NN=IF0L 
A T R I B ( I A 0 R , * ) = R E C I 0 ( 1 . I A G E , I R £ L > 
RETURN 
THE PROSECUTOR EFFECTS THE FLOW OF OFFENOERS THRU THE COURTS 
BOXES 2 3 , 3 0 , 3 2 
5 7 0 0 CALL L O C F ( I O , l , L O C P , L O C P P > 
I C = 0 
J = I P A R C ( I 0 ) - 1 
DO 5 7 0 1 I sLOCP,LOCPP 
I B * I C + 1 
PI( IB)"UOATA(J+NCRXHE*XC*XCRXNE> 
2 7 1 
5 7 1 1 I C = I C * 1 
I F ( T N 0 W , L T . T I N I T L * 3 6 I . ) GO TO 5 7 0 6 
C 
C LEVEL OF PROSECUTOR'S RESOURCES EFFECTS HIS DECISIONS 
PROBHlsRR 
PR0BM2=RR 
I F ( M E R E S . E Q . l ) P R 0 B M 2 * 1 . 
I F ( M E R E S * E Q * 2 ) P R 0 B M 1 = 1 , 
C 
C THE SIZE OF THE PREpTRIAL DELAY EFFECTS THE PROSECUTOR'S DECISIONS 
I F ( H E Q U E . L E . O ) GO TO 570A> 
SWAIT = NWAIT(37)<-NWAIT(39) 
5 7 0 2 I F ( S W A I T . L E . O * > GO TO 570% 
57Q3 I F ( M E Q U E . N E . 2 ) PR0BM1=PR0BH1*SINITQ/SWAIT 
IF(MEQUE*GE*2) PROBM2=PR0BM2*SWAIT/SINITQ 
C 
C THE SEVERITY OF THE CURRENT OFFENSE EFFECTS THE PROSECUTOR'S DECISH 
570% I F ( M E S E V . L E . O ) GO TO 5 7 0 5 
C S R = S E V E R E ( I C R I N E ) / A C S 
I F ( M E S E V . N E * 2 ) PR0BM1=PR0BM1*CSR 
I F ( M E S E V . G E * 2 ) PR0BM2=PR0BM2»CSR 
C 
C THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY EFFECTS THE PROSECUTOR'S DECISIONS 
5 7 0 5 I F ( M E H I S . L E . O ) GO TO 5 7 0 6 
C 0 N = A H O D < A T R I B U A O R * 6 ) , 1 0 0 . ) 
CHM=C0N/AN0(ICRIME) 
I F ( M E H I S . N E . 2 ) PROBM1=PR08M1»CHM 
I F ( M E H I S * G E * 2 ) PR08M2=PROBH2*CHM 
C 
5 7 0 6 I F ( I D * 3 0 ) 5 7 1 0 * 5 7 2 0 , 5 7 3 0 
C 
C AOJUST PROSECUTOR'S P R O B A B I L I T I E S AT BOX 2 3 
5 7 1 0 P I ( 2 ) « P I ( 2 ) » P R 0 B M 1 
P I < 2 ) = A M I N 1 ( P I < 2 > , 1 . 0 ) 
B=RANO(JSEEO) 
I F C B . G T . P I ( 2 ) ) G O TO 5 7 1 1 
NN=28 
RETURN 
5 7 1 1 DP=1*»PI (2 ) 
D P A = P I ( 1 > / ( P I ( 1 ) + P I ( 3 ) ) 
P I ( 1 ) = D P * 0 P A * P I ( 2 ) 
NN=25 
I F ( B . L E . P I ( 1 ) ) GO TO 57%0 
NN=5% 
GO TO 5 5 0 0 
C 
C ADJUST PROSECUTOR'S DECISION P R O B A B I L I T I E S AT BOX 30 
5 7 2 0 P I ( 2 ) = P I ( 2 ) » P R 0 8 M 1 
P I ( 2 > = A M I N 1 ( P I < 2 ) , 1 . 0 ) 
N N S 3 2 
B=RAND(JSEEO) 
I F ( B . G T . P I ( 2 ) ) N N * 3 1 
RETURN 
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C ADJUST PROSECUTOR'S DECISION P R O B A B I L I T I E S AT BOX 3 2 
5 7 3 0 P I ( 2 ) = P I ( 2 ) » P R O B M 2 
P I ( 2 ) * A M I N 1 ( P I ( 2 ) , 1 . 0 ) 
NN=39 
B-RAND(JSEEO) 
I F ( B . G T . P I < 2 ) ) N N = 3 7 
C 
C OETERHINE WHETHER OR NOT DETAINED OFFENDER I S S T I L L IN J A I L DURING 
C A TRIAL AT ANY OF BOXES 2 5 . 3 7 , 3 9 
5 7 4 0 I T = A T R I B ( I A O R , 4 > + . 0 5 
I F ( I T . L T . O ) RETURN 
B=RAND(JSEED) 
I F ( B . L E . C J A I L ( I C R I H E ) ) RETURN 
AT R I B ( I A O R , 4 ) = - 9 9 9 9 . 
KADR=LTOP 
KD=22 
GO TO 5 5 0 3 
C 
C # # # # # f f f f f f f # # # # f f f i f f f f i f f f f f f t # # f f f f i i i f i f i f f f f f f f O f f i f f f i f f • # 
C ILLEGAL CALL TO USERC SUBROUTINE 
C f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f i f f f f 
C 
0000 H E S 1 S 1 O H I L L E G A L CA 
MES2=10HLL TO USER 
MES3=10HCI BOX NU 
MES4=10HMBER ERROR 
CALL E R R S I M ( I D , - N , S U B N , M E S 1 , N E S 2 , M E S 3 , M E S 4 ) , RETURNS 1 9 0 0 0 , 9 0 0 2 ) 
8 0 0 1 ITO=5 
MES1 = 1 OHILLEGAL CA 
MES2=18HLL TO USER 
MES3=10HC 
MES4=10H 
CALL E R R S I M ( 0 , N , S U B N , H E S 1 , H E S 2 , H E S 3 , M E S 4 ) , R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 0 , 9 0 0 2 ) 
8 0 0 2 ITO=5 
MES1=1OHRELEASE OF 
MES2=10H J U V E N I L E 
M £ S 3 = 1 0 H J A I L E O AS 
HES4-10HADULT 
CALL E R R S I M ( 0 , I D , S U B N , H E S 1 , N E S 2 , M E S 3 , N E S 4 ) . R E T U R N S ( 9 0 0 2 , 9 0 0 2 ) 
C 
9000 RETURN 
9 0 0 1 RETURN NQXI 
9 0 0 2 RETURN HXYZ 
END 
2 7 3 
c 
SUBROUTINE U S E R O ( 0 1 * 0 2 , 0 3 , 0 % , 0 5 , 0 6 , 0 7 , 0 8 , 0 9 , N R E S , L O C R E S . I F R E Q , 
• A T R I B , I A T R I B , T S ) 
C 
C PURPOSE I TO OUTPUT S P E C I A L USER VARIABLES ANO REPORTS 




• M B E G I N , A C S , P R G , M E Q U E , M E R E S , M E S E V , M E H I S , H I S , M O N T H S , I Y E A R S , 
* O C C C M I C C C , SCCC, SNOFS, ICOF, TSTOP , T I N I T L , IERROR, ANO,TRACEF, 
• A N 0 F S ( 4 , 7 ) , N 0 ( 4 , 7 ) , R S U H ( 1 0 ) , R S Q ( 1 0 ) , R N A X ( 1 0 ) , R N U M , R T I N E , S A G E 
• , R G R O W ( 1 0 ) , S I N I T Q 
COMHON/BASE/ARRAY(56000) .UOATA(3000) 
C 0 M M 0 N / G L 0 B A L / C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , F S H 0 T , X R , I P , I G O , I F R O M , I T S 1 , I F R 1 , I A V A I L , 
• IORUN, I T O , I R A T E , I S T U P , I P R T Y , I S P S E G , I F U L L , I S P 1 , I S P O , I S P 9 , 
• I S P 1 0 , I S P 1 1 , I S P 1 2 , I S P 1 5 , I S > P 2 1 , I P I , I P 2 , I P 3 , I P 4 , I P 5 , I P 6 , 
• I P 7 , I P 8 , I P 9 , I P 1 0 , I P 1 1 . I S E E 0 . I T 0 P . I P 1 5 F . I P 1 5 , I P 1 6 , I P 1 7 , 
• I P 1 8 , I P 1 9 , I P 2 0 , I P 2 1 , I P 2 2 , I P 2 3 , IP2A>, J H A L F , K , L 0 C R 2 , 
•MAXAR, MAXUO, MAXIA, MAXIO, MHST,M£NTRY. MRES* M B 0 X , M R E S 1 , 
•MNRES, MOELET, MHORK, NV, MCELL, NQBOX.NFVAR,NST. 
• N E R R , NOWPAS, NPASS, NBOX, NGRP, NETRL, NTRACE, NCALL, N S I N K , 
• N Q B 1 , NQB2, NSOUR, NOBOX, NRBOX, N A T R I B , N C E L L . T C A L L . U T I M E . 
• I S W 1 , I S H 2 , I S H 3 , ISW4, I S M 5 , V A R 1 , V A R 2 , V A R 3 , VAR*.. V A R 5 . L I N E , 
• N R A T E , I H R I T E , I P A S S . KSUM. LTOP, TNOH, T L A S T , 
•NOOMP, CONT, COST, ENO, NXTMOO.QUE. R E S C , RESCHG, S E P R T , 
• S T O E P , TMCOST.UIN. UOUT, UFORM, STCHG,NOPREM, L U 1 , L U 2 , L U 3 . L U 4 , 
• L U 5 , L U 6 , L U 7 , L U 8 , L U 9 , L U 1 0 , L L A G , LLSEGM, LORS 
C 
LOGICAL L U 1 . L U 2 , L U 3 , L U 4 , L U 5 , L U 6 , L U 7 , L U 8 , L U 9 , L U 1 0 , L L A G , 
• L L S E G M , LORS 
LOGICAL CONT, COST, ENO, NXTMOO.QUE. R E S C , RESCHG, S E P R T , 
• S T O E P , TMCOST.UIN. UOUT, UFORM, STCHG,NOPREM, NOOMP 
C 
INTEGER 0 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 , 0 4 , 0 5 , 0 6 , 0 7 , 0 0 , 0 9 . S U B N 
INTEGER N E H ( 1 2 ) , N H I S T ( 5 , 1 2 ) , C R I M E ( 7 ) . S I N K S ( 6 ) 
INTEGER N R E S ( D 1 . 0 4 > . I F R E Q ( D 8 , D 9 ) . LOCRES ( 0 4 . 0 5 ) . I A T R I B ( 0 2 . 0 3 ) . 
• I A ( 5 6 0 0 0 ) , I U O A T A ( 3 0 0 0 ) , L O C ( I O O ) . N P ( I O O ) . N E X ( 1 5 ) 
C 
REAL A T R I B ( 0 2 , 0 3 ) . T S ( 0 6 , D 7 ) , A ( 5 8 0 0 0 ) 
REAL H M I N ( 1 2 ) . H I N C ( 1 2 ) . A N O ( 7 ) , I C O F ( 4 ) , S C C C ( 4 ) , S N O F S ( % ) , S A G E ( 4 ) 
LOGICAL OUMP, TRACEF 
C 
EQUIVALENCE ( I A ( 1 ) . A ( l ) , ARRAY ( 1 ) , L O C ( D ) , 
• (UOATA ( 1 ) . I U O A T A ( l ) . N P ( D ) 
C 
OATA SUBN/OHUSERO / 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I . l ) . 1 = 1 . 4 ) /10HOFFENDER C,1OHATEGORIES , 
• 1 0 H ( 1 = M A L E . 2 . 1 0 H = F E M A L E ) / 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I . 2 ) . 1 = 1 . 2 ) /10HOFFENOER 0,1OHEATH AGE / 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I . 3 ) . 1 = 1 , 2 ) / 1 0 H O F F E N S E S C,10HOMMITTEO / 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I , 4 ) , I * 1 , 4 > /lOHNUMBER OF ,1OHOFFENSES P , 
• 10HER OFFENDE, 1HR / 
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OATA < N H I S T ( I , 5 ) , 1 = 1 , 3 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I , 6 ) , 1 = 1 , 3 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I , 7 ) , 1 = 1 , 4 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I , 8 ) , 1 = 1 , 5 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I , 9 ) , 1 = 1 , 5 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T d , 1 0 ) , 1 = 1 , 4 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T ( I . l l ) , 1 = 1 . 3 ) 
OATA ( N H I S T C I . 1 2 ) . 1 = 1 . 3 ) 
OATA NEH / 4 , 2 , 2 , 4 , 3 , 
OATA HMIN / l . . 5 , , 1 « , 1 
OATA HZNC / 1 . . 5 . . 1 . . 1 . . 1 
OATA S I N K S / 3 , 7 , 1 6 * 2 7 
OATA N E X / 4 , 5 , 1 , 2 , 1 4 , 6 , 9 , 
/ lOHSINK BOX R . 
IHS / 
/ lOHCAREER C R I . 
10H ( / I C C C ) / 
/ 1 0 H T I M E S E R I E . 
10HR CRIMINAL, 
/10HTZHE S E R I E , 
10HR OF OFFEN, 
10HFENOER / 
/ 1 0 H T I M E S E R I E , 
10HER C O S T ) / ( , 
10HOFFENSESI / 
/ 1 0 H T I M E S E R I E , 
10HGE AGE OF , 
/ 1 0 H I N I T I A L AG, 
10HOER / 
/ 1 0 H F X N A L AGE , 
10HR / 
3 , 4 , 5 , 5 , 4 , 
1 0 H E A L I Z A T I O N , 
10HNINAL COST, 
1 0 H S OF CAREE, 
10H COST / 
1 0 H S OF NUMBE, 
1 0 H S E S PER OF, 
1 0 H S OF (CARE, 
10HNUMBER OF , 
1 0 H S OF AVERA, 
10HOFFENOER / 
10HE OF OFFEN, 
10HOF OFFENOE, 
3 , 3 / 
5 . / 
. , 1 . , 1 8 0 . , 1 8 0 . , 1 8 0 . , 1 8 0 . , 5 . , 5 , / 
, 3 4 , 3 5 , 3 6 , 4 6 / 
1 0 , 1 1 , 7 , 1 3 , 3 , 1 5 , 6 , 1 6 / 
»####### f i f f fff Of f f f f f f f f f I f f f f f f f f Off f f f f f f ####### f f f f f f f f f fff M M 
BEGINNING OF RUNI REPORT C J S PARAMETERS 
I F ( T N O M . G E . 3 0 . ) G 0 TO 60 
IAOULT=ADULT 
P R R = P R G * 1 0 0 . 
ICCC=DCCC 
IF(OUMP) M R I T E ( 6 , 1 0 ) 
.0 FORMAT ( 1 H 1 ) 
W R I T E ( 6 , 1 ) N C R I M E , N C H A R G , N D I S P , N S D I S P , N O C , I A D U L T , 
• I C C C , M I C C C , A C S , T S T O P , M B E G I N , P R R , N P ( N P N ) 
1 F O R M A T ( 1 H 0 , 3 5 X , ' C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E MODEL INPUT D A T A * / 1 H 0 / 
* * NUMBER OF C R I M E S ! * , 1 5 / 
• • NUMBER OF CONVICTION L A B E L S ! * , 1 5 / 
• NUMBER OF COURT DISPOSITIONS S * , 1 5 / 
• NUMBER OF DISPOSITIONS REQUIRING C J S M O N I T O R I N G ! * , 1 5 / 
• NUMBER OF OFFENOER C A T E G O R I E S ! * , 1 5 / 
• MINIMUM AGE OF A D U L T S ! ' , 1 5 / 
• OIVISOR FOR CAREER CRIMINAL C O S T l * . I 8 / 
• MAX, NUMBER OF HISTOGRAM BARS FOR CAREER CRIMINAL C O S T S * , 
1 5 / 
• AVERAGE CRIME SEVERITY VALUE I * , F 1 0 . 2 / 
• NUMBER OF YEARS S I M U L A T E D ! * , F O . 2 / 
• MONTH PROSECUTOR"S RESOURCES ANO/OR INFORMATION*, 
• ARE C H A N G E D ! * , 1 5 / 
• PERCENT CHANGE I N THE PROSECUTOR'S R E S O U R C E S ! » , F 7 . 2 / 
• ACTUAL S I Z E OF USER A R R A Y ! * , 1 6 ) 
2 7 5 
I F C T I N I T L . G T . Q . ) W R I T E ( 6 , 6 ) T I N I T L 
6 FORMAT(• YEAR TO BEGIN COLLECTING C J S S T A T I S T I C S ! * , F 6 . 2 ) 
M R I T E ( 6 , 2 6 ) ( R G R O M ( I G ) , I G * 1 , N R E S > 
2 6 FORMAT(• RESOURCE LEVEL MONTHLY GROWTH R A T E S » » , 1 0 F 1 0 . 3 / / > 
INFO=MESEV+MEHIS 
IPLEA*INFO+HEQUE+HERES 
I F ( I P L E A . L E . O ) GO TO 30 
I F ( I N F O . L E . O ) GO TO A>0 
M R I T E ( 6 , 3 ) HIS 
3 FORMAT(* COST PER OFFENDER OF CAREER CRIMINAL INFORMATION! S * , I 5 ) 
I F C M E S E V . G T . 0 ) W R I T E ( 6 , 1 1 ) 
1 1 FORMAT(» CRIME SEVERITY EFFECTS PROSECUTOR'S DECISIONS*) 
I F ( M E H I S , G T , 0 ) W R I T E ( 6 , 1 2 ) 
1 2 FORMAT(* OFFENDER'S PREVIOUS CRIMINAL RECORD E F F E C T S * . 
* » PROSECUTOR'S D E C I S I O N S * ) 
I F ( M E H I S . G T . O ) W R I T E ( 6 , 1 6 ) ( I , A N O ( I > , 1 = 1 , N C R I M E > 
1 6 FORMAT(1OXt*AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES OF A L L * . 
* * OFFENDERS WHO COMMIT CRIME*, 1 3 , * . I S * , F 6 . 2 ) 
*>0 IF(MEQUE.GT.O) W R I T E ( 6 , 1 3 ) 
1 3 FORMAT (* LENGTH OF P R E - T R I A L DELAY EFFECTS PROSECUTOR'S*, 
* » OECISIONS*) 
IF (HEQUE.GT.O) W R I T E ( 6 , 2 9 ) S INITQ 
2 9 FORMAT(* BASE VALUE OF SUPERIOR COURT P R E - T R I A L Q U E U E ! * , F 5 # 0) 
IF (MERES #GT, 0) W R I T E ( 6 , 1 % ) 
1*> FORMAT (* LEVEL OF PROSECUTOR'S RESOURCES EFFECTS H I S * , 
* • DECISIONS*) 
C 
30 IF(OUMP) GO TO 50 
W R I T E ( 6 , 1 5 ) 
1 5 F O R M A T ( 1 H 1 , 3 5 X , * G N S MODEL INPUT PARAMETERS*) 
GO TO 1 0 0 0 
C 
C * f fffffffffffffff f f f f f f f f ### Off fff Off fff ffff f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f # 
C BEGINNING OF RUN! OUMP USER ARRAYS 
C f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 
c 
50 W R I T E ( 6 , 5 ) 
5 F O R M A T ( 1 H 1 , 3 5 X , 
* * J H E FOLLOWING I S A OUMP OF USER-SUPPLIED DATA! • ) 
HRXTE<6,%)NP(NPN),MAXU0 
*» F O R M A T ( / 1 H 0 , 2 5 X , * S I Z E REQUIRED FOR USER A R R A Y ! * , 1 6 , 
* * S I Z E A L L O C A T E O ! * , I 6 / 1 H O ) 
N P N 1 = 1 
GO TO 7 5 
C 
60 W R I T E ( 6 , 9 ) 
9 F O R M A T ( 1 H 1 , 5 5 X , * USER HISTOGRAMS*) 
N P N 1 S 2 0 
C 
7 5 NPNFsNPN-1 
00 90 I=MPN1,NPMF 
J « I * 1 
L * J 
I F ( I . L E , 1 5 ) L " N £ X ( I ) 
K * N P < L ) » N P U ) 
2 7 6 
WRITE(6 .2) J . I . K 
2 FORMAT(1H0/25X** PARTITION * * I 2 » * BEGINNING AT N P ( * , I 2 , 
• • ) CONTAINS** I*>** ELEMENTS*/ ) 
I F = N P ( I > 
I T = N P ( L > - 1 
I F ( I . L T . 3 ) G O TO 60 
I F ( I . G E . 2 0 . A N D . I . L E . 2 5 ) G O TO ftO 
I F ( I * G E « 3 6 ) GO TO 60 
I F ( I . E Q * 1 3 ) I T = N P ( L ) ~ 2 
W R I T E ( 6 , 1 8 ) ( U D A T A ( J ) , J = I F , I T ) 
1 8 F O R M A T ( 5 X . 1 0 F 1 0 * 3 ) 
I F ( I * N E * 1 3 ) G 0 TO 90 
I F = N P ( L ) - 1 
I T = I F 
80 W R I T E ( 6 . 1 9 ) ( I U D A T A ( J ) . J = I F . I T ) 
1 9 FORMAT ( 5 X * 1 0 U 0 ) 
90 CONTINUE 
C 
I F ( T N O W , G E . 3 0 . ) GO TO 1 0 0 
W R I T E(6 . 1 5 ) 
GO TO 1 0 0 0 
C 
C f f # # # f f f f f f # # f # f f # f # # f # f # f i f # # # # # # f f f f # # # # # # # f f f f f f f f f * f f f f f § § § 9 9 f f f f f f § § § § 
C COMPLETION OF RUNI OUTPUT GRAPHS OF USER S T A T I S T I C S 
C ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff*fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
c 
1 0 0 00 1 1 0 I C R I M E s l . N C R I M E 
00 1 1 0 I B = l . N O C 




DO 200 I = N P N 1 . N P N F 
K = I * 1 
J = I f j l 9 
C 
I F ( I . L E . 2 5 ) GO TO 1 3 0 
X F d . G E . 3 0 ) GO TO 1 3 0 
C 
C PRINT TIME S E R I E S 
I F ( T I N I T L . L E . O . ) GO TO 1 2 0 
M O N = 1 2 . * T I N I T L + 6 . 0 5 
HMIN(J)=MON*30 
1 2 0 00 1 2 5 I B = l , N O C 
I A O R = ( I B - l ) * I Y E A R S + N P ( I ) 
CALL T O U T ( l * l * I V E A R S * U O A T A ( I A O R ) * 6 » H M I N ( J ) , H I N C ( J ) ) 
NEHSTOP=NEH(J) 
WRITE(6*8) K * ( N H X S T ( L « J ) * L « l * f l E H S T O P ) 
1 2 5 W R I T E ( 6 * 2 7 ) I B 
2 7 FORMAT(52X**OFFENOER CATEGORY**12) 
GO TO 2 0 0 
C 
C COMPUTE FREQUENCIES 
1 3 0 NQUIT=NOC 
I F C K . C Q . 2 1 ) MQUIT*1 
N 1 * N P ( I ) 4 1 
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N 2 = N 1 * I U D A T A ( N P ( I ) ) * 1 
00 1 9 0 I B = 1 , N Q U I T 
NSAMPLE=0 
00 1 3 1 L = N 1 , N 2 
1 3 1 NSAMPLE=NSAMPLE*IUDATA(L) 
I F ( M S A M P L E . L E . O ) GO TO 1 8 0 
00 1 3 2 L = M 1 . N 2 
1 3 2 I U D A T A ( L ) = 1 0 0 . » I U D A T A ( L ) / N S A M P L E 
C 
C PRINT HISTOGRAMS OF S T A T I S T I C S 
CALL H I S 0 U T ( 1 , 1 , I U D A T A ( N P ( I ) ) , I U D A T A ( N 1 ) , H M I N ( J ) , H I N C ( J ) , 6 ) 
NEHSTOP=NEH(J) 
WRITE(6 . 8 ) K , ( N H I S T ( L , J ) . L = 1 , N E H S T 0 P ) 
6 FORMAT ( 1 H 0 , 4 5 X . I 3 . * « * , 5 A 1 0 > 
W R I T E ( 6 , 2 7 ) I B 
H R I T E ( 6 . 7 ) NSAMPLE 
7 FORMAT(1H0*51X**SAMPLE S I Z E * • , I 1 0 / 1 H 0 ) 
I F ( J . E Q . 3 ) W R I T E ( 6 , 2 0 ) ( I C R , C R I M E ( I C R ) , I C R = 1 , N C R I M E ) 
20 F 0 R N A T ( 5 5 X . » C R I M E * . 1 2 . * * * . A 1 0 ) 
I F C J . E Q . 4 ) WRITE ( 6 . 2 3 ) (CRIME ( ICR ),ANOFS ( I B , I C R ) , N O ( I B , I C R ) , 
• I C R = 1 . N C R I M E ) 
2 3 FORMAT ( 3 5 X , ' A V E . NUMBER OF OFFENSES WHEN LAST CRIME I S * . A 1 0 . 
• * - * . F 8 . 2 » * N = • . 1 1 0 ) 
I F ( J . E Q . 5 ) W R I T E ( 6 , 2 1 ) ( I S N , S I N K S ( I S N ) , I S N = 1 , 8 > 
2 1 F O R M A T ( 5 1 X . * S I N K * , 1 2 , • * NOOE • • 1 3 ) 
ICCC=DCCC 
I F ( J . E Q . 6 ) W R I T E ( 6 . 2 2 ) ICCC 
2 2 FORMAT(1H8 ,58X»*ICCC * • • 1 1 0 ) 
1 8 8 N 1 = N 2 * 1 




C PRINT RESOURCE USAGE OURING BASE YEAR 
M=RNUM 
R T I M E = R T I N E Z 3 6 0 . 
W R I T E ( 6 . 2 4 ) T I N I T L . R T I H E 
2 4 F O R M A T ( 1 H 1 , 3 4 X . • R E S O U R C E USAGE BETWEEN YEARS * . F 9 . 2 » * ANO • • 
• F 9 . 2 / / / 3 5 X , ' R E S O U R C E * , 8 X , » H E A N » , 4 X , » S T A N D A R 0 » , 5 X , » M A X I M U M » , 
• 2 X , » 9 5 PERCENT*/37X»*NUMBER*»7X»*VALUE*»3X»*DEVIATION*»7X» 
• * V A L U E * . 2 X . * C 0 N S T R A I N T * ) 
DO 3 0 0 I K = 1 , M R E S 
CALL C A L S T ( R 8 A R , R S T . I K . H . R S U M . R S Q ) 
C 0 N S T R = R B A R * 1 . 9 6 * R S T 
308 W R I T E ( 6 . 2 5 ) I K . R B A R . R S T . R M A X ( I K ) . C O N S T R 
2 5 F O R M A T ( 1 H D , 3 2 X , 1 1 0 , 4 F 1 2 . 2 ) 
W R I T E ( 6 , 2 6 ) M 
2 6 FORMAT(1H0 ,34X,*THE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS (MONTHS) I S * , 1 5 ) 
C 
W R I T E ( 6 , 1 7 ) 
1 7 FORMAT(1H1) 
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